Chap. IX.

Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary
Government.

    I. Socrates is a man, and therefore a living creature, is a
right reasoning, and that most evident, because there is nothing
needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence,
but that the word Man be understood, because a living creature is
in the definition it selfe of a Man, and every one makes up the
proposition which was desired, namely this, Man is a living
Creature; And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates his Father, and
therefore his Lord, is perhaps a true inference, but not evident,
because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father:
wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident, that the
connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that
have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent over
his children, have brought no other argument then that of
generation, as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is
begotten by me, is mine; just as if a man should think, that
because there is a triangle, it appeares presently without any
farther discourse, that its angles are equall to two Rights.
Besides, since Dominion (that is) supreme Power is indivisible,
insomuch as no man can serve two Masters, but two Persons male
and female, must concurre in the act of generation, its
impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation
onely. Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place,
enquire into the original of paternal Government.

    II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature, in
which, by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper
yeares are to be accounted equall; There by right of nature the
Conqueror is Lord of the conquered: by the Right therefore of
nature, the Dominion over the Infant first belongs to him who
first hath him in his power'd but it's manifest that he who is
newly born is in the Mothers power before any others, insomuch as
she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed him up, or
adventure him to fortune.

    III. If therefore she breed him (because the state of nature
is the state of warre) she is supposed to bring him up on this
condition, that being grown to full age he become not her enemy;
(which is) that he obey her. For since by naturall necessity we
all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be
understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to
another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at
once become an enemy; but each man is an enemy to that other whom
he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature,
every woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a
Lord. But what some say, that in this case, the Father by reason
of the preeminence of sexe, and not the Mother, becomes Lord,
signifies nothing. For both reason shewes the contrary, because
the inequality of their naturall forces is not so great, that the
man could get the Dominion over the woman without warre. And
custome also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons, have in
former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of
their children at their own wils, and at this day in divers
places, women are invested with the principall authority. Neither
doe their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves;
which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they
who have the supreme power, are not tyed at all (as hath bin
shewed) to the civill lawes. Adde also that in the state of
nature it cannot be known who is the Father but by the testimony
of the Mother; the child therefore is his whose the Mother will
have it, and therefore hers; Wherefore originall Dominion over
children belongs to the Mother, and among men no lesse then other
creatures: The birth followes the belly.

    IV. The Dominion passes from the Mother to others, divers
wayes; first, if she quit and forsake her Right by exposing the
child. He therefore that shall bring up the childe thus exposed,
shall have the same Dominion over it, which the Mother had. For
that life which the Mother had given it (not by getting, but
nourishing it) she now by exposing, takes from it; Wherefore the
obligation also which arose from the benefit of life, is by this
exposition made voyd. Now the preserved, oweth all to the
preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a Mother, or
of his service, as to a Lord; for although the Mother in the
state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may
recover her sonne again (namely by the same Right that any body
else might doe it) yet may not the Sonne rightly transferre
himselfe again unto his Mother.

    V. Secondly, if the Mother be taken prisoner, her Sonne is
his that took her, because that he who hath Dominion over the
Person, hath also Dominion over all belonging to the Person;
Wherefore over the Sonne also, as hath been shewed in the
foregoing Chapter, in the fifth Article. Thirdly, if the Mother
be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the
supreme authority in that government, will also have the Dominion
over him that is born of her. for he is Lord also of the Mother,
who is bound to obey him, in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for
societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition; that he
shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the
contribution of both Parties, is the Fathers, in regard of the
command he hath over the Mother; but if a woman bearing rule
shall have children by a Subject, the children are the Mothers:
for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to
her authority. And universally, if the society of the male and
female be such an union, as the one have subjected himselfe to
the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.

    VI. But in the state of nature, if a man, and woman contract
so, as neither is subject to the command of the other, the
children are the Mothers for the reasons above given in the third
Article, unlesse by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the
Mother may by pact dispose of her Right as she lists, as
heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who of those children
which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact
allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves;
but in a civill government, if there be a contract of marriage
between a man and woman, the children are the Fathers; because in
all Cities, viz. constituted of Fathers, not Mothers governing
their families, the domesticall command belongs to the man, and
such a contract, if it be made according to the civill Laws, is
called MATRIMONY; but if they agree only to lye together, the
children are the Fathers, or the Mothers variously, according to
the differing civill Lawes of divers Cities.

