The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 1]
YATES Saturday, June 9th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment.

Motion by Mr. Gerry to reconsider the appointment of the national executive.

That the national executive be appointed by the state executives.

He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great number of bad men of various descriptions -- these will make a wrong appointment. Besides, an executive thus appointed, will have his partiality in favor of those who appointed him -- that this will not be the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this means be independent of the national legislature, but the appointment by the state executives ought to be made by votes in proportion to their weight in the scale of the representation.

Mr. Randolph opposes the motion. The power vested by it is dangerous -- confidence will be wanting -- the large states will be masters of the election -- an executive ought to have great experience, integrity and activity. The executives of the states cannot know the persons properly qualified as possessing these. An executive thus appointed will court the officers of his appointment, and will relax him in the duties of commander of the militia -- Your single executive is already invested with negativing laws of the state. Will he duly exercise the power? Is there no danger in the combinations of states to appoint such an executive as may be too favorable to local state governments? Add to this the expense and difficulty of bringing the executives to one place to exercise their powers. Can you suppose they will ever cordially raise the great oak, when they must sit as shrubs under its shade?

Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided.

On motion of Mr. Patterson, the consideration of the 2d resolve was taken up, which is as follows: Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be apportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of inhabitants, as the one or other rule may seem best in different cases.

Judge Brearly. -- The present question is an important one. On the principle that each state in the union was sovereign, congress, in the articles of confederation, determined that each state in the public councils had one vote. If the states still remain sovereign, the form of the present resolve is founded on principles of injustice. He then stated the comparative weight of each state -- the number of votes 90. Georgia would be I, Virginia 16, and so of the rest. This vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a national government, what is the remedy? Lay the map of the confederation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines of the respective state jurisdictions, and make a new division so that each state is equal -- then a government on the present system will be just.


Mr. Patterson opposed the resolve. Let us consider with what powers are we sent here? (moved to have the credentials of Massachusetts read, which was done.) By this and the other credentials we see, that the basis of our present authority is founded on a revision of the articles of the present confederation, and to alter or amend them in such parts where they may appear defective. Can we on this ground form a national government? I fancy not. -- Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our proceedings?

We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign states, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our states who have sent us here for other purposes?

What, pray, is intended by a proportional representation? Is property to be considered as part of it? Is a man, for example, possessing a property of £4000 to have 40 votes to one possessing only £100? This has been asserted on a former occasion. If state distinctions are still to be held up, shall I submit the welfare of the state of New-Jersey, with 5 votes in the national council, opposed to Virginia who has 16 votes? Suppose, as it was in agitation before the war, that America had been represented in the British parliament, and had sent 200 members; what would this number avail against 600? We would have been as much enslaved in that case as when unrepresented; and what is worse, without the prospect of redress. But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on states; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may. I therefore declare, that I will never consent to the present system, and I shall make all the interest against it in the state which I represent that I can. Myself or my state wilt never submit to tyranny or despotism.9



[Note 9: 9 According to Madison and King this is the end of Paterson's speech. The paragraph following probably represents Yates's own ideas.]

Upon the whole, every sovereign state according to a confederation must have an equal vote, or there is an end to liberty. As long therefore as state distinctions are held up, this rule must invariably apply; and if a consolidated national government must take place, then state distinctions must cease, or the states must be equalized.

Mr. Wilson was in favor of the resolve. He observed that a majority, nay even a minority, of the states have a right to confederate with each other, and the rest may do as they please. He considered numbers as the best criterion to determine representation. Every citizen of one state possesses the same rights with the citizen of another. Let us see how this rule will apply to the present question. Pennsylvania, from its numbers, has a right to 12 votes, when on the same principle New-Jersey is entitled to 5 votes. Shall New-Jersey have the same right or influence in the councils of the nation with Pennsylvania? I say no. It is unjust -- I never will confederate on this plan. The gentleman from New-Jersey is candid in declaring his opinion -- I commend him for it -- I am equally so. I say again I never will confederate on his principles. If no state will part with any of its sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government. The state who has five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay must have the same proportion of weight in the representation. If there was a probability of equalizing the states, he would be for it. But we have no such power. If however, we depart from the principle of representation in proportion to numbers, we will lose the object of our meeting.

The question postponed for farther consideration.

Adjourned to to-morrow morning.

KING
9 June

Brearly. opposes the equality of Representation, alledges that although it is numerically equal, yet in its operation it will be unequal -- illustrates by saying there will be two divisions in the States thus represented, the one made up of Mass. Penn. & Virgin. the other including the Ten other states -- when Georga. sends one member, Virginia will send sixteen -- These 16 members are united, the members of three or four small States although equal in number are not capable of combination, the influence of the 16 members of Virginia will be different, for these Reasons, from those from three or four small States -- I agree that the Rule of confedn. is unequal -- I shall be willing to take the map of the U S. and divide it into 13 equal parts-- this being done there may fairly be an equality in the representation of the States --

