The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [Elliot's Debates, Volume 3]
Thursday, June 12, 1788.
(Excerpts)
[The 1st and 2d sections still under consideration.]
Mr. GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, I asserted yesterday that there were two opinions in the world--the one that mankind were capable of governing themselves, the other that it required actual force to govern them. On the principle that the first position was true, and which is consonant to the rights of humanity, the house will recollect that it was my opinion to amend the present Confederation, and infuse a new portion of health and strength into the state governments; to apportion the public debts in such a manner as to throw the unpopular ones on the back lands; to divide the rest of the domestic debt among the different states; and to call for requisitions only for the interest of the foreign debt. If, contrary to this maxim, force is necessary to govern men, I then did propose, as an alternative, not a monarchy like that of Great Britain, but a milder government, one which, under the idea of a general corruption of manners, and the consequent necessity of force, should be as gentle as possible. I showed, in as strong a manner as I could, some of the principal defects in the Constitution. The greatest defect is the opposition of the component parts to the interests of the whole; for, let gentlemen ascribe its defects to as many causes as their imagination may suggest, this is the principal and radical one. I urged that, to remedy the evils which must result from this government, a more equal representation in the legislature, and proper checks against abuse, were indispensably necessary. I do not pretend to propose for your adoption the plan of government which I mentioned as an alternative to a monarchy, in case mankind were incapable of governing themselves. I only meant, if it were once established that force was necessary to govern men, that such a plan would be more eligible for a free people than the introduction of crowned heads and nobles. Having premised this much, to obviate misconstruction, I shall proceed to the clause before us with this observation--that I prefer a completer consolidation to a partial one, but a federal government to either. In my opinion, the states which give up the power of taxation have nothing more to give. The people of that state which suffers any power but her own immediate government to interfere with the sovereign right of taxation are gone forever. Giving the right of taxation is giving a right to increase the miseries of the people....
...I said, yesterday, that there were one thousand five hundred representatives, and one hundred and sixty senators, who transacted the affairs of the different states. But we are told that this great number is unnecessary, and that in the multitude of counsellors there is folly instead of wisdom; that they are a dead weight on the public business, which is said in all public assemblies to devolve on a few. . . . .It must be confessed that it is highly improper to trust our liberty and property in the hands of so few persons, if they were any thing less than divine....
...Do not gentlemen recollect our situation during the war? Our ports were Blocked up, and all means of getting money destroyed, and almost every article taken from the farmer for the public service--so as, in many instances, not to leave him enough to support his own family with tolerable decency and comfort. It cannot be forgot that another resort of government was applied to, and that press-warrants were made to answer for noncompliance of requisitions. Every person must recollect our miserable situation during the arduous contest; therefore, I shall make no further apology for the states, during the existence of the war. Since the peace, there have been various causes for not furnishing the necessary quotas to the general government. In some of the flourishing states, the requisitions have been attended to; in others, their non-compliance is to be attributed more to the inability of the people than to their unwillingness to advance the general interests. Massachusetts attempted to correct the nature of things by extracting more from the people than they were able to part With. What did it produce? A revolution which shook that state to its centre....
...I would not deny the utility of vesting the general government with a power of this kind, were it properly guarded. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it occurs to me that Congress may give exclusive privileges to merchants residing within the tea miles square, and that the same exclusive power of legislation will enable them to grant similar privileges to merchants in the strongholds within the states. I wish to know if there be any thing in the Constitution to prevent it. If there be, I have not been able to discover it. I may, perhaps, not thoroughly comprehend this part of the Constitution; but it strikes my mind that there is a possibility that, in process of time, and from the simple operation of effects from causes, the whole commerce of the United States may be exclusively carried on by merchants residing within the seat of government, and those places of arms which may be purchased of the state legislatures. How detrimental and injurious to the community, and how repugnant to the equal rights of mankind, such exclusive emoluments would be, I submit to the consideration of the committee. Things of a similar nature have happened in other countries....
