THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
By Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
Translated by Thomas Nugent, revised by J. V. Prichard
Based on an public domain edition published in 1914 by G. Bell & Sons,
Ltd., London
Rendered into HTML and text by Jon Roland of the Constitution Society
**********
The Translator to the Reader
by Thomas Nugent
1752
The following work may with the strictest justice be said to have done honour to human nature as
well as to the great abilities of the author. The wisest and most learned man, and those most
distinguished by birth and the elevation of their stations, have, in every country in Europe,
considered it as a most excellent performance. And may we be permitted to add, that a sovereign
prince [1] as justly celebrated for his probity and good sense, as for his political and military skill,
has declared that from M. de Montesquieu he has learnt the art of government. But had the
illustrious author received no such distinguished honour, the numerous editions of this work in
French, and their sudden spreading through all Europe, are a sufficient testimony of the high esteem
with which it has been received by the public.
But notwithstanding the deserved applause which has been so liberally bestowed on the author,
there have been some who have not only endeavoured to blast his laurels, but have treated him with
all that scurrility which bigotry and superstition are apt, on every occasion, to throw out against truth,
reason and good sense. These M. de Montesquieu has himself answered, in a separate treatise intitled,
A Defense of the Spirit of Laws, from whence we have thought proper to extract, for the sake of such as
have not seen that treatise, the principal of those objections, and the substance of what has been given
in reply: Only first observing, that this defense is divided into three parts, in the first of which he
answers the general reproaches that have been thrown out against him; in the second he replies to
particular reproaches; and in the third, he gives some reflections on the manner in which his work has
been criticized.
The author first complains of his being charged both with espousing the doctrines of Spinoza, and with
being a Deist, two opinions directly contradictory to each other. To the former of these he answers, by
placing in one view the several passages in the Spirit of Laws directly levelled against the doctrines of
Spinoza; and then he replies to the objections that have been made to those passages, upon which this
injurious charge is founded.
The critic asserts that our author stumbles at his first setting out, and is offended at his saying, that
Laws in their most extensive signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of
things. To this he replies, that the critic had heard it said that Spinoza had maintained that the world
was governed by a blind and necessary principle; and from hence on seeing the word necessary, he
concludes that this must be Spinozism; tho' what is most surprising, this article is directly levelled at
the dangerous principles maintained by Spinoza: That he had Hobbes's system in his eye, a system,
which, as it makes all the virtues and vices depend on the establishment of human laws, and as it
would prove that men were born in a state of war, and that the first law of nature is a war of all against
all, overturns, like Spinoza, all religion, and all morality. Hence he laid down this position, that there
were laws of justice and equity before the establishment of positive laws: hence also he has proved that
all beings had laws; that even before their creation they had possible laws; and that God himself had
laws, that is, the laws which he himself had made. He has shewn [2] that nothing can be more false than
the assertion that men were born in a state of war; and he has made it appear that wars did not
commence till after the establishment of society. His principles are here extremely clear; from whence
it follows, that as he has attacked Hobbes's errors, he has consequently those of Spinoza; and he has been
so little understood, that they have taken for the opinions of Spinoza, those very objections which were
made against Spinozism.
Again, the author has said that the creation which appears to be an arbitrary act, supposes laws as
invariable as the fatality of the Atheists. From these words the critic concludes that the author
admits the fatality of the Atheists. To this he answers, that he had just before destroyed this fatality,
by representing it as the greatest absurdity to suppose that a blind fatality was capable of producing
intelligent beings. Besides, in the passage here censured, he can only be made to say what he really
does say: he does not speak of causes, nor does he compare causes; but he speaks of effects and
compares effects. The whole article, what goes before and what follows, make it evident, that there is
nothing here intended but the laws of motion, which, according to the author, had been established by
God: these laws are invariable; this he as asserted, and all natural philosophy has asserted the same
thing; they are invariable because God has been pleased to make them so, and because he has pleased
to preserve the world. When the author therefore says that the creation which appears to be an
arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as the fatality of the Atheists, he cannot be understood to
say that the creation was a necessary act like the fatality of the Atheists.
Having vindicated himself from the charge of Spinozism, he proceeds to the other accusation, and from
a multitude of passages collected together proves that he has not only acknowledged the truth of
revealed religion; but that he is in love with Christianity, and endeavours to make it appear amiable in
the eyes of others. He then enquires into what his adversaries have said to prove the contrary,
observing that the proofs ought to bear some proportion to the accusation; that this accusation is not of
a frivolous nature, and that the proofs therefore ought not to be frivolous.
The first objection is, that he has praised the Stoics, who admitted a blind fatality, and that this is the
foundation of natural religion. To this he replies, "I will for a moment suppose that this false manner of
reasoning has some weight: has the author praised the philosophy and metaphysics of the Stoics? He
has praised their morals, and has said that the people reaped great benefit from them: he has said this,
and he has said no more: I am mistaken, he has said more, he has at the beginning of his book attacked
this fatality, he does not then praise it, when he praises the Stoics."
The second objection is, that he has praised Bayle, in calling him a great man. To this he answers, "It is
true that the author has called Bayle a great man, but he has censured his opinions: if he has censured
them, he has not espoused them: and since he has censured his opinions, he does not call him a great
man because of his opinions. Every body knows that Bayle had a great genius which he abused; but this
genius which he abused, he had: the author has attacked his sophisms, and pities him on account of his
errors. I don't love the men who subvert the laws of their country; but I should find great difficulty in
believing that Caesar and Cromwell had little minds: I am not in love with conquerors, but it would be
very difficult to persuade me to believe that Alexander and Jenghiz-Khan were men of only a common
genius. Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men make but little impression on any
except those who are angry: the greatest part of the readers are men of moderation, and seldom take up
a book but when they are in cool blood; for rational and sensible men love reason. Had the author
loaded Bayle with a thousand injurious reproaches, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle
had reasoned well or ill; all that his readers would have been able to conclude from it would have been,
that the author knew how to be abusive."
The third objection is, that he has not in his first chapter spoken of original sin. To which he replies: "I
ask every sensible man if this chapter is a treatise of divinity? if the author had spoken of original sin,
they might have imputed it to him as a crime that he had not spoken of redemption."
The next objection takes notice, that "The author has said that in England self-murder is the effect of a
distemper, and that it cannot be punished without punishing the effects of madness; the consequence
the critic draws from thence is, that a follower of natural religion can never forget that England is the
cradle of his sect, and that he rubs a sponge over all the crimes he found there." He replies, "The
author does not know that England is the cradle of natural religion; but he knows that England was not
his cradle. He is not of the same religious sentiments as an Englishman, any more than an Englishman
who speaks of the physical effects he found in France, is not of the same religion as the French. He is
not a follower of natural religion; but he wishes that his critic was a follower of natural logic."
These are the principle objections levelled against our author, on this head, from which our readers
will sufficiently see on what trifling, what puerile arguments this charge of Deism is founded. He
concludes however this article, with a defense of the religion of nature, and such a defense as every
rational Christian must undoubtedly approve.
"Before I conclude this first part, I am tempted to make one objection against him who has made so
many; but he has so stunned my ears with the words follower of natural religion, that I scarcely
dare pronounce them. I shall endeavour however to take courage. Do not the critic's two pieces
stand in greater need of an explication, than that which I defend? Does he do well, while speaking
of natural religion and revelation, to fall perpetually upon one side of the subject, and to lose all
traces of the other? Does he do well never to distinguish those who acknowledge only the religion
of nature, from those who acknowledge both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to
turn frantic whenever the author considers man in the state of natural religion, and whenever he
explains any thing on the principles of natural religion? Does he do well to confound natural
religion with Atheism? Have I not heard that we have all natural religion? Have I not heard that
Christianity is the perfection of natural religion? Have I not heard that natural religion is
employed to prove the truth of revelation against the Deists? and that the same natural religion is
employed to prove the existence of a God against the Atheists? He has said that the Stoics were
the followers of natural religion; and I say, that they were Atheists, since they believed that a
blind fatality governed the universe; and it is by the religion of nature that we ought to attack that
of the Stoics. He says that the scheme of natural religion is connected with that of Spinoza; and I
say, that they are contradictory to each other, and it is by natural religion that we ought to
destroy Spinoza's scheme. I say, that to confound natural religion with Atheism, is to confound
the proof with the thing to be proved, and the objections against error with error itself, and that
this is to take away the most powerful arms we have against this error."
