The Federalist Papers
"5. Because, from the contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, in the numbers of the Federalist, (which is cited only because the Supreme Court has recognised its authority,) it is clear..."
- Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, Dec. 19th, 1828 protest of the Legislature of that State, [Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1873 TUESDAY, February 10, 1829.]
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"....I have delivered to Mr. Madison to be forwarded to you a sett of the papers
under the signature of Publius,(4) neatly enough bound, to be honored with a
place in your library. I presume you have understood that the writers of these
Papers are chiefly Mr. Madison & myself with some aid from Mr. Jay. I take it
for granted, Sir, you have concluded to comply with what will no doubt be the
general call of your country in relation to the new government. You will permit
me to say that it is indispensable you should lend yourself to its first
operations. It is to little purpose to have introduced a system, if the
weightiest influence is not given to its firm establishment, in the outset.
I remain with the greatest esteem, Dr Sir, Yr. Obed & hum servant,
A Hamilton"
(4) That is, the Federalist, which had been published in two volumes March 22
and May 28, 1788.
- Alexander Hamilton, Letter to George Washington, Aug. 13, 1788
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The Constitutional Convention of 1787 had originally convened to 'hammer out' changes that appeared necessary to the Articles of Confederation. This was being done to correct perceived flaws in the Confederation government. The inadequacy of the Confederation had become evident. And, as there were numerous contentions between the states. It was making the possiblity of civil war(s) eminent. The idea of more war, after having just been through a long and bloody struggle with the British throne. Was the last thing any of the founders desired. Instead of attempting to correct the obvious flaws in the Articles, there arose a movement to change the whole form of government.
The Constitutional Convention met a number of times during 1787. Many of the deliberations were kept secret because they were exceeding the convention's mandate and existing law. Nevertheless, the meetings and deliberations continued. It seemed prudent to announce to the people the intent of starting a whole new form of government. The Federalist Papers were the means used by the Framers, of the Constitution, to 'sell' the idea of the newly devised Federal Government to the People. The main authors were Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison who published the papers using the pseudonym "Publius".
There arose contentions and concern about the proposed new system of government and it's 'Constitution'. A group of dissenting Founders soon formed, and began publishing articles of rebuttal to the ideas published in The Federalist Papers. Their work became known as The Anti-Federalist Papers. The mention of The Anti-Federalist is important, in that the ideas presented in that work caused the introduction of our Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was itself heatedly contended.
In consideration of the intent behind publishing The Federalist Papers. Which was to promote the idea of a Constitutional Republican form of government to The People. It can reasonably be asserted that The Federalist are THE best method to be used in determining the INTENTIONS of the Framers of Our Constitution.
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"The USURPATIONS of the legislature might be so FLAGRANT and so SUDDEN, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of a PECULIAR FAVORITE of THE PEOPLE. In such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the TRUE MERITS of the question. It would INEVITABLY be CONNECTED with the SPIRIT of PRE-EXISTING PARTIES, or OF PARTIES SPRINGING OUT OF THE QUESTION ITSELF. It would be CONNECTED with PERSONS of distinguished character and EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE IN THE COMMUNITY. It would be PRONOUNCED by the VERY MEN who had been AGENTS in, or OPPPONENTS of, the MEASURES to which the DECISION would RELATE. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the REASON, ALONE, OF THE PUBLIC, THAT OUGHT TO CONTROL AND REGULATE THE GOVERNMENT. The PASSIONS ought to be CONTROLLED and REGULATED by the government."
- James Madison, Federalist #49.
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"An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others."
- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 195, (As quoted by - James Madison, Federalist #48)
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"These gentlemen MUST HERE BE REMINDED OF THEIR ERROR. THEY MUST BE TOLD THAT THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY, wherever the derivative may be found, RESIDES IN THE PEOPLE ALONE, and that it will NOT DEPEND merely on the comparative AMBITION or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the EXPENSE of the other."
- James Madison, Federalist #46
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"When the transient circumstances and fugitive performances which attended this crisis
shall have disappeared, that work, (The Federalist Papers), will merit the notice of
posterity, because in it are candidly and ably discussed the principles of freedom and
the topics of government--which will be always interesting to mankind so long as they
shall be connected in civil society."
- George Washington, letter to Alexander Hamilton, August 28, 1788.
[The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799.
John C. Fitzpatrick, Editor].
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"In the course of the argument, The Federalist has been quoted ; and the opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their merit ; but in applying their opinions to the cases which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their correctness must be retained ; and, to understand the argument, we must examine the proposition it maintains, and the objections against which it is directed."
- U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND, [4 Wheaton 316.] 1819.
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"The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great authority. It is a complete commentary on our Constitution; and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank; and the part two of its authors performed in framing the constitution, put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed..."
- Chief Justice John Marshall, U.S. Supreme Court, Cohens v. Virginia (1821).
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"The Federalist is regarded as the highest contemporary authority on the construction of the Constitution; and in the sixty-fourth number the functions of the Senate "sitting in their judicial capacity as a court for the trial of impeachments" are examined."
- Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. [Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, WEDNESDAY, March 4, 1868.]