    VII. Now because by the third Article the Mother is
originally Lord of her Children, and from her the Father, or some
body else by derived Right, it is manifest that the Children are
no lesse subject to those by whom they are nourisht, and brought
up, then Servants to their Lords, and Subjects to him who beares
the Supreme Rule; and that a Parent cannot be injurious to his
Sonne as long as he is under his power. A Son also is freed from
subjection on the same manner as a subject and servant are. For
emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication
with banishment.

    VIII. The enfranchised son, or released servant, doe now
stand in lesse fear of their Lord and Father, being deprived of
his naturall and lordly power over them, and (if regard be had to
true and inward Honour) doe Honour him lesse, then before. For
Honour (as hath been said in the section above) is nothing else
but the estimation of anothers power; and therefore he that hath
least power, hath alwayes least Honour. But it is not to be
imagin'd that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the
enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as
acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things,
as if he were become wholly his equall; It must therefore be ever
understood, That he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a
servant, sonne, or some colony, doth promise all those externall
signes, at least whereby Superiours used to be Honour'd by their
inferiours. From whence it followes, That the precept of
honouring our Parents, belongs to the law of nature, not onely
under the title of Gratitude, but also of Agreement.

    IX. What then, will some one demand, is the difference
between a sonne, or between a subject, and a servant? Neither doe
I know that any Writer hath fully declared what liberty, and what
slavery is. Commonly to doe all things according to our own
phancies, and that without punishment, is esteem'd to be liberty;
not to be able to doe this, is judg'd bondage; which in a Civill
Government, and with the peace of mankind cannot possibly be
done, because there is no City without a Command, and a
restraining Right. LIBERTY, that we may define it, is nothing
else but an absence of the lets, and hinderances of motion, as
water shut up in a vessell is therefore not at liberty, because
the vessell hinders it from running out, which the vessell being
broken, is made free. And every man hath more or lesse liberty,
as he hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself: as
he hath more liberty, who is in a large, then he that is kept in
a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part, and yet
not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this, and that
side with hedges, or stone walls, lest he spoyle the vines, or
corne, neighbouring on the high way. And these kinde of lets are
externall, and absolute; in which sense all Servants, and
Subjects are free, who are not fetter'd and imprisoned. There are
others which are arbitrary, which doe not absolutely hinder
motion, but by accident; to wit, by our own choyce, as he that is
in a ship is not so hindered, but he may cast himselfe into the
Sea, if he will: and here also the more wayes a man may move
himselfe, the more liberty he hath, and herein consists civill
liberty; for no man, whether subject, sonne, or servant, is so
hindred by the punishments appointed by the City, the Father, or
the Lord, how cruell soever, but that he may doe all things, and
make use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life
and health. For my part therefore I cannot finde what reason a
meer servant hath to make complaints, if they relate onely to
want of liberty, unlesse he count it a misery to be restrained
from hurting himselfe, and to receive that life, (which by warre,
or misfortune, or through his own idlenesse was forfeited)
together with all manner of sustenance, and all things necessary
to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he
will be rul'd: for he that is kept in by punishments layd before
him, so as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all
things; is not opprest by servitude, but is governed and
sustained. But this priviledge free subjects and sonnes of a
family, have above servants, (in every government, and family,
where servants are) that they may both undergoe the more
honourable offices of the City or family, and also enjoy a larger
possession of things superfluous. And herein layes the difference
between a free subject, and a servant, that he is FREE, but a
SERVANT is he who also indeed, who serves his City onely; serves
his fellow subject: all other liberty is an exemption from the
Lawes of the City, and proper only to those that bear Rule.

    X. A Father, with his sonnes and servants growne into a
civill Person by vertue of his paternall jurisdiction, is called
a FAMILY. This family, if through multiplying of children, and
acquisition of servants, it becomes numerous, insomuch as without
casting the uncertain dye of warre, it cannot be subdued, will be
termed an Hereditary Kingdome; which though it differ from an
institutive Monarchy, being acquired by force in the original, &
manner of its constitution; yet being constituted, it hath al the
same properties, and the Right of authority is every where the
same, insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any thing of them
apart.