The author now proceeds to the second part of his defence, in which he has the following remarks.
"What has the critic done to give an ample scope to his declamations, and to open the widest door
to invectives? he has considered the author, as if he had intended to follow the example of
M. Abbadye, and had been writing a treatise on the Christian religion: he has attacked him, as if
his two books on religion were two treatises on divinity; he has cavilled against him, as if while he
had been talking of any religion whatsoever which was not Christian, he should have examined it
according to the principles, and doctrines of Christianity; he has judged him as if in his two books
relating to religion he ought to have preached to Mahometans and Idolators the doctrines of
Christianity. Whenever he has spoken of religion in general, whenever he has made use of the word
religion, the critic says, 'that is the Christian religion'; whenever he has compared the religious
rites of different nations and has said that they are more conformable to the political government
of these countries, than some other rites, the critic again says, 'you approve them then and
abandon the Christian faith': when he has spoken of a people who have never embraced
Christianity, or who have lived before Christ, again says the critic, 'you don't then acknowledge the
morals of Christianity'; when he has canvassed any custom whatsoever, which he has found in a
political writer, the critic asks him, 'Is this a doctrine of Christianity?' He might as well add, 'You
say you are a civilian, and I will make you a divine in spite of yourself: you have given us elsewhere
some very excellent things on the Christian religion, but this was only to conceal your real
sentiments, for I know your heart, and penetrate into your thoughts. It is true I do not understand
your book, nor it is material that I should discover the good or bad design with which it has been
written; but I know the bottom of all your thoughts: I don't know a word of what you have said, but
I understand perfectly well, what you have not said.'"
But to proceed. The author has maintained the polygamy is necessarily and in its own nature bad;
he has wrote a chapter expressly against it, and afterwards has examined in a philosophical manner,
in what countries, in what climates, or in what circumstances it is least pernicious; he has compared
climates with climates, and countries with countries, and has found, that there are countries, where
its effects are less pernicious than in others; because, according to the accounts that have been given
of them, the number of men and women not being every where equal, it is evident, that if there are
places where there are more women than men, polygamy, bad as it is in itself, is there less pernicious
than in others. But as the title of this chapter [3] contains these words, That the law of polygamy is an
affair of calculation, they have seized this title as an excellent subject for declamation. Having
repeated the chapter itself, against which no objection is made, he proceeds to justify the title and
adds: "Polygamy is an affair of calculation when we would know, if it is more or less pernicious in
certain climates, in certain countries, in certain circumstances than in others; it is not an affair of
calculation when we would decide whether it be good or bad in itself. It is not an affair of
calculation when we reason on its nature; it may be an affair of calculation when we combine its
effects; in short, it is never an affair of calculation when we enquire into the end of marriage, and it
is even less so, when we enquire into marriage as a law established and confirmed by Jesus Christ."
Again, the author having said, that [4] polygamy is more conformable to nature in some countries
than in others, the critic has seized the words more conformable to nature, to make his say, that he
approves polygamy. To which he answers, "If I say, that I should like better to have a fever than
the scurvy, does this signify that I should like to have a fever? or only that the scurvy is more
disagreeable to me than a fever?"
Having finished his reply to what had been objected to on the subject of polygamy, he vindicates
that excellent part of his work which treats of the climates; when speaking of the influence these
have upon religion, he says, "I am very sensible that religion is in its own nature independent of all
physical causes whatsoever, that the religion which is good in one country is good in another, and
that it cannot be pernicious in one country without being so in all; but yet, I say, that as it is
practiced by men, and has a relation to those who do not practice it, any religion whatsoever will
find a greater facility in being practiced, either in the whole or in part, in certain circumstances
than in others, and that whoever says the contrary must renounce all pretensions to sense and
understanding."
But the critic has been greatly offended by our author's saying, [5] that when a state is at liberty to
receive or to reject a new religion, it ought to be rejected; when it is received, it ought to be tolerated.
From hence he objects, that the author has advised idolatrous princes, not to admit the Christian
religion into their dominions. To this he answers first by referring to a passage in which he says, [6]
that the best civil and political laws are, next to Christianity, the greatest blessings that men can give
or receive; and adds, "If then Christianity is the first and greatest blessing, and the political and civil
laws the second, there are no political or civil laws in any state that can or ought to hinder the
entrance of the Christian religion."
His second answer is, "That the religion of heaven is not established by the same methods as the
religions of the earth; read the history of the church, and you will see the wonders performed by
the Christian religion: was she to enter a country, she knew how to open its gates; every instrument
was able to effect it; at one time God makes use of a few fisherman, at another he sets an emperor on
the throne, and makes him bow down his head under the yolk of the gospel. Does Christianity hide
herself in subterranean caverns? stay a moment, and you see an advocate speaking from the imperial
throne on her behalf. She traverses, whenever she pleases, seas, rivers, and mountains; no obstacles
here below can stop her progress: implant aversion in the mind, she will conquer this aversion:
establish customs, form habits, publish edicts, enact laws, she will triumph over the climate, over the
laws which result from it, and over the legislators who have made them. God acting according to
decrees which are unknown to us, extends or contracts the limits of his religion."
______
1. The present Kind of Sardinia.
2. Book i. Chap. 1.
3. Book xvi. Chap. 4.
4. Book xvi. Chap. 4.
5. Book xxv. Ch. 10.
6. Ibid. Ch. 1.
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The Spirit of Laws
by Charles de Montesquieu
PART I, BOOKS 1 - 15
CONTENTS
Preface
Advertisement
Book I. Of Laws in General
1. Of the Relation of Laws to Different Beings
2. Of the Laws of Nature
3. Of Positive Laws
Book II. Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government
1. Of the Nature of the Three Different Governments
2. Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in Relation to Democracy
3. Of the Laws in Relation to the Nature of Aristocracy
4. Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government
5. Of the Laws in Relation to the Nature of a Despotic Government
Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government
1. Difference Between the Nature and Principle of Government
2. Of the Principle of Different Governments
3. Of the Principle of Democracy
4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy
5. That Virtue Is Not the Principle of a Monarchical Government
6. In What Manner Virtue Is Supplied in a Monarchical Government
7. Of the Principle of Monarchy
8. That Honour Is Not the Principle of Despotic Government
9. Of the Principle of Despotic Government
10. Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments
11. Reflections on the Preceding Chapters
Book IV. That the Laws of Education Ought to Be in Relation to
the Principles of Government
1. Of the Laws of Education
2. Of Education in Monarchies
3. Of Education in a Despotic Government
4. Difference between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education
5. Of Education in a Republican Government
6. Of some Institutions among the Greeks
7. In What Cases These Singular Institutions May Be of Service
8. Explanation of a Paradox of the Ancients in Respect to Manners
Book V. That the Laws Given by the Legislator Ought to Be in
Relation to the Principle of Government
1. Idea of This Book
2. What Is Meant by Virtue in a Political State
3. What Is Meant by a Love of the Republic in a Democracy
4. In What Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality Is Inspired
5. In What Manner the Laws Establish Equality in a Democracy
6. In What Manner the Laws Ought to Maintain Frugality in a Democracy
7. Other Methods of Favouring the Principle of Democracy
8. In What Manner the Laws Should Relate to the Principle of Government
in an Aristocracy
9. In What Manner the Laws Are in Relation to Their Principle in
Monarchies
10. Of the Expedition Peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies
11. Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government
12. The Same Subject Continued
13. An Idea of Despotic Power
14. In What Manner the Laws Are in Relation to the Principles of
Despotic Government
15. The Same Subject Continued
16. Of the Communication of Power
17. Of Presents
18. Of Rewards Conferred by the Sovereign
19. New Consequences of the Principles of the Three Governments
Book VI. Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments
with Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws, the Form
of Judgments, and the Inflicting of Punishments
1. Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws in Different Governments
2. Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws in Different Governments
