The Spirit of Laws
by Charles de Montesquieu
PART II, BOOKS 16 - 31
Book XVI. How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Bear a Relation
to the Nature of the Climate
1. Of Domestic Servitude
2. That in the Countries of the South There Is a Natural Inequality
between the Two Sexes
3. That a Plurality of Wives Greatly Depends on the Means of Supporting
Them
4. That the Law of Polygamy Is an Affair That Depends on Calculation
5. The Reason of a Law of Malabar
6. Of Polygamy Considered in Itself
7. Of an Equality of Treatment in Case of Many Wives
8. Of the Separation of Women from Men
9. Of the Connection between Domestic and Political Government
10. The Principle on Which the Morals of the East Are Founded
11. Of Domestic Slavery Independently of Polygamy
12. Of Natural Modesty
13. Of Jealousy
14. Of the Eastern Manner of Domestic Government
15. Of Divorce and Repudiation
16. Of Repudiation and Divorce among the Romans
to the Nature of the Climate
1. Of Political Servitude
2. The Difference between Nations in Point of Courage
3. Of the Climate of Asia
4. The Consequences Resulting from This
5. That When the People in the North of Asia and Those of the North of
Europe Made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquests Were Not the Same
6. A new Physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia, and of the Liberty of
Europe
7. Of Africa and America
8. Of the Capital of the Empire
the Soil1. How the Nature of the Soil Has an Influence on the Laws
2. The Same Subject Continued
3. What Countries Are Best Cultivated
4. New Effects of the Fertility and Barrenness of Countries
5. Of the Inhabitants of Islands
6. Of Countries Raised by the Industry of Man
7. Of Human Industry
8. The General Relation of Laws
9. Of the Soil of America
10. Of Population in the Relation It Bears to the Manners of Procuring
Subsistence
11. Of Savage and Barbarous Nations
12. Of the Law of Nations among People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth
13. Of the Civil Laws of Those Nations Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth
14. Of the Political State of the People Who Do Not Cultivate the Land
15. Of People Who Know the Use of Money
16. Of Civil Laws among People Who Know Not the Use of Money
17. Of Political Laws among Nations Who Have Not the Use of Money
18. Of the Power of Superstition
19. Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars
20. Of the Law of Nations as Practised by the Tartars
21. The Civil Law of the Tartars
22. Of a Civil Law of the German Nations
23. Of the Regal Ornaments among the Franks
24. Of the Marriages of the Kings of the Franks
25. Childeric
26. Of the Time When the Kings of the Franks Became of Age
27. The Same Subject Continued
28. Of Adoption among the Germans
29. Of the Sanguinary Temper of the Kings of the Franks
30. Of the National Assemblies of the Franks
31. Of the Authority of the Clergy under the First Race
Book XIX. Of Laws in Relation to the Principles Which Form the
General Spirit, Morals, and Customs of a Nation
1. Of the Subject of This Book
2. That It Is Necessary People's Minds Should Be Prepared for the
Reception of the Best Laws
3. Of Tyranny
4. Of the General Spirit of Mankind
5. How Far We Should Be Attentive Lest the General Spirit of a Nation Be
Changed
6. That Everything Ought Not to Be Corrected
7. Of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians
8. Effects of a Sociable Temper
9. Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations
10. Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese
11. A Reflection
12. Of Customs and Manners in a Despotic State
13. Of the Behaviour of the Chinese
14. What Are the Natural Means of Changing the Manners and Customs of a
Nation
15. The Influence of Domestic Government on the Political
16. How some Legislators Have Confounded the Principles Which Govern
Mankind
17. Of the Peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government
18. A Consequence Drawn from the Preceding Chapter
19. How This Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs among the
Chinese Was Effected
20. Explanation of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese
21. How the Laws Ought to Have a Relation to Manners and Customs
22. The Same Subject Continued
23. How the Laws Are Founded on the Manners of a People
24. The Same Subject Continued
25. The Same Subject Continued
26. The Same Subject Continued
27. How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character
of a Nation
Book XX. Of Laws in Relation to Commerce, Considered in its
Nature and Distinctions
1. Of Commerce
2. Of the Spirit of Commerce
3. Of the Poverty of the People
4. Of Commerce in Different Governments
5. Of Nations That Have Entered into an Economical Commerce
6. Some Effects of an Extensive Navigation
7. The Spirit of England with Respect to Commerce
8. In What Manner Economical Commerce Has Been Sometimes Restrained
9. Of the Prohibition of Commerce
10. An Institution Adapted to Economical Commerce
11. The Same Subject Continued
12. Of the Freedom of Commerce
13. What It Is That Destroys This Liberty
14. The Laws of Commerce Concerning the Confiscation of Merchandise
15. Of Seizing the Persons of Merchants
16. An Excellent Law
17. A Law of Rhodes
18. Of the Judges of Commerce
19. That a Prince Ought Not to Engage Himself in Commerce
20. The Same Subject Continued
21. Of the Commerce of the Nobility in a Monarchy
22. A Singular Reflection
23. To What Nations Commerce Is Prejudicial
Book XXI. Of Laws in Relation to Commerce, Considered in
the Revolutions It Has Met With in the World
1. Some General Considerations
2. Of the People of Africa
3. That the Wants of the People in the South Are Different from those of
the North
4. The Principal Difference between the Commerce of the Ancients and the
Moderns
5. Other Differences
6. Of the Commerce of the Ancients
7. Of the Commerce of the Greeks
8. Of Alexander: His Conquests
9. Of the Commerce of the Grecian Kings after the Death of Alexander
10. Of the Circuit of Africa
11. Of Carthage and Marseilles
12. The Isle of Delos. Mithridates
13. Of the Genius of the Romans as to Maritime Affairs
14. Of the Genius of the Romans with Respect to Commerce
15. Of the Commerce of the Romans with the Barbarians
16. Of the Commerce of the Romans with Arabia, and the Indies
17. Of Commerce after the Destruction of the Western Empire
18. A Particular Regulation
19. Of Commerce after the Decay of the Roman Power in the East
20. How Commerce Broke Through the Barbarism of Europe
21. The Discovery of Two New Worlds, and in What Manner Europe Is
Affected by It
22. Of the Riches Which Spain Drew from America
23. A Problem
1. The Reason of the Use of Money
Book XXII. Of Laws in Relation to the Use of Money
2. Of the Nature of Money
3. Of Ideal Money
4. Of the Quantity of Gold and Silver
5. The Same Subject Continued
6. Why Interest Was Lowered One Half after the Conquest of the Indies
7. How the Price of Things Is Fixed in the Variation of the Sign of
Riches
8. The Same Subject Continued
9. Of the Relative Scarcity of Gold and Silver
10. Of Exchange
11. Of the Proceedings of the Romans with Respect to Money
12. The Circumstances in Which the Romans Changed the Value of Their
Specie
13. Proceedings with Respect to Money in the Time of the Emperors
14. How Exchange Is a Constraint on Despotic Power
15. The Practice of Some Countries in Italy
16. The Assistance a State May Derive from Bankers
17. Of Public Debts
18. Of the Payment of Public Debts
19. Of Lending upon Interest
20. Of Maritime Usury
21. Of Lending by Contract, and the State of Usury among the Romans
22. The Same Subject Continued
of Inhabitants
1. Of Men and Animals with Respect to the Multiplication of Their
Species
2. Of Marriage
3. Of the Condition of Children
4. Of Families
5. Of the Several Orders of Lawful Wives
6. Of Bastards in Different Governments
7. Of the Father's Consent to Marriage
8. The Same Subject Continued
9. Of Young Women
10. What It Is That Determines Marriage
11. Of the Severity of Government
12. Of the Number of Males and Females in Different Countries
13. Of Seaport Towns
14. Of the Productions of the Earth Which Require a Greater or Less
Number of Men
15. Of the Number of Inhabitants with Relation to the Arts
16. The Concern of the Legislator in the Propagation of the Species
17. Of Greece, and the Number of its Inhabitants
18. Of the State and Number of People before the Romans
19. Of the Depopulation of the Globe
20. That the Romans Were under the Necessity of Making Laws to Encourage
the Propagation of the Species
21. Of the Laws of the Romans Relating to the Propagation of the Species
22. Of the Exposing of Children
23. Of the State of the World after the Destruction of the Romans
24. The Changes Which Happened in Europe, with Regard to the Number of
the Inhabitants
25. The Same Subject Continued
26. Consequences
27. Of the Law Made in France to Encourage the Propagation of the
Species
28. By What Means We May Remedy a Depopulation
29. Of Hospitals
Book XXIV. Of Laws in Relation to Religion, Considered in Itself,
and in Its Doctrine
1. Of Religion in General
2. A Paradox of M. Bayle's
3. That a Moderate Government Is Most Agreeable to the Christian
Religion, and a Despotic Government to the Mahometan
4. Consequences from the Character of the Christian Religion and That of
the Mahometan
5. That the Catholic Religion Is Most Agreeable to a Monarchy, and the
Protestant to a Republic
6. Another of M. Bayle's Paradoxes
7. Of the Laws of Perfection in Religion
8. Of the Connection between the Moral Laws and Those of Religion
9. Of the Essenes
10. Of the Sect of Stoics
11. Of Contemplation
12. Of Penances
13. Of Inexpiable Crimes
14. In What Manner Religion Has an Influence on Civil Laws
15. How False Religions Are Sometimes Corrected by the Civil Laws
16. How the Laws of Religion Correct the Inconveniences of a Political
Constitution
17. The Same Subject Continued
18. How the Laws of Religion Have the Effect of Civil Laws
19. That It Is Not So Much the Truth or Falsity of a Doctrine Which
Renders It Useful or Pernicious to Men in Civil Government, as the Use
or Abuse of It
20. The Same Subject Continued
21. Of Metempsychosis
22. That It Is Dangerous for Religion to Inspire an Aversion for Things
in Themselves Indifferent
23. Of Festivals
24. Of the Local Laws of Religion
25. The Inconvenience of Transplanting a Religion from One Country to
