BOOK III

ANTONIUS' ADVANCE

On the Flavian side the generals concerted their plans for the war 1
with greater loyalty and greater success. They had met at Poetovio[1]
at the head-quarters of the Third legion, where they debated whether
they should block the passage of the Pannonian Alps and wait until
their whole strength came up to reinforce them, or whether they should
take a bolder line, assume the offensive, and strike for Italy. Those
who were in favour of waiting for reinforcements and prolonging the war dwelt on the strength and reputation of the German legions, and
pointed out that the flower of the British army had lately arrived in
Rome with Vitellius;[2] their own forces were numerically inferior and
had recently suffered defeat; moreover, conquered troops, however bold
their language, never show the same courage. On the other hand, if
they occupied the Alps, Mucianus would soon arrive with the forces
from the East. Besides, Vespasian still[3] commanded the sea, and
could count on the support of the fleets[4] and of the provinces,
where he could still raise material for a sort of second war. A
salutary delay would bring them fresh forces without in any way
prejudicing their present position.

In answer to these arguments Antonius Primus,[5] who had done more 2
than any one else to stir up the war, stoutly maintained that prompt
action would save them and ruin Vitellius. 'Their victory,' he said,
'has not served to inspirit but to enervate them. The men are not held
in readiness in camp, but are loitering in towns all over Italy. No
one but their hosts has any call to fear them. The more unruly and
ferocious they showed themselves before, the greater the greed with
which they now indulge in unwonted draughts of pleasure. The circus,
the theatre, and the charms of the capital have ruined their hardness
and their health. But if we give them time to train for war they will
regain their energy. It is not far to Germany, whence they draw their
main strength. Britain is only separated by a narrow channel. Close at
hand they have Gaul and Spain, from the provinces of which they can
get men, horses, and subsidies. Then again, they can rely on Italy
itself and all the resources of the capital, while, if they want to
take the offensive, they have two fleets[6] and full command of the
Illyrian Sea.[7] Besides, what good to us are the ramparts of the
mountains? Why should we drag on the war into another summer? Where
can we get funds and supplies in the meanwhile? No, let us seize our
opportunity. The Pannonian legions are burning to rise in revenge.
They were not defeated but deceived.[8] The Moesian army has not yet
lost a man. If you count not legions but men, our forces are superior
both in numbers and in character. The very shame of our defeat[9]
makes for good discipline. And even then our cavalry was not beaten.
For though we lost the day, they shattered the enemy's line.[10] And
what was the force that broke through the Vitellians? Two regiments of
cavalry from Pannonia and Moesia. What have we now? Sixteen regiments.
Will not their combined forces, as they roar and thunder down upon the
enemy, burying them in clouds of dust, overwhelm these horses and
horsemen that have forgotten how to fight? I have given you my plan,
and, unless I am stopped, I will put it in operation. Some of you have
not yet burnt your boats.[11] Well, you can keep back the legions.
Give me the auxiliaries in light marching order. They will be enough
for me. You will soon hear that the door of Italy is open and the
power of Vitellius shaken. You will be glad enough to follow in the
footsteps of my victory.'

All this and much else of the same tenor Antonius poured out with 3
flashing eyes, raising his voice so as to reach the centurions and
some of the soldiers, who had gathered round to share in their
deliberations.[12] His truculent tone carried away even the more
cautious and far-seeing, while the rest of the crowd were filled with
contempt for the cowardice of the other generals, and cheered their
one and only leader to the echo. He had already established his
reputation at the original meeting, when Vespasian's letter[13] was
read. Most of the generals had then taken an ambiguous line, intending
to interpret their language in the light of subsequent events. But
Antonius seemed to have taken the field without any disguise, and this
carried more weight with the men, who saw that he must share their
disgrace or their glory.

Next to Antonius in influence stood Cornelius Fuscus, the imperial 4
agent.[14] He, too, always attacked Vitellius in no mild terms, and
had left himself no hope in case of failure. Tampius Flavianus[15] was
a man whose disposition and advanced years inclined him to dilatory
measures, and he soon began to earn the dislike and suspicion of the
soldiers, who felt he had not forgotten his kinship with Vitellius.
Besides this, when the legions first rose, he had fled to Italy and
subsequently returned of his own free will, which looked like
meditating treachery.[16] Having once given up his province and
returned to Italy, he was out of the reach of danger, but the passion
for revolution had induced him to resume his title and meddle in the
civil war. It was Cornelius Fuscus who had persuaded him to this--not
that he needed his assistance, but because he felt that, especially at
the outset of the rising, the prestige of an ex-consul would be a
valuable asset to the party.

In order to make their march across into Italy safe and effective, 5
letters were sent to Aponius Saturninus[17] to bring the Moesian army
up as quickly as possible. To prevent the exposure of the defenceless
provinces to the attacks of foreign tribes, the chiefs of the
Sarmatian Iazyges,[18] who formed the government of the tribe, were
enlisted in the service. They also offered their tribal force,
consisting entirely of cavalry, but were excused from this
contribution for fear that the civil war might give opportunity for a
foreign invasion, or that an offer of higher pay from the enemy might
tempt them to sacrifice their duty and their honour.[19] Sido and
Italicus, two princes of the Suebi,[20] were allowed to join
Vespasian's side. They had long acknowledged Roman sovereignty, and
companionship in arms[21] was likely to strengthen the loyalty of the
tribe. Some auxiliaries were stationed on the flank towards Raetia,
where hostilities were expected, since the imperial agent Porcius
Septiminus,[22] remained incorruptibly loyal to Vitellius. Sextilius
Felix was therefore dispatched with Aurius' Horse[23] and eight
cohorts of auxiliary infantry, together with the native levies of
Noricum, to hold the line of the river Aenus,[24] which forms the
frontier of Raetia and Noricum. Neither side provoked a battle: the
fortune of the rival parties was decided elsewhere.

Meanwhile, at the head of a picked band of auxiliaries and part of 6
the cavalry, Antonius hurried off to invade Italy. He took with him an
energetic soldier named Arrius Varus, who had made his reputation
while serving under Corbulo in his Armenian victories. He was supposed
to have sought a private interview with Nero, at which he maligned
Corbulo's character. His infamous treachery brought him the emperor's
favour and a post as senior centurion. This ill-gotten prize delighted
him now, but ultimately proved his ruin.[25]

After occupying Aquileia,[26] Antonius and Varus found a ready welcome
at Opitergium and Altinum[27] and all the other towns in the
neighbourhood. At Altinum a garrison was left behind to guard their
communications against the fleet at Ravenna, for the news of its
desertion had not as yet arrived. Pressing forward, they won Patavium
and Ateste[28] for the party. At the latter place they learnt that
three cohorts of Vitellius' auxiliary infantry and a regiment of
cavalry, known as Sebosus' Horse,[29] were established at Forum
Alieni,[30] where they had constructed a bridge.[31] The report added
that they were off their guard, so this seemed a good opportunity to
attack them. They accordingly rushed the position at dawn, and cut
down many of the men without their weapons. Orders had been given
that, after a few had been killed, the rest should be terrorized into
desertion. Some surrendered at once, but the majority succeeded in
destroying the bridge, and thus checked the enemy's pursuit. The first
bout had gone in the Flavians' favour.

When the news spread to Poetovio, the Seventh Galbian and the 7
Thirteenth Gemina hurried in high spirits to Patavium under the
command of Vedius Aquila. At Patavium they were given a few days'
rest, during which Minicius Justus, the camp-prefect of the Seventh
legion, who endeavoured to enforce a standard of discipline too severe
for civil war, had to be rescued from the fury of his troops and sent
to Vespasian. Antonius conceived that his party would gain in
prestige, if they showed approval of Galba's government, and stood for
the revival of his cause. So he gave orders that all the statues of
Galba, which had been thrown down during the civil war, should be
replaced for worship throughout the country towns. This was a thing
that had long been desired, and in their ambitious imaginations it
assumed an undue importance.

The question then arose where they should choose their seat of war. 8
The best place seemed to be Verona. The open country round it was
suited for the manoeuvres of the cavalry, in which their strength
lay: and they would gain both prestige and profit by wresting from
Vitellius a strongly garrisoned town. On the road they occupied
Vicetia.[32] In itself this was a very small matter, since there was
only a moderate force in the town, but it gained considerable
importance from the reflection that it was Caecina's birthplace: the
enemy's general had thus lost his native town. But Verona was well
worth while. The inhabitants could aid the party with encouragement
and funds: the army was thrust midway between Raetia and the Julian
Alps,[33] and had thus blocked all passages by that route for the
German armies.

This move had been made either without the knowledge or against the
orders of Vespasian. His instructions were to suspend operations at
Aquileia and wait for the arrival of Mucianus. He had further added
this consideration, that so long as he held Egypt and the key to the
corn-supply,[34] as well as the revenue of the richest provinces,[35]
he could reduce Vitellius' army to submission from sheer lack of money
and provisions. Mucianus had sent letter after letter with the same
advice, pointing to the prospect of a victory without bloodshed or
bereavement, and using other similar pretexts to conceal his real
motive. This was ambition. He wanted to keep all the glory of the war
to himself. However, the distance was so great that events outran his
instructions.

Antonius accordingly made a sudden sally against the enemy's 9
outposts, and after a slight skirmish, in which they tested each
other's temper, both sides withdrew without advantage. Soon after,
Caecina entrenched a strong position between a Veronese village called
Hostilia[36] and the marshes of the river Tartaro. Here he was safe,
with the river in his rear and the marsh to guard his flanks. Had he
added loyalty to his other advantages, he might have employed the full
strength of the Vitellian forces to crush the enemy's two legions,
before they were reinforced by the Moesian army, or, at least, have
forced them to retire in ignominious flight and abandon Italy. But
Caecina used various pretexts for delay, and at the outset of the war
treacherously yielded all his advantages to the enemy. While it was
open to him to rout them by force of arms, he preferred to pester them
with letters and to wait until his intermediaries had settled the
terms of his treason. In the meantime, Aponius Saturninus arrived with
the Seventh Claudian legion,[37] commanded by the tribune[38]
Vipstanus Messala, a distinguished member of a famous family, and the
only man who brought any honesty to this war.[39] To these forces,
still only three legions and no match for the Vitellians, Caecina
addressed his letters. He criticized their rash attempt to sustain a
lost cause, and at the same time praised the courage of the German
army in the highest terms. His allusions to Vitellius were few and
casual, and he refrained from insulting Vespasian. In fact he used no
language calculated either to seduce or to terrorize the enemy. The
Flavian generals made no attempt to explain away their former defeat.
They proudly championed Vespasian, showing their loyalty to the cause,
their confidence in the army, and their hostile prejudice[40] against
Vitellius. To the tribunes and centurions they held out the hope of
retaining all the favours they had won from Vitellius, and they urged
Caecina himself in plain terms to desert. These letters were both
read before a meeting of the Flavian army, and served to increase
their confidence, for while Caecina wrote mildly and seemed afraid of
offending Vespasian, their own generals had answered contemptuously
and scoffed at Vitellius.

When the two other legions arrived, the Third[41] commanded by 10
Dillius Aponianus, and the Eighth by Numisius Lupus, Antonius decided
to entrench Verona and make a demonstration in force. It so happened
that the Galbian legion, who had been told off to work in the trenches
facing the enemy, catching sight of some of their allies' cavalry in
the distance, took them for the enemy, and fell into a groundless
panic. Suspecting treachery, they seized their arms and visited their
fury on Tampius Flavianus.[42] They could prove no charge against him,
but he had long been unpopular, and a blind impulse made them clamour
for his head. He was Vitellius' kinsman, they howled; he had betrayed
Otho; he had embezzled their donative. They would listen to no
defence, although he implored them with outstretched hands, grovelling
for the most part flat upon the ground, his clothes all torn, his face
and chest shaken with sobs. This only served to inflame the soldiers'
anger. His very excess of terror seemed to prove his guilt.
Aponius[43] tried to address them, but his voice was drowned in their
shouts. The others, too, were contemptuously howled down. They would
give no one a hearing except Antonius, who had the power of authority
as well as the arts of eloquence necessary to quiet a mob. When the
riot grew worse, and they began to pass from insulting speeches to
murderous violence, he gave orders that Flavianus should be put in
chains. Feeling that this was a farce,[44] the soldiers broke through
the guards round the general's quarters, prepared to resort to
extremities. Whereupon Antonius, drawing his sword, bared his breast
and vowed that he would die either by their hands or his own. Whenever
he saw a soldier whom he knew or could recognize by his decorations,
he called on him by name to come to the rescue. At last he turned
towards the standards and the gods of war,[45] and prayed incessantly
that they would rather inspire the enemy's army with this mad spirit
of mutiny. At last the riot died away and at nightfall they all
dispersed to their tents. Flavianus left that same night, and on his
way met letters from Vespasian, which delivered him from danger.

