The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 1]
YATES Monday, June 4th, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Mr. Pinkney moved that the blank in the 7th resolve consisting ofbe filled up with an individual.
Mr. Wilson, in support of the motion, asserted, that it would not be obnoxious to the minds of the people, as they in their state governments were accustomed and reconciled to a single executive. Three executives might divide so that two could not agree in one proposition--the consequence would be anarchy and confusion.
Mr. Sherman thought there ought to be one executive, but that he ought to have a council. Even the king of Great Britain has his privy council.
Mr. Gerry was for one executive--if otherwise, it would be absurd to have it consist of three Numbers equally in rank would oddly apply to a general or admiral.
Question put--7 states for, and 3 against. New-York against it.
The 8th resolve, That the executive and a number of the judicial officers ought to compose a council of revision.
Mr. Gerry objects to the clause--moves its postponement in order to let in a motion--that the right of revision should be in the executive only.
Mr. Wilson contends that the executive and judicial ought to have a joint and full negative--they cannot otherwise preserve their importance against the legislature.
Mr. King was against the interference of the judicial they may be biased in the interpretation--He is therefore to give the executive a complete negative.
Carried to be postponed, 6 states against 4--New-York for it.
The next question, that the executive have a complete negative; and it was therefore moved to expunge the remaining part of the clause.
Dr. Franklin against the motion the power dangerous, and would be abused so as to get money for passing bills.
Mr. Madison against it because of the difficulty of an executive venturing on the exercise of this negative, and is therefore of opinion that the revisional authority is better.
Mr. Bedford is against the whole, either negative or revisional--the two branches are sufficient checks on each other--no danger of subverting the executive, because his powers may by the convention be so well defined that the legislature cannot overleap the bounds.
Mr. Mason against the negative power in the executive, because it will not accord with the genius of the people.
On this the question was put and carried, nem. con. against expunging part of the clause so as to establish a complete negative.
Mr. Butler then moved that all acts passed by the legislature be suspended for the space ofdays by the executive.
Unanimously in the negative.
It was resolved and agreed, that the blank be filled up with the words two thirds of the legislature. Agreed to.
The question was then put on the whole of the resolve as amended and filled up. Carried, 8 states for--2 against. New-York for it.
Mr. Wilson then moved for the addition of a convenient number of the national judicial to the executive as a council of revision. Ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
Adjourned until to-morrow.
KING
4 June Comee. of y Whole
On the Question of vesting the executive powers in one or more persons--it was carried for the former
Mas. Cont. NYk. Pen. Virg. NC. SC. Geor. Ay
N Jer. Del. Mar. No.21
[Note 21: 21 Journal, Madison and Yates omit New Jersey and make New York's vote "no".]
Motion by Mr Gerry & Mr Kg to postpone the article for a Council of Revision and adopt one vesting a qualified negative in the Executive--
8 ays z no--Cont. & Mard.22
[Note 22: 22 Journal, Madison and Yates, all give this vote: Ayes--6, Noes--4.]
Wilson moves & Hamilton seconds him that the Executive shd. have a complete and full negative the former is in favor because the natural operation of the Legislature will be to swallow up the Executive power divided is the object of Contest the strongest will finally acquire the whole--
Butler agt. it--it will terminate in a King Franklin agt. it one former Govr. abused his power of negative and extorted Money from the Legislature before he wd. sign yr. Acts. in one instance of an indian Invasion, he wd. not agree to an act for marching the Militia agt. the Indians unless the Estate of the Proprietors was exempted from Taxes for the support of the Militia--
We ought not to believe that one man Can possess more wisdom than both br's. of the Legislature--The Negative of the King of G. B. has not been exercised since the Revolution he--effects that by Corruption wh. he might with hazard accomplish by his negative--
Mad: I am opposed to the complete negative, because no man will dare exercise it whn. the law was passed almost unanimously. I doubt whether the Kng of Eng. wd. have firmness sufficient to do it.