Mr. PENDLETON. Mr. Chairman, When I spoke formerly, I endeavored to account for the uneasiness of the public mind, that it arose from objections to government drawn from mistaken sources. I stated the general governments of the world to have been either dictated by a conqueror at the point of his sword, or the offspring of confusion--when a great popular leader, seizing the occasion, if he did not produce it, restored order at the expense of liberty, and became the tyrant. In either case, the interest and ambition of the despot, and not the good of society, give the tone to the government, and establish contending interests. A war is commenced, and kept up, where there ought to be union; and the friends of liberty have sounded the alarm to the people, to regain that liberty which circumstances have thus deprived them of. Those alarms, misrepresented and improperly applied to this government, have produce uneasiness in the public mind.
I said, improperly applied, because the people, by us, are peaceably assembled, to contemplate, in the calm lights of mild philosophy, what government is best calculated to promote their happiness and secure their liberty. This I am sure we shall effect, if we do not lose sight of them by too much attachment to pictures of beauty, or horror, in our researches into antiquity, our travels for examples into remote regions, or severe criticisms upon our unfriendly applications of expressions which may drop in the effusions of honest zeal. The term herd was thus produced--meaning to express a multitude. It was capable of an odious application--that of placing the citizens in a degrading character. I wish it had not been used, and I wish the gentleman on the other side had thought himself at liberty to let it pass, without pointing out its odious meaning. However, claim no right to prescribe to him. It is done, and it must rest with the candor of the attending citizens, whom it concerns, to give it the innocent meaning which, I am sure, the honorable gentleman intended.
On the subject, of government, the worthy member (Mr. Henry) and I differ at the threshold. I think government necessary to protect liberty. He supposes the American spirit all sufficient for the purpose. What say the most respectable writers--Montesquieu, Locke, Sidney, Harrington, &c.? They have presented us with no such idea. They properly discard from their system all the severity of cruel punishment, such as tortures, inquisitions, and the like--shocking to human nature, and only calculated to coerce the dominion of tyrants over slaves. But they recommend making the ligaments of government firm, and a rigid execution of the laws, as more necessary, than in a monarchy, to preserve that virtue which they all declare to be the pillar on which the government, and liberty, its object, must stand. They are not so visionary as to suppose there ever did, or ever will, exist a society, however large their aggregate fund of virtue may be, but hath among them persons of a turbulent nature, restless in themselves and disturbing the peace of others--sons of rapine and violence, who, unwilling to labor themselves, are watching every opportunity to snatch from the industrious peasant the fruits of his honest labor. Was I not, then, correct in my inference, that such a government and liberty were friends and allies, and that their common enemies were turbulence, faction, and violence? It is those, therefore, that will be offended by good government; and for those I suppose no gentleman will profess himself an advocate.
The writers just mentioned point out licentiousness as the natural offspring of liberty, and that, therefore, all free governments Should endeavor to suppress it, or else it will ultimately overthrow that liberty of which it is the result. Is this speculation only? Alas! reason and experience too fatally prove its truth in all instances. A republican government is the nursery of science. It turns the bent of it to eloquence, as a qualification for the representative character, which is, as it ought to be, the road to our public offices. I have pleasure in beholding these characters already produced in our councils--and a rising fund equal to a constant supply. May Heaven prosper their endeavors, and direct their eloquence to the real good of their country! I am unfortunate enough to differ from the worthy member in another circumstance. He professes himself an advocate for the middling and lower classes of men. I profess to be a friend to the equal liberty of all men, from the palace to the cottage, without any other distinction than that between good and bad men. I appeal to my public life and private behavior, to decide whether I have departed from this role. Since distinctions have been brought forth and communicated to the audience, and will be therefore disseminated, I beg gentlemen to take with them this observation--that distinctions have been produced by the opposition. From the friends of the new government they have heard none. None such are to be found in the organization of the paper before you.
Why bring into the debate the whims of writers--introducing the distinction of well-born from others? I consider every man well-born who comes into the world with an intelligent mind, and with all his parts perfect. I am an advocate for fixing our government on true republican principles, giving to the poor man free liberty in his person and property.