The infection seemed to spread among the legions. They next 11
attacked Aponius Saturninus, who was in command of the Moesian army.
This fresh disturbance was caused by the circulation of a letter,
which Saturninus was supposed to have written to Vitellius, and it was
the more alarming since it broke out not when they were tired by their
labours but in the middle of the day. Once the soldiers had vied with
each other in courage and discipline: now they were rivals in ribaldry
and riot. They were determined that the fury with which they denounced
Aponius should not fall short of their outcry against Flavianus. The
Moesian legions remembered that they had helped the Pannonian army to
take their revenge; while the Pannonian troops, feeling that their
comrades' mutiny acquitted them of blame, were glad enough to repeat
the crime. They invaded the country house in which Saturninus was
living. He escaped, however, aided not so much by the efforts of
Antonius, Aponianus, and Messala, who did everything in their power to
rescue him, but rather by the security of his hiding-place, for he
concealed himself in the furnace of some disused baths. Eventually he
gave up his lictors and retired to Patavium. The departure of both the
consular governors left Antonius in supreme command of the two armies.
His colleagues[46] deferred to him and the men gave him enthusiastic
support. It was even supposed by some that he had cunningly promoted
both outbreaks, to secure for himself the full profit of the war.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Petau.

[2] i.e. the detachments 8,000 strong from the army in
Britain (see ii. 57).

[3] i.e. still, after parting with the force which he had
sent forward under Mucianus (see ii. 82, 83).

[4] Of Pontus, Syria, and Egypt.

[5] See ii. 86.

[6] Of Misenum and Ravenna.

[7] Adriatic.

[8] See ii. 42.

[9] At Bedriacum.

[10] See ii. 41.

[11] i.e. not yet declared finally against Vitellius.

[12] These were usually confined to the legates,
camp-prefects, tribunes, and senior centurions.

[13] See ii. 82.

[14] In Pannonia (see ii. 86).

[15] Military governor of Pannonia (see ii. 86).

[16] i.e. they suspected that he wanted to alienate the
troops from Vespasian.

[17] Military governor of Moesia (see i. 79, &c.).

[18] They occupied part of Hungary between the Danube and the
Theiss.

[19] They took the chiefs as a pledge of peace and kept them
safely apart from their tribal force.

[20] Tiberius' son, Drusus, had in A.D. 19 settled the Suebi
north of the Danube between the rivers March and Waag.

[21] Reading _commilitio_ (Meiser). The word _commissior_ in
the Medicean manuscript gives no sense.

[22] This being a small province the procurator was sole
governor.

[23] A squadron of Spanish horse, called after some governor
of the province where it was raised.

[24] The Inn.

[25] Probably under Domitian, who married Corbulo's daughter.

[26] See ii. 46.

[27] Oderzo and Altino.

[28] Este.

[29] A Gallic troop called after some unknown governor.

[30] (?) Legnago.

[31] Over the Adige.

[32] Vicenza.

[33] The Brenner.

[34] i.e. Alexandria.

[35] i.e. Egypt, Syria, Asia.

[36] Ostiglia.

[37] From Moesia (cp. chap. 5).

[38] The legate Tettius Julianus had fled (see ii. 85).

[39] He also wrote a history of the period, which Tacitus
found useful (see ii. 101, note 459). He is one of the
characters in the _Dialogue on Oratory_, and many passages
show that Tacitus admired him greatly, both for his character
and his eloquence.

[40] The text here is doubtful. There seems to be no exact
parallel to the absolute use of _praesumpsere_. In the
Medicean MS. the whole passage, from _revirescere_ at the end
of chap. 7 down to _inimici_ here, has been transposed to the
beginning of chap. 5, where it stands between the second and
third syllables of the word _Saturnino_. Thus in M.
_praesumpsere_ stands immediately after _partes_. It is
possible that the word _partes_ may belong to this passage as
well as to the end of chap. 7. _Praesumpsere partes_ would
mean 'they took their own cause for granted' (cp. Quintilian
xi. 1. 27). The addition of _ut inimici_ would add the sense
of 'hostile prejudice'.

[41] Gallica.

[42] See chap. 4, note 15.

[43] Saturninus.

[44] We have seen this trick before (cp. i. 45).

[45] Mars, Bellona, Victoria, Pavor, &c., whose images were
wrought in medallion on the shafts of the standards, which
themselves too were held sacred.

[46] i.e. Vedius, Dillius, Numisius, Vipstanus Messala.

DISSENSION IN VITELLIUS' CAMP

[47]Vitellius' party was equally a prey to disquiet, and there the 12
dissension was the more fatal, since it was aroused not by the men's
suspicions but by the treachery of the generals. The sailors of the
fleet at Ravenna were mostly drawn from the provinces of Dalmatia and
Pannonia, which were both held for Vespasian, and while they were
still wavering, the admiral, Lucilius Bassus, decided them in favour
of the Flavian party. Choosing the night-time for their treason, the
conspirators assembled at head-quarters without the knowledge of the
other sailors. Bassus, who was either ashamed or uncertain of their
success, awaited developments in his house. Amid great disturbance the
ships' captains attacked the images of Vitellius and cut down the few
men who offered any resistance. The rest of the fleet were glad enough
of a change, and their sympathies soon came round to Vespasian. Then
Lucilius appeared and publicly claimed responsibility. The fleet
appointed Cornelius Fuscus[48] as their admiral, and he came hurrying
on to the scene. Bassus was put under honourable arrest and conveyed
with an escort of Liburnian cruisers[49] to Atria,[50] where he was
imprisoned by Vibennius Rufinus, who commanded a regiment of auxiliary
horse in garrison there. However, he was soon set free on the
intervention of Hormus, one of the emperor's freedmen. For he, too,
ranked as a general.

When the news that the navy had gone over became known, Caecina, 13
carefully selecting a moment when the camp was deserted, and the men
had all gone to their various duties, summoned to head-quarters the
senior centurions and a few of the soldiers. He then proceeded to
praise the spirit and the strength of Vespasian's party: 'they
themselves had been deserted by the fleet; they were cramped for
supplies; Spain and Gaul were against them; Rome could not be
trusted.' In every way he exaggerated the weakness of Vitellius'
position. Eventually, when some of his accomplices had given the cue
and the rest were dumbfoundered by his change of front, he made them
all swear allegiance to Vespasian. Immediately the portraits[51] of
Vitellius were torn down and messengers dispatched to Antonius.
However, when the treason got abroad in the camp, and the men
returning to head-quarters saw Vespasian's name on the standards and
Vitellius' portraits scattered on the ground, at first there was an
ominous silence: then with one voice they all vented their feelings.
Had the pride of the German army sunk so low that without a battle and
without a blow they should let their hands be shackled and render up
their arms? What had they against them? None but defeated troops. The
only sound legions of Otho's army, the First and the Fourteenth,
Vespasian had not got, and even those they had routed and cut to
pieces on that same field. And all for what? That these thousands of
fighting men should be handed over like a drove of slaves to Antonius,
the convict![52] 'Eight legions, forsooth, are to follow the lead of
one miserable fleet. Such is the pleasure of Bassus and Caecina. They
have robbed the emperor of his home, his estate, and all his wealth,
and now they want to take away his troops. We have never lost a man
nor shed a drop of blood. The very Flavians will despise us. What
answer can we give when they question us about our victory or our
defeat?'

Thus they shouted one and all as their indignation urged them. Led 14
by the Fifth legion, they replaced the portraits of Vitellius and put
Caecina in irons. They selected Fabius Fabullus, commanding the Fifth
legion, and the camp-prefect, Cassius Longus, to lead them. Some
marines who arrived at this point from three Liburnian cruisers,[53]
quite innocent and unaware of what had happened, were promptly
butchered. Then the men deserted their camp, broke down the
bridge,[54] and marched back to Hostilia, and thence to Cremona to
join the two legions, the First Italian and Twenty-first Rapax, which
Caecina had sent ahead[55] with some of the cavalry to occupy Cremona.

FOOTNOTES:

[47] The narrative is now resumed from the end of Book II.

[48] See ii. 86.

[49] See ii. 16, note 247.

[50] Atri.

[51] i.e. the medallions on the standards.

[52] See ii. 86.

[53] See ii. 16, note 247.

[54] Over the Tartaro (chap. 9).

[55] See ii. 100.

THE ENGAGEMENT NEAR CREMONA

When Antonius heard of this he determined to attack the enemy 15
while they were still at variance and their forces divided. The
Vitellian generals would soon recover their authority and the troops
their discipline, and confidence would come if the two divisions were
allowed to join. He guessed also that Fabius Valens had already
started from Rome and would hasten his march when he heard of
Caecina's treachery. Valens was loyal to Vitellius and an experienced
soldier. There was good reason, besides, to fear an attack on the side
of Raetia from an immense force of German irregulars. Vitellius had
already summoned auxiliaries from Britain, Gaul, and Spain in
sufficient numbers to blight their chances utterly, had not Antonius
in fear of this very prospect forestalled the victory by hurriedly
forcing an engagement. In two days he marched his whole force from
Verona to Bedriacum.[56] On the next day[57] he left his legions
behind to fortify the camp, and sent out his auxiliary infantry into
territory belonging to Cremona, to taste the joys of plundering their
compatriots under pretext of collecting supplies. To secure greater
freedom for their depredations, he himself advanced at the head of
four thousand cavalry eight miles along the road from Bedriacum. The
scouts, as is usual, turned their attention further afield.

About eleven in the morning a mounted scout galloped up with the 16
news that the enemy were at hand; there was a small body in advance of
the rest, but the noise of an army in movement could be heard over the
country-side. While Antonius was debating what he ought to do, Arrius
Varus, who was greedy to distinguish himself, galloped out with the
keenest of the troopers and charged the Vitellians, inflicting only
slight loss; for, on the arrival of reinforcements, the tables were
turned and those who had been hottest in pursuit were now hindmost in
the rout. Their haste had no sanction from Antonius, who had foreseen
what would happen. Encouraging his men to engage with brave hearts, he
drew off the cavalry on to each flank and left a free passage in the
centre to receive Varus and his troopers. Orders were sent to the
legions to arm and signals were displayed to the foraging party,
summoning them to cease plundering and join the battle by the quickest
possible path. Meanwhile Varus came plunging in terror into the middle
of their ranks, spreading confusion among them. The fresh troops were
swept back along with the wounded, themselves sharing the panic and
sorely embarrassed by the narrowness of the road.

In all the confusion of the rout Antonius never for a moment 17
forgot what befitted a determined general and a brave soldier. Staying
the panic-stricken, checking the fugitives, wherever the fight was
thickest, wherever he saw a gleam of hope, he schemed, he fought, he
shouted, always conspicuous to his own men and a mark for the enemy.
At last, in the heat of his impatience, he thrust through with a lance
a standard-bearer, who was in full flight, then seized the standard
and turned it against the enemy. Whereupon for very shame a few of his
troopers, not more than a hundred, made a stand. The nature of the
ground helped them. The road there was narrower; a stream barred their
way, and the bridge was broken; its depth was uncertain and the steep
banks checked their flight. Thus necessity or chance restored their
fallen fortunes. Forming in close order, they received the
Vitellians' reckless and disordered charge, and at once flung them
into confusion. Antonius pressed hard on the fugitives and cut down
all who blocked his path. The others followed each his inclination,
rifling the dead, capturing prisoners, seizing arms and horses.
Meanwhile, summoned by their shouts of triumph, those who had just now
been in full flight across the fields came hurrying back to share the
victory.

Four miles from Cremona they saw the standards of the Rapax and 18
Italian legions gleaming in the sun. They had marched out thus far
under cover of their cavalry's original success. When fortune turned
against them, they neither opened their ranks to receive the routed
troops nor marched out to attack the enemy, who were wearied with
fighting and their long pursuit. While all went well the Vitellians
did not miss their general, but in the hour of danger they realized
their loss. The victorious cavalry came charging into their wavering
line, and at the same time Vipstanus Messala arrived with the Moesian
auxiliaries and a good number of men from the legions, who had kept up
with the pace of their forced march.[58] These combined forces broke
the opposing column, and the proximity of Cremona's sheltering walls
gave the Vitellians more hope of refuge and less stomach for
resistance.

FOOTNOTES:

[56] About thirty-three miles.

[57] October 27.

[58] They would be more heavily laden than the Moesian
auxiliaries.