Mason. opposed to the Complete negative, We have voted that the Ex. powers be vested in one person, we now propose to give that single person a negative in all Cases. You have agreed that he shall appoint all Officers not otherwise to be appointed--and those which he has not the sole right of appointing, he has a power to negative with these powers the executive may soon currupt the Legislature & we shall have a monarchy & we must consult the Genius of our People wh. is republican--this Genius will not receive a King--
Franklin. The Pr. of Orange first had limited powers and for life--his son raised a faction and caused himself to be elected by force--in the present Century the Pr. of Orange caused himself to be declared hereditary &--we shall meet with the same misfortune--
Wil Ham Kg
ayUnanimous negative
Mad. The Judicial ought to be introduced in the business of Legislation--they will protect their Department, and uniting wh. the Executive render their Check or negative more respectable--there is weight in the objections agt. this measure--but a Check is necessary experience proves it, and teaches us that what we once thought the Calumny of the Enemies of Republican Govts. is undoubtedly true--There is diversity of Interest in every Country the Rich & poor, the Dr. & Cr. the followers of different Demagogues, the diversity of religious Sects--The Effects of these parties are obvious in the ant'. Govts. -- the same causes will operate with us--
We must introduce the Checks, which will destroy the measures of an interested majority-- in this view a negative in the Ex: is not only necessary for its own safety, but for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested majority--The independent condition of the Ex. who has the Eyes of all Nations on him will render him a just Judge --add the Judiciary and you increase the respectability--
Wilson moves the addition of the Judiciary--Madison seconds--
Dickerson--agt. it--you must separate the Leg. Jud. & Ex.--but you propose to give the Executive a share in Legislation--why not the Judicial--
There is a Difference-the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not to be legislators. The Executive is merely ministerial--besides we have Experience in the British Constitution of the Executive's having a negative--
The motion was waved--23
[Note 23: 23 [Endorsed:] 4 June | Complete Neg. of the Extive | addn. of judiciary]
PIERCE.
Mr. Wilson said that all the Constitutions of America from New Hampshire to Georgia have their Executive in a single Person. A single Person will produce vigor and activity. Suppose the Executive to be in the hands of a number they will probably be divided in opinion.
It was proposed that the Judicial should be joined with the Executive to revise the Laws.
Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join in the negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and they will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the constitution.
Dr. Franklin thinks it would be improper to put it in the power of any Man to negative a Law passed by the Legislature because it would give him the controul of the Legislature; and mentioned the influence of the British King, and the influence which a Governor of Pennsylvania once had in arresting (for the consideration of an encrease of salary) the power out of the hands of the Legislature.
Mr. Maddison was of opinion that no Man would be so daring as to place a veto on a Law that had passed with the assent of the Legislature.24
[Note 24: 24 See Appendix A, CCCLXXIII.]
Mr. Butler observed that power was always encreasing on the part of the Executive. When he voted for a single Person to hold the Executive power he did it that Government be expeditiously executed, and not that it should be clogged.
Mr. Bedford was of opinion that no check was necessary on a Legislature composed as the national Legislature would be, with two branches,--an upper and a lower House.
Mr. Mason was of opinion that it would be so dangerous for the Executive in a single Person to negative a Law that the People will not accept of it. He asked if Gentlemen had ever reflected on that awful period of time between the passing and final adoption of this constitution;--what alarm might possibly take place in the public mind.
Mr. Maddison in a very able and ingenious Speech,25 ran through the whole Scheme of the Government,--pointed out all the beauties and defects of ancient Republics; compared their situation with ours wherever it appeared to bear any anology, and proved that the only way to make a Government answer all the end of its institution was to collect the wisdom of its several parts in aid of each other whenever it was necessary. Hence the propriety of incorporating the Judicial with the Executive in the revision of the Laws. He was of opinion that by joining the Judges with the Supreme Executive Magistrate would be strictly proper, and would by no means interfere with that indepence so much to be approved and distinguished in the several departments.
[Note 25: 25 Professor Jameson (American Historical Review, III, 323 note) ascribes this speech by Madison and the one following by Dickinson to June 6. But the text above shows that Madison's records at the close of this day's sessions were quite defective. It is possible that he inserted in his record of his remarks on June 6 a portion of his speech on June 4.]
Mr. Dickinson could not agree with Gentlemen in blending the national Judicial with the Executive, because the one is the expounder, and the other the Executor of the Laws.
MASON26
[Note 26: 26 This document in Mason's handwriting was found among the Mason papers. It is evidently the draft of a speech in the Convention and probably of this date. The copy in the text is taken from K. M. Rowland, Life of George Mason, II, 112--115.]
It is not yet determined how the Executive is to be regulated, whether it is to act solely from its own judgment, or with the advice of others; whether there is, or is not to be a council annexed to it, and if a council how far their advice shall operate in controlling the judgment of the supreme magistracy. If there is no Council of State and the executive power be vested in a single person, what are the provisions for its proper operation, upon casual disability by sickness or otherwise. These are subjects which must come under our consideration, and perhaps some of the most important objections would be obviated by placing the executive power in the hands of three, instead of one person.