Another
26. The Same Subject Continued
Book XXV. Of Laws in Relation to the Establishment of Religion
and its External Polity
1. Of Religious Sentiments
2. Of the Motives of Attachment to Different Religions
3. Of Temples
4. Of the Ministers of Religion
5. Of the Bounds Which the Laws Ought to Prescribe to the Riches of the
Clergy
6. Of Monasteries
7. Of the Luxury of Superstition
8. Of the Pontificate
9. Of Toleration in Point of Religion
10. The Same Subject Continued
11. Of Changing a Religion
12. Of Penal Laws
13. A Most Humble Remonstrance to the Inquisitors of Spain and Portugal
14. Why the Christian Religion Is So Odious in Japan
15. Of the Propagation of Religion
Book XXVI. Of Laws in Relation to the Order of Things Which
They Determine
1. Idea of This Book
2. Of Laws Divine and Human
3. Of Civil Laws Contrary to the Law of Nature
4. The Same Subject Continued
5. Cases in Which We May Judge by the Principles of the Civil Law, in
Limiting the Principles of the Law of Nature
6. That the Order of Succession or Inheritance Depends on the Principles
of Political or Civil Law, and Not on Those of the Law of Nature
7. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Precepts of Religion What Belongs
Only to the Law of Nature
8. That We Ought Not to Regulate by the Principles of the Canon Law
Things Which Should Be Regulated by Those of the Civil Law
9. That Things Which Ought to Be Regulated by the Principles of Civil
Law Can Seldom Be Regulated by Those of Religion.
10. In What Case We Ought to Follow the Civil Law Which Permits, and Not
the Law of Religion Which Forbids
11. That Human Courts of Justice Should Not Be Regulated by the Maxims
of Those Tribunals Which Relate to the Other Life
12. The Same Subject Continued
13. In What Cases, with Regard to Marriage, We Ought to Follow the Laws
of Religion; and in What Cases We Should Follow the Civil Laws
14. In What Instances Marriages between Relatives Should Be Regulated by
the Laws of Nature; and in What Instances by the Civil Laws
15. That We Should Not Regulate by the Principles of Political Law Those
Things Which Depend on the Principles of Civil Law
16. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Rules of the Civil Law, When It
Is Proper to Decide by Those of the Political Law
17. The Same Subject Continued
18. That It Is Necessary to Inquire Whether the Laws Which Seem
Contradictory Are of the Same Class
19. That We Should Not Decide Those Things by the Civil Law Which Ought
to Be Decided by Domestic Laws
20. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Principles of the Civil Laws
Those Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations
21. That We Should Not Decide by Political Laws Things Which Belong to
the Law of Nations
22. The Unhappy State of the Inca Athualpa
23. That When, by Some Circumstance, the Political Law Becomes
Destructive to the State, We Ought to Decide by Such a Political Law, as
Will Preserve It, Which Sometimes Becomes a Law of Nations
24. That the Regulations of the Police Are of a Different Class from
Other Civil Laws
25. That We Should Not Follow the General Disposition of the Civil Law
in Things Which Ought to Be Subject to Particular Rules Drawn from Their
Own Nature
Book XXVIII. Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Civil Laws
among the French
1. Different Character of the Laws of the Several People of Germany
2. That the Laws of the Barbarians Were All Personal
3. Capital Difference between the Salic Laws, and Those of the Visigoths
and Burgundians
4. In What Manner the Roman Law Came to Be Lost in the Country Subject
to the Franks, and Preserved in That Subject to the Goths and
Burgundians
5. The Same Subject Continued
6. How the Roman Law Kept its Ground in the Demesne of the Lombards
7. How the Roman Law Came to Be Lost in Spain
8. A False Capitulary
9. In What Manner the Codes of Barbarian Laws, and the Capitularies Came
to Be Lost
10. The Same Subject Continued
11. Other Causes of the Disuse of the Codes of Barbarian Laws, as well
as of the Roman Law, and of the Capitularies
12. Of Local Customs. Revolution of the Laws of Barbarous Nations, as
well as of the Roman Law
13. Difference between the Salic Law, or That of the Salian Franks, and
That of the Ripuarian Franks, and other Barbarous Nations
14. Another Difference
15. A Reflection
16. Of the Ordeal or Trial by Boiling Water, Established by the Salic
Law
17. Particular Notions of Our Ancestors
18. In What Manner the Custom of Judicial Combats Gained Ground
19. A New Reason of the Disuse of the Salic and Roman Laws, as Also of
the Capitularies
20. Origin of the Point of Honour
21. A new Reflection on the Point of Honour among the Germans
22. Of the Manners in Relation to Judicial Combats
23. Of the Code of Laws on Judicial Combats
24. Rules Established in the Judicial Combat
25. Of the Bounds Prescribed to the Custom of Judicial Combats
26. On the Judiciary Combat between One of the Parties and One of the
Witnesses
27. Of the Judicial Combat between One of the Parties and One of the
Lords' Peers. Appeal of False Judgment
28. Of the Appeal of Default of Justice
29. Epoch of the Reign of St. Louis
30. Observation on Appeals
31. The Same Subject Continued
32. The Same Subject Continued
33. The Same Subject Continued
34. In What Manner the Proceedings at Law Became Secret
35. Of the Costs
36. Of the Public Prosecutor
37. In What Manner the Institutions of St. Louis Fell into Oblivion
38. The Same Subject Continued
39. The Same Subject Continued
40. In What Manner the Judiciary Forms Were Borrowed from the Decretals
41. Flux and Reflux of the Ecclesiastic and Temporal Jurisdiction
42. The Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result Thereof. Change of
Tribunals
43. The Same Subject Continued
44. Of the Proof by Witnesses
45. Of the Customs of France
2. The Same Subject Continued
3. That the Laws Which Seem to Deviate from the Views of the Legislator
Are Frequently Agreeable to Them
4. Of the Laws Contrary to the Views of the Legislator
5. The Same Subject Continued
6. The Laws Which Appear the Same Have Not Always the Same Effect
7. The Same Subject Continued. Necessity of Composing Laws in a Proper
Manner
8. That Laws Which Appear the Same Were Not Always Made through the Same
Motive
9. That the Greek and Roman Laws Punished Suicide, but Not through the
Same Motive
10. That Laws Which Seem Contrary Proceed Sometimes from the Same Spirit
11. How to Compare Two Different Systems of Laws
12. That Laws Which Appear the Same Are Sometimes Really Different
13. That We Must Not Separate Laws from the End for Which They Were
Made: of the Roman Laws on Theft
14. That We Must Not Separate the Laws from the Circumstances in Which
They Were Made
15. That Sometimes It Is Proper the Law Should Amend Itself
16. Things to Be Observed in the Composing of Laws
17. A bad Method of Giving Laws
18. Of the Ideas of Uniformity
19. Of Legislators
Book XXX. Theory of the Feudal Laws among the Franks in the
Relation They Bear to the Establishment of the Monarchy
1. Of Feudal Laws
2. Of the Source of Feudal Laws
3. The Origin of Vassalage
4. The Same Subject Continued
5. Of the Conquests of the Franks
6. Of the Goths, Burgundians, and Franks
7. Different Ways of Dividing the Land
8. The Same Subject Continued
9. A Just Application of the Law of the Burgundians, and of That of the
Visigoths, in Relation to the Division of Lands
10. Of Servitudes
11. The Same Subject Continued
12. That the Lands Belonging to the Division of the Barbarians Paid No
Taxes
13. Of Taxes Paid by the Romans and Gauls, in the Monarchy of the Franks
14. Of What They Called Census
15. That What They Called Census Was Raised Only on the Bondmen and Not
on the Freemen
16. Of the Feudal Lords or Vassals
17. Of the Military Service of Freemen
18. Of the Double Service
19. Of Compositions among the Barbarous Nations
20. Of What Was Afterwards Called the Jurisdiction of the Lords
21. Of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Churches
22. That the Jurisdictions Were Established before the End of the Second
Race
23. General Idea of the Abbé Du Bos' Book on the Establishment of the
French Monarchy in Gaul
24. The Same Subject Continued. Reflection on the Main Part of the
System
25. Of the French Nobility
Book XXXI. Theory of the Feudal Laws among the Franks, in
the Relation They Bear to the Revolutions of their Monarchy
1. Changes in the Offices and in the Fiefs. Of the Mayors of the Palace
2. How the Civil Government Was Reformed
3. Authority of the Mayors of the Palace
4. Of the Genius of the Nation in Regard to the Mayors
5. In What Manner the Mayors Obtained the Command of the Armies
6. Second Epoch of the Humiliation of Our Kings of the First Race
7. Of the Great Offices and Fiefs under the Mayors of the Palace
8. In What Manner the Allodial Estates Were Changed into Fiefs
9. How the Church Lands Were Converted into Fiefs
10. Riches of the Clergy
11. State of Europe at the Time of Charles Martel
12. Establishment of the Tithes
13. Of the Election of Bishops and Abbots
14. Of the Fiefs of Charles Martel
15. The Same Subject Continued
16. Confusion of the Royalty and Mayoralty. The Second Race
17. A Particular Circumstance in the Election of the Kings of the Second
Race
18. Charlemagne
19. The Same Subject Continued
20. Louis the Debonnaire
21. The Same Subject Continued
22. The Same Subject Continued
23. The Same Subject Continued
24. That the Freemen Were Rendered Capable of Holding Fiefs
25. The Principal Cause of the Humiliation of the Second Race. Changes
in the Allodia
26. Changes in the Fiefs
27. Another change Which Happened in the Fiefs
28. Changes Which Happened in the Great Offices and in the Fiefs
29. Of the Nature of the Fiefs after the Reign of Charles the Bald
30. The Same Subject Continued
31. In What Manner the Empire Was Transferred from the Family of
Charlemagne
32. In What Manner the Crown of France Was Transferred to the House of
Hugh Capet
33. Some Consequences of the Perpetuity of Fiefs
34. The Same Subject Continued
Book XVI. How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Bear a Relation
to the Nature of the Climate
1. Of domestic Servitude. Slaves are established for the family; but
they are not a part of it. Thus I distinguish their servitude from that
which the women in some countries suffer, and which I shall properly
call domestic servitude.