THE FATE OF CREMONA

Antonius did not follow up his advantage. He realized that, although
the issue had been successful, the battle had long been doubtful, and
had cost the troopers and their horses many wounds and much hard
fighting. As evening fell, the whole strength of the Flavian army 19
arrived. They had marched among heaps of corpses, and the still
reeking traces of slaughter, and now, feeling that the war was over,
they clamoured to advance at once on Cremona and either receive its
submission or take it by storm. This sounded well for public
utterance, but each man in his heart was thinking, 'We could easily
rush a city on the plain. In a night-assault men are just as brave and
have a better chance of plunder. If we wait for day it will be all
peace and petitions, and what shall we get for our wounds and our
labours? A reputation for mercy! There's no money in that. All the
wealth of Cremona will find its way into the officers' pockets. Storm
a city, and the plunder goes to the soldiers: if it surrenders, the
generals get it.' They refused to listen to their centurions and
tribunes and drowned their voices in a rattle of arms, swearing they
would break their orders unless they were led out. Antonius then 20
went round among the companies, where his authoritative bearing
obtained silence. He assured them that he had no wish to rob them of
the glory and the reward they so well deserved. 'But,' he said, 'an
army and a general have different functions. It is right that soldiers
should be greedy for battle, but the general often does more good not
by temerity but by foresight, deliberation and delay. I have done all
I could to aid your victory with my sword: now I will serve you by the
general's proper arts of calculation and strategy. The risks that face
us are obvious. It is night; we know nothing of the lie of the city;
the enemy are behind the walls; everything favours an ambush. Even if
the gates were open, we cannot safely enter except by day and after
due reconnoitring. Are you going to begin storming the town when you
cannot possibly see where the ground is level and how high the walls
are? How do you know whether to assault it with engines and showers of
missiles, or with penthouses and shelters?'[59] Then he turned to
individuals, asking one after another whether they had brought
hatchets and pick-axes and other implements for storming a town. When
they answered no, 'Well,' he said, 'could any troops possibly break
through walls or undermine them with nothing but swords and javelins?
Suppose it proves necessary to construct a mound and to shelter
ourselves with mantlets and fascines,[59] are we going to stand idle
like a lot of helpless idiots, gaping at the height of the enemy's
towers and ramparts? Why not rather wait one night till our
siege-train arrives and then carry the victory by force?' So saying,
he sent the camp-followers and servants with the freshest of the
troopers back to Bedriacum to bring up supplies and whatever else was
wanted.

The soldiers indeed chafed at this and mutiny seemed imminent, 21
when some of the mounted scouts, who had ridden right up to the walls,
captured a few stragglers from Cremona, and learnt from them that six
Vitellian legions and the whole Hostilia army had that very day
covered thirty miles, and, hearing of their comrades' defeat, were
already arming for battle and would be on them immediately. This
alarming news cured their obstinate deafness to the general's advice.
He ordered the Thirteenth legion to take up their position on the
raised Postumian high-road. In touch with them on the left wing in the
open country were the Seventh Galbian, beside whom stood the Seventh
Claudian, so placed that their front was protected by a ditch. On the
right wing were the Eighth, drawn up along an open cross-road, and
next to them the Third, distributed among some thick clumps of trees.
Such, at any rate, was the order of the eagles and standards. In the
darkness the soldiers were confused and took their places at random.
The band of Guards[60] was next to the Third, and the auxiliaries on
the wings, while the cavalry were disposed in support round the flanks
and the rear. Sido and Italicus with their picked band of Suebi[61]
fought in the front line.

For the Vitellians the right course was to rest at Cremona and 22
recuperate their strength with food and a night's rest, and then on
the next day to crush and rout the Flavians when they were stiff with
cold and weak from hunger. But they had no general;[62] they had no
plan. Though it was nearly nine at night they flung themselves upon
the Flavians, who were standing steady in their places to receive
them. In their fury and the darkness the Vitellian line was so
disordered that one can hardly venture to describe the disposition of
their troops. However, it has been stated that the Fourth Macedonian
legion were on the right flank; in the centre were the Fifth and
Fifteenth with the detachments of the Ninth, the Second and the
Twentieth from Britain; the Sixteenth, the Twenty-second, and the
First formed the left wing. The men of the Rapax and Italian
legions[63] were distributed among all the companies.[64] The cavalry
and auxiliaries picked their own position. All night the battle raged
with varying fortune, never decided, always savagely contested.
Disaster threatened now one side, now the other. Courage, strength
were of little use: their eyes could not even see in front of them.
Both sides were armed alike; the watchwords, constantly demanded, soon
became known; the standards were all in confusion, as they were
captured and carried off from one band to another. The Seventh legion,
raised recently by Galba, suffered most severely. Six of the senior
centurions fell and several standards were lost. They nearly lost
their eagle too, but it was rescued by the bravery of the senior
centurion, named Atilius Verus, who after great slaughter of the enemy
fell finally himself.

Antonius had meanwhile called up the Guards to reinforce his 23
wavering line. Taking up the fight, they repulsed the enemy, only to
be repulsed in their turn. For the Vitellian artillery, which had at
first been scattered all along the line, and had been discharged upon
the bushes without hurting the enemy, was now massed upon the
high-road, and swept the open space in front. One immense engine in
particular, which belonged to the Fifteenth, mowed down the Flavian
line with huge stones. The slaughter thus caused would have been
enormous, had not two of the Flavian soldiers performed a memorable
exploit. Concealing their identity by snatching up shields from among
the enemy's dead,[65] they cut the ropes which suspended the weights
of the engine. They fell immediately, riddled with wounds, and so
their names have perished. But of their deed there is no doubt.

Fortune had favoured neither side when, as the night wore on, the moon
rose and threw a deceptive glamour over the field of battle. Shining
from behind the Flavians the moon was in their favour. It magnified
the shadows of their men and horses so that the enemy took the shadow
for the substance, and their missiles were misdirected and fell
short. The Vitellians, on the other hand, had the moon shining full on
them and were an easy mark for the Flavians, shooting as it were out
of cover.[66]

Thus being enabled to recognize his own men, and to be recognized 24
by them, Antonius appealed to some by taunting their honour, to many
by words of praise and encouragement, to all by promising hope of
reward. He asked the Pannonian legions why they had drawn their swords
again. Here on this field they could regain their glory and wipe out
the stain of their former disgrace.[67] Then turning to the Moesian
troops, who were the chief promoters of the war,[68] he told them it
was no good challenging the Vitellians with verbal threats, if they
could not bear to face them and their blows. Thus he addressed each
legion as he reached it. To the Third he spoke at greater length,
reminding them of their victories both old and new. Had they not under
Mark Antony defeated the Parthians[69] and the Armenians under
Corbulo?[70] Had they not but lately crushed the Sarmatians?[71] Then
he turned in fury on the Guards. 'Peasants that you are,' he shouted,
'have you another emperor, another camp waiting to shelter you, if you
are defeated? There in the enemy's line are your standards and your
arms: defeat means death and--no, you have drained disgrace already to
the dregs.'

These words roused cheers on all sides, and the Third, following the
Syrian custom,[72] saluted the rising sun. Thus arose a casual 25
rumour--or possibly it was suggested by the general's ingenuity--that
Mucianus had arrived, and that the two armies were cheering each
other. On they pressed, feeling they had been reinforced. The
Vitellian line was more ragged now, for, having no general to marshal
them, their ranks now filled, now thinned, with each alternation of
courage and fear. As soon as Antonius saw them waver, he kept
thrusting at them in massed column. The line bent and then broke, and
the inextricable confusion of wagons and siege-engines prevented their
rallying. The victorious troops scattered along the cross-road in
headlong pursuit.
The slaughter was marked by one peculiar horror. A son killed his
father. I give the facts and names on the authority of Vipstanus
Messala.[73] One Julius Mansuetus, a Spaniard who had joined the
legion Rapax, had left a young son at home. This boy subsequently grew
up and enlisted in the Seventh legion, raised by Galba.[74] Chance now
sent his father in his way, and he felled him to the ground. While he
was ransacking the dying man, they recognized each other. Flinging his
arms round the now lifeless corpse, in a piteous voice he implored
his father's spirit to be appeased and not to turn against him as a
parricide. The crime was his country's, he cried; what share had a
single soldier in these civil wars? Meanwhile he lifted the body and
began to dig a grave and perform the last rites for his father. Those
who were nearest noticed this; then the story began to spread, till
there ran through the army astonishment and many complaints and curses
against this wicked war. Yet they never ceased busily killing and
plundering friends and relatives and brothers; and while they talked
of the crime they were committing it themselves.

When they reached Cremona a fresh task of vast difficulty awaited 26
them. During the war with Otho[75] the German army had entrenched
their camp round the walls of Cremona and then erected a rampart round
the camp; and these fortifications had been further strengthened. The
sight of them brought the victors to a halt, and their generals were
uncertain what instructions to give. The troops had had no rest for a
day and a night. To storm the town at once would be an arduous and, in
the absence of reserves, a perilous task. On the other hand, a retreat
to Bedriacum would involve the intolerable fatigue of a long march,
and destroy the value of their victory. Again, it would be dangerous
to entrench themselves so close to the lines of the enemy, who might
at any minute sally forth and rout them while they were dispersed and
digging trenches. The chief anxiety lay in the temper of the men, who
were much more ready to face danger than delay. To them discretion was
disagreeable and hazard spelt hope. Their thirst for plunder
outweighed all fears of wounds and bloodshed.

Antonius also inclined to this view and gave orders for them to 27
surround the rampart. At first they stood back and delivered volleys
of arrows and stones, suffering themselves the severer loss, for a
storm of missiles rained down from the walls. Antonius then told off
each legion to assault a different point of the rampart or one of the
gates, hoping that by thus separating them he could distinguish the
cowards from the brave and inflame them with a spirit of honourable
rivalry. The Third and Seventh took the position nearest the road to
Bedriacum; the Eighth and Seventh Claudian assaulted the right-hand
side of the rampart; the Thirteenth swept up to the Brixian Gate.[76]
A brief delay was caused while some fetched mattocks and pickaxes from
the fields, and others hooks and ladders. Then holding their shields
above their heads in close 'tortoise' formation,[77] they advanced
under the rampart. Both sides employed Roman tactics. The Vitellians
rolled down huge masses of stones, and, as the sheltering cover of
shields parted and wavered, they thrust at it with lances and poles,
until at last the whole structure was broken up and they mowed down
the torn and bleeding soldiers beneath with terrible slaughter.

The men would certainly have hesitated, had not the generals,
realizing that they were really too tired to respond to any other form
of encouragement, pointed significantly to Cremona. Whether this 28
was Hormus's idea, as Messala[78] records, or whether we should rather
follow Caius Pliny, who accuses Antonius, it is not easy to determine.
This one may say, that, however abominable the crime, yet in
committing it neither Antonius nor Hormus belied the reputation of
their lives. After this neither wounds nor bloodshed could stay the
Flavian troops. They demolished the rampart, shook the gates, climbed
up on each other's shoulders, or over the re-formed 'tortoise', and
snatched away the enemy's weapons or caught hold of them by the arms.
Thus the wounded and unwounded, the half-dead and the dying, all came
rolling down and perished together by every imaginable kind of death.

The fight raged thickest round the Third and Seventh legions, and 29
the general, Antonius, came up with a picked band of auxiliaries to
support their assault. The Vitellians, finding themselves unable to
resist the attack of troops thus stubbornly vying with each other, and
seeing their missiles all glide off the shelter of shields, at last
sent their engine of war crashing down upon their heads. For the
moment it scattered and crushed beneath it the men on whom it fell,
but it dragged with it some of the battlements and the top of the
rampart. At the same moment one of the towers on the rampart gave way
under a shower of stones. While the men of the Seventh struggled up to
the breach in close column,[79] the Third hewed down the gate with
hatchets and swords. All the authorities[80] agree that Caius Volusius
of the Third legion was the first man in. Emerging on the top of the
rampart, he hurled down those who barred his path, and from this
conspicuous position waved his hand and shouted that the camp was
taken. The others poured through, while the Vitellians in panic flung
themselves down from the rampart, and the whole space between the camp
and the walls became a seething scene of carnage.

Here, again, was a new type of task for the Flavians. Here were 30
high walls, stone battlements, iron-barred gates, and soldiers hurling
javelins. The citizens of Cremona were numerous and devoted to the
cause of Vitellius, and half Italy had gathered there for the Fair
which fell just at that time. Their numbers were a help to the
defenders, but the prospect of plundering them offered an incentive to
their assailants. Antonius ordered his men to bring fire and apply it
to the most beautiful of the buildings outside the walls, hoping that
the loss of their property might induce the citizens to turn traitor.
The houses that stood nearest to the walls and overtopped them he
crowded with his bravest troops, who dislodged the defenders with
showers of beams and tiles and flaming torches. Meanwhile, some of 31
the legionaries began to advance in 'tortoise' formation,[81] while
others kept up a steady fire of javelins and stones.

