The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 1]
YATES Tuesday, June 19th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states.

On the consideration of the first resolve of the Jersey plan.

Mr. Madison. -- This is an important question -- Many persons scruple the powers of the convention. If this remark had any weight, it is equally applicable to the adoption of either plan. The difference of drawing the powers in the one from the people and in the other from the states, does not affect the powers. There are two states in the union where the members of congress are chosen by the people. A new government must be made. Our all is depending on it; and if we have but a clause that the people will adopt, there is then a chance for our preservation. Although all the states have assented to the confederation, an infraction of any one article by one of the states is a dissolution of the whole. This is the doctrine of the civil law on treaties.²⁵

[Note 25: 25 For Genet's interpretation of this speech, see Appendix A, CCCX.]

Jersey pointedly refused complying with a requisition of congress, and was guilty of this infraction, although she afterwards rescinded her non-complying resolve. What is the object of a confederation? It is two-fold -- 1st, to maintain the union; 2dly, good government. Will the Jersey plan secure these points? No; it is still in the power of the confederated states to violate treaties--Has not Georgia, in direct violation of the confederation made war with the Indians, and concluded treaties? Have not Virginia and Maryland entered into a partial compact? Have not Pennsylvania and Jersey regulated the bounds of the Delaware? Has not the state of Massachusetts, at this time, a considerable body of troops in pay? Has not congress been obliged to pass a conciliatory act in support of a decision of their federal court, between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, instead of having the power of carrying into effect the judgment of their own court? Nor does the Jersey plan provide for a ratification by the respective states of the powers intended to be vested. It is also defective in the establishment of the judiciary, granting only an appellate jurisdiction, without providing for a second trial; and in case the executive of a state should pardon an offender, how will it effect the definitive judgment on appeal? It is evident, if we do not radically depart from a federal plan, we shall share the fate of ancient and modern confederacies. The amphyctionic council, like the American congress, had the power of judging in the last resort in war and peace--call out forces--send ambassadors. What was its fate or continuance? Philip of Macedon, with little difficulty, destroyed every appearance of it. The Athenian had nearly the same fate -- The Helvetic confederacy is rather a league--In the German confederacy the parts are too strong for the whole -- The Dutch are in a most wretched situation--weak in all its parts, and only supported by surrounding contending powers.

The rights of individuals are infringed by many of the state laws--such as issuing paper money, and instituting a mode to discharge debts differing from the form of the contract. Has the Jersey plan any checks to prevent the mischief? Does it in any instance secure internal tranquility? Right and force, in a system like this, are synonymous terms. When force is employed to support the system, and men obtain military habits, is there no danger they may turn their arms against their employers? Will the Jersey plan prevent foreign influence? Did not Persia and Macedon distract the councils of Greece by acts of corruption? And is not Jersey and Holland at this day subject to the same distractions? Will not the plan be burthensome to the smaller states, if they have an equal representation? But how is military coercion to enforce government? True, a smaller state may be brought to obedience, or crushed; but what if one of the larger states should prove disobedient, are you sure you can by force effect a submission? Suppose we cannot agree on any plan, what will be the condition of the smaller states? Will Delaware and Jersey be safe against Pennsylvania, or Rhode-Island against Massachusetts? And how will the smaller states be situated in case of partial confederacies? Will they not be obliged to make larger concessions to the greater states? The point of representation is the great point of difference, and which the greater states cannot give up; and although there was an equalization of states, state distinctions would still exist. But this is totally impracticable; and what would be the effect of the Jersey plan if ten or twelve new states were added?

Mr. King moved that the committee rise, and report that the Jersey plan is not admissible, and report the first plan.

Mr. Dickinson supposed that there were good regulations in both. Let us therefore contrast the one with the other, and consolidate such parts of them as the committee approve.

Mr. King's motion was then put -- For it 7 states--3 against--one divided. New-York in the minority.

The committee rose and reported again the first plan, and the inadmissibility of the Jersey plan.

The convention then proceeded to take the first plan into consideration.