2. That in the Countries of the South there is a natural Inequality
between the two Sexes. Women, in hot climates, are marriageable at
eight, nine, or ten years of age;[1] thus, in those countries, infancy
and marriage generally go together. They are old at twenty: their reason
therefore never accompanies their beauty. When beauty demands the
empire, the want of reason forbids the claim; when reason is obtained,
beauty is no more. These women ought then to be in a state of
dependence; for reason cannot procure in old age that empire which even
youth and beauty could not give. It is therefore extremely natural that
in these places a man, when no law opposes it, should leave one wife to
take another, and that polygamy should be introduced.
In temperate climates, where the charms of women are best preserved,
where they arrive later at maturity, and have children at a more
advanced season of life, the old age of their husbands in some degree
follows theirs; and as they have more reason and knowledge at the time
of marriage, if it be only on account of their having continued longer
in life, it must naturally introduce a kind of equality between the two
sexes; and, in consequence of this, the law of having only one wife.
In cold countries the almost necessary custom of drinking strong liquors
establishes intemperance amongst men. Women, who in this respect have a
natural restraint, because they are always on the defensive, have
therefore the advantage of reason over them.
Nature, which has distinguished men by their reason and bodily strength,
has set no other bounds to their power than those of this strength and
reason. It has given charms to women, and ordained that their ascendancy
over man shall end with these charms: but in hot countries, these are
found only at the beginning, and never in the progress of life.
Thus the law which permits only one wife is physically conformable to
the climate of Europe, and not to that of Asia. This is the reason why
Mahometanism was so easily established in Asia, and with such difficulty
extended in Europe; why Christianity is maintained in Europe, and has
been destroyed in Asia; and, in fine, why the Mahometans have made such
progress in China, and the Christians so little. Human reasons, however,
are subordinate to that Supreme Cause who does whatever He pleases, and
renders everything subservient to His will.
Some particular reasons induced Valentinian[2] to permit polygamy in the
empire. That law, so improper for our climates, was abrogated by
Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius.[3]
3. That a Plurality of Wives greatly depends on the Means of supporting
them. Though in countries where polygamy is once established the number
of wives is principally determined by the opulence of the husband, yet
it cannot be said that opulence established polygamy in those states,
since poverty may produce the same effect, as I shall prove when I come
to speak of the savages.
Polygamy, in powerful nations, is less a luxury in itself than the
occasion of great luxury. In hot climates they have few wants, and it
costs little to maintain a wife and children;[4] they may therefore have
a great number of wives.
4. That the Law of Polygamy is an affair that depends on Calculation.
According to the calculations made in several parts of Europe, there are
here born more boys than girls;[5] on the contrary, by the accounts we
have of Asia, there are there born more girls than boys.[6] The law
which in Europe allows only one wife, and that in Asia which permits
many, have therefore a certain relation to the climate.
In the cold climates of Asia there are born, as in Europe, more males
than females; and hence, say the Lamas,[7] is derived the reason of that
law which amongst them permits a woman to have many husbands.[8]
But it is difficult for me to believe that there are many countries
where the disproportion can be great enough for any exigency to justify
the introducing either the law in favour of many wives or that of many
husbands. This would only imply that a majority of women, or even a
majority of men, is more conformable to nature in certain countries than
in others.
I confess that if what history tells us be true, that at Bantam there
are ten women to one man,[9] this must be a case particularly favourable
to polygamy.
In all this I only give their reasons, but do not justify their customs.
5. The Reason of a Law of Malabar. In the tribe of the Naires, on the
coast of Malabar, the men can have only one wife, while a woman, on the
contrary, may have many husbands.[10] The origin of this custom is not I
believe difficult to discover. The Naires are the tribe of nobles, who
are the soldiers of all those nations. In Europe soldiers are forbidden
to marry; in Malabar, where the climate requires greater indulgence,
they are satisfied with rendering marriage as little burdensome to them
as possible: they give one wife amongst many men, which consequently
diminishes the attachment to a family, and the cares of housekeeping,
and leaves them in the free possession of a military spirit.
6. Of Polygamy considered in itself. With regard to polygamy in general,
independently of the circumstances which may render it tolerable, it is
not of the least service to mankind, nor to either of the two sexes,
whether it be that which abuses or that which is abused. Neither is it
of service to the children; for one of its greatest inconveniences is,
that the father and mother cannot have the same affection for their
offspring; a father cannot love twenty children with the same tenderness
as a mother can love two. It is much worse when a wife has many
husbands; for then paternal love only is held by this opinion, that a
father may believe, if he will, or that others may believe, that certain
children belong to him.
They say that the Emperor of Morocco has women of all colours, white,
black, and tawny, in his seraglio. But the wretch has scarcely need of a
single colour.
Besides, the possession of so many wives does not always prevent their
entertaining desires for those of others;[11] it is with lust as with
avarice, whose thirst increases by the acquisition of treasure.
In the reign of Justinian, many philosophers, displeased with the
constraint of Christianity, retired into Persia. What struck them the
most, says Agathias,[12] was that polygamy was permitted amongst men who
did not even abstain from adultery.
May I not say that a plurality of wives leads to that passion which
nature disallows? for one depravation always draws on another. I
remember that in the revolution which happened at Constantinople, when
Sultan Achmet was deposed, history says that the people, having
plundered the Kiaya's house, found not a single woman; they tell us that
at Algiers,[13] in the greatest part of their seraglios, they have none
at all.
7. Of an Equality of Treatment in case of many Wives. From the law which
permitted a plurality of wives followed that of an equal behaviour to
each. Mahomet, who allowed of four, would have everything, as
provisions, dress, and conjugal duty, equally divided between them. This
law is also in force in the Maldivian isles,[14] where they are at
liberty to marry three wives.
The law of Moses[15] even declares that if any one has married his son
to a slave, and this son should afterwards espouse a free woman, her
food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage shall he not diminish. They
might give more to the new wife, but the first was not to have less than
she had before.
8. Of the Separation of Women from Men. The prodigious number of wives
possessed by those who live in rich and voluptuous countries is a
consequence of the law of polygamy. Their separation from men, and their
close confinement, naturally follow from the greatness of this number.
Domestic order renders this necessary; thus an insolvent debtor seeks to
conceal himself from the pursuit of his creditors. There are climates
where the impulses of nature have such force that morality has almost
none. If a man be left with a woman, the temptation and the fall will be
the same thing; the attack certain, the resistance none. In these
countries, instead of precepts, they have recourse to bolts and bars.