Gradually the spirit of the Vitellians ebbed. The higher their rank,
the more easily they gave way to misfortune. For they were afraid that
if Cremona too[82] was demolished, there would be no hope of pardon;
the victors' fury would fall not on the common poor but on the
tribunes and centurions, whom it would pay to kill. The common
soldiers felt safe in their obscurity, and, careless of the future,
continued to offer resistance. They roamed the streets or hid
themselves in houses, and though they had given up the war, refused
even so to sue for peace. Meanwhile the tribunes and centurions did
away with the name and portraits of Vitellius.[83] They released
Caecina, who was still in irons,[84] and begged his help in pleading
their cause. When he turned from them in haughty contempt they
besought him with tears. It was, indeed, the last of evils that all
these brave men should invoke a traitor's aid. They then hung veils
and fillets[85] out on the walls, and when Antonius had given the
order to cease firing, they carried out their standards and eagles,
followed by a miserable column of disarmed soldiers, dejectedly
hanging their heads. The victors had at first crowded round, heaping
insults on them and threatening violence, but when they found that the
vanquished had lost all their proud spirit, and turned their cheeks
with servile endurance to every indignity, they gradually began to
recollect that these were the men who had made such a moderate use of
their victory at Bedriacum.[86] But when the crowd parted, and Caecina
advanced in his consular robes, attended by his lictors in full state,
their indignation broke into flame. They charged him with insolence
and cruelty, and--so hateful is crime--they even flung his treachery
in his teeth.[87] Antonius restrained them and sent Caecina under
escort to Vespasian.

Meanwhile the citizens of Cremona suffered sorely from the 32
violence of the troops, and only the entreaties of their generals
could withhold them from a general massacre. Antonius summoned a mass
meeting and delivered a eulogy upon his victorious army, promising
mercy to the vanquished and speaking of Cremona in ambiguous terms.
Besides their natural passion for plunder, there was an old grudge
which urged them to sack Cremona. The town was believed to have given
assistance to the Vitellian cause before this in the war with
Otho;[88] and again, when the Thirteenth had been left behind to
build an amphitheatre,[89] the populace had shown its town-bred
impertinence by assailing them with insolent ridicule. Other causes
increased this bad feeling: it was here that Caecina had given his
show of gladiators:[89] the town had become for a second time the
theatre of the war: the citizens had conveyed food to the Vitellians
during the battle: some women had been killed, whose enthusiasm for
the cause had led them to take part in the fight. Besides all this,
the Fair had filled the rich city with an even greater display of
wealth than usual. All eyes were now centred on Antonius, whose fame
and good fortune overshadowed all the other generals. It so happened
that he hurried off to the baths to wash off the stains of blood.
Finding fault with the temperature of the water, he received the
answer, 'It will not be long before it is hot,' and this phrase was
caught up. The attendant's words were repeated, and brought all the
odium on Antonius, who was thus believed to have given the signal to
set fire to Cremona, which was already in flames.[90]

Thus forty thousand soldiers burst into the town with a yet larger 33
crowd of servants and sutlers, even more depraved than the soldiers in
their readiness for cruelty and lust. Without any respect for age or
for authority they added rape to murder and murder to rape. Aged men
and decrepit old women, who were worthless as booty, were hustled off
to make sport for them. If some grown girl or a handsome youth fell
into their clutches, they would be torn to pieces in the struggle for
possession, while the plunderers were left to cut each other's
throats. Whoever carried off money or any of the solid gold offerings
in the temples was liable to be cut to pieces, if he met another
stronger than himself. Some, disdaining easy finds, hunted for hidden
hoards, and dug out buried treasure, flogging and torturing the
householders. They held torches in their hands and, having once
secured their prize, would fling them wantonly into an empty house or
some dismantled temple. Composed as the army was of citizens, allies,
and foreign troops, differing widely in language and customs, the
objects of the soldiers' greed differed also. But while their views of
what was right might vary, they all agreed in thinking nothing wrong.

Cremona lasted them four days. While all other buildings sacred and
secular sank in the flames, only the temple of Mefitis outside the
walls was left standing, saved either by its position or the power of
the presiding deity.[91]

Such was the end of Cremona two hundred and eighty-six years after 34
its foundation. It had been originally built in the consulship of
Tiberius Sempronius and Publius Cornelius, while Hannibal was
threatening to invade Italy, to serve as a bulwark against the Gauls
beyond the Po,[92] and to resist any other power that might break in
over the Alps. And so it grew and flourished, aided by its large
number of settlers, its conveniently situated rivers,[93] the
fertility of its territory, and its connexion through alliance and
intermarriage with other communities. Foreign invasions had left it
untouched only to become the victim of civil war. Antonius, ashamed of
his crime, and realizing his growing disfavour, proclaimed that no
citizen of Cremona was to be kept as a prisoner of war; and, indeed,
the unanimous feeling in Italy against buying such slaves had already
frustrated the soldiers' hope of profit. So they began to kill their
captives, whose relatives and friends, when this became known,
covertly bought their release. After a while, the rest of the
inhabitants returned, and the squares and temples were rebuilt by the
munificence of the burghers and under Vespasian's direct patronage.

However, the soil was so foully infected by the reek of blood that 35
it was impossible for the Flavians to encamp for long on the ruins of
this buried city. They advanced along the road to the third milestone,
and mustered the Vitellians, still straggling and panic-stricken, each
under his own standard. The defeated legions were then distributed
through Illyricum, for the civil war was still in progress and their
fidelity could not be relied on. They then dispatched couriers to
carry the news to Britain and the Spanish provinces. To Gaul they sent
an officer named Julius Calenus, to Germany Alpinius Montanus, who had
commanded an auxiliary cohort. Montanus was a Treviran and Calenus an
Aeduan; both had fought for Vitellius and thus served to advertise
Vespasian's victory. At the same time garrisons were sent to hold the
passes of the Alps, for fear that Germany might rise in support of
Vitellius.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] See ii. 21.

[60] i.e. the band of Otho's old Guards whom Vitellius had
disbanded and Vespasian re-enlisted (see ii. 67, 82).

[61] See chap. 5.

[62] Caecina was under arrest, Valens still on his way from
Rome (see chaps. 14, 15).

[63] XXI and I.

[64] Because they had already suffered heavy losses earlier
in the day (see chap. 18).

[65] These shields would have Vitellius' name on them, and
thus conceal their identity.

[66] Dio asserts that the moon was 'black and bloody, and
gave off other fearsome hues'.

[67] i.e. at the first battle of Bedriacum (see ii. 43).

[68] See ii. 85.

[69] 36 B.C.

[70] A.D. 63.

[71] i.e. the Rhoxolani (cp. i. 79).

[72] They had served recently in Syria under Corbulo (see above).

[73] An eyewitness (see note 39).

[74] In Spain.

[75] i.e. at the time of the first battle of Bedriacum in April.

[76] i.e. the gate giving on to the road to Brescia.

[77] In this famous formation the front-rank men kept close
together and covered their bodies with long, concave shields,
while the others, holding flat shields over their heads and
pressing them one against another, formed a protecting roof.
They could thus approach the walls under cover.

[78] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.

[79] For the term (_cuneus_) here used, see note on ii. 42.

[80] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.

[81] See note 77.

[82] As well as the buildings outside the walls.

[83] i.e. tore them off the standards and shields, and broke
the statues at head-quarters.

[84] See chap. 14.

[85] Cp. i. 66.

[86] Cp. ii. 45.

[87] i.e. even though it was in their own interest.

[88] Cp. ii. 70.

[89] Cp. ii. 67.

[90] The words were either attributed wrongly to Antonius or
were supposed to be spoken in answer to his question, 'Are
the furnaces not lit?' In either case they were taken to
apply not to the heating of the baths but to the burning of
the town.

[91] i.e. the goddess of malaria, who reigned in terror by
the swampy banks of the Po.

[92] Cremona was founded in 218 B.C. as a Latin colony,
together with Placentia, to keep the Gallic tribes of North
Italy in check.

[93] The Po, Adda, and Oglio.

VITELLIUS

When Caecina had left Rome,[94] Vitellius, after an interval of a 36
few days, sent Fabius Valens hurrying to the front, and then proceeded
to drown his cares in self-indulgence. He neither made any provision
for the war, nor tried to increase the efficiency of his troops either
by haranguing or by drilling them. He did not keep himself in the
public eye, but retired into the pleasant shade of his gardens,
regarding past, present, and future with equal indifference, like one
of those listless animals which lie sluggish, and torpid so long as
you supply them with food. While he thus loitered languid and indolent
in the woods of Aricia,[95] he received the startling news of Lucilius
Bassus' treachery and the disaffection of the fleet at Ravenna.[96]
Soon afterwards he heard with mixed feelings of distress and
satisfaction that Caecina had deserted him and had been imprisoned by
the army. On his insensate nature joy had more effect than trouble.
He returned in triumph to Rome and at a crowded meeting praised the
devotion of the troops in extravagant terms. He gave orders for the
imprisonment of Publilius Sabinus, the prefect of the Guards, on the
ground of his intimacy with Caecina, and appointed Alfenus Varus[97]
in his place.

He next delivered a pompous and elaborate speech in the senate, 37
where he was loaded with far-fetched compliments by the members.
Lucius Vitellius rose to propose a harsh sentence against Caecina. The
rest of the house inveighed with assumed indignation against the
consul who had betrayed his country, the general who had betrayed his
commander-in-chief, the friend who had betrayed his benefactor to whom
he owed all his riches and distinction. But their protestations of
sympathy with Vitellius really voiced their personal vexation.[98]
None of the speeches contained any criticism of the Flavian generals.
They threw the blame on the misguided and impolitic action of the
armies, and with cautious circumlocution avoided all direct mention of
Vespasian. Caecina's consulship[99] had still one day to run, and
Rosius Regulus actually made humble petition for this one day's
office, Vitellius' offer and his acceptance exciting universal
derision. Thus he entered and abdicated his office on the same day,
the last of October. Men who were learned in constitutional history
pointed out that no one before had ever been elected to fill a
vacancy without the passing of a bill or some act of deprivation,
although there was precedent for the one day consulship in the case of
Caninius Rebilus when Caius Caesar was dictator and the civil war
necessitated prompt rewards.[100]

It was at this time that the news of the death of Junius 38
Blaesus[101] gave rise to much talk. I give the story as I find it.
When Vitellius was lying seriously ill at his house in the Servilian
Park, he noticed that a neighbouring mansion was brilliantly
illuminated at night. On asking the reason, he was told that Caecina
Tuscus[102] was giving a large dinner-party, at which Junius Blaesus
was the chief guest. He further received an exaggerated account of
their extravagance and dissipation. Some of his informants even made
specific charges against Tuscus and others, but especially accused
Blaesus for spending his days in revelry while his emperor lay ill.
There are people who keep a sharp eye on every sign of an emperor's
displeasure. They soon made sure that Vitellius was furious and that
Blaesus' ruin would be an easy task, so they cast Lucius Vitellius for
the part of common informer. He had a mean and jealous dislike for
Blaesus, whose spotless reputation far outshone his own, which was
tainted with every kind of infamy. Bursting into the emperor's
apartment, he caught up Vitellius' young son in his arms and fell at
his feet. When asked the reason of this excitement, he said it was due
to no anxiety for himself; all his suit and all his prayers were for
his brother and his brother's children. Their fears of Vespasian were
idle: between him and Vitellius lay all the legions of Germany, all
those brave and loyal provinces, and an immeasurable space of land and
sea. 'It is here in Rome,' he cried, 'in the bosom of our household
that we have an enemy to fear, one who boasts the Junii and Antonii as
his ancestors, one who shows himself affable and munificent to the
troops, posing as a descendant of imperial stock.[103] It is to him
that Rome's attention turns, while you, Sire, careless who is friend
or foe, cherish in your bosom a rival, who sits feasting at his table
and watches his emperor in pain. You must requite his unseasonable
gaiety with a night of deadly sorrow, in which he may both know and
feel that Vitellius lives and is his emperor, and, if anything should
happen, has a son to be his heir.'

Vitellius hesitated anxiously between his criminal desires and his 39
fear that, if he deferred Blaesus' death, he might hasten his own
ruin, or by giving official orders for it might raise a storm of
indignation. He decided to proceed by poison. The suspicion against
him he confirmed by going to see Blaesus and showing obvious
satisfaction. Moreover, he was heard to make the savage boast that he
had, to quote his own words, 'feasted his eyes on his enemy's
deathbed.'

Blaesus, besides his distinguished origin and refined character, was
steadfastly loyal. Even before the decline of Vitellius' cause he had
been canvassed by Caecina and other party leaders, who were turning
against the emperor, and had met them with a persistent refusal. He
was a man of quiet and blameless life, with no ambition for the
principate or, indeed, for any sudden distinction, but he could not
escape the danger of being considered worthy of it.

