Chap. VIII.
Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant.
I. In the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an
institutive, or fram'd Government, as being that which receives
its originall from the consent of many, who by Contract and Faith
mutually given, have oblig'd each other. Now followes, what may
be said, concerning a naturall Government, which may also be
call'd, Acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power,
and naturall force. But we must know in the first place by what
means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of
men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little
Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion
over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a
Little Kingdome a Family. Let us return again to the state of
nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the
earth, and suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity
without all kind of engagement to each other: There are but three
wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of
another; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract made
between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have
willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some
man, or Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d
is, If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else
distrusting his own forces, (to avoid Death) promises the
Conquerour, or the stronger Party, his Service, i.e. to do all
whatsoever he shall command him; in which Contract the good which
the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth receive, is the
grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the naturall
state of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which he
promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue therefore of
this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from
the vanquisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting
what repugns the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the
Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him, is
simply, and without any restriction tyed to the performance of
all Commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tyed, is call'd a
SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD. Thirdly, there is a Right
acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by Generation; of which kind
of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter.
II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life
spar'd him, is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord; for
every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as
to be able, if he desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his
service, or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve
indeed but within Prisons, or bound within Irons, and therefore
they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely, but by
the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at this day un serviteur,
and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations.
III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord
ariseth not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence
rather, That he keeps him not bound, or imprison'd, for all
obligation derives from Contract; but where's no trust, there can
be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a
Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted. There
is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit
of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall
liberty. so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had
happen'd, he might not onely have made his escape, but also have
kill'd his Lord, who was the preserver of his life.
IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by
imprisonment, or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition
of Servants given above, because those serve not for the
Contracts sake, but to the end they may not suffer; and therefore
if they flie, or kill their Lord, they offend not against the
Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a plain signe, that the
binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by
any other obligation.
V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant
that is not, then over one that is bound, for he hath a Supreme
Power over both, and may say of his Servant no lesse then of
another thing, whether animate, or inanimate, This is mine;
whence it followes, that whatsoever the Servant had before his
servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and whatsoever he
hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can by Right
dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those
things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore
nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will
of his Lord; yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety,
and Dominion over his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may
keep, and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant,
in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject
hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme
Authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow
subject.
VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself, and all that
belongs to him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every
man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases; the Lord
may either sell, lay to pledge, or by Testament conveigh the
Dominion he hath over his Servant, according to his own will and
pleasure.
VII. Farthermore, what hath before been demonstrated
concerning subjects in an institutive Government, namely, that he
who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury; is true
also concerning Servants, because they have subjected their will
to the will of the Lord; wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is
done with their wills, but no injury can be done to him that
willeth it.
VIII. But if it happen that the Lord, either by captivity or
voluntary subjection, doth become a Servant or Subject to
another, that other shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of
his Servants; Supreme Lord over these, immediate Lord over him.
Now because not the Servant only, but also all he hath are his
Lords; therefore his Servants now belong to this man, neither can
the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good
to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill Governments,
the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's
suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature, and not
constituted, but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.
IX. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude,
that a Subject in an institutive government, is freed from his
subjection; First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right
which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same
may the Lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of
bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION; which is just as if a
City should permit a Citizen to conveigh himselfe under the
jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly, if the Lord cast off
his servant from him, which in a City is banishment; neither
differs it from Manumission in effect, but in manner onely: for
there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: In
both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken
prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all
other things, so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in
equity the Lord must protect, if he will have them to be his.
Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a
successour, the Lord dying (suppose) without any Testament, or
Heire, for no man is understood to be obliged, unlesse he know to
whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is
put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporall
liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for
there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that
faith be broken which is not given. But the Lord who himselfe
serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must
still continue under the power of the supreme, for, as hath been
shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme Lords.
X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same
manner, that we doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and
naturall strength; for if in the state of nature it is lawfull
for every one, by reason of that warre which is of all against
all, to subdue, and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to
conduce unto their good, much more will the same be lawfull
against Brutes; namely at their own discretion, to reduce those
to servitude which by art may be tamed, and fitted for use, and
to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetuall warre, as
dangerous and noxious. Our Dominion therefore over beasts, hath
its originall from the right of nature, not from divine positive
Right: for if such a Right had not been before the publishing of
the sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast
for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made
manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men indeed whom
the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might not
destroy them: Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right
of nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same
Right, that a man may slay a beast.
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