The first resolve was read.

Mr. Wilson. I am (to borrow a sea-phrase) for taking a new departure, and I wish to consider in what direction we sail, and what may be the end of our voyage. I am for a national government, though the idea of federal is, in my view, the same. With me it is not a desirable object to annihilate the state governnents, and here I differ from the honorable gentleman from New-York. In all extensive empires a subdivision of power is necessary. Persia, Turkey and Rome, under its emperors, are examples in point. These, although despots, found it necessary. A general government, over a great extent of territory, must in a few years make subordinate jurisdictions. -- Alfred the great, that wise legislator, made this gradation, and the last division on his plan amounted only to ten territories. With this explanation, I shall be for the first resolve.

Mr. Hamilton. I agree to the proposition. I did not intend yesterday a total extinguishment of state governments; but my meaning was, that a national government ought to be able to support itself without the aid or interference of the state governments, and that therefore it was necessary to have full sovereignty. Even with corporate rights the states will be dangerous to the national government, and ought to be extinguished, new modified, or reduced to a smaller scale.

Mr. King. None of the states are now sovereign or independent--Many of these essential rights are vested in congress. Congress, by the confederation, possesses the rights of the United States. This is a union of the men of those states. None of the states, individually or collectively, but in congress, have the rights of peace or war. The magistracy in congress possesses the sovereignty--To certain points we are now a united people. Consolidation is already established. The confederation contains an article to make alterations -- Congress have the right to propose such alterations.

The 8th article respecting the quotas of the states, has been altered, and eleven states have agreed to it. Can it not be altered in other instances? It can, excepting the guarantee of the states.

Mr. Martin. When the states threw off their allegiance on Great Britain, they became independent of her and each other. They united and confederated for mutual defence, and this was done on principles of perfect reciprocity -- They will now again meet on the same ground. But when a dissolution takes place, our original rights and sovereignties are resumed. -- Our accession to the union has been by states. If any other principle is adopted by this convention, he will give it every opposition.

Mr. Wilson. The declaration of independence preceded the state constitutions. What does this declare? In the name of the people of these states, we are declared to be free and independent. The power of war, peace, alliances and trade, are declared to be vested in congress.

Mr. Hamilton. I agree to Mr. Wilson's remark. -- Establish a weak government and you must at times overleap the bounds. Rome was obliged to create dictators. Cannot you make propositions to the people because we before confederated on other principles? -- The people can yield to them, if they will. The three great objects of government, agriculture, commerce and revenue, can only be secured by a general government.

Adjourned to to-morrow morning.

KING
18[19] June

Madison

Confedn. unanimously adopted can be dissolved only by unanimous consent -- this Position is not true -- A contract entered into by men or societies may be dissolved by the breach of a single Articles--this is the case in Treaties--sometimes however provision is made that the Breach of a single Article shall not dissolve the Contn. or Treaty Georgia has declared & prosecuted a war agt. the Indians -- they have treated with them -- N Jersey has expressly refused a constutitional Requisition -- Virginia & Maryland have formed a Contract relative to the Potomack -- Pennsylvania & NYk have agreed about their boundary -- Massachussets has raised an Army, & are now about to augment that Establishment --

Will a federal Govt. answer --

Amphictions -- to decide between the members -- to mulct offenders -- command the forces, sent Embass. chose the Comr. in Chief, and used the Genl. Forces agt. the deficient --

Athenian confed. similar to the Amphictions -- their fate terminated by the strength of the members

Helvetic Confed. loose & weak and not like our situation --

Germanic Confedy.

Loose & weak, the strength of individual Members exceed that of the whole --

The Netherlands -- weak -- no powers --

Wilson

I dont agree that the Genl. Govt. will swallow up the states or yr. Government -- I think they must be preserved they must be continued -- they may live in harmony with the Genl. Government -- our Country is too extensive for a single Govt. no Despot ever did govern a country so extensive -- Persia is divided into 20 subordinate Govts. Rome governed by her Proconsuls -- Alfred adopted the plan and formed societies of 10, to those of 100ds towns counties, &c --²⁶

[Note 26: 26 [Endorsed] June 19 | Confederation unanimously | formed, may be dissolved | without unanimity]

Objections to a general or national Govt.²⁷

[Note 27: 27 Although not indicated in the MS. this is so evidently an outline of King's speech of this date that it is inserted here without hesitation.]