Meanwhile Fabius Valens, encumbered by a long train of harlots and 40
eunuchs, was conducting a leisurely advance, most unlike a march to
the front, when couriers arrived post-haste with the news that
Lucilius Bassus had surrendered the Ravenna fleet.[104] If he had
hurried forward on his march he might have been in time to save
Caecina's faltering loyalty, or to have joined the legions before the
critical engagement was fought. Many, indeed, advised him to avoid
Ravenna and to make his way by obscure by-roads to Hostilia or
Cremona. Others wanted him to send to Rome for the Guards and to break
through the enemy's lines with a strong force. Valens himself, with
helpless indecision, let the time for action go by while he took
advice; and then rejecting the advice he was offered, chose the middle
course, which is always the worst in a crisis, and thus failed both in
courage and in caution.

He wrote to Vitellius demanding reinforcements, and there arrived 41
three cohorts of Guards and a regiment of cavalry from Britain, too
many to slip through unobserved and too few to force a passage. But
even in such a crisis as this Valens' reputation was as unsavoury as
ever. He was still believed to use violence in the pursuit of illicit
pleasures, and to betray the confidence of his hosts by seducing their
wives and families. He had money and authority to help him, and the
feverish impatience of one whose star is on the wane. At last the
arrival of the reinforcements revealed the perversity of his strategy.
He had too few men to assume the offensive, even if they had been
unquestionably loyal, and their loyalty was under grave suspicion.
However, their sense of decency and respect for the general restrained
them for a while, though such ties are soon broken when troops are
disinclined for danger and indifferent to disgrace.[105] Fearing
trouble, he sent the Guards forward to Ariminum[106] with the cavalry
to secure the rear. Valens himself, with a few companions, whose
loyalty had survived misfortune, turned off into Umbria and thence to
Etruria, where he learnt the result of the battle of Cremona.
Thereupon he formed a plan, which was far from cowardly and might have
had alarming consequences, if it had succeeded. He was to seize ships
and cross to some point on the coast of Narbonnese Gaul, whence he
could rouse the provinces of Gaul and the native German tribes, and
thus raise forces for a fresh outbreak of war.

Valens' departure having dispirited the troops at Ariminum, 42
Cornelius Fuscus[107] advanced his force and, stationing
Liburnian[108] cruisers along the adjoining coast, invested the town
by land and sea. The Flavians thus occupied the Umbrian plain and the
sea-board of Picenum; and the Apennines now divided Italy between
Vitellius and Vespasian.

Valens, embarking from the Bay of Pisa, was either becalmed on a slow
sea or caught by an unfavourable wind and had to put in at the harbour
of Hercules Monoecus.[109] Stationed in the neighbourhood was Marius
Maturus, the Governor of the Maritime Alps,[110] who had remained
loyal to Vitellius, and, though surrounded by enemies, had so far been
faithful to his oath of allegiance. He gave Valens a friendly welcome
and strongly advised him not to venture rashly into Narbonnese Gaul.
This alarmed Valens, who found also that his companions' loyalty was
yielding to their fears. For Valerius Paulinus, the imperial agent 43
in the province, was an energetic soldier who had been friendly with
Vespasian in old days, and had lately sworn all the surrounding
communities to his cause. Having summoned to his flag all the Guards
discharged by Vitellius,[111] who needed no persuasion to resume the
war, he was now holding the colony of Forum Julii,[112] the key to the
command of the sea. His influence carried the more weight since Forum
Julii was his native town and, having once been an officer in the
Guards, he was respected by the men. Besides this, the inhabitants
supported their fellow citizen, and in the hope of future
aggrandizement rendered enthusiastic service to the party. When the
news of these efficient preparations, somewhat exaggerated by rumour,
came to the ears of the Vitellians, who were already in some doubt,
Fabius Valens returned to the ships with four men of the Body Guard,
three of his friends and three centurions, while Maturus and the rest
preferred to remain and swear allegiance to Vespasian. As for Valens,
though he felt safer at sea than among the cities on the coast, he was
still full of doubts for the future, since he was certain what he had
to avoid but quite uncertain whom he could trust. Eventually a gale
drove him upon the Stoechades,[113] some islands belonging to
Marseilles, and there he was overtaken by the cruisers which Paulinus
had sent in pursuit.

FOOTNOTES:

[94] The story returns again to ii. 101.

[95] La Riccia.

[96] See chap. 12.

[97] Hitherto camp-prefect (cp. ii. 29).

[98] Against Caecina for his inefficiency.

[99] Cp. i. 77.

[100] This was in 45 B.C., when Caesar was carrying on the
government with a high hand and small regard for precedent.
Holding an election on the last day of the year, he was told
that the consul was dead: there was no one to preside. So he
promptly announced that Caninius was consul till the next
morning. 'So no one,' says Cicero, 'breakfasted during his
consulship. However, there was no crime either, and his
vigilance was such that he never closed an eye during his
whole term of office.'

[101] Cp. ii. 59.

[102] This man had been prefect of Egypt, and had built
special baths for Nero, who was expected to visit Alexandria.
But he committed the indiscretion of washing in them first,
for which Nero had banished him.

[103] Both the Junii and Antonii could claim as an ancestor
Augustus' sister Octavia; and the Junii were also connected
with M. Junius Silanus, Augustus' great-great-grandson, whom
Nero had put out of the way.

[104] See chap. 12.

[105] They had already incurred the disgrace of betraying
first Galba, then Otho.

[106] Rimini.

[107] Now admiral of the Ravenna fleet (see chap. 12).

[108] See ii. 16, note 247.

[109] Monaco.

[110] See ii. 12.

[111] Cp. ii. 67.

[112] Fr�jus.

[113] �les d'Hy�res.

THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES

With the capture of Valens the tide had now fully turned in favour 44
of Vespasian. The movement had been begun in Spain by the First legion
_Adjutrix_,[114] whose reverence for Otho's memory made them hate
Vitellius. They carried the Tenth and the Sixth[115] with them. The
provinces of Gaul soon followed suit. Britain was bound to his cause
by the favour felt for one who had been sent there by Claudius in
command of the Second legion, and had fought with great distinction in
the war. But the adherence of the province was to some extent opposed
by the other legions, in which many of the centurions and soldiers had
been promoted by Vitellius. They were used to their emperor and felt
some doubt about the change. This quarrel between the legions and 45
the constant rumours of civil war, encouraged the Britons to take
heart. Their chief instigator was one Venutius. He was of a ferocious
disposition and hated the name of Rome, but his strongest motive was a
private quarrel with Queen Cartimandua, a member of a powerful family,
who ruled the Brigantes.[116] Her authority had lately increased,
since she had betrayed King Caratacus into the hands of the Romans,
and was thus considered to have provided Claudius Caesar with material
for his triumph.[117] Thus she had grown rich, and with prosperity
came demoralization. She threw over Venutius, who was her husband, and
gave her hand and kingdom to his squire, Vellocatus. This crime soon
proved the ruin of her house. The people supported her husband: she
defended her lover with passionate ferocity. Venutius therefore
summoned assistance and, aided by the simultaneous revolt of the
Brigantes, brought Cartimandua into dire straits. She petitioned for
troops from Rome. Our auxiliaries, both horse and foot, then fought
several engagements with varying success, but eventually rescued the
queen. Thus the kingdom was left in the hands of Venutius and the war
in ours.

Almost simultaneously a disturbance broke out in Germany, where 46
the inefficiency of the generals, the disaffection of the troops, the
strength of the enemy, and the treachery of our allies all combined to
bring the Roman government into serious danger. The causes and history
of this protracted struggle--for such it proved--we must leave to a
later chapter.[118] Amongst the Dacians[119] also there was trouble.
They could never be trusted, and now that the army was moved from
Moesia they were no longer under the restraint of fear. At first they
remained quiet and awaited developments. But when they saw Italy in
the flames of war, and found the whole empire divided into hostile
camps, they fell upon the winter-quarters of the auxiliary infantry
and cavalry and began to occupy both banks of the Danube. They were on
the point of storming the Roman camp as well, when Mucianus, who knew
of the victory at Cremona, sent the Sixth legion[120] against them.
For the empire was in danger of a double foreign invasion, if the
Dacians and the Germans had broken in from opposite directions. But
here, as so often, Rome's good fortune saved her by bringing Mucianus
on the scene with the forces of the East just at the moment when we
had settled matters at Cremona. Fonteius Agrippa, who had for the last
year been pro-consul in Asia, was transferred to the government of
Moesia. His forces were strengthened by a draft from the defeated
Vitellian army, for in the interest of peace it seemed prudent to
distribute these troops over the provinces and to keep their hands
tied by a foreign war.

The other peoples soon made their voices heard. Pontus[121] had 47
suddenly risen in a general rebellion at the instigation of a foreign
menial, who was in command of what had once been the royal fleet. He
was one of Polemo's freedmen, by name Anicetus, who had formerly been
influential and resented the change which had converted the kingdom
into a province of the Roman empire. He accordingly enlisted the
maritime tribes of Pontus in Vitellius' service, attracting all the
neediest ruffians with promises of plunder. At the head of no mean
force he suddenly fell upon Trapezus,[122] an ancient and famous city,
founded by Greek settlers on the frontier of the Pontic kingdom. There
he cut to pieces the auxiliaries, who had once formed the king's Body
Guard, and, after receiving the Roman franchise, had adopted our
ensigns and equipment, while still retaining all the inefficiency and
insubordination of Greek troops. Anicetus also set fire to the
fleet[123] and thus enjoyed complete mastery of the sea, since
Mucianus had moved the pick of his cruisers and all his troops to
Byzantium. The sea was overrun by natives too, who had hurriedly built
themselves boats. These, which they call 'arks',[124] are
broad-bottomed boats with low sides, built without any brass or iron
rivets. In a rough sea, as the waves rise higher and higher, the
height of the sides is raised by the addition of planks which, in the
end, enclose the whole boat under a sort of roof. They are thus left
to toss up and down on the waves. They have bows at both ends and the
paddles can be used on either side, since it is as easy and as safe to
row in one direction as in the other.

This state of things attracting Vespasian's attention, he was 48
obliged to send out a picked force of detachments from the legions
under Virdius Geminus, a soldier of tried experience. He attacked the
enemy while they were dispersed in all directions in quest of plunder,
and drove them back to their ships. He then had some Liburnian
cruisers hurriedly constructed and ran Anicetus to ground in the mouth
of the river Chobus,[125] where he had taken refuge with the King of
the Sedochezi tribe, whose alliance he had purchased by bribes. At
first, indeed, the king endeavoured to protect his petitioner by using
threats of violence, but he soon saw that it was a choice between
making war or being paid for his treachery. The barbarian's sense of
honour was unequal to this strain. He came to terms, surrendered
Anicetus and the other fugitives, and thus put an end to 'the slaves'
war'.

This victory delighted Vespasian: everything was succeeding beyond his
hopes: and to crown all the news of the battle of Cremona now reached
him in Egypt. He hurried forward all the faster towards Alexandria
with the object of bringing starvation[126] upon Vitellius' defeated
troops and the inhabitants of Rome, who were already feeling the pinch
of diminished imports. For he was at the same time making preparations
for an invasion of the adjacent province of Africa[127] by land and
sea. By cutting off their corn supply he hoped to reduce the enemy to
famine and disunion.

FOOTNOTES:

[114] The marines (see ii. 67, i. 6).

[115] X Gemina, VI Victrix.

[116] They occupied a large district of the north of England,
from the Trent to the Tyne.

[117] As a matter of fact his triumph took place in 44.
Caratacus was brought to Rome in 51. Perhaps Tacitus regards
this in itself as a 'triumph', or else he makes a venial
mistake.

[118] The rebellion on the Rhine is described in Books IV and V.

[119] In Roumania.

[120] Ferrata. Cp. ii. 83.

[121] This little kingdom west of Trebizond was left to Rome
by Polemo II, A.D. 63. Nero made it a Roman province under the
name of Pontus Polemoniacus.

[122] Trebizond.

[123] Mucianus had 'ordered the fleet to move from Pontus to
Byzantium' (ii. 83). This leads some editors to change the
text, and others to suppose that a few ships were left behind.

[124] Literally, arched boats. Tacitus describes somewhat
similar craft in _Germania_, 44.

[125] The Khopi, which flows from the Caucasus into the Euxine.

[126] Cp. chap. 8.

[127] Africa came next to Egypt in importance as a Roman
granary (cp. i. 73).