One of the Chinese classic authors considers the man as a prodigy of
virtue who, finding a woman alone in a distant apartment, can forbear
making use of force.[16]
9. Of the Connection between domestic and political Government. In a
republic the condition of citizens is moderate, equal, mild, and
agreeable; everything partakes of the benefit of public liberty. An
empire over the women cannot, among them, be so well exerted; and where
the climate demands this empire, it is most agreeable to a monarchical
government. This is one of the reasons why it has ever been difficult to
establish a popular government in the East.
On the contrary, the slavery of women is perfectly conformable to the
genius of a despotic government, which delights in treating all with
severity. Thus at all times have we seen in Asia domestic slavery and
despotic government walk hand in hand with an equal pace.
In a government which requires, above all things, that a particular
regard be paid to its tranquillity, and where the extreme subordination
calls for peace, it is absolutely necessary to shut up the women; for
their intrigues would prove fatal to their husbands. A government which
has not time to examine into the conduct of its subjects views them with
a suspicious eye, only because they appear and suffer themselves to be
known.
Let us only suppose that the levity of mind, the indiscretions, the
tastes and caprices of our women, attended by their passions of a higher
and a lower kind, with all their active fire, and in that full liberty
with which they appear amongst us, were conveyed into an eastern
government, where would be the father of a family who could enjoy a
moment's repose? The men would be everywhere suspected, everywhere
enemies; the state would be overturned, and the kingdom overflowed with
rivers of blood.
10. The Principle on which the Morals of the East are founded. In the
case of a multiplicity of wives, the more a family ceases to be united,
the more ought the laws to reunite its detached parts in a common
centre; and the greater the diversity of interests, the more necessary
is it for the laws to bring them back to a common interest.
This is more particularly done by confinement. The women should not only
be separated from the men by the walls of the house, but they ought also
to be separated in the same enclosure, in such a manner that each may
have a distinct household in the same family. Hence each derives all
that relates to the practice of morality, modesty, chastity, reserve,
silence, peace, dependence, respect, and love; and, in short, a general
direction of her thoughts to that which, in its own nature, is a thing
of the greatest importance, a single and entire attachment to her
family.
Women have naturally so many duties to fulfil -- duties which are
peculiarly theirs -- that they cannot be sufficiently excluded from
everything capable of inspiring other ideas; from everything that goes
by the name of amusements; and from everything which we call business.
We find the manners more pure in the several parts of the East, in
proportion as the confinement of women is more strictly observed. In
great kingdoms there are necessarily great lords. The greater their
wealth, the more enlarged is their ability of keeping their wives in an
exact confinement, and of preventing them from entering again into
society. Hence it proceeds that in the empires of Turkey, Persia, of the
Mogul, China, and Japan, the manners of their wives are admirable.
But the case is not the same in India, where a multitude of islands and
the situation of the land have divided the country into an infinite
number of petty states, which from causes that we have not here room to
mention are rendered despotic.
There are none there but wretches, some pillaging and others pillaged.
Their grandees have very moderate fortunes, and those whom they call
rich have only a bare subsistence. The confinement of their women cannot
therefore be very strict; nor can they make use of any great precautions
to keep them within due bounds; hence it proceeds that the corruption of
their manners is scarcely to be conceived.
We may there see to what an extreme the vices of a climate indulged in
full liberty will carry licentiousness. It is there that nature has a
force and modesty a weakness, which exceeds all comprehension. At
Patan[17] the wanton desires of the women are so outrageous, that the
men are obliged to make use of a certain apparel to shelter them from
their designs.[18] According to Mr. Smith,[19] things are not better
conducted in the petty kingdoms of Guinea. In these countries the two
sexes lose even those laws which properly belong to each.
11. Of domestic Slavery independently of Polygamy. It is not only a
plurality of wives which in certain places of the East requires their
confinement, but also the climate itself. Those who consider the
horrible crimes, the treachery, the dark villainies, the poisonings, the
assassinations, which the liberty of women has occasioned at Goa and in
the Portuguese settlements in the Indies, where religion permits only
one wife; and who compare them with the innocence and purity of manners
of the women of Turkey, Persia, Hindostan, China, and Japan, will
clearly see that it is frequently as necessary to separate them from the
men, when they have but one, as when they have many.
These are things which ought to be decided by the climate. What purpose
would it answer to shut up women in our northern countries, where their
manners are naturally good; where all their passions are calm; and where
love rules over the heart with so regular and gentle an empire that the
least degree of prudence is sufficient to conduct it?
It is a happiness to live in those climates which permit such freedom of
converse, where that sex which has most charms seems to embellish
society, and where wives, reserving themselves for the pleasures of one,
contribute to the amusement of all.
12. Of natural Modesty. All nations are equally agreed in fixing
contempt and ignominy on the incontinence of women. Nature has dictated
this to all. She has established the attack, and she has established too
the resistance; and having implanted desires in both, she has given to
the one boldness, and to the other shame. To individuals she has granted
a long succession of years to attend to their preservation: but to
continue the species, she has granted only a moment.
It is then far from being true that to be incontinent is to follow the
laws of nature; on the contrary, it is a violation of these laws, which
can be observed only by behaving with modesty and discretion.
Besides, it is natural for intelligent beings to feel their
imperfections. Nature has, therefore, fixed shame in our minds -- a
shame of our imperfections.
When, therefore, the physical power of certain climates violates the
natural law of the two sexes, and that of intelligent beings, it belongs
to the legislature to make civil laws, with a view to opposing the
nature of the climate and re-establishing the primitive laws.
13. Of Jealousy. With respect to nations, we ought to distinguish
between the passion of jealousy and a jealousy arising from customs,
manners, and laws. The one is a hot raging fever; the other, cold, but
sometimes terrible, may be joined with indifference and contempt.
The one, an abuse of love, derives its source from love itself. The
other depends only on manners, on the customs of a nation, on the laws
of the country, and sometimes even on religion.[20]
It is generally the effect of the physical power of the climate; and, at
the same time, the remedy of this physical power.
14. Of the Eastern Manner of domestic Government. Wives are changed so
often in the East that they cannot have the power of domestic
government. This care is, therefore, committed to the eunuchs, whom they
entrust with their keys and the management of their families. "In
Persia," says Sir John Chardin, "married women are furnished with
clothes as they want them, after the manner of children." Thus that care
which seems so well to become them, that care which everywhere else is
the first of their concern, does not at all regard them.
15. Of Divorce and Repudiation. There is this difference between a
divorce and a repudiation, that the former is made by mutual consent,
arising from a mutual antipathy; while the latter is formed by the will,
and for the advantage of one of the two parties, independently of the
will and advantage of the other.
The necessity there is sometimes for women to repudiate, and the
difficulty there always is in doing it, render that law very tyrannical
which gives this right to men without granting it to women. A husband is
the master of the house; he has a thousand ways of confining his wife to
her duty, or of bringing her back to it; so that in his hands it seems
as if repudiation could be only a fresh abuse of power. But a wife who
repudiates only makes use of a dreadful kind of remedy. It is always a
great misfortune for her to go in search of a second husband, when she
has lost the most part of her attractions with another. One of the
advantages attending the charms of youth in the female sex is that in an
advanced age the husband is led to complacency and love by the
remembrance of past pleasures.
It is then a general rule that in all countries where the laws have
given to men the power of repudiating, they ought also to grant it to
women. Nay, in climates where women live in domestic slavery, one would
think that the law ought to favour women with the right of repudiation,
and husbands only with that of divorce.
When wives are confined in a seraglio, the husband ought not to
repudiate on account of an opposition of manners; it is the husband's
fault if their manners are incompatible.
Repudiation on account of the barrenness of the woman ought never to
take place except where there is only one wife:[21] when there are many,
this is of no importance to the husband.
A law of the Maldivians permitted them to take again a wife whom they
had repudiated.[22] A law of Mexico[23] forbade their being reunited
under pain of death. The law of Mexico was more rational than that of
the Maldivians: at the time even of the dissolution, it attended to the
perpetuity of marriage; instead of this, the law of the Maldivians
seemed equally to sport with marriage and repudiation.
The law of Mexico admitted only of divorce. This was a particular reason
for their not permitting those who were voluntarily separated to be ever
reunited. Repudiation seems chiefly to proceed from a hastiness of
temper, and from the dictates of passion; while divorce appears to be an
affair of deliberation.
Divorces are frequently of great political use: but as to the civil
utility, they are established only for the advantage of the husband and
wife, and are not always favourable to their children.
16. Of Repudiation and Divorce amongst the Romans. Romulus permitted a
husband to repudiate his wife, if she had committed adultery, prepared
poison, or procured false keys. He did not grant to women the right of
repudiating their husbands. Plutarch[24] calls this a law extremely
severe.