Patterson. Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Governments, and the Erection of a national Govt. -- They only authorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Basis the present Confederation which establishes the principle that each State has an equal vote in Congress -- agrees wth. Brearly for an equal Division of the Territory of the US, and then the equality of Territory will be the parent or origin of an equality of Representation -- But perhaps the inequality of the present system is not so obvious -- the States are equals and they vote equal, in every state the individual Citizens have equal votes although their property is unequal -- a man of 4000£ has one vote, and the man of 100£ has one vote, yet one has forty times as much property as the other -- why shd. not this be the case in the several States -- Mr. Galloway who was early in Cong. proposed that america shd. be represented in the Brith. parl. perhaps they wd. have sent 200 members, and G. Britain 500 members; but it was clearly seen that this project wd. not secure the american Liberties -- neither wd. the smaller States be secured in their Liberties -- the project of an equality in Representation will never succeed -- Admit that a majority of the States in Convention shd. agree in the Measure -- they cannot give the assent of the other States -- I never will agree to this project here, and I will use my influence agt. it in N Jersey -- New Jersey never will agree to the Scheme--


Wilson -- the Doctrine of Representation is this -- first the representative ought to speak the Language of his Constituents, and secondly that his language or vote shd. have the same influence as though the Constituents gave it -- apply this principle and it concludes in favor of an equality of Representation & agt. the present System--10

[Note 10: 10 [Endorsed:] 9 June | Question | Representation according to census -- Debate | Brearly and Patterson no | Wilson aye]

PATERSON11

[Note 11: 11 Reprinted from American Historical Review (IX, 320--324, 330).]

[A]12

[Note 12: 12 The notes numbered A-E probably represent Paterson's careful preparation for his speech of this date: A is a long and elaborate draft; B is the same in shorter form, but with some additional notes; C includes some notes for reference; D seems to consist of catch-words; and E is an elaboration of one or two points. These drafts contain notes of previous debates, but apparently only in so far as Paterson wished to use them for this speech. F seems to represent notes on the debate of this day, taken in a similar way for future use.]

Consider the Nature and Construction of this Assembly. Formed under the act of Congress passed in Conformity with one of the Articles of the Confedn.

See the Comn. from Massts.13

[Note 13: 13 See C below.]

Assumption of Power13a -- The Comn. measures our Power -- to revise the Confedn. to report to Congress and the several Legs.--must not go beyond our Powers--

[Note 13a: 13a In MS. these first words were in the margin.]

Self-constituted and self-ordained Body.

The Coms. give the political Complexion of the several

States -- not ripe -- we must follow the People; the People will not follow us -- The Plan must be accommodated to the public Mind -- consult the Genius, the Temper, the Habits, the Prejudices of the People.

A little practicable Virtue to be preferred to Theory.

Not to sport Opinions of my own -- not to say wt. is the best Govt. or what ought to be done -- but what can be done -- wt. can we do consistently with our Powers; wt. can we do that will meet with the Approbation of the People -- their Will must guide--

Insurrections -- So there are in every Govt. -- even in England -- it may shew, that our particular Systems are wrong -- that our Instns. are too pure -- not sufficiently removed from a State of Nature to answer the Purposes of a State of Society -- it will not militate agt. the democratick Principle when properly regulated and modified--

The democratick Spirit beats high --

Not half wrong enough to have a good Govt.--

2. The Plan proposed The 1st. Propn. withdrawn14 -- it was incompatible with the 2d. The Principles were gradually unfolded--

[Note 14: 14 Refers to action of May 30.]

Wt. Qy. of Land14a -- The I Propn. accords with the Spirit of the Constn.

[Note 14a: 14a In MS. these first words were in the margin.]

Each State is sovereign, free, and independt. etc. Sovereignty includes Equality--

If then the States in Union are as States still to continue in Union, they must be considered as Equals--

13 sovereign and independent States can never constitute one Nation, and at the same Time be States -- they may by Treaty make one confederated Body--

Mr. Randolph -- We ought to be one Nation -- etc. The States as States must be cut up, and destroyed -- This is the way to form us into a Nation -- It has Equality -- it will not break in upon the Rights of any Citizen -- it will destroy State Politicks and Attachmts. Will it be acceded to, etc.

G. Morris -- Every Citizen should enjoy a rateable Proportion of Sovereignty--

Foeus of a Monarch -- 15 An infant Hercules in his Cradle -- 15a The Mind of Man is fond of Power--

[Note 15: 15 Randolph's expression, see June 1 and June 2.]
[Note 15a: 15a In MS. these first words were in the margin.]

Enlarge his prospects, you increase his Desires -- Proportion of Votes -- State-Politicks, State-Attachments, State-Influence, State-Passions -- Districts--

Great Britain and America -- Suppose Representn. from the latter before the Revolutn. according to the Quantum of Property or Number of Souls -- Wt. the Consequence --

3 Article -- 16 Com. Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare.

[Note 16: 16 Refers to Article III of Articles of Confederation.]