ANTONIUS' ADVANCE FROM CREMONA

Thus[128] a world-wide convulsion marked the passing of the 49
imperial power into new hands. Meanwhile, after Cremona, the behaviour
of Antonius Primus was not so blameless as before. He had settled the
war, he felt; the rest would be plain sailing. Or, perhaps, in such a
nature as his success only brought to light his greed and arrogance
and all his other dormant vices. While harrying Italy like a conquered
country, he courted the goodwill of his troops and used every word and
every action to pave his way to power. He allowed his men to appoint
centurions themselves in place of those who had fallen, and thus gave
them a taste for insubordination; for their choice fell on the most
turbulent spirits. The generals no longer commanded the men, but were dragged at the heels of their caprices. This revolutionary system,
utterly fatal to good discipline, was exploited by Antonius for his
own profit.[129] Of Mucianus' approach he had no fears, and thus made
a mistake even more fatal than despising Vespasian.[130]

His advance, however, continued. As winter was at hand[131] and 50
the Po had inundated the meadows, his column marched unencumbered by
heavy baggage. The main body of the victorious legions was left
behind at Verona, together with such of the soldiers as were
incapacitated by wounds or old age, and many besides who were still in
good condition. Having already broken the back of the campaign,
Antonius felt strong enough with his auxiliary horse and foot and some
picked detachments from the legions. The Eleventh[132] had voluntarily
joined the advance. They had held back at first, but, seeing Antonius'
success, were distressed to think they had had no share in it. The
column was also accompanied by a force of six thousand Dalmatian
troops, which had been recently raised. The ex-consul, Pompeius
Silvanus,[133] commanded the column, but the actual control was in the
hands of a general named Annius Bassus. Silvanus was quite ineffective
as a general, and wasted every chance of action in talking about it.
Bassus, while showing all due respect, managed him completely, and was
always ready with quiet efficiency to do anything that had to be done.
Their force was further increased by enlisting the best of the marines
from the Ravenna fleet, who were clamouring for service in the
legions. The vacancies in the fleet were filled by Dalmatians. The
army and its generals halted at Fanum Fortunae,[134] still hesitating
what policy to adopt, for they had heard that the Guards were on the
move from Rome, and supposed that the Apennines were held by troops.
And they had fears of their own. Supplies were scarce in a district
devastated by war. The men were mutinous and demanded 'shoe-money',[135]
as they called the donative, with alarming insistence. No provision
had been made either for money or for stores. The precipitate greed of
the soldiers made further difficulties, for they each looted what
might have served for them all.

I find among the best authorities evidence which shows how 51
wickedly careless were the victorious army of all considerations of
right and wrong. They tell how a trooper professed that he had killed
his brother in the last battle, and demanded a reward from his
generals. The dictates of humanity forbade them to remunerate such a
murder, but in the interests of civil war they dared not punish it.
They had put him off with the plea that they could not at the moment
reward his service adequately. And there the story stops. However, a
similar crime had occurred in earlier civil wars. In the battle which
Pompeius Strabo fought against Cinna at the Janiculum,[136] one of his
soldiers killed his own brother and then, realizing what he had done,
committed suicide. This is recorded by Sisenna.[137] Our ancestors, it
seems, had a livelier sense than we have both of the glory of good
deeds and the shame of bad.[138] These and other such instances from
past history may be appropriately cited, whenever the subject seems to
demand either an example of good conduct or some consolation for a
crime.

Antonius and his fellow generals decided to send the cavalry ahead 52
to explore the whole of Umbria, and to see whether any of the
Apennines were accessible by a gentler route; to summon the eagles and
standards[139] and all the troops at Verona,[140] and to fill the Po
and the sea with provision ships. Some of the generals continually
suggested obstacles. Antonius had grown too big for his place, and
they had surer hopes of reward from Mucianus. He was distressed that
victory had come so soon, and felt that, if he was not present when
Rome was taken, he would lose his share in the war and its glory. So
he kept on writing to Antonius and Varus in ambiguous terms, sometimes
urging them to 'press forward on their path', sometimes expatiating on
'the manifold value of delay'. He thus managed to arrange that he
could disclaim responsibility in case of a reverse, or acknowledge
their policy as his own if it succeeded. To Plotius Grypus, whom
Vespasian had lately raised to senatorial rank and put in command of a
legion, and to his other trusty friends he sent less ambiguous
instructions, and they all wrote back criticizing the haste with which
Antonius and Varus acted. This was just what Mucianus wanted. He
forwarded the letters to Vespasian with the result that Antonius'
plans and exploits were not appreciated as highly as Antonius had
hoped. This he took very ill and threw the blame on Mucianus, 53
whose charges he conceived had cheapened his exploits. Being little
accustomed to control his tongue or to obey orders, he was most
unguarded in his conversation and composed a letter to Vespasian in
presumptuous language which ill befitted a subject, making various
covert charges against Mucianus. 'It was I,' he wrote, 'who brought
the legions of Pannonia into the field:[141] it was my stimulus which
stirred up the officers in Moesia:[142] it was by my persistence that
we broke through the Alps, seized hold of Italy and cut off the German
and Raetian auxiliaries.[143] When Vitellius' legions were all
scattered and disunited, it was I who flung the cavalry on them like a
whirlwind, and then pressed home the attack with the infantry all day
and all night. That victory is my greatest achievement and it is
entirely my own. As for the mishap at Cremona, that was the fault of
the war. In old days the civil wars cost the country far more damage
and involved the destruction of more than one town. It is not with
couriers and dispatches that I serve my master, but with my sword in
my hand. Nor can it be said that I have interfered with the glory of
the men who have meanwhile settled matters in Dacia.[144] What peace
in Moesia is to them, the safety and welfare of Italy are to me. It
was my encouragement which brought the provinces of Gaul and of Spain,
the strongest parts of the whole world, over to Vespasian's side. But
my labours will prove useless, if the reward for the dangers I have
run is to fall to the man who was not there to share them.' All this
reached the ears of Mucianus and a serious quarrel resulted. Antonius
kept it up in a frank spirit of dislike, while Mucianus showed a
cunning which was far more implacable.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] The narrative is here resumed from the end of chap. 35.

[129] Would-be centurions doubtless bribed him to influence
the soldiers in their favour.

[130] Vespasian was too big to mind being despised; Mucianus
was not, and eventually retaliated (cp. iv. 11).

[131] November.

[132] From Dalmatia (see ii. 11, 67).

[133] Governor of Dalmatia (cp. ii. 86).

[134] Fano.

[135] Apparently soldiers' slang. Probably at some period an
officer had bribed his men under the pretence of making
special grants for the purchase of nails for their shoes.

[136] 87 B.C.

[137] L. Cornelius Sisenna, who died 67 B.C. in Pompey's war
against the pirates, wrote a history of his own time, dealing
in particular with Sulla's wars.

[138] This or some similar incident seems to have become a
respected commonplace of history and poetry (cp. chap. 25).

[139] i.e. the main body of the legions.

[140] See chap. 50.

[141] See ii. 86.

[142] i.e. Aponius, Vipstanus Messala, Dillius, and Numisius
(see ii. 85, iii. 9, 10).

[143] Cp. chap. 8.

[144] i.e. Mucianus and his officers (see chap. 46).

VITELLIUS' MEASURES OF DEFENCE

After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly suppressed 54
the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but
only his precautions against it. Had he admitted the facts and sought
advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that
all went well only made matters worse. He was himself extraordinarily
silent about the war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was
forbidden. This only increased the number of people who, if permitted,
would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread
grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian leaders slow to
foster these rumours. Whenever they captured Vitellian spies they
escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning
army, and sent them back again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them
in private and then had them murdered. A centurion named Julius
Agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to
fire Vitellius' courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the
emperor to send him to inspect the enemy's forces and discover what
had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt to deceive Antonius
by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the
emperor's instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown
everything. He was given guides, who showed him the field of battle,
the ruins of Cremona and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to
Vitellius. Finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even
suggested that he had been bribed, he said, 'You want some certain
evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or
dead, I will give you evidence that you can believe.' And he was as
good as his word. He went straight from the emperor's presence and
committed suicide. Some say he was killed by order of Vitellius, but
they give the same account of his heroic devotion.[145]

Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched Julius 55
Priscus and Alfenus Varus[146] with fourteen cohorts of Guards and all
his available cavalry to hold the Apennines. A legion levied from the
marines[147] was sent after them. This large army of picked men and
horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to
have even taken the offensive. His other cohorts[148] were given to
his brother, Lucius Vitellius, for the protection of the city. The
emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling
nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated
consuls for several years in advance. He lavished special
charters[149] on allied communities and extended Latin rights[150] to
foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. In
fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple
the empire. However, the mob accepted these munificent grants with
open mouths. Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them
invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a
revolution. At last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined
the camp at Mevania,[151] where they had taken up their position. A
long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but
most by their fears. Here he was still undecided and at the mercy of
treacherous advice.

During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A cloud of 56
ill-omened birds[152] flew over his head and its density obscured the
daylight. To this was added another omen of disaster. A bull broke
from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped
so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed
according to the proper ritual. But the chief portent was Vitellius
himself. He was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew
nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed
forward or protracted. He always had to ask some one else. At every
fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And
then he would get drunk. At last he found camp life too tedious, and
on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at Misenum[153] he returned to
Rome. Every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed
insensible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with his
full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out
with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his forces he sent his
keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken
prisoner. The more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this
policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted.
But the emperor's intimates refused them admittance. He had, indeed,
formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and
refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run
fatal.

In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The mutiny of 57
the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by Claudius Faventinus, a
centurion whom Galba had dismissed in disgrace. To obtain his object
he had forged a letter from Vespasian promising rewards for treachery.
The admiral, Claudius Apollinaris,[154] was neither a staunch loyalist
nor an enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor,
who happened to be at Minturnae,[155] offered to take the lead of the
rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns.
Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while Capua remained
loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the
civil war. To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius
Julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at Misenum and
had allowed lax discipline. To support him he was given one cohort of
the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under
him. The two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not
long before Julianus came over to Vespasian's side. They then joined
forces and occupied Tarracina,[156] which owed its strength more to
its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.

When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force at 58
Narnia[157] with the prefects of the Guard,[158] and sent his brother
Lucius with six regiments of Guards and five hundred horse to cope
with the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous depression
was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the
populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. For he dignified this
poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by
the specious titles of 'the army' or 'his legions'. His friends were
all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice
of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who
gave their names. As their numbers were too great, he gave the task of
selection to the two consuls. From each of the senators he levied a
fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights offered
money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar
assistance. Indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had
gradually changed into real sympathy. People began to feel pity, not
perhaps so much for Vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes.
He himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands
upon their compassion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when
they are frightened, beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the
title of Caesar,[159] but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a
superstitious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one
listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while a rash
and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it
always begins to flag. Gradually the senators and knights deserted
him. At first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but
soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. At last
Vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them
from the services which they refused to render.

FOOTNOTES:

[145] This incident was probably another historical
commonplace. See the story from Plutarch (ii. 46, note 316),
which is also told by Suetonius and Dio.

[146] The prefects of the Guards (cp. ii. 92).

[147] At Misenum. (Leg. II Adjutrix.) The Ravenna marines were
on the Flavian side (see chap. 50).

[148] i.e. the rest of the Guards (2), with the city garrison (4),
and police (7) (cp. ii. 93).

[149] i.e. granting them special privileges denied to other
communities in the same province.

[150] A sort of 'half-way house to Roman citizenship'. Full
commercial rights were included but not those of
intermarriage. It was possible for individual citizens in a
Latin town to obtain the full rights of a Roman.

[151] Bevagna.

[152] Dio makes them vultures and the scene a sacrifice: they
scattered the victims and nearly knocked Vitellius off his
pulpit.

[153] Described in the following chapter.

[154] He had succeeded Bassus (iii. 12).

[155] Near the mouth of the Liris.

[156] Horace's 'Anxur perched on gleaming rocks'. It lay near
the Pontine marshes on the Appian way.

[157] Narni.

[158] Priscus and Varus (see chap. 55).

[159] i. 62, ii. 62.

THE PASSAGE OF THE APENNINES

The occupation of Mevania[160] had terrified Italy with the 59
prospect of a revival of the war, but Vitellius' cowardly retreat[161]
sensibly strengthened the popularity of the Flavian party. The
Samnites, Pelignians, and Marsians were now induced to rise. They were
jealous of Campania for stealing a march on them, and the change of
masters, as so often happens, made them perform all their military
duties with the utmost alacrity. But in crossing the Apennines
Antonius' army suffered severely from the rough December weather.
Though they met with no opposition, they found it hard enough to
struggle through the snow, and realized what danger they would have
had to face if Vitellius had not happened to turn back. Certainly
chance helped the Flavian generals quite as often as their own
strategy. Here they came across Petilius Cerialis,[162] who had been
enabled by his knowledge of the country to elude Vitellius' outposts,
disguised as a peasant. As he was a near relative of Vespasian and a
distinguished soldier he was given a place on the staff. Several
authorities say that Flavius Sabinus and Domitian[163] were also
afforded facilities for escape, and that Antonius sent messengers who
contrived by various devices to get through to them, and made
arrangements for an interview and safe conduct. Sabinus, however,
pleaded that his health was unequal to the fatigue of such a bold
step. Domitian was quite ready to venture, but although the guards to
whom Vitellius had entrusted him, promised that they would share his
flight, he was afraid they might be laying a trap for him. As a matter
of fact, Vitellius was too anxious for the safety of his own relatives
to plot any harm against Domitian.