As the Athenian law[25] gave the power of repudiation to the wife as
well as to the husband, and as this right was obtained by the women
among the primitive Romans, notwithstanding the law of Romulus, it is
evident that this institution was one of those which the deputies of
Rome brought from Athens, and which were inserted in the laws of the
Twelve Tables.
Cicero says that the reasons of repudiation sprang from the law of the
Twelve Tables.[26] We cannot then doubt but that this law increased the
number of the reasons for repudiation established by Romulus.
The power of divorce was also an appointment, or at least a consequence,
of the law of the Twelve Tables. For from the moment that the wife or
the husband had separately the right of repudiation, there was a much
stronger reason for their having the power of quitting each other by
mutual consent.
The law did not require that they should lay open the causes of
divorce[27] In the nature of the thing, the reasons for repudiation
should be given, while those for a divorce are unnecessary; because,
whatever causes the law may admit as sufficient to break a marriage, a
mutual antipathy must be stronger than them all.
The following fact, mentioned by Dionysius Halicarnassus,[28] Valerius
Maximus,[29] and Aulus Gellius,[30] does not appear to me to have the
least degree of probability: though they had at Rome, say they, the
power of repudiating a wife, yet they had so much respect for the
auspices that nobody for the space of five hundred and twenty years ever
made[31] use of this right, till Carvilius Ruga repudiated his, because
of her sterility. We need only be sensible of the nature of the human
mind to perceive how very extraordinary it must be for a law to grant
such right to a whole nation, and yet for nobody to make use of it.
Coriolanus, setting out on his exile, advised his[32] wife to marry a
man more happy than himself. We have just been seeing that the law of
the Twelve Tables and the manners of the Romans greatly extended the law
of Romulus. But to what purpose were these extensions if they never made
use of a power to repudiate? Besides, if the citizens had such a respect
for the auspices that they would never repudiate, how came the
legislators of Rome to have less than they? And how came the laws
incessantly to corrupt their manners?
All that is surprising in the fact in question will soon disappear, only
by comparing two passages in Plutarch. The regal law[33] permitted a
husband to repudiate in the three cases already mentioned, and "it
enjoined," says Plutarch,[34] "that he who repudiated in any other case
should be obliged to give the half of his substance to his wife, and
that the other half should be consecrated to Ceres." They might then
repudiate in all cases, if they were but willing to submit to the
penalty. Nobody had done this before Carvilius Ruga,[35] who, as
Plutarch says in another place,[36] "put away his wife for her sterility
two hundred and thirty years after Romulus." That is, she was repudiated
seventy-one years before the law of the Twelve Tables, which extended
both the power and causes of repudiation.
The authors I have cited say that Carvilius Ruga loved his wife, but
that the censors made him take an oath to put her away, because of her
barrenness, to the end that he might give children to the republic; and
that this rendered him odious to the people. We must know the genius and
temper of the Romans before we can discover the true cause of the hatred
they had conceived against Carvilius. He did not fall into disgrace with
the people for repudiating his wife; this was an affair that did not at
all concern them. But Carvilius had taken an oath to the censors, that
by reason of the sterility of his wife he would repudiate her to give
children to the republic. This was a yoke which the people saw the
censors were going to put upon them. I shall discover, in the
prosecution of this work,[37] the repugnance which they always felt to
regulations of the like kind. But whence can such a contradiction
between those authors arise? It is because Plutarch examined into a
fact, and the others have recounted a prodigy.
1. "Mahomet married Cadhisja at five, and took her to his bed at eight
______
Book XVII. How the Laws of Political Servitude Bear a Relation to the
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Of political Servitude. Political servitude does not less depend on
the nature of the climate than that which is civil and domestic; and
this we shall now demonstrate.
2. The Difference between Nations in point of Courage. We have already
observed that great heat enervates the strength and courage of men, and
that in cold climates they have a certain vigour of body and mind, which
renders them patient and intrepid, and qualifies them for arduous
enterprises. This remark holds good, not only between different nations,
but even in the different parts of the same country. In the north of
China[1] people are more courageous than those in the south; and those
in the south of Korea[2] have less bravery than those in the north.
We ought not, then, to be astonished that the effeminacy of the people
in hot climates has almost always rendered them slaves; and that the
bravery of those in cold climates has enabled them to maintain their
liberties. This is an effect which springs from a natural cause.
This has also been found true in America; the despotic empires of Mexico
and Peru were near the Line, and almost all the little free nations
were, and are still, near the Poles.
3. Of the Climate of Asia. The relations of travellers[3] inform us
"that the vast continent of the north of Asia, which extends from forty
degrees or thereabouts to the Pole, and from the frontiers of Muscovy
even to the eastern ocean, is in an extremely cold climate; that this
immense tract of land is divided by a chain of mountains which run from
west to east, leaving Siberia on the north, and Great Tartary on the
south; that the climate of Siberia is so cold that, excepting a few
places, it is unsusceptible of cultivation; and that, though the
Russians have settlements all along the Irtis, they cultivate nothing;
that this country produces only some little firs and shrubs; that the
natives of the country are divided into wretched hordes or tribes, like
those of Canada; that the reason of this cold proceeds, on the one hand,
from the height of the land, and on the other from the mountains, which,
in proportion as they run from south to north, are levelled in such a
manner that the north wind everywhere blows without opposition; that
this wind, which renders Nova Zembia uninhabitable, blowing in Siberia
makes it a barren waste; that in Europe, on the contrary, the mountains
of Norway and Lapland are admirable bulwarks, which cover the northern
countries from the wind; so that at Stockholm, which is about fifty-nine
degrees latitude, the earth produces plants, fruits, and corn; and that
about Abo, which is sixty-one degrees, and even to sixty-three and
sixty-four, there are mines of silver, and the land is fruitful enough."
We see also in these relations "that Great Tartary, situated to the
south of Siberia, is also exceedingly cold; that the country will not
admit of cultivation; that nothing can be found but pasturage for flocks
and herds; that trees will not grow there, but only brambles, as in
Iceland; that there are, near China and India, some countries where
there grows a kind of millet, but that neither corn nor rice will ripen;
that there is scarcely a place in Chinese Tartary at forty-three,
forty-four, and forty-five degrees where it does not freeze seven or
eight months in the year, so that it is as cold as Iceland, though it
might be imagined, from its situation, to be as hot as the south of
France; that there are no cities, except four or five towards the
eastern ocean, and some which the Chinese, for political reasons, have
built near China; that in the rest of Great Tartary there are only a few
situated in Buchar, Turkestan, and Cathay; that the reason of this
extreme cold proceeds from the nature of the nitrous earth, full of
saltpetre and sand, and more particularly from the height of the land.
Father Verbiest found that a certain place, eighty leagues north of the
great wall, towards the source of Kavamhuran, exceeded the height of the
sea near Pekin three thousand geometrical paces; that this height[4] is
the cause that though almost all the great rivers of Asia have their
source in this country, there is, however, so great a want of water that
it can be inhabited only near the rivers and lakes."
These facts being laid down, I reason thus: Asia has properly no
temperate zone, as the places situated in a very cold climate
immediately touch upon those which are exceedingly hot, that is, Turkey,
Persia, India, China, Korea, and Japan.
In Europe, on the contrary, the temperate zone is very extensive, though
situated in climates widely different from each other; there being no
affinity between the climates of Spain and Italy and those of Norway and
Sweden. But as the climate grows insensibly cold upon our advancing from
south to north, nearly in proportion to the latitude of each country, it
thence follows that each resembles the country joining it; that there is
no very extraordinary difference between them, and that, as I have just
said, the temperate zone is very extensive.
Hence it comes that in Asia, the strong nations are opposed to the weak;
the warlike, brave, and active people touch immediately upon those who
are indolent, effeminate, and timorous; the one must, therefore,
conquer, and the other be conquered. In Europe, on the contrary, strong
nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have
nearly the same courage. This is the grand reason of the weakness of
Asia, and of the strength of Europe; of the liberty of Europe, and of
the slavery of Asia: a cause that I do not recollect ever to have seen
remarked. Hence it proceeds that liberty in Asia never increases; whilst
in Europe it is enlarged or diminished, according to particular
circumstances.
The Russian nobility have indeed been reduced to slavery by the ambition
of one of their princes; but they have always discovered those marks of
impatience and discontent which are never to be seen in the southern
climates. Have they not been able for a short time to establish an
aristocratic government? Another of the northern kingdoms has lost its
laws; but we may trust to the climate that they are not lost in such a
manner as never to be recovered.
4. The Consequences resulting from this. What we have now said is
perfectly conformable to history. Asia has been subdued thirteen times;
eleven by the northern nations, and twice by those of the south. In the
early ages it was conquered three times by the Scythians; afterwards it
was subdued once by the Medes, and once by the Persians; again by the
Greeks, the Arabs, the Moguls, the Turks, the Tartars, the Persians, and
the Afghans. I mention only the Upper Asia, and say nothing of the
invasions made in the rest of the south of that part of the world which
has most frequently suffered prodigious revolutions.