3. In What Governments and in What Cases the Judges Ought to Determine
According to the Express Letter of the Law
4. Of the Manner of Passing Judgment
5. In What Governments the Sovereign May Be Judge
6. That in Monarchies Ministers Ought Not to Sit as Judges
7. Of a Single Magistrate
8. Of Accusation in Different Governments
9. Of the Severity of Punishments in Different Governments
10. Of the Ancient French Laws
11. That When People Are Virtuous, Few Punishments Are Necessary
12. Of the Power of Punishments
13. Insufficiency of the Laws of Japan
14. Of the Spirit of the Roman Senate
15. Of the Roman Laws in Respect to Punishments
16. Of the Just Proportion between Punishments and Crimes
17. Of the Rack
18. Of Pecuniary and Corporal Punishments
19. Of the Law of Retaliation
20. Of the Punishment of Fathers for the Crimes of Their Children
21. Of the Clemency of the Prince
Book VII. Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three
Governments with Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the
Condition of Women
1. Of Luxury
2. Of Sumptuary Laws in a Democracy
3. Of Sumptuary Laws in an Aristocracy
4. Of Sumptuary Laws in a Monarchy
5. In What Cases Sumptuary Laws Are Useful in a Monarchy
6. Of the Luxury of China
7. Fatal Consequences of Luxury in China
8. Of Public Continency
9. Of the Condition or State of Women in Different Governments
10. Of the Domestic Tribunal among the Romans
11. In What Manner the Institutions Changed at Rome, Together with the
Government
12. Of the Guardianship of Women among the Romans
13. Of the Punishments Decreed by the Emperors against the Incontinence
of Women
14. Sumptuary Laws among the Romans
15. Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages in Different Constitutions
16. An Excellent Custom of the Samnites
17. Of Female Administration
Book VIII. Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three
Governments
1. General Idea of This Book
2. Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy
3. Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality
4. Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People
5. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy
6. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy
7. The Same Subject Continued
8. Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchical Government
9. How Ready the Nobility Are to Defend the Throne
10. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Despotic Government
11. Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of
Government
12. The Same Subject Continued
13. The Effect of an Oath among Virtuous People
14. How the Smallest Change of the Constitution Is Attended with the
Ruin of its Principles
15. Sure Methods of Preserving the Three Principles
16. Distinctive Properties of a Republic
17. Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy
18. Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy
19. Distinctive Properties of a Despotic Government
20. Consequence of the Preceding Chapters
21. Of the Empire of China
Book IX. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force
1. In What Manner Republics Provide for Their Safety
2. That a Confederate Government Ought to Be Composed of States of the
Same Nature, Especially of the Republican Kind
3. Other Requisites in a Confederate Republic
4. In What Manner Despotic Governments Provide for their Security
5. In What Manner a Monarchical Government Provides for Its Security
6. Of the Defensive Force of States in General
7. A Reflection
8. A Particular Case in Which the Defensive Force of a State Is Inferior
to the Offensive
9. Of the Relative Force of States
10. Of the Weakness of Neighbouring States
Book X. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force
1. Of Offensive Force
2. Of War
3. Of the Right of Conquest
4. Some Advantages of a Conquered People
5. Gelon, King of Syracuse
6. Of Conquest Made by a Republic
7. The Same Subject Continued
8. The Same Subject Continued
9. Of Conquests Made by a Monarchy
10. Of One Monarchy That Subdues Another
11. Of the Manners of a Conquered People
12. Of a Law of Cyrus
13. Charles XII
14. Alexander
15. New Methods of Preserving a Conquest
16. Of Conquests Made by a Despotic Prince
17. The Same Subject Continued
Book XI. Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, with
Regard to the Constitution
1. A General Idea
2. Different Significations of the Word Liberty
3. In What Liberty Consists
4. The Same Subject Continued
5. Of the End or View of Different Governments
6. Of the Constitution of England
7. Of the Monarchies We Are Acquainted With
8. Why the Ancients Had Not a Clear Idea of Monarchy
9. Aristotle's Manner of Thinking
10. What Other Politicians Thought
11. Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece
12. Of the Government of the Kings of Rome, and in What Manner the Three
Powers Were There Distributed
13. General Reflections on the State of Rome after the Expulsion of its
Kings
14. In What Manner the Distribution of the Three Powers Began to Change
after the Expulsion of the Kings
15. In What Manner Rome, in the Flourishing State of That Republic,
Suddenly Lost its Liberty
16. Of the Legislative Power in the Roman Republic
17. Of the Executive Power in the Same Republic
18. Of the Judiciary Power in the Roman Government
19. Of the Government of the Roman Provinces
20. The End of This Book
Book XII. Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, in Relation to
the Subject
1. Idea of This Book
2. Of the Liberty of the Subject
3. The Same Subject Continued
4. That Liberty is Favoured by the Nature and Proportion of Punishments
5. Of Certain Accusations That Require Particular Moderation and
Prudence
6. Of the Crime against Nature
7. Of the Crime of High Treason
8. Of the Misapplication of the Terms Sacrilege and High Treason
9. The Same Subject Continued
10. The Same Subject Continued
11. Of Thoughts
12. Of Indiscreet Speeches
13. Of Writings
14. Breach of Modesty in Punishing Crimes
15. Of the Enfranchisement of Slaves in Order to Accuse Their Master
16. Of Calumny with Regard to the Crime of High Treason
17. Of the Revealing of Conspiracies
18. How Dangerous It Is in Republics to Be Too Severe in Punishing the
Crime of High Treason
19. In What Manner the Use of Liberty Is Suspended in a Republic
20. Of Laws Favourable to the Liberty of the Subject in a Republic
21. Of the Cruelty of Laws in Respect to Debtors in a Republic
22. Of Things That Strike at Liberty in Monarchies
23. Of Spies in Monarchies
24. Of Anonymous Letters
25. Of the Manner of Governing in Monarchies
26. That in a Monarchy the Prince Ought to Be of Easy Access
27. Of the Manners of a Monarch
28. Of the Regard Which Monarchs Owe to Their Subjects
29. Of the Civil Laws Proper for Mixing Some Portion of Liberty in a
Despotic Government
30. The Same Subject Continued
Book XIII. Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the
Greatness of the Public Revenues Bear to Liberty
1. Of the Public Revenues
2. That It Is Bad Reasoning to Say That the Greatness of Taxes Is Good
in its Own Nature
3. Of Taxes in Countries Where Part of the People Are Villains or
Bondmen
4. Of a Republic in the Like Case
5. Of a Monarchy in the Like Case
6. Of a Despotic Government in the Like Case
7. Of Taxes in Countries where Villainage is Not Established
8. In What Manner the Deception Is Preserved
9. Of a Bad Kind of Impost
10. That the Greatness of Taxes Depends on the Nature of the Government
11. Of Confiscations
12. Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty
13. In What Government Taxes Are Capable of Increase
14. That the Nature of the Taxes Is in Relation to the Government
15. Abuse of Liberty
16. Of the Conquests of the Mahometans
17. Of the Augmentation of Troops
18. Of an Exemption from Taxes
19. Which Is More Suitable to the Prince and to the People, the Farming
the Revenues, or Managing Them by Commission?
20. Of the Farmers of the Revenues
Book XIV. Of Laws in Relation to the Nature of the Climate
1. General Idea
2. Of the Difference of Men in Different Climates
3. Contradiction in the Tempers of Some Southern Nations
4. Cause of the Immutability of Religion, Manners, Customs, and Laws, in
the Eastern Countries
5. That Those Are Bad Legislators Who Favour the Vices of the Climate,
and Good Legislators Who Oppose Those Vices
6. Of Agriculture in Warm Climates
7. Of Monkery
8. An Excellent Custom of China
9. Means of Encouraging Industry
10. Of the Laws in Relation to the Sobriety of the People
11. Of the Laws in Relation to the Distempers of the Climate
12. Of the Laws against Suicides
13. Effects Arising from the Climate of England
14. Other Effects of the Climate
15. Of the Different Confidence Which the Laws Have in the People,
According to the Difference of Climates
Book XV. In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Relate to the
Nature of the Climate
1. Of Civil Slavery
2. Origin of the Right of Slavery among the Roman Civilians
3. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery
4. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery
5. Of the Slavery of the Negroes
6. The True Origin of the Right of Slavery
7. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery
8. Inutility of Slavery among Us
9. Several Kinds of Slavery
10. Regulations Necessary in Respect to Slavery
11. Abuses of Slavery
12. Danger from the Multitude of Slaves
13. Of Armed Slaves
14. The Same Subject Continued
15. Precautions to Be Used in Moderate Governments
16. Regulations between Masters and Slaves
17. Of Enfranchisements
18. Of Freedmen and Eunuchs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREFACE
IF amidst the infinite number of subjects contained in this book there
is anything which, contrary to my expectation, may possibly offend, I
can at least assure the public that it was not inserted with an ill
intention: for I am not naturally of a captious temper. Plato thanked
the gods that he was born in the same age with Socrates: and for my part
I give thanks to the Supreme that I was born a subject of that
government under which I live; and that it is His pleasure I should obey
those whom He has made me love.