Whether a man, be great or small he is equally dear to me. I wish, sir, for a regular government, in order to secure and protect those honest citizens who have been distinguished--I mean the industrious farmer and planter. I wish them to be protected in the enjoyment of their honestly and industriously acquired property. I wish commerce to be fully protected and encouraged, that the people may have an opportunity of disposing of their crops at market, and of procuring such supplies as they may be in want of. I presume that there can be no political happiness, unless industry be cherished and protected, and properly secured. Suppose a poor man becomes rich by honest labor, and increases the public stock of wealth: shall his reward be the loss of that liberty he set out with? Will you take away every stimulus to industry, by declaring that he shall not retain the fruits of it? The idea of the poor becoming rich by assiduity is not mere fancy. I am old enough, and have had sufficient experience, to know the effects of it. I have often known persons, commencing in life without any other stock but industry and economy, by the mere efforts before, rise to opulence and wealth. This could not have been the case without a government to protect their industry. In my mind the true principle of republicanism, and the greatest security of liberty, is regular government. Perhaps I may not be a republican, but this is my idea. In reviewing the history of the world, shall we find an instance where any Society retained its liberty without government? As I before hinted, the smallest society in extent, to the greatest empire, can only be preserved by a regular government, to suppress that faction and turbulence so natural to many of our species. What do men do with those passions when they come into society? Do they leave them? No; they bring them with them. These passions, which they thus bring into society, will produce disturbances, which, without any check, will overturn it.
A distinction has been made, which surprised me, between the illumined mind and the ignorant. I have heard with pleasure, in other places, that worthy gentleman expatiate on the advantages of learning--among other things, as friendly to liberty. I have seen, in our code of laws, the public purse applied to cherish private seminaries. This is not strictly just; but with me the end sanctified the means, and I was satisfied. But did we thus encourage learning, to set up those who attained its benefits as butts of invidious distinction? Surely the worthy member, on reflection, will disavow the idea. He learns to little purpose, indeed, who vainly supposes himself become, from the circumstance, of an order of beings superior to the honest citizens--peasants if you please to term them so--who, in their labor, produce great good to the community. But those illumined minds who apply their knowledge to promote and cherish liberty--equal liberty to all, the peasant as well as others--give to society the real blessings of learning....
...The happiness of the people is the object of this government, and the people are therefore made the fountain of all power. They cannot act personally, and must delegate powers. Here the worthy gentleman who spoke last, and I travelling not together indeed, but in sight, are placed at an immeasurable distance--as far as the poles asunder. He recommends a government more energetic and strong than this, abundantly too strong ever to receive my approbation,--a first magistrate borrowed from Britain, to whom you are to make a surrender of your liberty; and you give him a separate interest from yours. You intrench that interest by powers and prerogatives undefined--implant in him self-love, from the influence of which he is to do, what--to promote your interest in opposition to his own? An operation of self-love which is new! Having done this, you accept from him a charter of the rights you have parted with; present him a bill of rights, telling him, Thus far shall you oppress us, and no farther.
It still depends on him whether he will give you that charter, or allow the operation of the bill of rights. He will do it as long as he cannot do otherwise, but no longer. Did ever any free people in the world, not dictated to by the sword of a conqueror, or by circumstances into which licentiousness may have plunged them, place themselves in so degrading a situation, or make so disgraceful a sacrifice of their liberty? If they did, sure I am that the example will not be followed by this Convention. This is not all: we are to look somewhere for the chosen few to go into the ten miles square, with extensive powers for life, and thereby destroy every degree of true responsibility. Is there no medium, or shall we recur to extremes? As a republican, sir, I think that the security of the liberty and happiness of the people, from the highest to the lowest, being the object of government, the people are consequently the fountain of all power.
They must, however, delegate it to agents, because, from their number, dispersed situation, and many other circumstances, they cannot exercise it in person. They must therefore, by frequent and certain elections, choose representatives to whom they trust it.