In Europe, on the contrary, since the establishment of the Greek and
Phoenician colonies, we know but of four great changes; the first caused
by the conquest of the Romans; the second by the inundation of
barbarians, who destroyed those very Romans; the third by the victories
of Charlemagne; and the last by the invasions of the Normans. And if
this be rightly examined, we shall find, even in these changes, a
general strength diffused through all the parts of Europe. We know the
difficulty which the Romans met with in conquering Europe, and the ease
and facility with which they invaded Asia. We are sensible of the
difficulties the northern nations had to encounter in overturning the
Roman empire; of the wars and labours of Charlemagne; and of the several
enterprises of the Normans. The destroyers were incessantly destroyed.
5. That when the People in the North of Asia and those of the North of
Europe made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquest were not the same.
The nations in the north of Europe conquered as freemen; the people in
the north of Asia conquered as slaves, and subdued as others only to
gratify the ambition of a master.
The reason is that the people of Tartary, the natural conquerors of
Asia, are themselves enslaved. They are incessantly making conquests in
the south of Asia, where they form empires: but that part of the nation
which continues in the country finds that it is subject to a great
master, who, being despotic in the south, will likewise be so in the
north, and exercising an arbitrary power over the vanquished subjects,
pretends to the same over the conquerors. This is at present most
conspicuous in that vast country called Chinese Tartary, which is
governed by the emperor, with a power almost as despotic as that of
China itself, and which he every day extends by his conquests.
We may likewise see in the history of China that the emperors[5] sent
Chinese colonies into Tartary. These Chinese have become Tartars, and
the mortal enemies of China; but this does not prevent their carrying
into Tartary the spirit of the Chinese government.
A part of the Tartars who were conquerors have very often been
themselves expelled; when they have carried into their deserts that
servile spirit which they had acquired in the climate of slavery. The
history of China furnishes us with strong proofs of this assertion, as
does also our ancient history.[6]
Hence it follows that the genius of the Getic or Tartarian nation has
always resembled that of the empires of Asia. The people in these are
governed by the cudgel; the inhabitants of Tartary by whips. The spirit
of Europe has ever been contrary to these manners; and in all ages, what
the people of Asia have called punishment those of Europe have deemed
the most outrageous abuse.[7]
The Tartars who destroyed the Grecian empire established in the
conquered countries slavery and despotic power: the Goths, after
subduing the Roman empire, founded monarchy and liberty.
I do not know whether the famous Rudbeck, who in his Atlantica has
bestowed such praises on Scandinavia, has made mention of that great
prerogative which ought to set this people above all the nations upon
earth; namely, this country's having been the source of the liberties of
Europe -- that is, of almost all the freedom which at present subsists
amongst mankind.
Jornandes the Goth called the north of Europe the forge of the human
race. I should rather call it the forge where those weapons were framed
which broke the chains of southern nations. In the north were formed
those valiant people who sallied forth and deserted their countries to
destroy tyrants and slaves, and to teach men that, nature having made
them equal, reason could not render them dependent, except where it was
necessary to their happiness.
6. A new physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia, and of the Liberty of
Europe. In Asia they have always had great empires; in Europe these
could never subsist. Asia has larger plains; it is cut out into much
more extensive divisions by mountains and seas; and as it lies more to
the south, its springs are more easily dried up; the mountains are less
covered with snow; and the rivers, being not so large, form more
contracted barriers.[8]
Power in Asia ought, then, to be always despotic; for if their slavery
was not severe they would soon make a division inconsistent with the
nature of the country.
In Europe the natural division forms many nations of a moderate extent,
in which the ruling by laws is not incompatible with the maintenance of
the state: on the contrary, it is so favourable to it, that without this
the state would fall into decay, and become a prey to its neighbours.
It is this which has formed a genius for liberty that renders every part
extremely difficult to be subdued and subjected to a foreign power,
otherwise than by the laws and the advantage of commerce.
On the contrary, there reigns in Asia a servile spirit, which they have
never been able to shake off, and it is impossible to find in all the
histories of that country a single passage which discovers a freedom of
spirit; we shall never see anything there but the excess of slavery.
7. Of Africa and America. This is what I had to say of Asia and Europe.
Africa is in a climate like that of the south of Asia, and is in the
same servitude. America,[9] being lately destroyed and repeopled by the
nations of Europe and Africa, can now scarcely display its genuine
spirit; but what we know of its ancient history is very conformable to
our principles.
8. Of the Capital of the Empire. One of the consequences of what we have
been mentioning is, that it is of the utmost importance to a great
prince to make a proper choice of the seat of his empire. He who places
it to the southward will be in danger of losing the north; but he who
fixes it on the north may easily preserve the south. I do not speak of
particular cases. In mechanics there are frictions by which the effects
of the theory are frequently changed or retarded; and policy has also
its frictions.
______
1. Father Du Halde, i, p. 112.
2. The Chinese books make mention of this. Ibid., iv, p. 448.
3. See Travels to the North, viii; the History of the Tartars; and
Father Du Halde, iv.
4. Tartary is, then, a kind of flat mountain.
5. As Vouty V, emperor of the fifth dynasty.
6. The Scythians thrice conquered Asia, and thrice were driven thence.
Justin, ii. 3.
7. This is in no way contrary to what I shall say in book xxviii. 20
concerning the manner of thinking among the German nations in respect to
the cudgel; let the instrument be what it will, the power or action of
beating was always considered by them as an affront.
8. The waters lose themselves or evaporate before or after their streams
are united.
9. The petty barbarous nations of America are called by the Spaniards
Indios Bravos and are much more difficult to subdue than the great
empires of Mexico and Peru.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book XVIII. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to the Nature
of the Soil
1. How the Nature of the Soil has an Influence on the Laws. The goodness
of the land, in any country, naturally establishes subjection and
dependence. The husbandmen, who compose the principal part of the
people, are not very jealous of their liberty; they are too busy and too
intent on their own private affairs. A country which overflows with
wealth is afraid of pillage, afraid of an army. "Who is there that forms
this goodly party?" said Cicero to Atticus;[1] "are they the men of
commerce and husbandry? Let us not imagine that these are averse to
monarchy -- these to whom all governments are equal, as soon as they
bestow tranquillity."
Thus monarchy is more frequently found in fruitful countries, and a
republican government in those which are not so; and this is sometimes a
sufficient compensation for the inconveniences they suffer by the
sterility of the land.
The barrenness of the Attic soil established there a democracy; and the
fertility of that of Lacedæmonia an aristocratic constitution. For in
those times Greece was averse to the government of a single person, and
aristocracy bore the nearest resemblance to that government.
Plutarch says[2] that the Cilonian sedition having been appeased at
Athens, the city fell into its ancient dissensions, and was divided into
as many parties as there were kinds of land in Attica. The men who
inhabited the eminences would, by all means, have a popular government;
those of the flat, open country demanded a government composed of the
chiefs; and they who were near the sea desired a mixture of both.
2. The same Subject continued. These fertile provinces are always of a
level surface, where the inhabitants are unable to dispute against a
stronger power; they are then obliged to submit; and when they have once
submitted, the spirit of liberty cannot return; the wealth of the
country is a pledge of their fidelity. But in mountainous districts, as
they have but little, they may preserve what they have. The liberty they
enjoy, or, in other words, the government they are under, is the only
blessing worthy of their defence. It reigns, therefore, more in
mountainous and rugged countries than in those which nature seems to
have most favoured.
The mountaineers preserve a more moderate government, because they are
not so liable to be conquered. They defend themselves easily, and are
attacked with difficulty; ammunition and provisions are collected and
carried against them with great expense, for the country furnishes none.
It is, then, a more arduous, a more dangerous, enterprise to make war
against them; and all the laws that can be enacted for the safety of the
people are there of least use.
3. What Countries are best cultivated. Countries are not cultivated in
proportion to their fertility, but to their liberty; and if we make an
imaginary division of the earth, we shall be astonished to see in most
ages deserts in the most fruitful parts, and great nations in those
where nature seems to refuse everything.
It is natural for a people to leave a bad soil to seek a better, and not
to leave a good soil to go in search of worse. Most invasions have,
therefore, been made in countries which nature seems to have formed for
happiness; and as nothing is more nearly allied than desolation and
invasion, the best provinces are most frequently depopulated, while the
frightful countries of the north continue always inhabited, from their
being almost uninhabitable.
We find by what historians tell us of the passage of the people of
Scandinavia along the banks of the Danube that this was not a conquest,
but only a migration into desert countries.