I beg one favour of my readers, which I fear will not be granted me;
this is, that they will not judge by a few hours' reading of the labour
of twenty years; that they will approve or condemn the book entire, and
not a few particular phrases. If they would search into the design of
the author, they can do it in no other way so completely as by searching
into the design of the work.
I have first of all considered mankind; and the result of my thoughts
has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners,
they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.
I have laid down the first principles, and have found that the
particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all
nations are only consequences of them; and that every particular law is
connected with another law, or depends on some other of a more general
extent.
When I have been obliged to look back into antiquity, I have endeavoured
to assume the spirit of the ancients, lest I should consider those
things as alike which are really different; and lest I should miss the
difference of those which appear to be alike.
I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices, but from the nature
of things.
Here a great many truths will not appear till we have seen the chain
which connects them with others. The more we enter into particulars, the
more we shall perceive the certainty of the principles on which they are
founded. I have not even given all these particulars, for who could
mention them all without a most insupportable fatigue?
The reader will not here meet with any of those bold flights which seem
to characterise the works of the present age. When things are examined
with never so small a degree of extent, the sallies of imagination must
vanish; these generally arise from the mind's collecting all its powers
to view only one side of the subject, while it leaves the other
unobserved.
I write not to censure anything established in any country whatsoever.
Every nation will here find the reasons on which its maxims are founded;
and this will be the natural inference, that to propose alterations
belongs only to those who are so happy as to be born with a genius
capable of penetrating the entire constitution of a state.
It is not a matter of indifference that the minds of the people be
enlightened. The prejudices of magistrates have arisen from national
prejudice. In a time of ignorance they have committed even the greatest
evils without the least scruple; but in an enlightened age they even
tremble while conferring the greatest blessings. They perceive the
ancient abuses; they see how they must be reformed; but they are
sensible also of the abuses of a reformation. They let the evil
continue, if they fear a worse; they are content with a lesser good, if
they doubt a greater. They examine into the parts, to judge of them in
connection; and they examine all the causes, to discover their different
effects.
Could I but succeed so as to afford new reasons to every man to love his
prince, his country, his laws; new reasons to render him more sensible
in every nation and government of the blessings he enjoys, I should
think myself the most happy of mortals.
Could I but succeed so as to persuade those who command, to increase
their knowledge in what they ought to prescribe; and those who obey, to
find a new pleasure resulting from obedience -- I should think myself
the most happy of mortals.
The most happy of mortals should I think myself could I contribute to
make mankind recover from their prejudices. By prejudices I here mean,
not that which renders men ignorant of some particular things, but
whatever renders them ignorant of themselves.
It is in endeavouring to instruct mankind that we are best able to
practise that general virtue which comprehends the love of all. Man,
that flexible being, conforming in society to the thoughts and
impressions of others, is equally capable of knowing his own nature,
whenever it is laid open to his view; and of losing the very sense of
it, when this idea is banished from his mind.
Often have I begun, and as often have I laid aside, this undertaking. I
have a thousand times given the leaves I had written to the winds: I,
every day, felt my paternal hands fall. I have followed my object
without any fixed plan: I have known neither rules nor exceptions; I
have found the truth, only to lose it again. But when I once discovered
my first principles, everything I sought for appeared; and in the course
of twenty years, I have seen my work begun, growing up, advancing to
maturity, and finished.
If this work meets with success, I shall owe it chiefly to the grandeur
and majesty of the subject. However, I do not think that I have been
totally deficient in point of genius. When I have seen what so many
great men both in France, England, and Germany have said before me, I
have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage: I have
said with Correggio, "And I also am a painter."
ADVERTISEMENT
1. For the better understanding of the first four books of this work, it
is to be observed that what I distinguish by the name of virtue, in a
republic, is the love of one's country, that is, the love of equality.
It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it is
the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honour is
the spring which gives motion to monarchy. Hence it is that I have
distinguished the love of one's country, and of equality, by the
appellation of political virtue. My ideas are new, and therefore I have
been obliged to find new words, or to give new acceptations to old
terms, in order to convey my meaning. They, who are unacquainted with
this particular, have made me say most strange absurdities, such as
would be shocking in any part of the world, because in all countries and
governments morality is requisite.
2. The reader is also to notice that there is a vast difference between
saying that a certain quality, modification of the mind, or virtue, is
not the spring by which government is actuated, and affirming that it is
not to be found in that government. Were I to say such a wheel or such a
pinion is not the spring which sets the watch going, can you infer
thence that they are not to be found in the watch? So far is it from
being true that the moral and Christian virtues are excluded from
monarchy, that even political virtue is not excluded. In a word, honour
is found in a republic, though its spring be political virtue; and
political virtue is found in a monarchical government, though it be
actuated by honour.
To conclude, the honest man of whom we treat in the third book, chapter
5, is not the Christian, but the political honest man, who is possessed
of the political virtue there mentioned. He is the man who loves the
laws of his country, and who is actuated by the love of those laws. I
have set these matters in a clearer light in the present edition, by
giving a more precise meaning to my expression: and in most places where
I have made use of the word virtue I have taken care to add the term
political.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book I. Of Laws in General
1. Of the Relation of Laws to different Beings. Laws, in their most
general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the
nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity[1]
His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man
their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.
They who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we
behold in this world talk very absurdly; for can anything be more
unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive
of intelligent beings?
There is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations subsisting
between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one
another.
God is related to the universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by
which He created all things are those by which He preserves them. He
acts according to these rules, because He knows them; He knows them,
because He made them; and He made them, because they are in relation to
His wisdom and power.
Since we observe that the world, though formed by the motion of matter,
and void of understanding, subsists through so long a succession of
ages, its motions must certainly be directed by invariable laws; and
could we imagine another world, it must also have constant rules, or it
would inevitably perish.
Thus the creation, which seems an arbitrary act, supposes laws as
invariable as those of the fatality of the Atheists. It would be absurd
to say that the Creator might govern the world without those rules,
since without them it could not subsist.
These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. In bodies moved, the
motion is received, increased, diminished, or lost, according to the
relations of the quantity of matter and velocity; each diversity is
uniformity, each change is constancy.
Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but
they have some likewise which they never made. Before there were
intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible
relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there
were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or
unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same
as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not
equal.
We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the
positive law by which they are established: as, for instance, if human
societies existed, it would be right to conform to their laws; if there
were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another being,
they ought to show their gratitude; if one intelligent being had created
another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in its original
state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures another, it
deserves a retaliation; and so on.
But the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the
physical. For though the former has also its laws, which of their own
nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the
physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent
beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on
the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do
not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their
own instituting they frequently infringe.
Whether brutes be governed by the general laws of motion, or by a
particular movement, we cannot determine. Be that as it may, they have
not a more intimate relation to God than the rest of the material world;
and sensation is of no other use to them than in the relation they have
either to other particular beings or to themselves.
By the allurement of pleasure they preserve the individual, and by the
same allurement they preserve their species. They have natural laws,
because they are united by sensation; positive laws they have none,
because they are not connected by knowledge. And yet they do not
invariably conform to their natural laws; these are better observed by
vegetables, that have neither understanding nor sense.
Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which we have; but they have
some which we have not. They have not our hopes, but they are without
our fears; they are subject like us to death, but without knowing it;
even most of them are more attentive than we to self-preservation, and
do not make so bad a use of their passions.
Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable
laws. As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws
established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is left
to his private direction, though a limited being, and subject, like all
finite intelligences, to ignorance and error: even his imperfect
knowledge he loses; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by a
thousand impetuous passions. Such a being might every instant forget his
Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of
religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself;
philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed to
live in society, he might forget his fellow-creatures; legislators have
therefore by political and civil laws confined him to his duty.
2. Of the Laws of Nature. Antecedent to the above-mentioned laws are
those of nature, so called, because they derive their force entirely
from our frame and existence. In order to have a perfect knowledge of
these laws, we must consider man before the establishment of society:
the laws received in such a state would be those of nature.
The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines
us towards Him, is the first in importance, though not in order, of
natural laws. Man in a state of nature would have the faculty of
knowing, before he had acquired any knowledge. Plain it is that his
first ideas would not be of a speculative nature; he would think of the
preservation of his being, before he would investigate its origin. Such
a man would feel nothing in himself at first but impotency and weakness;
his fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from
instances (were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in
forests,[2] trembling at the motion of a leaf, and flying from every
shadow.