There is also to be a council of revision, invested, in a great measure, with a power of negative upon the laws; and an idea has been suggested, either within or without doors, that this council should be formed of the principal officers of the state, I presume of the members of the Treasury Board, the Board of War, the Navy Board, and the Department for Foreign Affairs. It is unnecessary, if not improper, to examine this part of the subject now, but I will venture to hazard an opinion, when it comes to be thoroughly investigated, that we can hardly find worse materials out of which to create a council of revision, or more improper or unsafe hands in which to place the power of a negative upon our laws. It is proposed, I think, sir, in the plan upon your table, that this council of revision shall be formed out of the members of the Judiciary departments joined with the Executive; and I am inclined to think, when the subject shall be taken up, it may be demonstrated, that this will be the wisest and safest mode of constituting this important council of revision. But the federal inferior courts of justice must, I presume, be fixed in the several respective States, and consequently most of them at a great distance from the seat of the federal government. The almost continual operation of the council of revision upon the acts of the national parliament, and upon their negative of the acts of the several State legislatures, will require that this council should be easily and speedily convened, and consequently, that only the judges of the Supreme Federal Court, fixed near the seat of government, can be members of it. Their number will be small. By placing the Executive in three persons, instead of one, we shall not only increase the number of the council of revision (which I have endeavored to show will want increasing), but by giving to each of the three a vote in the council of revision, we shall increase the strength of the Executive in that particular circumstance in which it will most want strength--in the power of defending itself against the encroachments of the legislature. These, I must acknowledge, are, with me, weighty considerations for vesting the Executive rather in three than in one person.
The chief advantages which have been urged in favor of unity in the Executive, are the secresy, the dispatch, the vigor and energy which the government will derive from it, especially in time of war. That these are great advantages, I shall most readily allow. They have been strongly insisted on by all monarchical writers; they have been acknowledged by the ablest and most candid defenders of republican government; and it cannot be denied that a monarchy possesses them in a much greater degree than a republic. Yet perhaps a little reflection may incline us to doubt whether these advantages are not greater in theory than in practice, or lead us to enquire whether there is not some pervading principle in republican government which sets at naught and tramples upon this boasted superiority, as hath been experienced to their cost, by most monarchies which have been imprudent enough to invade or attack their republican neighbors. This invincible principle is to be found in the love, the affection, the attachment of the citizens to their laws, to their freedom, and to their country. Every husbandman will be quickly converted into a soldier when he knows and feels that he is to fight not in defence of the rights of a particular family, or a prince, but for his own. This is the true construction of the pro aris et focis which has, in all ages, performed such wonders. It was this which in ancient times enabled the little cluster of Grecian republics to resist, and almost constantly to defeat, the Persian monarch. It was this which supported the States of Holland against a body of veteran troops through a thirty years' war with Spain, then the greatest monarchy in Europe, and finally rendered them victorious. It is this which preserves the freedom and independence of the Swiss Cantons in the midst of the most powerful nations. And who that reflects seriously upon the situation of America, in the beginning of the late war--without arms--without soldiers--without trade, money or credit, in a manner destitute of all resources,but must ascribe our success to this pervading, all-powerful principle?
We have not yet been able to define the powers of the Executive, and however moderately some gentlemen may talk or think upon the subject, I believe there is a general tendency to a strong Executive, and I am inclined to think a strong Executive necessary. If strong and extensive powers are vested in the Executive, and that executive consists only of one person, the government will of course degenerate (for I will call it degeneracy) into a monarchy--a government so contrary to the genius of the people that they will reject even the appearance of it. I consider the federal government as in some measure dissolved by the meeting of this Convention. Are there no dangers to be apprehended from procrastinating the time between the breaking up of this Assembly and the adoption of a new system of government? I dread the interval. If it should not be brought to an issue in the course of the first year the consequences may be fatal. Have not the different parts of this extensive government, the several States of which it is composed a right to expect an equal participation in the Executive, as the best means of securing an equal attention to their interests? Should an insurrection, a rebellion or invasion happen in New Hampshire when the single supreme magistrate is a citizen of Georgia, would not the people of New Hampshire naturally ascribe any delay in defending them to such a circumstance and vice versa? If the Executive is vested in three persons, one chosen from the Northern, one from the Middle, and one from the Southern States, will it not contribute to quiet the minds of the people and convince them that there will be proper attention paid to their respective concerns? Will not three men so chosen bring with them, into office, a more perfect and extensive knowledge of the real interests of this great Union? Will not such a mode of appointment be the most effectual means of preventing cabals and intrigues between the legislature and the candidates for this office, especially with those candidates who from their local situation, near the seat of the federal government, will have the greatest temptations and the greatest opportunities? Will it not be the most effectual means of checking and counteracting the aspiring views of dangerous and ambitious men, and consequently the best security for the stability and duration of our government upon the invaluable principles of liberty? These Sir, are some of my motives for preferring an Executive consisting of three persons rather than of one.
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