These happy climates must therefore have been depopulated by other
migrations, though we know not the tragic scenes that happened. "It
appears by many monuments of antiquity," says Aristotle,[3] "that the
Sardinians were a Grecian colony. They were formerly very rich; and
Aristeus, so famed for his love of agriculture, was their law-giver. But
they have since fallen to decay; for the Carthaginians, becoming their
masters, destroyed everything proper tor the nourishment of man, and
forbade the cultivation of the lands on pain of death." Sardinia was not
recovered in the time of Aristotle, nor is it to this day.
The most temperate parts of Persia, Turkey, Muscovy, and Poland have not
been able to recover perfectly from the devastations of the Tartars.
4. New Effects of the Fertility and Barrenness of Countries. The
barrenness of the earth renders men industrious, sober, inured to
hardship, courageous, and fit for war; they are obliged to procure by
labour what the earth refuses to bestow spontaneously. The fertility of
a country gives ease, effeminacy, and a certain fondness for the
preservation of life. It has been remarked that the German troops raised
in those places where the peasants are rich, as, for instance, in
Saxony, are not so good as the others. Military laws may provide against
this inconvenience by a more severe discipline.
5. Of the Inhabitants of Islands. The inhabitants of islands have a
higher relish for liberty than those of the continent. Islands are
commonly of small extent;[4] one part of the people cannot be so easily
employed to oppress the other; the sea separates them from great
empires; tyranny cannot so well support itself within a small compass:
conquerors are stopped by the sea; and the islanders, being without the
reach of their arms, more easily preserve their own laws.
6. Of Countries raised by the Industry of Man. Those countries which the
industry of man has rendered habitable, and which stand in need of the
same industry to provide for their subsistence, require a mild and
moderate government. There are principally three of this species: the
two fine provinces of Kiang-nan and Tsekiang in China; Egypt, and
Holland.
The ancient emperors of China were not conquerors. The first thing they
did to aggrandise themselves was what gave the highest proof of their
wisdom. They raised from beneath the waters two of the finest provinces
of the empire; these owe their existence to the labour of man. And it is
the inexpressible fertility of these two provinces which has given
Europe such ideas of the felicity of that vast country. But a continual
and necessary care to preserve from destruction so considerable a part
of the empire demanded rather the manners of a wise than of a voluptuous
nation, rather the lawful authority of a monarch than the tyrannic sway
of a despotic prince. Power was, therefore, necessarily moderated in
that country, as it was formerly in Egypt, and as it is now in Holland,
which nature has made to attend to herself, and not to be abandoned to
negligence or caprice.
Thus, in spite of the climate of China, where they are naturally led to
a servile obedience; in spite of the apprehensions which follow too
great an extent of empire, the first legislators of this country were
obliged to make excellent laws, and the government was frequently
obliged to follow them.
7. Of human Industry. Mankind by their industry, and by the influence of
good laws, have rendered the earth more proper for their abode. We see
rivers flow where there have been lakes and marshes: this is a benefit
which nature has not bestowed; but it is a benefit maintained and
supplied by nature. When the Persians[5] were masters of Asia, they
permitted those who conveyed a spring to any place which had not been
watered before to enjoy the benefit for five generations; and as a
number of rivulets flowed from Mount Taurus, they spared no expense in
directing the course of their streams. At this day, without knowing how
they came thither, they are found in the fields and gardens.
Thus, as destructive nations produce evils more durable than themselves,
the actions of an industrious people are the source of blessings which
last when they are no more.
8. The general Relation of Laws. The laws have a very great relation to
the manner in which the several nations procure their subsistence. There
should be a code of laws of a much larger extent for a nation attached
to trade and navigation than for people who are content with cultivating
the earth. There should be a much greater for the latter than for those
who subsist by their flocks and herds. There must be a still greater for
these than for such as live by hunting.
9. Of the Soil of America. The cause of there being such a number of
savage nations in America is the fertility of the earth, which
spontaneously produces many fruits capable of affording them
nourishment. If the women cultivate a spot of land around their
cottages, the maize grows up presently; and hunting and fishing put the
men in a state of complete abundance. Besides, black cattle, as cows,
buffaloes, &c., thrive there better than carnivorous beasts. The latter
have always reigned in Africa.
We should not, I believe, have all these advantages in Europe if the
land was left uncultivated; it would scarcely produce anything besides
forests of oaks and other barren trees.
10. Of Population in the Relation it bears to the Manner of procuring
Subsistence. Let us see in what proportion countries are peopled where
the inhabitants do not cultivate the earth. As the produce of
uncultivated land is to that of land improved by culture, so the number
of savages in one country is to that of husbandmen in another: and when
the people who cultivate the land cultivate also the arts, this is also
in such proportions as would require a minute detail.
They can scarcely form a great nation. If they are herdsmen and
shepherds, they have need of an extensive country to furnish subsistence
for a small number; if they live by hunting, their number must be still
less, and in order to find the means of life they must constitute a very
small nation.
Their country commonly abounds with forests, which, as the inhabitants
have not the art of draining off the waters, are filled with bogs; here
each troop canton themselves, and form a petty nation.
11. Of savage and barbarous Nations. There is this difference between
savage and barbarous nations: the former are dispersed clans, which for
some particular reason cannot be joined in a body; and the latter are
commonly small nations, capable of being united. The savages are
generally hunters; the barbarians are herdsmen and shepherds.
This appears plain in the north of Asia. The people of Siberia cannot
live in bodies, because they are unable to find subsistence; the Tartars
may live in bodies for some time, because their herds and flocks may for
a time be reassembled. All the clans may then be reunited, and this is
effected when one chief has subdued many others; after which they may do
two things -- either separate, or set out with a design to make a great
conquest in some southern empire.
12. Of the Law of Nations among People who do not cultivate the Earth.
As these people do not live in circumscribed territories, many causes of
strife arise between them; they quarrel about waste land as we about
inheritances. Thus they find frequent occasions for war, in disputes in
relation either to their hunting, their fishing, the pasture for their
cattle, or the violent seizing of their slaves; and as they are not
possessed of landed property, they have many things to regulate by the
law of nations, and but few to decide by the civil law.
13. Of the Civil Laws of those Nations who do not cultivate the Earth.
The division of lands is what principally increases the civil code.
Among nations where they have not made this division there are very few
civil laws.
The institutions of these people may be called manners rather than laws.
Among such nations as these the old men, who remember things past, have
great authority; they cannot there be distinguished by wealth, but by
wisdom and valour.
These people wander and disperse themselves in pasture grounds or in
forests. Marriage cannot there have the security which it has among us,
where it is fixed by the habitation, and where the wife continues in one
house; they may then more easily change their wives, possess many, and
sometimes mix indifferently like brutes.
Nations of herdsmen and shepherds cannot leave their cattle, which are
their subsistence; neither can they separate themselves from their
wives, who look after them. All this ought, then, to go together,
especially as living generally in a flat open country, where there are
few places of considerable strength, their wives, their children, their
flocks, may become the prey of their enemies.
The laws regulate the division of plunder, and give, like our Salic
laws, a particular attention to theft.
14. Of the political State of the People who do not cultivate the Land.
These people enjoy great liberty; for as they do not cultivate the
earth, they are not fixed: they are wanderers and vagabonds; and if a
chief should deprive them of their liberty, they would immediately go
and seek it under another, or retire into the woods, and there live with
their families. The liberty of the man is so great among these people
that it necessarily draws after it that of the citizen.
15. Of People who know the Use of Money. Aristippus, being cast away,
swam and got safely to the next shore, where, beholding geometrical
figures traced in the sand, he was seized with a transport of joy,
judging that he was among Greeks, and not in a nation of barbarians.
Should you ever happen to be cast by some adventure among an unknown
people; upon seeing a piece of money you may be assured that you have
arrived in a civilised country.
The culture of lands requires the use of money. This culture supposes
many inventions and many degrees of knowledge; and we always see
ingenuity, the arts, and a sense of want making their progress with an
equal pace. All this conduces to the establishment of a sign of value.
Torrents and eruptions have made the discovery that metals are contained
in the bowels of the earth.[6] When once they have been separated, they
have easily been applied to their proper use.
16. Of Civil Laws among People who know not the Use of Money. When a
people have not the use of money, they are seldom acquainted with any
other injustice than that which arises from violence; and the weak, by
uniting, defend themselves from its effects. They have nothing there but
political regulations. But where money is established, they are subject
to that injustice which proceeds from craft -- an injustice that may be
exercised in a thousand ways. Hence they are forced to have good civil
laws, which spring up with the new practices of iniquity.
In countries where they have no specie, the robber takes only bare
movables, which have no mutual resemblance. But where they make use of
money, the robber takes the signs, and these always resemble each other.
In the former nothing can be concealed, because the robber takes along
with him the proofs of his conviction; but in the latter it is quite the
contrary.
17. Of political Laws among Nations who have not the Use of Money. The
greatest security of the liberties of a people who do not cultivate the
earth is their not knowing the use of money. What is gained by hunting,
fishing, or keeping herds of cattle cannot be assembled in such great
quantity, nor be sufficiently preserved, for one man to find himself in
a condition to corrupt many others: but when, instead of this, a man has
a sign of riches, he may obtain a large quantity of these signs, and
distribute them as he pleases.