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U.S. Supreme Court cases that reference the Federalist Papers
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The Federalist Papers Index:
No. 01 - Introduction
No. 02 - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
No. 03 - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued).
No. 04 - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued).
No. 05 - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued).
No. 06 - Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
No. 07 - Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (continued).
No. 08 - Consequences of Hostilities Between the States.
No. 09 - The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard;
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
No. 10 - The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard;
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued).
N0. 11 - The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a
Navy.
No. 12 - The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
No. 13 - Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
No. 14 - Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Answered.
No. 15 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
No. 16 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued).
No. 17 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued).
No. 18 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued).
No. 19 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued).
No. 20 - Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued).
No. 21 - Other Defects of the Present Confederation.
N0. 22 - Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued).
No. 23 - Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the
Preservation of the Union.
No. 24 - Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered.
No. 25 - Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
(continued).
No. 26 - Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered.
No. 27 - Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered (continued).
No. 28 - Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered (continued).
No. 29 - Concerning the Militia.
No. 30 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation.
No. 31 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 32 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 33 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 34 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 35 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 36 - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued).
No. 37 - Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of
Government.
No. 38 - The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the
New Plan Exposed.
No. 39 - Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles.
No. 40 - On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government
Examined and Sustained.
No. 41 - General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution.
No. 42 - The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered.
N0. 43 - The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
(continued).
No. 44 - Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States.
No. 45 - Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments
Considered.
No. 46 - The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared.
No. 47 - The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of
Power Among Its Different Parts.
No. 48 - These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
No. 49 - Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department
of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
No. 50 - Periodical Appeals to the People Considered.
No. 51 - The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Balances Between the Different Departments.
No. 52 - The House of Representatives.
No. 53 - The House of Representatives (continued).
No. 54 - Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives Among the
States.
No. 55 - The Total Number of the House of Representatives.
No. 56 - The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued).
No. 57 - The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense
of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
No. 58 - Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Progress of Population Demands Considered.
No. 59 - Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members.
No. 60 - Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
(continued).
No. 61 - Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
(continued).
No. 62 - The Senate.
No. 63 - The Senate (continued).
No. 64 - The Powers of the Senate.
No. 65 - The Powers of the Senate (continued).
No. 66 - Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments
Further Considered.
No 67 - The Executive Department.
No. 68 - The Mode of Electing the President.
No. 69 - The Real Character of the Executive.
No. 70 - The Executive Department Further Considered.
No. 71 - The Duration in Office of the Executive.
No. 72 - The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive
Considered.
No. 73 - The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power.
No. 74 - The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power
of the Executive.
No. 75 - The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive.
No. 76 - The Appointing Power of the Executive.
No. 77 - The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
Considered.
No. 78 - The Judiciary Department.
No. 79 - The Judiciary Continued.
No. 80 - The Powers of the Judiciary.
No. 81 - The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
No. 82 - The Judiciary Continued.
No. 83 - The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury.
No. 84 - Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution
Considered and Answered.
No. 85 - Concluding Remarks.
"In denying the right [the Supreme Court usurps] of exclusively explaining the Constitution, I go further than [others] do, if I understand rightly [this] quotation from the Federalist of an opinion that 'the judiciary is the last resort in relation to the other departments of the government, but not in relation to the rights of the parties to the compact under which the judiciary is derived.' If this opinion be sound, then indeed is our Constitution a complete felo de se [act of suicide]. For intending to establish three departments, coordinate and independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone the right to prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to that one, too, which is unelected by and independent of the nation. For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is not even a scare-crow... The Constitution on this hypothesis is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please."
- Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, 1819. ME 15:212
Courtesy of The
Footnotes
(Reprinted in its entirety from The Federalist main page on Constitution.org)
The text of this version is primarily taken from the first collected 1788 "McLean edition", but spelling and punctuation have been modernized, and some glaring errors -- mainly printer's lapses -- have been corrected. The main heads have also been taken from that edition and a few later ones, except where the head was something like "The Same Subject Continued" we have repeated the previous heading and appended "(continued)", so that each document can better stand alone. We have been guided by the excellent edition by Jacob E. Cooke, Wesleyan University Press, 1961. The footnotes are those of the authors, except where the original edition used a variety of special typographical symbols for superscripts, we use numerals. Editors's footnotes are indicated by being preceded by the letter "E". The original typography used for emphasis, such as all caps or italics, has been used here. We have tried to identify the date of earliest appearance in a newspaper. The newspapers were theIndependent Journal [J], the New-York Packet [P], and the Daily Advertiser [A], all based in New York, shown preceding the date. Nos. 78-85 actually first appeared May 28, 1788, in a bound volume published by J. and A. McLean, Federalist II. We have followed the consensus of scholars on attribution of each paper to its primary author, James Madison [M], John Jay [J], or Alexander Hamilton [H], which is shown following the date. Please email comments or corrections to jon.roland@constitution.org.
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Also See:
By John C. Hamilton (John Church), (1792-1882) and Asher B. Durand, (1796-1886).
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1904
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"Commune hoc ignorantiae vitium est: quae nescias, nequicquam esse profiteri."
(A common thing with the ignorant, to despise what they do not understand).
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