A national Govt. to operate individually upon the People in the first Instance, and not upon the States -- and therefore a Representation from the People at large and not from the States--

Will the Operation of the natl. Govt. depend upon the Mode of Representn. -- No -- it depends upon the Quantum of Power lodged in the leg. ex. and judy. Departments -- it will operate individually in the one Case as well as in the other--

Why not operate upon the States -- if they are coerced, they will in Turn coerce each individual--

Let the People elect the State-Legr. -- The State-Legr. elect the federal Legr. -- assign to the State Legr. its Duty -- the same to the federal -- they will be Checks upon each other, and the best Checks that can be formed -- Cong. the Sun of out political System--17

[Note 17: 17 Dickinson's metaphor, see June 7.]

Why a Representation from the People at large -- to equalize Representn. Majr. Butler18 -- Representn. -- Property -- People--

[Note 18: 18 Butler, see June 6.]

Mr. Wilson -- Majority of the States sufficient. This in Opposition to Mr. King -- 19

[Note 19: 19 Debate of June 5.]

2 Views. I. Under the Confedn. -- 13th. Article -- Rhode-Island. 2. As forming an original Combinn. or Confederacy -- can bind the contracting Parties only--

The large States can agree upon a Reform only upon the Principle of an equal Representn.

II Propn.20

[Note 20: 20 Refers to the 11th of the Randolph Resolutions or Virginia Plan.]

If the lesser States form a Junction of Govt. and Territory, the Gy.21 ceases to operate as to them -- This will prevent a Consolidn. of Govt. and Territory--

[Note 21: 21 Guaranty.]

The people will likewise prevent any new State from being taken from the old -- Vermont -- Kentucky -- several in Embryo -- Republicks -- Monarchies -- large Frontiers.

[B]

Wt Qy. of Land, etc they approach each other, etc. 21a -- The I Prop. accords with the Spirit of the Confedn.

[Note 21a: 21a In MS, these first words were in the margin.]

Each State is sovereign, free, and independent etc. The Idea of a Supreme, and the Maxim Imperium in Imperio--

If then the States in Union are as States still to continue in Union, they must be considered as Equals, etc.

13 sovereign and independant states can never constitute one Nation; they may by Treaty make one confederated Body--

Mr. Randolph we ought to be one Nation -- 2 Article -- 5th. Article--22

[Note 22: 22 Refers to Articles of Condeferation.]

G. Morris -- Every Individual should enjoy a rateable Proportion of Sovereignty--

Districts--

3 Article -- Common Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare -- Proportion of Votes.

II Propn.

If the lesser States form a Junction of Govt. and Territory, the Gy. ceases to operate as to them -- This will prevent a Consoln. of Govt. and Territory--

The Propn. will likewise prevent any new States from being taken from the old -- Vermont, Kentucky -- Several in embryo -- Republics -- Monarchies -- large Frontiers--

The large States can agree to a Reform only upon the Principle of an Equality of Representn.

In what we are all agreed--

[C]

Massts.

"for the sole and express Purpose of revising the Articles of Confdn. and reporting to Congress and the several Legs. such Alterations and Provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the federal Constn. adequate to the Exigencies of Government and the Preservn. of the Union."23

[Note 23: 23 Quotation from Commission of Massachusetts delegates. Used by Paterson in his speech.]

Connectt. as above--

Jersey, etc

Georgia,

{table}

[Note 24: 24 Among the Wilson papers in the Library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, upon the first page of the copy of the resolutions used by the Committee of Detail, is a duplicate of this document except that: the names of states are abbreviated; New Jersey's quota is given as 166,316; and in the column of "Delegates", instead of a line after the number for Pennsylvania, lines are drawn after the numbers for New York and South Carolina and after the total of "90", "24" and "25½" have been crossed out, and then "12" written, showing that an estimate had been made of the total number of the delegates for the seven and five smaller states.
See a similar document from the Brearley Papers, below July 10.]

[D]

Ambition goads him on. The Impulse is progressive--enlarge his Prospects, and you enlarge his Desires. As to orders--as to Societies. Mithradates--Com. Defence--Liberty.

Mr. Madison -- Districts.

Mr. King.

Guarranty.

Nature of Govts.

So corrected and enlarged.

Regulation of Commerce,

the Collection of Revenue.

Negative in particular

Cases.

To promote the general Welfare, to protect Liberty and Property.

Cr. Lands.

[E]

[F]

Mr. Brearley. unfair; because of the Combination of the Parts.

Districts --

Equalize the States --

Mr. Wilson -- All Authority is derived from the People -- the People entitled to exercise Authority in Person -- Italy -- Roman Citizens --

2 Things necessary -- 1. That the Representatives express the Sentiments of the represented. 2. That the Sentiments thus expressed should have the same Operation as if expressed by the People themselves --

Numbers the best Estimate of Property. One free Citizen ought to be of equal Importance with another.

One Mass -- 13 -- it will be given away 1/3 of the Territory --

No Authority -- it is besides impracticable.

He wishes the Distinction of States might be destroyed.

A Principle given up in the first Confedn.

Mr. Wm.son. It does not appear to him, that the lesser States will be swallowed up.

A small County, and a large County; according to Numbers --

Mr. Maddison

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