Is there any distinction in the exercise of this delegation of power? The man who possesses twenty-five acres of land has an equal right of voting for a representative with the man who has twenty-five thousand acres. This equality of suffrage secures the people in their property. While we are in pursuit of checks, and balances, and proper security in the delegation of power, we ought never to lose sight of the representative character. By this we preserve the great principle of the primary right of power in the people; and should deviations happen from our interest, the spirit of liberty, in future elections, will correct it--a security I esteem far superior to paper bills of rights....
...Permit me to deliver a few sentiments on the great and important subject of previous and subsequent amendments. When I sat down to read that paper, I did not read it with an expectation that it was perfect, and that no man would object to it. I had learned, sir, that an expectation of such perfection in any institute devised by man, was as vain as the search for the philosopher's stone. I discovered objections--I thought I saw there some sown seeds of disunion--not in the immediate operation of the government, but which might happen in some future time. I wish amendments to remove these. But these remote possible errors may be eradicated by the amendatory clause in the Constitution. I see no danger in making the experiment, since the system itself points out an easy mode of removing any errors which shall have been experienced. In this view, then, I think we may safely trust in the government. With respect to the eight states who have already acceded to it, do gentlemen believe that, should we propose amendments as the sine qua non of our adoption, they would listen to our proposals? I conceive, sir, that they would not retract. They would tell us--No, gentlemen, we cannot accept of your conditions. You put yourselves upon the ground of opposition. Your amendments are dictated by local considerations. We, in our adoption, have been influenced by considerations of general utility to the Union. We cannot abandon principles, like these, to gratify you. Thus, sir, by previous amendments, we present a hostile countenance. If, on the contrary, we imitate the conduct of those states, our language will be conciliatory and friendly. Gentlemen, we put ourselves on the same ground that you are on. We are not actuated by local consideration, but by such as affect the people of America in general. This conduct will give our amendments full weight.
I was surprised when I heard introduced the opinion of a gentleman (Mr. Jefferson) whom I highly respect. I know He great abilities of that gentleman. Providence has, for the good of mankind, accompanied those extensive abilities with a disposition to make use of them for the good of his fellow-beings; and I wish, with all my heart, that he was here to assist us on this interesting occasion. As to his letter, impressed as I am with the force of his authority, I think it was improper to introduce it on this occasion. The opinion of a private individual, however enlightened, ought not to influence our decision. But, admitting that this opinion ought to be conclusive with us, it strikes me in a different manner from the honorable gentleman. I have seen the letter in which this gentleman has written his opinion upon this subject. It appears that he is possessed of that Constitution, and has in his mind the idea of amending it--he has in his mind the very question, of subsequent or previous amendments, which is now under consideration. His sentiments on this subject are as follows: "I wish, with all my soul, that the nine first conventions may accept the new Constitution, because it will secure to us the good it contains, which I think great and important. I wish the four latest, whichever they be, may refuse to accede to it till amendments are secured." He then enumerates the amendments which he wishes to be secured, and adds, "We must take care, however, that neither this nor any other objection to the form, produce a schism in our Union. That would be an incurable evil; because friends falling out never cordially reunite." Are these sentiments in favor of those who wish to prevent its adoption by previous amendments? He wishes the first nine states to adopt it. What are his reasons? Because he thinks it will secure to us the good it contains, which he thinks great and important; and he wishes the other four may refuse it, because he thinks it may tend to obtain necessary amendments. But he would not wish that a schism should take place in the Union on any consideration. If, then, we are to be influenced by his opinion at all, we shall ratify it, and secure thereby the good it contains. The Constitution points out a plain and ordinary method of reform, without any disturbance or convulsions whatever. I therefore think that we ought to ratify it, in order to secure the Union, and trust to this method for removing those inconveniences which experience shall point out.