The people who have no money have but few wants; and these are supplied
with ease, and in an equal manner. Equality is then unavoidable; and
hence it proceeds that their chiefs are not despotic.
If what travellers tell us be true, the constitution of a nation of
Louisiana, called the Natches, is an exception to this. Their chief
disposes of the goods of all his subjects, and obliges them to work and
toil, according to his pleasure.[7] He has a power like that of the
grand signior, and they cannot even refuse him their heads. When the
presumptive heir enters the world, they devote all the sucking children
to his service during his life. One would imagine that this is the great
Sesostris. He is treated in his cottage with as much ceremony as an
emperor of Japan or China.
18. Of the Power of Superstition. The prejudices of superstition are
superior to all others, and have the strongest influence on the human
mind. Thus, though the savage nations have naturally no knowledge of
despotic tyranny, still they feel the weight of it. They adore the sun;
and if their chief had not imagined that he was the brother of this
glorious luminary, they would have thought him a wretch like themselves.
19. Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars. The
Arabs and Tartars are nations of herdsmen and shepherds. The Arabs find
themselves in that situation of which we have been speaking, and are
therefore free; whilst the Tartars (the most singular people on earth)
are involved in a political slavery.[8] I have already given reasons for
this[9] and shall now assign some others.
They have no towns, no forests, and but few marshes; their rivers are
generally frozen, and they dwell in a level country of an immense
extent. They have pasture for their herds and flocks, and consequently
property; but they have no kind of retreat, or place of safety. A khan
is no sooner overcome than they cut off his head; his children are
treated in the same manner,[10] and all his subjects belong to the
conqueror. These are not condemned to a civil slavery, for in that case
they would be a burden to a simple people, who have no lands to
cultivate, and no need of any domestic service. They therefore add to
the bulk of the nation; but instead of civil servitude, a political
slavery must naturally be introduced among them.
It is apparent that in a country where the several clans make continual
war, and are perpetually conquering each other; in a country where, by
the death of the chief, the body politic of the vanquished clan is
always destroyed, the nation in general can enjoy but little freedom;
for there is not a single party that must not have been often subdued.
A conquered people may preserve some degree of liberty when, by the
strength of their situation, they are in a state that will admit of
capitulating after their defeat. But the Tartars, always defenceless,
being once overcome, can never be able to obtain conditions.
I have said, in chapter 2, that the inhabitants of cultivated plains are
seldom free. Circumstances have occurred to put the Tartars, who dwell
in uncultivated plains, in the same situation.
20. Of the Law of Nations as practised by the Tartars. The Tartars
appear to be mild and humane among themselves; and yet they are most
cruel conquerors: when they take cities they put the inhabitants to the
sword, and imagine that they act humanely if they only sell the people,
or distribute them among their soldiers.
They have destroyed Asia, from India even to the Mediterranean; and all
the country which forms the east of Persia they have rendered a desert.
The law of nations is owing, I think, to the following cause. These
people having no towns, all their wars are carried on with eagerness and
impetuosity. They fight whenever they hope to conquer; and when they
have no such hope, they join the stronger army. With such customs, it is
contrary to the law of nations that a city incapable of repelling their
attack should stop their progress. They regard not cities as an
association of inhabitants, but as places made to bid defiance to their
power. They besiege them without military skill, and expose themselves
greatly in the attack; and therefore revenge themselves on all those who
have spilled their blood.
21. The Civil Law of the Tartars. Father Du Halde says that amongst the
Tartars the youngest of the males is always the heir, by reason that as
soon as the elder brothers are capable of leading a pastoral life they
leave the house with a certain number of cattle, given them by their
father, and build a new habitation. The last of the males, who continues
at home with the father, is then his natural heir.
I have heard that a like custom was also observed in some small
districts of England; and we find it still in Brittany, in the duchy of
Rohan, where it obtains with regard to ignoble tenures. This is
doubtless a pastoral law conveyed thither by some of the people of
Britain, or established by some German nation. By Cæsar and Tacitus we
are informed that the latter cultivated but little land.
22. Of a Civil Law of the German Nations. I shall here explain how that
particular passage of the Salic law which is commonly distinguished by
the term "the Salic law" relates to the institutions of a people who do
not cultivate the earth, or at least who cultivate it but very little.
The Salic law ordains[11] that, when a man has left children behind him,
the males shall succeed to the Salic land in preference to the females.
To understand the nature of those Salic lands, there needs no more than
to search into the usages or customs of the Franks with regard to lands
before they left Germany.
Mr. Echard has very plainly proved that the word Salic is derived from
Sala, which signifies a house; and therefore that the Salic land was the
land belonging to the house. I shall proceed further, and examine into
the nature of the house, and of the land belonging to the house, among
the Germans.
"They dwell not in towns," says Tacitus, "nor can they bear to have
their habitations contiguous to those of others; every one leaves a
space or small piece of ground about his house, which is enclosed."[12]
Tacitus is very exact in this account, for many laws of the Barbarian
codes have different decrees against those who threw down this
enclosure, as well as against such as broke into the house.[13]
We learn from Tacitus and Cæsar that the lands cultivated by the Germans
were given them only for the space of a year, after which they again
became public. They had no other patrimony but the house and a piece of
land within the enclosure that surrounded it.[14] It was this particular
patrimony which belonged to the males. And, indeed, how could it belong
to the daughters? They were to pass into another habitation.
The Salic land was then within that enclosure which belonged to a German
house; this was the only property they had. The Franks, after their
conquests, acquired new possessions, and continued to call them Salic
lands.
When the Franks lived in Germany their wealth consisted of slaves,
flocks, horses, arms, &c. The habitation and the small portion of land
adjoining it were naturally given to the male children who were to dwell
there. But afterwards, when the Franks had by conquest acquired large
tracts of land, they thought it hard that the daughters and their
children should be incapable of enjoying any part of them. Hence it was
that they introduced a custom of permitting the father to settle the
estate after his death upon his daughter, and her children. They
silenced the law; and it appears that these settlements were frequent,
since they were entered in the formularies.[15]
Among these formularies I find one of a singular nature.[16] A
grandfather ordained by will that his grandchildren should share his
inheritance with his sons and daughters. What then became of the Salic
law? In those times either it would not be observed, or the continual
use of nominating the daughters to an inheritance had made them consider
their ability to succeed as a case authorised by custom.
The Salic law had not in view a preference of one sex to the other, much
less had it a regard to the perpetuity of a family, a name, or the
transmission of land. These things did not enter into the heads of the
Germans; it was purely an economical law, which made the house and the
land dependent thereon to the males who should dwell in it, and to whom
it consequently was of most service.
We need here only transcribe the title of the Allodial Lands of the
Salic law; that famous text of which so many have talked, and which so
few have read.
"1. If a man dies without issue, his father or mother shall succeed him.
2. If he has neither father nor mother, his brother or sister shall
succeed him. 3. If he has neither brother nor sister, the sister of his
mother shall succeed him. 4. If his mother has no sister, the sister of
his father shall succeed him. 5. If his father has no sister, the
nearest relative by the male side shall succeed. 6. Not any part of the
Salic land shall pass to the females; but it shall belong to the males;
that is, the male children shall succeed their father."[17]
It is plain that the first five articles relate to the inheritance of a
man who dies without issue; and the sixth to the succession of him who
has children.
When a man dies without children, the law ordains that neither of the
two sexes shall have the preference to the other, except in certain
cases. In the first two degrees of succession, the advantages of the
males and females were the same; in the third and fourth, the females
had the preference; and the males in the fifth.
Tacitus points out the source of these extravagances. "The sister's
children," says he, "are as dear to their uncle as to their own father.
There are men who regard this degree of kindred as more strict, and even
more holy. They prefer it when they receive hostages."[18] Hence it
proceeds that our earliest historians speak in such strong terms of the
love of the kings of the Franks for their sisters and their sisters'
children.[19] And, indeed, if the children of the sister were considered
in her brother's house as his own children, it was natural for these to
regard their aunt as their mother.
The sister of the mother was preferred to the father's sister; this is
explained by other texts of the Salic law. When a woman became a
widow,[20] she fell under the guardianship of her husband's relatives;
the law preferred to this guardianship the relatives by the females
before those by the males. Indeed, a woman who entered into a family
joining herself with those of her own sex, became more united to her
relatives by the female than by the male. Moreover, when a man killed
another, and had not wherewithal to pay the pecuniary penalty, the law
permitted him to deliver up his substance, and his relatives were to
supply the deficiency.[21] After the father, mother, and brother, the
sister of the mother was to pay, as if this tie had something in it most
tender: now the degree of kindred which imposes the burdens ought also
to confer the advantages.