"The anxiety of the framers of the Constitution to preserve the independence especially of the judicial department is manifested by the provision now under review, forbidding the diminution of the compensation of the judges of courts exercising the judicial power of the United States. This requirement was foreshadowed, and its vital character attested, by the Declaration of Independence, which, among the injuries and usurpations recited against the King of Great Britain, declared that he had "made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."

"In framing the Constitution, therefore, the power to diminish the compensation of the federal judges was explicitly denied in order, inter alia, that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce their means of support. The high importance of the provision, as the contemporary history shows, was definitely pointed out by the leading statesmen of the time. Thus, in the Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton said: "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." And in No. 79:

""Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.""

"(The italics are in the original.)"

[Page 289 U. S. 532]

Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of the debates of the Virginia state Convention of 1829-1830 (pp. 616, 619), used the following strong and frequently quoted language:

"The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not to the last degree important that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and his conscience? . . . I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary."

"In a very early period of our history, it was said, in words as true today as they were then, that "if they [the people] value and wish to preserve their Constitution, they ought never to surrender the independence of their judges." Rawle on the Constitution, 2d ed., 281...."

- MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).

"Hamilton, in the Federalist, No. 81, made the following emphatic statement of the general principle of immunity:

"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind, and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union. Unless therefore there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.

[Page 292 U. S. 325]

"The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident it could not be done without waging war against the contracting state, and to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the state governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether forced and unwarrantable. [Footnote 4]""

- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)

"Alexander Hamilton, explaining the reasons for and the purpose of § 1 of Art. III, said:

""The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment. . . ."

""This simple view of the matter . . . proves incontestably that the judiciary is, beyond comparison, the weakest of the three departments of power, that it can never attack with success either of the other two, and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. . . ."

"The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority -- such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. . . ."

The Federalist, No. 78.

"Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts [Page 307 U. S. 286] to a power over his will. . . . The enlightened friends to good government in every State have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the State constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed have declared that permanent salaries should be established for the judges, but the experiment has in some instances shown that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude legislative evasions. Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. . . . This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy, and it may be safely affirmed that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the States in regard to their own judges."

The Federalist, No. 79.

- MR. JUSTICE BUTLER, in dissent, [U.S. Supreme] Court. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).

"First. That the supremacy of national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization, and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed out by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, [Footnote 9] and has since been given continuous recognition by this Court...."

"...[Footnote 9]....”

"...The importance of national power in all matters relating to foreign affairs and the inherent danger of state action in this field are clearly developed in Federalist papers No. 3, 4, 5, 42 and 80."

- MR. JUSTICE BLACK deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

"Before the Constitution was adopted, some States had granted patents either by special act or by general statute, [Footnote 3] but when the Constitution was adopted, provision for a federal patent law was made one of the enumerated powers of Congress because, as Madison put it in The Federalist No. 43, the States "cannot separately make effectual provision" for either patents or copyrights. [Footnote 4] That constitutional provision is Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which empowers Congress

""To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

"Pursuant to this constitutional [Page 376 U. S. 229] authority, Congress in 1790, enacted the first federal patent and copyright law, 1 Stat. 109, and, ever since that time, has fixed the condition upon which patents and copyrights shall be granted, see17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293. These laws, like other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U. S. 379 (1963). When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is "familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied" by the state law. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942). This is true, of course, even if the state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted state power."

- MR. JUSTICE BLACK deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).

"James Madison made the same point in this now famous passage from Federalist Paper No. 51:

""But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself.""

[Federalist 51 continues on to read in the next sentence to that quoted above; "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."]

- JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981). No. 80-5980 April 27, 1981.

“The general principle of state court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal laws is straightforward: state courts may assume subject matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state [Page 453 U. S. 478] court adjudication. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 507-508 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136 (1876). This rule is premised on the relation between the States and the National Government within our federal system, see The Federalist No. 82 (Hamilton). The two exercise concurrent sovereignty, although the Constitution limits the powers of each and requires the States to recognize federal law as paramount. Federal law confers rights binding on state courts, the subject matter jurisdiction of which is governed in the first instance by state laws. [Footnote 4] ...

...The Federalist No. 82, p. 514 (H. Lodge ed.1908) (Hamilton), quoted in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. at 138. State courts routinely exercise subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases arising from events in other States and governed by the other States' laws. See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11 (1881). Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U. S. 302 (1981). That the location of the event giving rise to the suit is an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, rather than another State, does not introduce any new limitation on the forum State's subject [Page 453 U. S. 482] matter jurisdiction. [Footnote 8] Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, supra, at 244 U. S. 72....

- JUSTICE POWELL deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981)

"We noted recently that

""[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial."

"INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to "diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu, [Page 478 U. S. 722] quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates'. . . ." The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed.1961).

"Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent Executive Branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. The Framers also provided for a Judicial Branch equally independent, with "[t]he judicial Power . . . extend[ing] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States." Art. III, § 2...."

"...The dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized.

""[T]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches."

"Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 129 (1976). Indeed, we also have observed only recently that

""[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted."

- CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER deliver[ing] the opinion of the [U.S. Supreme] Court. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)