(At this point, I interject the following quotation for your consideration;
“We established however some, although not all its [self-government] important principles. The constitutions of most of our States assert, that all power is inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by themselves, in all cases to which they think themselves competent, (as in electing their functionaries executive and legislative, and deciding by a jury of themselves, in all judiciary cases in which any fact is involved,) or they may act by representatives, freely and equally chosen; that it is their right and duty to be at all times armed...."
- Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824. Memorial Edition 16:45, Lipscomb and Bergh, editors).
...Mr. MADISON....The honorable member spoke of the decemviri at Rome as having some similitude to the ten representatives who are to be appointed by this state. I can see no point of similitude here, to enable us to draw any conclusion. For what purpose were the decemviri appointed? They were invested with a plenipotentiary commission to make a code of laws. By whom were they appointed? By the people at large? My memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were appointed by the senate,--I believe, in the name of the people. If they were appointed by the senate, and composed of the most influential characters among the nobles, can any thing be inferred from that against our federal representatives? Who made a discrimination between the nobles and the people? The senate.
Those men totally perverted the powers which were given them, for the purpose above specified, to the subversion of the public liberty. Can we suppose that a similar usurpation might be made by men appointed in a totally different manner? As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I conceive that no arguments drawn from that source can apply to this government. I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of my honorable friend, when he tells us that the federal government will predominate, and that the state interest will be lost, when, at the same time, he tells us that it will be a faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail, as states, I conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence, under the present feeble government, has prevailed, I think that a remedy ought to be introduced, by giving the general government power to suppress it.
...Mr. HENRY....But sure I am that the dangers of this system are real, when those who have no similar interests with the people of this country are to legislate for us--when our dearest interests are left in the power of those whose advantage it may be to infringe them. How will the quotas of troops be furnished? Hated as requisitions are, your federal officers cannot collect troops, like dollars, and carry them in their pockets. You must make those abominable requisitions for them, and the scale will be in proportion to the number of your blacks, as well as your whites, unless they violate the constitutional rule of apportionment. This is not calculated to rouse the fears of the people. It is founded in truth.
How oppressive and dangerous must this be to the Southern States, who alone have slaves! This will render their proportion infinitely greater than that of the Northern States. It has been openly avowed that this shall be the rule. I will appeal to the judgments of the committee, whether there be danger. The honorable gentleman said that there was no precedent for this American revolution. We have precedents in abundance. They have been drawn from Great Britain. Tyranny has arisen there in the same manner in which it was introduced among the Dutch. The tyranny of Philadelphia may be like the tyranny of George III. I believe this similitude will be incontestably proved before we conclude.
The honorable gentleman has endeavored to explain the opinion of Mr. Jefferson, our common friend, into an advice to adopt this new government. What are his sentiments? He wishes nine states to adopt, and that four states may be found somewhere to reject it. Now, sir, I say, if we pursue his advice, what are we to do? To prefer form to substance? For, give me leave to ask, what is the substantial part of his counsel? It is, sir, that four states should reject. They tell us that, from the most authentic accounts, New Hampshire will adopt it. When I denied this, gentlemen said they were absolutely certain of it. Where, then, will four states be found to reject, if we adopt it? If we do, the counsel of this enlightened and worthy countryman of ours will be thrown away; and for what? He wishes to secure amendments and a bill of rights, if I am not mistaken. I speak from the best information, and if wrong, I beg to be put right. His amendments go to that despised thing, called a bill of rights, and all the rights which are dear to human nature--trial by jury, the liberty of religion and the press, &c. Do not gentlemen see that, if we adopt, under the idea of following Mr. Jefferson's opinion, we amuse ourselves with the shadow, while the substance is given away? If Virginia be for adoption, what states will be left, of sufficient respectability and importance to secure amendments by their rejection? As to North Carolina, it is a poor, despised place. Its dissent will not have influence to introduce any amendments. Where is the American spirit of liberty? Where will you find attachment to the rights of mankind, when Massachusetts, the great northern state, Pennsylvania, the great middle state, and Virginia, the great southern state, shall have adopted this government? Where will you find magnanimity enough to reject it? Should the remaining states have this magnanimity, they will not have sufficient weight to have the government altered. This state has weight and importance. Her example will have powerful influence--her rejection will procure amendments. Shall we, by our adoption, hazard the loss of amendments? Shall we forsake that importance and respectability which our station in America commands, in hopes that relief will come from an obscure part of the Union? I hope my countrymen will spurn at the idea.