This convention does not possess authority to propose any reform which is not purely federal --

2. If they proposed such power it wd be inexpedient to exercise it, because the small States wd. loose their State influence or equality, and because the Genius of the people is of that sort that such a Reform wd. be rejected --

Answer -- The States under the confed. are not sovereign States -- they can do no act but such as are of a subordinate nature or such as terminate in themselves -- and even then in some instances they are restrained -- Coinage. P. Office &c they are wholly incompentent to the exercise of any of the Gt. & distinguishing acts of Sovereignty -- They can neither make nor receive to or from any other sovereign they have not the powers of injuring another, or of defending themselves from an Injury offered from another -- they are deaf, dumb, and impotent -- these Faculties are yielded up and the US in C. assd. hold and possess them, and they alone can exercise them -- they are so far out of the controul of the separate States, yt. if every State in the Union was to instruct yr. Deleg. and those Delegates within ye powers of the Arts. of Union shd. do an act in violation of their Instructions it wd. nevertheless be valid If they declare a war, any giving aid & comfort to the enemy wd. be Treason; if peace any capture on the high Seas wd. be piracy.

This remark proves yt. the States are now subordinate corporations or Societies and not Sovereigns -- these imperfect States are the confederates, and they are the Electors of the Magistrates who exercise the national Sovereignty -- The articles of Confedn. are perpetual union, -- are partly federal & partly of the nature of a constitution or form of Govt. arising from & applying to the Citizens of the US. & not from the individual States --

The only criterion of determing what is federal and what is national is this, those acts which are for the government of the states only are purely federal, those which are for the Government of the Citizens of the individual States are national & not federal

If then the articles of Confedn. & perpetl. union have this twofold capacity, and if they provide for an alteration in a certain mode, why may not they be so altered as that the federal article may be changed to a national one and the national to a federal? I see no argument that can be objected to the authority -- the 5. art. regulates the influence of the several States and makes them equal -- does not the confed. authorise this alteration that instead of this Equality, that one State may have double the Influence of another -- I conceive it does -- and so of every Article except that wh destroys the Idea of a confedy. I think it may be proved that every article may be totally altered provided you have one guarantying to each State the right of regulating its private & internal affairs in the manner of a subordinate corporation --

But admiting that the Arts. of Confed. & Perpet. Union, or the powers of the Legis. did not extend to the proposed Reform; yet the public Expectations, & the public Danger requires it -- the System proposed to be adopted is no scheme of a day, calculated to postpone the hour of Danger, & then leave it to fall with double ruin on our successors -- It is no crude and undigested plan, the Child of narrow and unextensive views, brought forward und[er] the auspices of Cowardice & Irresolution. it is a measure of Decision, it is the foundation of Freedom & of national Glory -- it will draw on itself, and be able to support the severest scrutiny & Examination -- It is no idle Experiment, no romantic Speculation -- the measure forces itself upon wise men, and if they have not firmness to look it in the face and protect it -- Farwel to the Freedom of our Government -- our military Glory will be tarnished, and our boasts of Freedom will be the scorn of the Enemies of Liberty²⁸

[Note 28: 28 [Endorsed] K | Remarks in favour of a | Genl Govt instead of the old | Plan of the Confederation | Question of Powers]

HAMILTON

Maddison -- Breach of compact in one article releases the whole --

Treaties may still be violated by the states under the Jersey plan --

Appellate jurisdiction not sufficient because second trial cannot be had under it --

Attempt made by one of the greatest monarchs of Europe to equalize the local peculiarities of their separate provinces -- in which the Agent fell a victim

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