    XI. It hath been spoken, by what Right supreme authorities
are constituted. Wee must now briefly tell you by what right they
may be continued. Now the Right by which they are continued, is
that which is called the right of SUCCESSION. Now because in a
Democratie, the supreme authority is with the People, as long as
there be any subjects in being, so long it rests with the same
Person; for the People hath no Successour. In like manner in an
Aristocraty, one of the Nobles dying, some other by the rest is
substituted in his place; and therefore except they all dye
together, which I suppose will never happen, there is no
succession. The Querie therefore of the Right of Succession takes
place onely in an absolute Monarchy. For they who exercise the
supreme power for a time onely, are themselves no Monarchs, but
Ministers of state.

    XII. But first, if a Monarch shall by Testament appoint one
to succeed him, the Person appointed shall succeed; for if he be
appointed by the People, he shall have all the Right over the
City which the People had, as hath been shewed in the 7. Chap.
Art. 11. But the People might choose him; by the same Right
therefore may he choose another; But in an hereditary Kingdome
there are the same Rights as in an institutive; Wherefore, every
Monarch may by his will make a successour.

    XIII. But what a man may transferre on another by Testament,
that by the same Right may he yet living, give, or sell away; To
whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power,
whether by gift, or sale, it is rightly made.

    XIV. But if living, he have not declared his will concerning
his successour by Testament, nor otherwise, it is supposed,
First, that he would not have his Government reduced to an
Anarchy, or the state of warre, (that is) to the destruction of
his subjects; as well because he could not doe that without
breach of the Lawes of nature, whereby he was obliged to the
performance of all things necessarily conducing to the
preservation of Peace, as also because if that had been his will,
it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next,
because the Right passeth according to the will of the Father, we
must judge of the successour according to the signes of his will.
It is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be
under a Monarchicall Government rather then any other, because he
himselfe in ruling, hath before approved of that state by his
example, and hath not afterward either by any word or deed
condemned it.

    XV. Furthermore, because by naturall necessity all men wish
them better from whom they receive glory, and honour, then
others; but every man after death receives honour and glory from
his children, sooner then from the power of any other men: hence
we gather, that a father intends better for his children, then
any other persons. It is to be understood therefore, that the
will of the father, dying without Testament, was, that some of
his children should succeed him; yet this is to be understood
with this proviso, that there be no more apparent tokens to the
contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custome may be
one, for he that makes no mention of his succession, is supposed
to consent to the customes of his Realme.

    XVI. Among children the Males carry the preheminence, in the
beginning perhaps, because for the most part (although not
alwayes) they are fitter for the administration of greater
matters, but specially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown
a custome, because that custome was not contradicted; and
therefore the will of the Father, unlesse some other custome or
signe doe clearly repugne it, is to be interpreted in favour of
them.

    XVII. Now because the Sonnes are equall, and the power cannot
be divided, the eldest shall succeed; for if there be any
difference by reason of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy,
for nature being judge, the most in years (because usually it is
so) is the wisest. But other judge there cannot be had. But if
the Brothers must be equally valued, the succession shall be by
lot. But primogeniture is a naturall lot, and by this the eldest
is already prefer'd; nor is there any that hath power to judge,
whether by this, or any other kind of lots the matter is to be
decided. Now the same reason which contends thus for the
first-born sonne, doth no lesse for the first born daughter.

    XVIII. But if he have no children, then the command shall
pass to his Brothers & Sisters, for the same reason, that the
children should have succeeded if he had had them: for those that
are nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest in
benevolence; and to his brothers, sooner then his sisters, and to
the elder sooner then the yonger; for the reason is the same for
these which it was for the children.

    XIX. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the
power, doe they also succeed to the Right of succession: for if
the first-born dye before the Father, it will be judged, that he
transferred his Right of succession unto his children, unlesse
the Father have otherwise decreed it, and therefore the Nephewes
will have a fairer pretence to the succession, then the Uncles. I
say all these things will be thus, if the custome of the place
(which the Father by not contradicting, will be judged to have
consented to) doe not hinder them.

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