Arrived at Carsulae[164] the Flavian generals took a few days' 60
rest and awaited the arrival of the main legionary force.[165] The
place suited them admirably for an encampment. It commanded a wide
view, and with so many prosperous towns in the rear their supplies
were safe. The Vitellians too, were only ten miles away, and they had
hopes of negotiating treason with them. The soldiers chafed at this
delay, preferring victory to peace. They did not even want to wait for
their own legions, for there would be more plunder than danger to
share with them. Antonius accordingly summoned a meeting of the men
and explained to them that Vitellius still had troops at his command.
Reflection might make them waver, despair would steel their hearts. In
civil war, he told them, the first steps may be left to chance,
nothing but careful strategy can win the final victory. The fleet at
Misenum and the richest districts of Campania had already deserted
Vitellius, and in the whole world nothing was left to him now except
the country between Narnia and Tarracina. The battle of Cremona had
brought them credit enough, and the destruction of the town more than
enough discredit. Their desire must be not to take Rome but to save
it. They would gain richer rewards and far more glory if they could
show that they had saved the senate and people of Rome without
shedding a drop of blood. Such considerations as these calmed their
excitement, and it was not long before the legions arrived.

Alarmed at the repute of this augmented army, Vitellius' Guards 61
began to waver. There was no one to encourage them to fight, while
many urged them to desert, being eager to hand over their companies or
squadrons to the enemy and by such a gift to secure the victor's
gratitude for the future. These also let the Flavians know that the
next camp at Interamna[166] had a garrison of four hundred cavalry.
Varus was promptly sent off with a light marching force, and the few
who offered resistance were killed. The majority threw away their arms
and begged for quarter. Some escaped to the main camp[167] and spread
universal panic by exaggerating the strength and prowess of the enemy,
in order to mitigate the disgrace of losing the fort. In the Vitellian
camp all offences went unpunished: desertion met with sure reward.
Their loyalty soon gave way and a competition in treachery began.
Tribunes and centurions deserted daily, but not the common soldiers,
who had grown stubbornly faithful to Vitellius. At last, however,
Priscus and Alfenus[168] abandoned the camp and returned to Vitellius,
thus finally releasing all the others from any obligation to blush for
their treachery.

About the same time Fabius Valens[169] was executed in his prison 62
at Urbinum, and his head was exhibited to Vitellius' Guards to show
them that further hope was vain. For they cherished a belief that
Valens had made his way into Germany, and was there mustering his old
force and fresh troops as well. This evidence of his death threw them
into despair. The Flavian army was vastly inspirited by it and
regarded Valens' death as the end of the war.

Valens had been born at Anagnia of an equestrian family. He was a man
of loose morality, not without intellectual gifts, who by indulging in
frivolity posed as a wit. In Nero's time he had acted in a
harlequinade at the Juvenalian Games.[170] At first he pleaded
compulsion, but afterwards he acted voluntarily, and his performances
were rather clever than respectable. Rising to the command of a
legion, he supported Verginius[171] and then defamed his character. He
murdered Fonteius Capito,[171] whose loyalty he had undermined--or
perhaps because he had failed to do so. He betrayed Galba and remained
faithful to Vitellius, a merit to which the treachery of others served
as a foil.

Now that their hopes were crushed on all sides, the Vitellians 63
prepared to go over to the enemy. But even at this crisis they saved
their honour by marching down with their standards and colours to the
plains below Narnia, where the Flavian army was drawn up in full
armour ready for battle in two deep lines on either side of the road.
The Vitellians marched in between and were surrounded. Antonius then
spoke to them kindly and told them to remain, some at Narnia and some
at Interamna. He also left behind some of the victorious legions,
which were strong enough to quell any outbreak but would not molest
them so long as they remained quiet.

FOOTNOTES:

[160] See chap. 55.

[161] See chap. 56.

[162] A distinguished officer, who successfully crushed the
rebellion on the Rhine (Book IV), and became governor of
Britain in 71.

[163] Vespasian's brother and younger son were both in Rome,
the former still holding the office of city prefect (cp. i. 46).

[164] Casigliano.

[165] From Verona (see chap. 52).

[166] Terni.

[167] At Narnia.

[168] The two prefects of the guard.

[169] See chap. 43.

[170] Properly a festival to celebrate the first cutting of
the beard. Nero forced high officials and their wives to take
part in unseemly performances (ii. 62), and the festivities
became a public scandal, culminating in Nero's own appearance
as a lyrist.

[171] See i. 7, 8.

THE ABDICATION OF VITELLIUS AND THE BURNING OF THE CAPITOL

During these days Antonius and Varus kept sending messages to
Vitellius, in which they offered him his life, a gift of money, and
the choice of a safe retreat in Campania, if he would stop the war and
surrender himself and his children to Vespasian. Mucianus wrote him
letters to the same effect. Vitellius usually took these offers
seriously and talked about the number of slaves he would have and the
choice of a seaside place. He had sunk, indeed, into such mental
torpor that, if other people had not remembered that he was an
emperor, he was certainly beginning to forget it himself. However, 64
it was to Flavius Sabinus, the City Prefect, that the leading men at
Rome addressed themselves. They urged him secretly not to lose all
share in the glory of victory. They pointed out that the City Garrison
was under his own command, and that he could count on the police and
their own bands of slaves, to say nothing of the good fortune of the
party and all the advantage that victory gives. He must not leave all
the glory to Antonius and Varus. Vitellius had nothing left but a few
regiments of guards, who were seriously alarmed at the bad news which
came from every quarter. As for the populace, their feelings soon
changed, and if he put himself at their head, they would be just as
loud in their flattery of Vespasian. Vitellius himself could not even
cope with success, and disaster had positively paralysed him. The
credit of ending the war would go to the man who seized the city. It
was eminently fitting that Sabinus should secure the throne for his
brother, and that Vespasian should hold him higher than any one else.

Age had enfeebled Sabinus, and he showed no alacrity to listen to 65
such talk as this. Some people covertly insinuated that he was jealous
of his brother's success and was trying to delay its realization.
Flavius Sabinus was the elder brother and, while they were both
private persons, he had been the richer and more influential. It was
also believed that he had been chary in helping Vespasian to recover
his financial position, and had taken a mortgage on his house and
estates. Consequently, though they remained openly friendly, there
were suspicions of a secret enmity between them. The more charitable
explanation is that Sabinus's gentle nature shrank from the idea of
bloodshed and massacre, and that this was his reason for so constantly
discussing with Vitellius the prospects of peace and a capitulation on
terms. After several interviews at his house they finally came to a
settlement--so the report went--at the Temple of Apollo.[172] To the
actual conversation there were only two witnesses, Cluvius Rufus[173]
and Silius Italicus,[174] but the expression of their faces was
watched from a distance. Vitellius was said to look abject and
demoralized: Sabinus showed less sign of pride than of pity.

Had Vitellius found it no harder to persuade his friends than to 66
make his own renunciation, Vespasian's army might have marched into
Rome without bloodshed. But as it was, each of his friends in
proportion to his loyalty persisted in refusing terms of peace. They
pointed to the danger and disgrace. Would their conqueror keep his
promises any longer than he liked? However great Vespasian's
self-confidence, he could not allow Vitellius to live in private. Nor
would the losers acquiesce: their very pity would be a menace.[175]
'Of course,' they said, 'you are an old man. You have done with
fortune, good or bad. But what sort of repute or position would your
son Germanicus[176] enjoy? At present they are promising you money and
a household, and the pleasant shores of Campania. But when once
Vespasian has seized the throne, neither he nor his friends nor even
his army will feel their safety assured until the rival claimant is
dead. They imprisoned Fabius Valens and meant to make use of him if a
crisis occurred, but they found him too great an incubus. You may be
sure that Antonius and Fuscus and that typical representative of the
party, Mucianus, will have no choice but to kill you. Julius Caesar
did not let Pompey live unmolested, nor Augustus Antony.[177] Do you
suppose that Vespasian's is a loftier disposition? Why, he was one of
your father's dependants,[178] when your father was Claudius's
colleague.[179] No, think of your father's censorship, his three
consulships,[179] and all the honour your great house has won. You
must not disgrace them. Despair, at least, should nerve your courage.
The troops are steadfast; you still enjoy the people's favour. Indeed,
nothing worse can happen to you than what we are eager to face of our
own free will. If we are defeated, we must die; if we surrender, we
must die. All that matters is whether we breathe our last amid mockery
and insult or bravely and with honour.'

But Vitellius was deaf to all courageous counsel. His mind was 67
obsessed with pity for his wife and children, and an anxious fear that
obstinate resistance might make the conqueror merciless towards them.
He had also a mother,[180] very old and infirm, but she had
opportunely died a few days before and thus forestalled the ruin of
her house. All she had got out of her son's principate was sorrow and
a good name. On December 17 he heard the news that the legion and the
Guards at Narnia had deserted him and surrendered to the enemy. He at
once put on mourning and left the palace, surrounded by his sorrowful
household. His small son was carried in a little litter, as though
this had been his funeral. The populace uttered untimely flatteries:
the soldiers kept an ominous silence.

On that day there was no one so indifferent to the tragedy of 68
human life as to be unmoved by this spectacle. A Roman emperor,
yesterday master of the inhabited world, had left the seat of his
authority, and was now passing through the streets of the city,
through the crowding populace, quitting the throne. Such a sight had
never been seen or heard of before. The dictator, Caesar, had been the
victim of sudden violence; Caligula of a secret conspiracy. Nero's had
been a stealthy flight to some obscure country house under cover of
night. Piso and Galba might almost be said to have fallen on the field
of battle. But here was Vitellius--before the assembly of his own
people, his own soldiers around him, with women even looking
on--uttering a few sentences suitable to his miserable situation. He
said it was in the interest of peace and of his country that he now
resigned. He begged them only to retain his memory in their hearts and
to take pity on his brother, his wife, and his little innocent
children. As he said this, he held out his son to them and commended
him, now to individuals, now to the whole assembly. At last tears
choked his voice. Turning to the consul, Caecilius Simplex,[181] who
was standing by, he unstrapped his sword and offered to surrender it
as a symbol of his power over the life and death of his subjects. The
consul refused. The people in the assembly shouted 'No'. So he left
them with the intention of depositing the regalia in the Temple of
Concord and then going to his brother's house. But he was faced with a
still louder uproar. They refused to let him enter a private house,
and shouted to him to return to the palace. They blocked every other
way and only left the road leading into the Via Sacra open.[182] Not
knowing what else to do, Vitellius returned to the palace.

A rumour of his abdication had preceded him, and Flavius Sabinus 69
had sent written instructions to the Guards'[183] officers to keep the
men in hand. Thus the whole empire seemed to have fallen into
Vespasian's lap. The chief senators, the majority of the knights, and
the whole of the city garrison and the police came flocking to the
house of Flavius Sabinus. There they heard the news of the popular
enthusiasm for Vitellius and the threatening attitude of the German
Guards.[184] But Sabinus had gone too far to draw back, and when he
showed hesitation, they all began to urge him to fight, each being
afraid for his own safety if the Vitellians were to fall on them when
they were disunited and consequently weaker. However, as so often
happens on these occasions, every one offered to give advice but few
to share the danger. While Sabinus' Body Guard were marching down by
the Fundane reservoir[185] they were attacked by some of the most
determined Vitellians. The surprise was unpremeditated, but the
Vitellians got the best of an unimportant skirmish. In the panic
Sabinus chose what was at the moment the safest course, and occupied
the summit of the Capitol,[186] where his troops were joined by a few
senators and knights. It is not easy to record their names, since
after Vespasian's victory crowds of people claimed credit for this
service to the party. There were even some women who endured the
siege, the most famous of them being Verulana Gratilla, who had
neither children nor relatives to attract her, but only her love of
danger.[187]

The Vitellians, who were investing them, kept a half-hearted watch,
and Sabinus was thus enabled to send for his own children and his
nephew Domitian at dead of night, dispatching a courier by an
unguarded route to tell the Flavian generals that he and his men were
under siege, and would be in great straits unless they were rescued.
All night, indeed, he was quite unmolested, and could have escaped
with perfect safety. The Vitellian troops could face danger with
spirit, but were much too careless in the task of keeping guard;
besides which a sudden storm of chilly rain interfered with their
sight and hearing.