In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality,
would fancy himself inferior. There would therefore be no danger of
their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature.
The natural impulse or desire which Hobbes attributes to mankind of
subduing one another is far from being well founded. The idea of empire
and dominion is so complex, and depends on so many other notions, that
it could never be the first which occurred to the human understanding.
Hobbes[3] inquires, "For what reason go men armed, and have locks and
keys to fasten their doors, if they be not naturally in a state of war?"
But is it not obvious that he attributes to mankind before the
establishment of society what can happen but in consequence of this
establishment, which furnishes them with motives for hostile attacks and
self-defence?
Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants.
Hence another law of nature would prompt him to seek for nourishment.
Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the
marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to
associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from. the very
pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same
species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of sexes
would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for
each other would form a third law.
Beside the sense or instinct which man possesses in common with brutes,
he has the advantage of acquired knowledge; and thence arises a second
tie, which brutes have not. Mankind have therefore a new motive of
uniting; and a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in
society.
3. Of Positive Laws. As soon as man enters into a state of society he
loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the
state of war.
Each particular society begins to feel its strength, whence arises a
state of war between different nations. The individuals likewise of each
society become sensible of their force; hence the principal advantages
of this society they endeavour to convert to their own emolument, which
constitutes a state of war between individuals.
These two different kinds of states give rise to human laws. Considered
as inhabitants of so great a planet, which necessarily contains a
variety of nations, they have laws relating to their mutual intercourse,
which is what we call the law of nations. As members of a society that
must be properly supported, they have laws relating to the governors and
the governed, and this we distinguish by the name of politic law. They
have also another sort of law, as they stand in relation to each other;
by which is understood the civil law.
The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle, that
different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good
they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without
prejudicing their real interests.
The object of war is victory; that of victory is conquest; and that of
conquest preservation. From this and the preceding principle all those
rules are derived which constitute the law of nations.
All countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois
themselves, though they devour their prisoners: for they send and
receive ambassadors, and understand the rights of war and peace. The
mischief is that their law of nations is not founded on true principles.
Besides the law of nations relating to all societies, there is a polity
or civil constitution for each particularly considered. No society can
subsist without a form of government. "The united strength of
individuals," as Gravina[4] well observes, "constitutes what we call the
body politic."
The general strength may be in the hands of a single person, or of many.
Some think that nature having established paternal authority, the most
natural government was that of a single person. But the example of
paternal authority proves nothing. For if the power of a father relates
to a single government, that of brothers after the death of a father,
and that of cousins-german after the decease of brothers, refer to a
government of many. The political power necessarily comprehends the
union of several families.
Better is it to say, that the government most conformable to nature is
that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in
whose favour it is established.
The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of
all their wills. "The conjunction of those wills," as Gravina again very
justly observes, "is what we call the civil state."
Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the
inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation
ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.
They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are
framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit
another.
They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each
government; whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or
whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.
They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the
quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal
occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds:
they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the
constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their
inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine,
they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the
intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are
established; in all of which different lights they ought to be
considered.
This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These
relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I
call the Spirit of Laws.
I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do
not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit
consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different
objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of
laws as that of these relations and objects.
I shall first examine the relations which laws bear to the nature and
principle of each government; and as this principle has a strong
influence on laws, I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly:
and if I can but once establish it, the laws will soon appear to flow
thence as from their source. I shall proceed afterwards to other and
more particular relations.
______
1. "Law," says Plutarch, "is the king of mortal and immortal beings."
See his treatise, A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince.
2. Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover, who was carried
over to England during the reign of George I.
3. In pref., De cive.
4. Italian poet and jurist, 1664-1718.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book II. Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government
1. Of the Nature of the three different Governments. There are three
species of government: republican, monarchical, and despotic. In order
to discover their nature, it is sufficient to recollect the common
notion, which supposes three definitions, or rather three facts: that a
republican government is that in which the body, or only a part of the
people, is possessed of the supreme power; monarchy, that in which a
single person governs by fixed and established laws; a despotic
government, that in which a single person directs everything by his own
will and caprice.
This is what I call the nature of each government; we must now inquire
into those laws which directly conform to this nature, and consequently
are the fundamental institutions.
2. Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in relation to
Democracy.[1] When the body of the people is possessed of the supreme
power, it is called a democracy. When the supreme power is lodged in the
hands of a part of the people, it is then an aristocracy.
In a democracy the people are in some respects the sovereign, and in
others the subject.
There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their suffrages, which
are their own will; now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself.
The laws therefore which establish the right of suffrage are fundamental
to this government. And indeed it is as important to regulate in a
republic, in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what,
suffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the
prince, and after what manner he ought to govern.
Libanius[2] says that at Athens a stranger who intermeddled in the
assemblies of the people was punished with death. This is because such a
man usurped the rights of sovereignty.
It is an essential point to fix the number of citizens who are to form
the public assemblies; otherwise it would be uncertain whether the
whole, or only a part of the people, had given their votes. At Sparta
the number was fixed at ten thousand. But Rome, designed by Providence
to rise from the weakest beginnings to the highest pitch of grandeur;
Rome, doomed to experience all the vicissitudes of fortune; Rome, who
had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls, and sometimes all
Italy and a considerable part of the world within them; Rome, I say,
never fixed the number[3] and this was one of the principal causes of
her ruin.
The people, in whom the supreme power resides, ought to have the
management of everything within their reach: that which exceeds their
abilities must be conducted by their ministers.
But they cannot properly be said to have their ministers, without the
power of nominating them: it is, therefore, a fundamental maxim in this
government, that the people should choose their ministers -- that is,
their magistrates.
They have occasion, as well as monarchs, and even more so, to be
directed by a council or senate. But to have a proper confidence in
these, they should have the choosing of the members; whether the
election be made by themselves, as at Athens, or by some magistrate
deputed for that purpose, as on certain occasions was customary at Rome.
The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are
to entrust with part of their authority. They have only to be determined
by things to which they cannot be strangers, and by facts that are
obvious to sense. They can tell when a person has fought many battles,
and been crowned with success; they are, therefore, capable of electing
a general. They can tell when a judge is assiduous in his office, gives
general satisfaction, and has never been charged with bribery: this is
sufficient for choosing a prætor. They are struck with the magnificence
or riches of a fellow-citizen; no more is requisite for electing an
edile. These are facts of which they can have better information in a
public forum than a monarch in his palace. But are they capable of
conducting an intricate affair, of seizing and improving the opportunity
and critical moment of action? No; this surpasses their abilities.
Should we doubt the people's natural capacity, in respect to the
discernment of merit, we need only cast an eye on the series of
surprising elections made by the Athenians and Romans; which no one
surely will attribute to hazard.
We know that though the people of Rome assumed the right of raising
plebeians to public offices, yet they never would exert this power; and
though at Athens the magistrates were allowed, by the law of Aristides,
to be elected from all the different classes of inhabitants, there never
was a case, says Xenophon,[4] when the common people petitioned for
employments which could endanger either their security or their glory.
As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified
to be chosen, so the people, though capable of calling others to an
account for their administration, are incapable of conducting the
administration themselves.
The public business must be carried on with a certain motion, neither
too quick nor too slow. But the motion of the people is always either
too remiss or too violent. Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they
overturn all before them; and sometimes with a hundred thousand feet
they creep like insects.
In a popular state the inhabitants are divided into certain classes. It
is in the manner of making this division that great legislators have
signalised themselves; and it is on this the duration and prosperity of
democracy have ever depended.
Servius Tullius followed the spirit of aristocracy in the distribution
of his classes. We find in Livy[5] and in Dionysius Halicarnassus,[6] in
what manner he lodged the right of suffrage in the hands of the
principal citizens. He had divided the people of Rome into 193
centuries, which formed six classes; and ranking the rich, who were in
smaller numbers, in the first centuries, and those in middling
circumstances, who were more numerous, in the next, he flung the
indigent multitude into the last; and as each century had but one
vote[7] it was property rather than numbers that decided the election.
Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes. In this he was
directed by the spirit of democracy, his intention not being to fix
those who were to choose, but such as were eligible: therefore, leaving
to every citizen the right of election, he made[8] the judges eligible
from each of those four classes; but the magistrates he ordered to be
chosen only out of the first three, consisting of persons of easy
fortunes.[9]
As the division of those who have a right of suffrage is a fundamental
law in republics, so the manner of giving this suffrage is another
fundamental.