The necessity of amendments is universally admitted. It is a word which is reechoed from every part of the continent. A majority of those who hear me think amendments are necessary. Policy tells us they are necessary. Reason, self-preservation, and every idea of propriety, powerfully urge us to secure the dearest rights of human nature. Shall we, in direct violation of these principles, rest this security upon the uncertainty of its being obtained by a few States, more weak and less respectable than ourselves, and whose virtue and magnanimity may be overborne by the example of so many adopting states? Poor Rhode Island, and North Carolina, and even New York, surrounded with federal walls on every side, may not be magnanimous enough to reject; and if they do reject it, they will have but little influence to obtain amendments. I ask, if amendments be necessary, from whence can they be so properly proposed as from this state? The example of Virginia is a powerful thing, particularly with respect to North Carolina, whose supplies must come through Virginia. Every possible opportunity of procuring amendments is gone, our power and political salvation are gone, if we ratify unconditionally. The important right of making treaties is upon the most dangerous foundation. The President, and a few senators, possess it in the most unlimited manner, without any real responsibility, if, from sinister views, they should think proper to abuse it; for they may keep all their measures in the most profound secrecy, as long as they please. Were we not told that war was the case wherein secrecy was the most necessary? But, by the paper on your table, their secrecy is not limited to this case only. It is as unlimited and unbounded as their powers. Under the abominable veil of political secrecy and contrivance, your most valuable rights may be sacrificed by a most corrupt faction, without having the satisfaction of knowing who injured you. They are bound by honor and conscience to act with integrity, but they are under no constitutional restraint. The navigation of the Mississippi, which is of so much importance to the happiness of the people of this country, may be lost by the operation of that paper. There are seven states now decidedly opposed to this navigation. If it be of the highest consequence to know who they are who shall have voted its relinquishment, the federal veil of secrecy will prevent that discovery. We may labor under the magnitude of our miseries without knowing or being able to punish those who produced them. I did not wish that transactions relative to treaties should, when unfinished, be exposed; but it should be known, after they were concluded, who had advised them to be made, in order to secure some degree of certainty that the public interest shall be consulted in their formation.
We are told that all powers not given are reserved. I am sorry to bring forth hackneyed observations. But, sir, important truths lose nothing of their validity or weight, by frequency of repetition. The English history is frequently recurred to by gentlemen. Let us advert to the conduct of the people of that country. The people of England lived without a declaration of rights till the war in the time of Charles I. That king made usurpations upon the rights of the people. Those rights were, in a great measure, before that time undefined. Power and privilege then depended on implication and logical discussion. Though the declaration of rights was obtained from that king, his usurpations cost him his life. The limits between the liberty of the people, and the prerogative of the king, were still not clearly defined.
The rights of the people continued to be violated till the Stuart family was banished, in the year 1688. The people of England magnanimously defended their rights, banished the tyrant, and prescribed to William, Prince of Orange, by the bill of rights, on what terms he should reign; and this bill of rights put an end to all construction and implication. Before this, sir, the situation of the public liberty of England was dreadful. For upwards of a century, the nation was involved in every kind of calamity, till the bill of rights put an end to all, by defining the rights of the people, and limiting the king's prerogative. Give me leave to add (if I can add any thing to so splendid an example) the conduct of the American people. They, sir, thought a bill of rights necessary. It is alleged that several states, in the formation of their government, omitted a bill of rights. To this I answer, that they had the substance of a bill of rights contained in their constitutions, which is the same thing. I believe that Connecticut has preserved it, by her Constitution, her royal charter, which clearly defines and secures the great rights of mankind--secures to us the great, important rights of humanity; and I care not in what form it is done.