At daybreak, before the two sides commenced hostilities, Sabinus 70
sent Cornelius Martialis, who had been a senior centurion, to
Vitellius with instructions to complain that the conditions were being
violated; that he had evidently made a mere empty show of abdication,
meant to deceive a number of eminent gentlemen. Else why had he gone
from the meeting to his brother's house, which caught the eye from a
conspicuous position overlooking the Forum, and not rather to his
wife's on the Aventine. That was the proper course for a private
citizen, anxious to avoid all pretension to supreme authority. But no,
Vitellius had returned to the palace, the very stronghold of imperial
majesty. From there he had launched a column of armed men, who had
strewn with innocent dead the most crowded quarter of Rome, and even
laid violent hands upon the Capitol. As for Sabinus himself, the
messenger was to say, he was only a civilian, a mere member of the
senate. While the issue was being decided between Vespasian and
Vitellius by the engagement of legions, the capture of towns, the
capitulation of cohorts; even when the provinces of Spain, of Germany,
of Britain, had risen in revolt; he, though Vespasian's brother, had
still remained faithful to his allegiance, until Vitellius, unasked,
began to invite him to a conference. Peace and union, he was to remind
him, serve the interest of the losers, and only the reputation of the
winners. If Vitellius regretted their compact, he ought not to take
arms against Sabinus, whom he had treacherously deceived, and against
Vespasian's son, who was still a mere boy. What was the good of
killing one youth and one old man? He ought rather to march out
against the legions and fight for the empire on the field. The result
of the battle would decide all other questions.

Greatly alarmed, Vitellius replied with a few words in which he tried
to excuse himself and throw the blame on his soldiers. 'I am too
unassuming,' he said, 'to cope with their overpowering impatience.' He
then warned Martialis to make his way out of the house by a secret
passage, for fear that the soldiers should kill him as an ambassador
of the peace to which they were so hostile. Vitellius himself was not
in a position to issue orders or prohibitions; no longer an emperor,
merely an excuse for war.

Martialis had hardly returned to the Capitol when the furious 71
soldiery arrived. They had no general to lead them: each was a law to
himself. Their column marched at full speed through the Forum and past
the temples overlooking it. Then in battle order they advanced up the
steep hill in front of them, until they reached the lowest gates of
the fortress on the Capitol. In old days there was a series of
colonnades at the side of this slope, on the right as you go up.
Emerging on to the roof of these, the besieged overwhelmed the
Vitellians with showers of stones and tiles. The attacking party
carried nothing but swords, and it seemed a long business to send for
siege-engines and missiles. So they flung torches into the
nearest[188] colonnade and, following in the wake of the flames, would
have burst through the burnt gates of the Capitol, if Sabinus had not
torn down all the available statues--the monuments of our ancestors'
glory--and built a sort of barricade on the very threshold. They then
tried to attack the Capitol by two opposite approaches, one near the
'Grove of Refuge'[189] and the other by the hundred steps which lead
up to the Tarpeian Rock. This double assault came as a surprise. That
by the Refuge was the closer and more vigorous. Nothing could stop the
Vitellians, who climbed up by some contiguous houses built on to the
side of the hill, which in the days of prolonged peace had been raised
to such a height that their roofs were level with the floor of the
Capitol. It is uncertain whether the buildings at this point were
fired by the assailants or--as tradition prefers--by the besieged in
trying to dislodge their enemies who had struggled up so far. The fire
spread to the colonnades adjoining the temples, and then the
'eagles'[190] supporting the roof, which were made of very old wood,
caught the flames and fed them. And so the Capitol, with its doors
fast shut, undefended and unplundered, was burnt to the ground.

Since the foundation of the city no such deplorable and horrible 72
disaster had ever befallen the people of Rome. It was no case of
foreign invasion. Had our own wickedness allowed, the country might
have been enjoying the blessings of a benign Providence; and yet here
was the seat of Jupiter Almighty--the temple solemnly founded by our
ancestors as the pledge of their imperial greatness, on which not even
Porsenna,[191] when Rome surrendered, nor the Gauls, when they took
it, had ever dared to lay rash hands--being brought utterly to ruin by
the mad folly of two rival emperors![192] The Capitol had been burnt
before in civil war,[193] but that was the crime of private persons.
Now it had been openly assaulted by the people of Rome and openly
burnt by them. And what was the cause of war? what the recompense for
such a disaster? Were we fighting for our country?

King Tarquinius Priscus had vowed to build this temple in the Sabine
war, and had laid the foundations on a scale that suited rather his
hope of the city's future greatness than the still moderate fortunes
of the Roman people. Later Servius Tullius, with the aid of Rome's
allies, and Tarquinius Superbus, with the spoils of the Volscians
after the capture of Suessa Pometia,[194] continued the building. But
the glory of completing it was reserved for the days of freedom. After
the expulsion of the kings, Horatius Pulvillus, in his second
consulship[195] dedicated this monument on such a magnificent scale,
that in later days, with all her boundless wealth, Rome has been able
to embellish but never to enlarge it. After an interval of four
hundred and fifteen years, in the consulship of Lucius Scipio and
Caius Norbanus,[196] it was burnt and rebuilt on the same site. Sulla
after his victory undertook the task of restoring it, but did not
dedicate it. This only was lacking to justify his title of 'Fortune's
Favourite'.[197] Much as the emperors did to it, the name of Lutatius
Catulus[198] still remained upon it up to the time of Vitellius.[199]
This was the temple that was now ablaze.

The besieged suffered more panic than their assailants. The 73
Vitellian soldiers lacked neither resource nor steadiness in moments
of crisis. But on the other side the troops were terrified, the
general[200] inert, and apparently so paralysed that he was
practically deaf and dumb. He neither adopted others' plans nor formed
any of his own, but only drifted about from place to place, attracted
by the shouts of the enemy, contradicting all his own orders. The
result was what always happens in a hopeless disaster: everybody gave
orders and nobody obeyed them. At last they threw away their weapons
and began to peer round for a way of escape or some means of hiding.
Then the Vitellians came bursting in, and with fire and sword made one
red havoc. A few good soldiers dared to show fight and were cut to
pieces. Of these the most notable were Cornelius Martialis,[201]
Aemilius Pacensis,[202] Casperius Niger, and Didius Scaeva. Flavius
Sabinus, who stood unarmed and making no attempt to escape, was surrounded together with the consul Quintius Atticus,[203] whose empty
title made him a marked man, as well as his personal vanity, which had
led him to distribute manifestoes full of compliments to Vespasian and
insults against Vitellius. The rest escaped by various means. Some
disguised themselves as slaves: some were sheltered by faithful
dependants: some hid among the baggage. Others again caught the
Vitellians' password, by which they recognized each other, and
actually went about demanding it and giving it when challenged, thus
escaping under a cloak of effrontery.

When the enemy first broke in, Domitian had taken refuge with the 74
sacristan, and was enabled by the ingenuity of a freedman to escape
among a crowd of worshippers in a linen dress,[204] and to take refuge
near the Velabrum with Cornelius Primus, one of his father's
dependants. When his father came to the throne, Domitian pulled down
the sacristan's lodging and built a little chapel to Jupiter the
Saviour with an altar, on which his adventures were depicted in marble
relief. Later, when he became emperor, he dedicated a huge temple to
Jupiter the Guardian with a statue of himself in the lap of the god.

Sabinus and Atticus were loaded with chains and taken to Vitellius,
who received them without any language or looks of disfavour, much to
the chagrin of those who wanted to see them punished with death and
themselves rewarded for their successful labours. When those who stood
nearest started an outcry, the dregs of the populace soon began to
demand Sabinus' execution with mingled threats and flatteries.
Vitellius came out on to the steps of the palace prepared to plead for
him: but they forced him to desist. Sabinus was stabbed and riddled
with wounds: his head was cut off and the trunk dragged away to 75
the Ladder of Sighs.[205] Such was the end of a man who certainly
merits no contempt. He had served his country for thirty-five years,
and won credit both as civilian and soldier. His integrity and
fairness were beyond criticism. He talked too much about himself, but
this is the one charge which rumour could hint against him in the
seven years when he was Governor of Moesia, and the twelve years
during which he was Prefect of the City. At the end of his life some
thought he showed a lack of enterprise, but many believed him a
moderate man, who was anxious to save his fellow citizens from
bloodshed. In this, at any rate, all would agree, that before
Vespasian became emperor the reputation of his house rested on
Sabinus. It is said that Mucianus was delighted to hear of his murder,
and many people maintained that it served the interests of peace by
putting an end to the jealousy of two rivals, one of whom was the
emperor's brother, while the other posed as his partner in the
empire.[206]

When the people further demanded the execution of the consul,
Vitellius withstood them. He had forgiven Atticus, and felt that he
owed him a favour, for, when asked who had set fire to the Capitol,
Atticus had taken the blame on himself, by which avowal--or was it a
well-timed falsehood?--he had fixed all the guilt and odium on himself
and exonerated the Vitellian party.

FOOTNOTES:

[172] On the Palatine.

[173] See i. 8.

[174] A friend of Vitellius and the author of the historical
epic on the second Punic War.

[175] This apparently means that, if Vitellius were spared,
pity for his position would inspire his supporters to make
further trouble.

[176] See ii. 59.

[177] Two good points, but both untrue.

[178] This too is probably hyperbole, but Vespasian may have
owed his command in Germany to the influence of Vitellius'
father.

[179] See i. 52, note 99.

[180] See ii. 64, 89.

[181] See ii. 60.

[182] i.e. the way back from the Forum to the Palace.

[183] Including the city garrison and police.

[184] In chap. 78 we find three cohorts of Guards still
faithful to Vitellius, and, as it appears from ii. 93, 94 that
men from the legions of Germany had been enlisted in the
Guards, the term _Germanicae cohortes_ seems to refer to these
three cohorts, in which perhaps the majority were men from the
German army.

[185] Said to be on the Quirinal.

[186] Either the whole hill, or, if the expression is exact,
the south-west summit.

[187] This seems to have led her later into the paths of
conspiracy, for she is said to have been banished by Domitian
for her friendship with Arulenus Rusticus.

[188] _Prominentem_ seems to mean the one that projected
towards them.

[189] The space lying between the two peaks of the Capitoline.

[190] A technical term for the beams of the pediment.

[191] 'Lars Porsenna of Clusium,' 507 B.C.

[192] 'Burning the Capitol' was a proverb of utter iniquity.

[193] In the war between Sulla and Marius, 83 B.C.

[194] The capital town of the Volscians. This early history is
told in the first book of Livy.

[195] 507 B.C.

[196] 83 B.C. The interval is really 425 years.

[197] This, according to Pliny, was Sulla's own saying.

[198] Consul in 69 B.C. He took the title of Capitolinus.

[199] On the monument which details his exploits Augustus says
that he restored the Capitol at immense cost without
inscribing his name on it.

[200] Flavius Sabinus.

[201] Cp. chap. 70.

[202] Cp. i. 20, 87; ii. 12.

[203] Consul for November and December. His colleague,
Caecilius Simplex, was on the other side (see chap. 68).

[204] The dress of the worshippers of the Egyptian goddess
Isis, who considered woollen clothes unclean.

[205] A flight of steps leading down from the Capitol to the
Forum. On them the bodies of criminals were exposed after
execution.

[206] Mucianus.

THE TAKING OF TARRACINA

About this same time Lucius Vitellius,[207] who had pitched his 76
camp at the Temple of Feronia,[208] made every effort to destroy
Tarracina, where he had shut up the gladiators and sailors, who would
not venture to leave the shelter of the walls or to face death in the
open. The gladiators were commanded, as we have already seen,[209] by
Julianus, and the sailors by Apollinaris, men whose dissolute
inefficiency better suited gladiators than general officers. They set
no watch, and made no attempt to repair the weak places in the walls.
Day and night they idled loosely; the soldiers were dispatched in all
directions to find them luxuries; that beautiful coast rang with their
revelry; and they only spoke of war in their cups. A few days earlier,
Apinius Tiro[210] had started on his mission, and, by rigorously
requisitioning gifts of money in all the country towns, was winning
more unpopularity than assistance for the cause.

In the meantime, one of Vergilius Capito's slaves deserted to 77
Lucius Vitellius, and promised that, if he were provided with men, he
would put the abandoned castle into their hands. Accordingly, at dead
of night he established a few lightly armed cohorts on the top of the
hills which overlooked the enemy. Thence the soldiers came charging
down more to butchery than battle. They cut down their victims
standing helpless and unarmed or hunting for their weapons, or perhaps
newly startled from their sleep--all in a bewildering confusion of
darkness, panic, bugle-calls, and savage cries. A few of the
gladiators resisted and sold their lives dearly. The rest rushed to
the ships; and there the same panic and confusion reigned, for the
villagers were all mixed up with the troops, and the Vitellians
slaughtered them too, without distinction. Just as the first uproar
began, six Liburnian c