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to
aristocracy.[10]
The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one, but
animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country.
Yet as this method is in itself defective, it has been the endeavour of
the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it.
Solon made a law at Athens that military employments should be conferred
by choice; but that senators and judges should be elected by lot.
The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies, attended with
great expense, should be given by choice; and the others by lot.
In order, however, to amend the suffrage by lot, he made a rule that
none but those who presented themselves should be elected; that the
person elected should be examined by judges[11] and that every one
should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office:[12]
this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot, and of that
by choice. When the time of their magistracy had expired, they were
obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct.
Persons utterly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giving
in their names to be drawn by lot.
The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage is likewise
fundamental in a democracy. It is a question of some importance whether
the suffrages ought to be public or secret. Cicero observes[13] that the
laws[14] which rendered them secret towards the close of the republic
were the cause of its decline. But as this is differently practised in
different republics, I shall offer here my thoughts concerning this
subject.
The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public[15] and this should
be considered as a fundamental law of democracy. The lower class ought
to be directed by those of higher rank, and restrained within bounds by
the gravity of eminent personages. Hence, by rendering the suffrages
secret in the Roman republic, all was lost; it was no longer possible to
direct a populace that sought its own destruction. But when the body of
the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy[16] or in a democracy the
senate[17] as the business is then only to prevent intrigues, the
suffrages cannot be too secret.
Intriguing in a senate is dangerous; it is dangerous also in a body of
nobles; but not so among the people, whose nature is to act through
passion. In countries where they have no share in the government, we
often see them as much inflamed on account of an actor as ever they
could be for the welfare of the state. The misfortune of a republic is
when intrigues are at an end; which happens when the people are gained
by bribery and corruption: in this case they grow indifferent to public
affairs, and avarice becomes their predominant passion. Unconcerned
about the government and everything belonging to it, they quietly wait
for their hire.
It is likewise a fundamental law in democracies, that the people should
have the sole power to enact laws. And yet there are a thousand
occasions on which it is necessary the senate should have the power of
decreeing; nay, it is frequently proper to make some trial of a law
before it is established. The constitutions of Rome and Athens were
excellent. The decrees of the senate[18] had the force of laws for the
space of a year, but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by
the consent of the people.
3. Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of Aristocracy. In an
aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number
of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and executive
authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them, the same
as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.
They do not vote here by lot, for this would be productive of
inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most
mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be
chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious; it is the
nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.
When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate the
affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding, and to
prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said that the
aristocracy is in some measure in the senate, the democracy in the body
of the nobles, and the people are a cipher.
It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the people, in some
measure, could be raised from their state of annihilation. Thus at
Genoa, the bank of St. George being administered by the people[19] gives
them a certain influence in the government, whence their whole
prosperity is derived.
The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own
members; for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses. At Rome,
which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy, the senate did not
fill up the vacant places in their own body; the new members were
nominated by the censors.[20]
In a republic, the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant power
produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy. In the latter the
laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted themselves to, the
constitution; and the principle of government checks the monarch: but in
a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant
power,[21] the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws
foresaw it not, and consequently made no provision against it.
There is an exception to this rule, when the constitution is such as to
have immediate need of a magistrate invested with extraordinary power.
Such was Rome with her dictators, such is Venice with her state
inquisitors; these are formidable magistrates, who restore, as it were
by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that these
magistracies are so very different in these two republics? It is because
Rome supported the remains of her aristocracy against the people;
whereas Venice employs her state inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy
against the nobles. The consequence was that at Rome the dictatorship
could be only of short duration, as the people acted through passion and
not with design. It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should
be exercised with lustre and pomp, the business being to intimidate, and
not to punish, the multitude. It was also proper that the dictator
should be created only for some particular affair, and for this only
should have an unlimited authority, as he was always created upon some
sudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occasion for a
permanent magistracy; for here it is that schemes may be set on foot,
continued, suspended, and resumed; that the ambition of a single person
becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many.
They have occasion for a secret magistracy, the crimes they punish being
hatched in secrecy and silence. This magistracy must have a general
inquisition, for their business is not to remedy known disorders, but to
prevent the unknown. In a word, the latter is designed to punish
suspected crimes; whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment
even for crimes that were openly avowed.
In all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by
the brevity of the duration. This most legislators have fixed to a year;
a longer space would be dangerous, and a shorter would be contrary to
the nature of government. For who is it that in the management even of
his domestic affairs would be thus confined? At Ragusa[22] the chief
magistrate of the republic is changed every month, the other officers
every week, and the governor of the castle every day. But this can take
place only in a small republic environed[23] by formidable powers, who
might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant magistrates.
The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the
legislature are so few and inconsiderable that the governing party have
no interest in oppressing them. Thus when[24] Antipater made a law at
Athens that whosoever was not worth two thousand drachms should have no
power to vote, he formed by this method the best aristocracy possible;
because this was so small a sum as to exclude very few, and not one of
any rank or consideration in the city.
Aristocratic families ought therefore, as much as possible, to level
themselves in appearance with the people. The more an aristocracy
borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection: and, in
proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect.
But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the people
that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command, as the
aristocracy of Poland, where the peasants are slaves to the nobility.
4. Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government. The
intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers constitute the nature of
monarchical government; I mean of that in which a single person governs
by fundamental laws. I said the intermediate, subordinate, and dependent
powers. And indeed, in monarchies the prince is the source of all power,
political and civil. These fundamental laws necessarily suppose the
intermediate channels through which the power flows: for if there be
only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the
state, nothing can be fixed, and of course there is no fundamental law.
The most natural, intermediate, and subordinate power is that of the
nobility. This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy,
whose fundamental maxim is: no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no
monarch; but there may be a despotic prince.
There are men who have endeavoured in some countries in Europe to
suppress the jurisdiction of the nobility, not perceiving that they were
driving at the very thing that was done by the parliament of England.
Abolish the privileges of the lords, the clergy and cities in a
monarchy, and you will soon have a popular state, or else a despotic
government.
The courts of a considerable kingdom in Europe have, for many ages, been
striking at the patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords and clergy. We do
not pretend to censure these sage magistrates; but we leave it to the
public to judge how far this may alter the constitution. Far am I from
being prejudiced in favour of the privileges of the clergy; however, I
should be glad if their jurisdiction were once fixed. The question is
not whether their jurisdiction was justly established; but whether it be
really established; whether it constitutes a part of the laws of the
country, and is in every respect in relation to those laws: whether
between two powers acknowledged independent, the conditions ought not to
be reciprocal; and whether it be not equally the duty of a good subject
to defend the prerogative of the prince, and to maintain the limits
which from time immemorial have been prescribed to his authority.
Though the ecclesiastic power be so dangerous in a republic, yet it is
extremely proper in a monarchy, especially of the absolute kind. What
would become of Spain and Portugal, since the subversion of their laws,
were it not for this only barrier against the incursions of arbitrary
power? A barrier ever useful when there is no other: for since a
despotic government is productive of the most dreadful calamities to
human nature, the very evil that restrains it is beneficial to the
subject.
In the same manner as the ocean, threatening to overflow the whole
earth, is stopped by weeds and pebbles that lie scattered along the
shore, so monarchs, whose power seems unbounded, are restrained by the
smallest obstacles, and suffer their natural pride to be subdued by
supplication and prayer.
The English, to favour their liberty, have abolished all the
intermediate powers of which their monarchy was composed. They have a
great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty; were they ever to be
so unhappy as to lose it, they would be one of the most servile nations
upon earth.
Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a republican and monarchical
constitution, was one of the greatest promoters of absolute power ever
known in Europe. Besides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to
his direction, he would fain suppress all the intermediate ranks, and
abolish the political communities. He was dissolving[25] the monarchy by
his chimerical reimbursements, and seemed as if he even wanted to redeem
the constitution.
It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy; there must
be also a depositary of the laws. This depositary can only be the judges
of the supreme courts of justice, who promulgate the new laws, and
revive the obsolete. The natural ignorance of the nobility, their
indolence and contempt of civil government, require that there should be
a body invested with the power of reviving and executing the laws, which
would be otherwise buried in oblivion. The prince's council are not a
proper depositary. They are naturally the depositary of the momentary
will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Besides, the
prince's council is continually changing; it is neither permanent nor
numerous; neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the
people; consequently it is capable of setting them right in difficult
conjunctures, or of reducing them to proper obedience.