Of what advantage is it to the American Congress to take away this great and general security? I ask, Of what advantage is it to the public, or to Congress, to drag an unhappy debtor, not for the sake of justice, but to gratify the malice of the plaintiff, with his witnesses, to the federal court, from a great distance? What was the principle that actuated the Convention in proposing to put such dangerous powers in the hands of any one? Why the trial by jury taken away? All the learned arguments that have been used on this occasion do not prove that it is secured. Even the advocates for the plan do not all concur in the certainty of its security. Wherefore is religious liberty not secured? One honorable gentleman, who favors adoption, said that he had had his fears on the subject. If I can well recollect, he informed us that he was perfectly satisfied, by the powers of reasoning, (with which he is so happily endowed,) that those fears were not well grounded. There is many a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative reasoning; there are many of our most worthy citizens who cannot go through all the labyrinths of syllogistic, argumentative deductions, when they think that the rights of conscience are invaded. This sacred right ought not to depend on constructive, logical reasoning.
When we see men of such talents and learning compelled to use their utmost abilities to convince themselves that there is no danger, is it not sufficient to make us tremble? Is it not sufficient to fill the minds of the ignorant part of men with fear? If gentlemen believe that the apprehensions of men will be quieted, they are mistaken, since our best informed men are in doubt with respect to the security of our rights. Those who are not so well informed will spurn at the government. When our common citizens, who are not possessed with such extensive knowledge and abilities, are called upon to change their bill of rights (which, in plain, unequivocal terms, secures their most valuable rights and privileges) for construction and implication, will they implicitly acquiesce? Our declaration of rights tells us that "all men are by nature free and independent," &c. [Here Mr. Henry read the declaration of rights.] Will they exchange these rights for logical reasons? If you had a thousand acres of land dependent on this, would you be satisfied with logical construction? Would you depend upon a title of so disputable a nature? The present opinions of individuals will be buried in entire oblivion when those rights will be thought of. That sacred and lovely thing, religion, ought not to rest on the ingenuity of logical deduction. Holy religion, sir, will be prostituted to the lowest purposes of human policy. What has been more productive of mischief among mankind than religious disputes? Then here, sir, is a foundation for such disputes, when it requires learning and logical deduction to perceive that religious liberty is secure.
...Rulers are the servants and agents of the people: the people are their masters. Does the new Constitution acknowledge this principle? Trial by jury is the best appendage of freedom. Does it secure this? Does it secure the other great rights of mankind? Our own Constitution preserves these principles. The honorable gentleman contributed to form that Constitution, (Jefferson, I presume). The applauses so justly due to it should, in my opinion, go to the condemnation of that paper.
With respect to the failures and errors of our government, they might have happened in any government. I do not justify what merits censure, but I shall not degrade my country. As to deviations from justice, I hope they will be attributed to the errors of the head, and not to those of the heart....
...Did we not know of the fallibility of human nature, we might rely on the present structure of this government. We might depend that the rules of propriety, and the general interest of the Union, would be observed. But the depraved nature of man is well known. He has a natural bias towards his own interest, which will prevail over every consideration, unless it be checked....
Mr. MADISON....The honorable member has introduced the subject of religion. Religion is not guarded; there is no bill of rights declaring that religion should be secure. Is a bill of rights a security for religion? Would the bill of rights, in this state, exempt the people from paying for the support of one particular sect, if such sect were exclusively: established by law? If there were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would be a poor protection for liberty. Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom arises from that multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is the best and only security for religions liberty in any society; for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest, Fortunately for this commonwealth, a majority of the people are decidedly against any exclusive establishment. I believe it to be so in the other states. There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation. I can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that I have warmly supported religious freedom. It is better that this security should be depended upon from the general legislature, than from one particular state. A particular state might concur in one religious project. But the United States abound in such a variety of sects, that it is a strong security against religious persecution; and it is sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that no one sect will ever be able to outnumber or depress the rest....
(Believe the same principle, as that alluded by Mr. Madison directly above, would apply concerning other rights, would it not?)
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