Despotic governments, where there are no fundamental laws, have no such
kind of depositary. Hence it is that religion has generally so much
influence in those countries, because it forms a kind of permanent
depositary; and if this cannot be said of religion, it may of the
customs that are respected instead of laws.
5. Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government. From
the nature of despotic power it follows that the single person, invested
with this power, commits the execution of it also to a single person. A
man whom his senses continually inform that he himself is everything and
that his subjects are nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and
ignorant. In consequence of this, he neglects the management of public
affairs. But were he to commit the administration to many, there would
be continual disputes among them; each would form intrigues to be his
first slave; and he would be obliged to take the reins into his own
hands. It is, therefore, more natural for him to resign it to a
vizir,[26] and to invest him with the same power as himself. The
creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government.
It is related of a pope that he had started an infinite number of
difficulties against his election, from a thorough conviction of his
incapacity. At length he was prevailed on to accept of the pontificate,
and resigned the administration entirely to his nephew. He was soon
struck with surprise, and said, "I should never have thought that these
things were so easy." The same may be said of the princes of the East,
who, being educated in a prison where eunuchs corrupt their hearts and
debase their understandings, and where they are frequently kept ignorant
even of their high rank, when drawn forth in order to be placed on the
throne, are at first confounded: but as soon as they have chosen a
vizir, and abandoned themselves in their seraglio to the most brutal
passions; pursuing, in the midst of a prostituted court, every
capricious extravagance, they would never have dreamed that they could
find matters so easy.
The more extensive the empire, the larger the seraglio; and consequently
the more voluptuous the prince. Hence the more nations such a sovereign
has to rule, the less he attends to the cares of government; the more
important his affairs, the less he makes them the subject of his
deliberations.
______
1. Compare Aristotle, Politics, vi. 2.
2. Declamations, 17, 18.
3. See the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of
the Romans, 9.
4. Pp. 691, 693, ed. Wechel, 1596.
5. Bk. i.
6. Bk. iv, art. 15 et seq.
7. See in the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline
of the Romans, 9, how this spirit of Servius Tullius was preserved in
the republic.
8. Dionysius Halicarnassus, Eulogium of Isocrates, ii, p. 97, ed.
Wechel. Pollux, viii. 10, art. 130.
9. See Aristotle's Politics, ii. 12.
10. Ibid, iv. 9.
11. See the oration of Demosthenes, De Falsa legat., and the oration
against Timarchus.
12. They used even to draw two tickets for each place, one which gave
the place, and the other which named the person who was to succeed, in
case the first was rejected.
13. De Leg., i, iii.
14. They were called leges tabulares; two tablets were presented to each
citizen, the first marked with an A, for Antique, or I forbid it; and
the other with an U and an R, for Uti rogas, or Be it as you desire.
15. At Athens the people used to lift up their hands.
16. As at Venice.
17. The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered the suffrages of the
Areopagites to be public, in order to manage them as they pleased. --
Lysias, Orat. contra Agorat. 8.
18. See Dionysius Halicarnassus, iv, ix.
19. See Mr. Addison, Travels to Italy, p. 16.
20. They were named at first by the consuls.
21. This is what ruined the republic of Rome. See Considerations on the
Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans, 14, 16.
22. Tournefort, Voyages.
23. At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months.
24. Diodorus, xviii, p. 601, ed. Rhodoman.
25. Ferdinand, king of Aragon, made himself grand master of the orders,
and that alone changed the constitution.
26. The Eastern kings are never without vizirs, says Sir John Chardin.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government
1. Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government. Having
examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government, we must
investigate those which relate to its principle.
There is this difference between the nature and principle[1] of
government, that the former is that by which it is constituted, the
latter that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure,
and the other the human passions which set it in motion.
Now, laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of
each government. We must, therefore, inquire into this principle, which
shall be the subject of this third book.
2. Of the Principle of different Governments. I have already observed
that it is the nature of a republican government that either the
collective body of the people, or particular families, should be
possessed of the supreme power; of a monarchy, that the prince should
have this power, but in the execution of it should be directed by
established laws; of a despotic government, that a single person should
rule according to his own will and caprice. This enables me to discover
their three principles; which are thence naturally derived. I shall
begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of
democracy.
3. Of the Principle of Democracy. There is no great share of probity
necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of
laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct
and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is
necessary, namely, virtue.
What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of
historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it
is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the
laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue
than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the
execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their
direction.
Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence,
ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil;
he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But
when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as
this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is
certainly undone.
A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent
efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they
who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue;
as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of
their members;[2] as the prevailing parties were successively animated
by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the
people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a
commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent
shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which
they had so wantonly proscribed.
When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city
was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble
remains of virtue, which were continually diminishing. Instead of being
roused from her lethargy by Cæsar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and
Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows,
her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.
The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other
support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely
taken up with manufacture, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.
When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are
disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The
objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has
become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws,
but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen
is like a slave who has run away from his master, that which was a maxim
of equity he calls rigour; that which was a rule of action he styles
constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and
not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of
individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this has become the
patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on
the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the
licence of many.
Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so
gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty
thousand citizens[3] when she defended the Greeks against the Persians,
when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had
twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them[4] as slaves are
told by the head in a market-place. When Philip attempted to lord it
over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens[5] she had even then
lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to
awaken her; she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of
her pleasures.[6] This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats,
and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes,
was overthrown at Chæronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of
resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners,
if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over
the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.
How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal,
upon his being made prætor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from
plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans?
Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and be beholden for
their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having
three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them
next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war.[7]
From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city, one may judge of
what she might have performed in her full vigour, and assisted by
virtue.
4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy. As virtue is necessary in a popular
government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in
the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.
The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects
with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have,
therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But
how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws
against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting
against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the
very nature of the constitution.
An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy.
The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own
particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there
are laws in being to see them executed.
But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people,
it is difficult to restrain themselves.[8] Such is the nature of this
constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the
power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.
Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by
a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a
level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic;
or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one
another, and upon this their preservation depends.
Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation,
I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and
pusillanimity.
5. That Virtue is not the Principle of a Monarchical Government. In
monarchies, policy effects great things with as little virtue as
possible. Thus in the nicest machines, art has reduced the number of
movements, springs, and wheels.
The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the
thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest
interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the
ancients, and to us are known only by tradition.
The laws supply here the place of those virtues; they are by no means
wanted, and the state dispenses with them: an action performed here in
secret is in some measure of no consequence.
Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a
distinction between crimes really public and those that are private,
which are so called because they are more injurious to individuals than
to the community.
Now in republics private crimes are more public, that is, they attack
the constitution more than they do individuals; and in monarchies,
public crimes are more private, that is, they are more prejudicial to
private people than to the constitution.
I beg that no one will be offended with what I have been saying; my
observations are founded on the unanimous testimony of historians. I am
not ignorant that virtuous princes are so very rare; but I venture to
affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be
virtuous.[9]
Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning
the courts of monarchs; let us recollect the conversations and
sentiments of people of all countries, in respect to the wretched
character of courtiers, and we shall find that these are not airy
speculations, but truths confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience.
Ambition in idleness; meanness mixed with pride; a desire of riches
without industry; aversion to truth; flattery, perfidy, violation of
engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope
from his weakness, but, above all, a perpetual ridicule cast upon
virtue, are, I think, the characteristics by which most courtiers in all
ages and countries have been constantly distinguished. Now, it is
exceedingly difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves,
and the inferior sort to be honest; for the former to be cheats, and the
latter to rest satisfied with being only dupes.
But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man[10] among the
people. Cardinal Richelieu, in his political testament, seems to hint
that a prince should take care not to employ him.[11] So true is it that
virtue is not the spring of this government! It is not indeed excluded,
but it is not the spring of government.
6. In what Manner Virtue is supplied in a Monarchical Government. But it
is high time for me to have done with this subject, lest I should be
suspected of writing a satire against monarchical government. Far be it
from me; if monarchy wants one spring, it is provided with another.
Honour, that is, the prejudice of every person and rank, supplies the
place of the political virtue of which I have been speaking, and is
everywhere her representative: here it is capable of inspiring the most
glorious actions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us to the
end of government as well as virtue itself.
Hence, in well-regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects,
and very few good men; for to be a good man[12] a good intention is
necessary,[13] and we should love our country, not so much on our own
account, as out of regard to the community.
7. Of the Principle of Monarchy. A monarchical government supposes, as
we have already observed, pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble
descent. Now since it is the nature of honour to aspire to preferments
and titles, it is properly placed in this government.
Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has some good
effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this
advantage, that it is in no way dangerous, because it may be continually
checked.
It is with this kind of government as with the system of the universe,
in which there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the
centre, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honour sets
all the parts of the body politic in motion, and by its very action
connects them; thus each individual advances the public good, while he
only thinks of promoting his own interest.
True it is that, philosophically speaking, it is a false honour which
moves all the parts of the government; but even this false honour is as
useful to the public as true honour could possibly be to private
persons.
Is it not very exacting to oblige men to perform the most difficult
actions, such as require an extraordinary exertion of fortitude and
resolution, without other recompense than that of glory and applause?
8. That Honour is not the Principle of Despotic Government. Honour is
far from being the principle of despotic government: mankind being here
all upon a level, no one person can prefer himself to another; and as on
the other hand they are all slaves, they can give themselves no sort of
preference.
Besides, as honour has its laws and rules, as it knows not how to
submit; as it depends in a great measure on a man's own caprice, and not
on that of another person; it can be found only in countries in which
the constitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.
How can despotism abide with honour? The one glories in the contempt of
life; and the other is founded on the power of taking it away. How can
honour, on the other hand, bear with despotism? The former has its fixed
rules, and peculiar caprices; but the latter is directed by no rule, and
its own caprices are subversive of all others.
Honour, therefore, a thing unknown in arbitrary governments, some of
which have not even a proper word to express it,[14] is the prevailing
principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic,
to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.
9. Of the Principle of Despotic Government. As virtue is necessary in a
republic, and in a monarchy honour, so fear is necessary in a despotic
government: with regard to virtue, there is no occasion for it, and
honour would be extremely dangerous.
Here the immense power of the prince devolves entirely upon those whom
he is pleased to entrust with the administration. Persons capable of
setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create disturbances.
Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least
sense of ambition.
A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and without the least
danger, relax its springs. It supports itself by the laws, and by its
own internal strength. But when a despotic prince ceases for one single
moment to uplift his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom
he has entrusted with the first employments,[15] all is over: for as
fear, the spring of this government, no longer subsists, the people are
left without a protector.
It is probably in this sense the Cadis maintained that the Grand
Seignior was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited
thereby his authority.[16]
It is necessary that the people should be judged by laws, and the great
men by the caprice of the prince, that the lives of the lowest subject
should be safe, and the pasha's head ever in danger. We cannot mention
these monstrous governments without horror. The Sophi of Persia,
dethroned in our days by Mahomet, the son of Miriveis, saw the
constitution subverted before this resolution, because he had been too
sparing of blood.[17]
History informs us that the horrid cruelties of Domitian struck such a
terror into the governors that the people recovered themselves a little
during his reign.[18] Thus a torrent overflows one side of a country,
and on the other leaves fields untouched, where the eye is refreshed by
the prospect of fine meadows.
10. Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments. In
despotic states, the nature of government requires the most passive
obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought
infallibly to produce its effect.
Here they have no limitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms,
equivalents, or remonstrances; no change to propose: man is a creature
that blindly submits to the absolute will of the sovereign.
In a country like this they are no more allowed to represent their
apprehensions of a future danger than to impute their miscarriage to the
capriciousness of fortune. Man's portion here, like that of beasts, is
instinct, compliance, and punishment.
Little does it then avail to plead the sentiments of nature, filial
respect, conjugal or parental tenderness, the laws of honour, or want of
health; the order is given, and, that is sufficient.
In Persia, when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful
to mention his name, or to intercede in his favour. Even if the prince
were intoxicated, or non compos, the decree must be executed;[19]
otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no
contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in that country in all
ages; as the order which Ahasuerus gave, to exterminate the Jews, could
not be revoked, they were allowed the liberty of defending themselves.
One thing, however, may be sometimes opposed to the prince's will,[20]
namely, religion. They will abandon, nay they will slay a parent, if the
prince so commands; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. The laws of
religion are of a superior nature, because they bind the sovereign as
well as the subject. But with respect to the law of nature, it is
otherwise; the prince is no longer supposed to be a man.
In monarchical and moderate states, the power is limited by its very
spring, I mean by honour, which, like a monarch, reigns over the prince
and his people. They will not allege to their sovereign the laws of
religion; a courtier would be apprehensive of rendering himself
ridiculous. But the laws of honour will be appealed to on all occasions.
Hence arise the restrictions necessary to obedience; honour is naturally
subject to whims, by which the subject's submission will be ever
directed.
Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of
government, the power is the same. On which side soever the monarch
turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is
that in a monarchy the prince receives instruction, at the same time
that his ministers have greater abilities, and are more versed in public
affairs, than the ministers of a despotic government.
11. Reflections on the preceding Chapters. Such are the principles of
the three sorts of government: which does not imply that in a particular
republic they actually are, but that they ought to be, virtuous; nor
does it prove that in a particular monarchy they are actuated by honour,
or in a particular despotic government by fear; but that they ought to
be directed by these principles, otherwise the government is imperfect.
______
1. This is a very important distinction, whence I shall draw many
consequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws.
2. Cromwell.
3. Plutarch, Pericles; Plato, in Critias.
4. She had at that time twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand
strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves. See Athenæus, vi.
5. She had then twenty thousand citizens. See Demosthenes in Aristog.
6. They had passed a law, which rendered it a capital crime for any one
to propose applying the money designed for the theatres to military
7. This lasted three years.
8. Public crimes may be punished, because it is here a common concern;
but private crimes will go unpunished, because it is the common interest
not to punish them.
9. I speak here of political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is
directed to the public good; very little of private moral virtue, and
not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths. This will
appear better in v. 2.
10. This is to be understood in the sense of the preceding note.
11. We must not, says he, employ people of mean extraction; they are too
rigid and morose. -- Testament Polit., 4.
12. This word good man is understood here in a political sense only.
13. See Footnote 1.
14. See Perry, p. 447.
15. As it often happens in a military aristocracy.
16. Ricaut on the Ottoman Empire. I, ii.
17. See the history of this revolution by Father du Cerceau.
18. Suetonius, Life of Domitian, viii. His was a military constitution,
which is one of the species of despotic government.
19. See Sir John Chardin.
20. Ibid.
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Book IV. That the Laws of Education Ought to Be in Relation to the
Principles of Government
1. Of the Laws of Education. The laws of education are the first
impressions we receive; and as they prepare us for civil life, every
private family ought to be governed by the plan of that great household
which comprehends them all.
If the people in general have a principle, their constituent parts, that
is, the several families, will have one also. The laws of education will
be therefore different in each species of government: in monarchies they
will have honour for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic
governments, fear.
2. Of Education in Monarchies. In monarchies the principal branch of
education is not taught in colleges or academies. It commences, in some
measure, at our setting out in the world; for this is the school of what
we call honour, that universal preceptor which ought everywhere to be
our guide.
Here it is that we constantly hear three rules or maxims, viz., that we
should have a certain nobleness in our virtues, a kind of frankness in
our morals, and a particular politeness in our behaviour.
The virtues we are here taught are less what we owe to others than to
ourselves; they are not so much what draws us towards society, as what
distinguishes us from our fellow-citizens. Here the actions of men are
judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not
as reasonable, but as extraordinary. When honour here meets with
anything noble in our actions, it is either a judge that approves them,
or sophist by whom they are excused.
It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection,
or with that of conquest; this is the reason why we never meet with so
strict a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican governments.
It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the notion of greatness
of soul or importance of affairs; as, for instance, in politics, with
finesses of which it is far from being offended.
It does not forbid adulation, save when separated from the idea of a
large fortune, and connected only with the sense of our mean condition.
With regard to morals, I have observed that the education of monarchies
ought to admit of a certain frankness and open carriage. Truth,
therefore, in conversation is here a necessary point. But is it for the
sake of truth? By no means. Truth is requisite only because a person
habituated to veracity has an air of boldness and freedom. And indeed a
man of this stamp seems to lay a stress only on the things themselves,
not on the manner in which they are received.
Hence it is that in proportion as this kind of frankness is commended,
that of the common people is despised, which has nothing but truth and
simplicity for its object.
In fine, the education of monarchies requires a certain politeness of
behaviour. Man, a sociable animal, is formed to please in