Chap. VII.
Of the three kindes of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy,
Monarchie.
I. We have already spoken of a City by institution in its
Genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the
difference of Cities, it is taken from the difference of the
Persons, to whom the Supreme Power is committed; this Power is
committed either to one Man, or Councell, or some one Court
consisting of many men. Furthermore, a Councell of many men,
consists either of all the Citizens, (insomuch as every man of
them hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the
greatest affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from
whence there arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the
Power is in a Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote,
and it is call'd a DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a
Councell, where not all, but some part onely have their
suffrages, and we call it an ARISTOCRATY. The third is that, when
the Supreme Authority rests onely in one, and it is stiled a
MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called demos, The
PEOPLE. In the second, the NOBLES. In the third, the MONARCH.
II. Now, although Ancient Writers of Politiques have
introduc'd three other kindes of Government opposite to these, to
wit, Anarchy or confusion to Democraty, Oligarchy, that is, the
command of some few, to Aristocraty, and Tyranny to Monarchy, yet
are not these three distinct formes of Government, but three
diverse Titles given by those who were either displeas'd with
that present Government, or those that bare Rule. For men, by
giving names, doe usually, not onely signifie the things
themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred,
anger, and the like, whence it happens that what one man calls a
Democraty, another calls an Anarchy; what one counts an
Aristocraty, another esteemes an Oligarchie. and whom one titles
a King, another stiles him a Tyrant; so as we see these names
betoken not a diverse kinde of Government, but the diverse
opinions of the Subjects concerning him who hath the Supreme
Power. For first, who sees not that Anarchy is equally opposite
to all the forenam'd Formes? For that word signifies that there
is no Government at all, that is, not any City. But how is it
possible that no City should be the species of a City?
Farthermore, what difference is there between an Oligarchie,
which signifies the Command of a few, or Grandees, or an
Aristocraty, which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads, more
then that men differ so among themselves, that the same things
seeme not good to all men? Whence it happens, that those persons,
who by some are look'd on as the best, are by others esteem'd to
be the worst of all men.
III. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly
be perswaded that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes
of Cities, who though they would rather have the City subject to
one, then many, yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd
unlesse it accord with their judgements: But we must discover by
Reason, and not by Passion, what the difference is between a
King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not in this, That a
Tyrant hath the greater Power, for greater then the Supreme
cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power,
the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King,
but his Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in
their manner of acquisition; for if in a Democraticall, or
Aristocraticall Government some one Citizen should, by force,
possesse himself of the Supreme Power, if he gain the consent of
all the Citizens, he becomes a legitimate Monarch; if not, he is
an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole
exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a King,
who governs wel, and he a Tyrant that doth otherwise. The case
therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimately
constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to
Rule well, and to their liking, they afford him the appellation
of a King, if not, they count him a Tyrant. Wherefore we see a
Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse Formes of Government, but
one and the self-same Monarch hath the name of a King given him
in point of Honour, and Reverence to him, and of a Tyrant in way
of contumely, and reproach. But what we frequently finde in
bookes said against Tyrants, took its originall from Greek, and
Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democraticall, and
partly Aristocraticall, and therefore not Tyrants onely, but even
Kings were odious to them.
IV. There are, who indeed doe think it necessary, That a
Supreme Command should be somewhere extant in a, City. but if it
should be in any one, either Man, or Councell, it would follow
(they say) that all the Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this
condition, they imagine that there may be a certaine Form of
Government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet
different from each particular, which they call a mixt Monarchie,
or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according as any one of
these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest: For
example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbitration of
War, and Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the
Lords, and contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of
making Lawes too altogether, this kind of State would they call a
mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possible that there could
be such a State, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the
subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as
much subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the
State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of the private
Sword, which certainly is much worse then any subjection
whatsoever: But that there can be no such kind of Government hath
been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic:
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
But that there can be no such kinde of Government] Most men
grant, That a Government ought not to be divided, but they would
have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very
reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of
moderating, and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a
very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely
Kings, but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would
so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and onely minding
their charges contain themselves within the limits of the
naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they
would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by others;
which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the
limits, must needs have some part of the Power, whereby they may
be enabled to doe it, the Government is properly divided, not
moderated.
V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form
of Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together
with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of
meeting a Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are
suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be determin'd
by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is
adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and places, is a clear
Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the
Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent
every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it
followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the
first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the
Convent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they
shall meet again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the
same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the
state of all men warring against all. The People therefore
retains the supreme power no longer then there is a certain day
and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever
will, may resort. For except that be known and determined, they
may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions,
or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a
dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attributes any
Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie,
whereof one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents)
makes demos, the People, the other (which is a plurality of
voyces) to kratos or the power.
VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so
as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times,
and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the
times be of lesse distance, then that any thing may in the mean
time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power) the City
may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of
the supreme authority be, during the intervall, granted to some
one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that
wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men
which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve the name of a
City, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right
of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.
VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular
persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men
each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that
the Persons contracting, must be in being before the contract it
selfe. But the People is not in being before the constitution of
government, as not being any Person, but a multitude of single
Persons; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the
People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed,
the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain,
because the People contains within its will, the will of that
subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may
at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe, and by
consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that
single Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from
hence, that in vain sure would the City have been constituted, if
the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit
what the City should command to be done or omitted. Because
therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as
necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is
already shewed) between the Subject and the People; it followes,
that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that each
man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on
condition that the rest also doe the like, as if every one should
say thus, I give up my Right unto the People for your sake, on
condition, that you also deliver up yours, for mine.
VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with
supreme authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty,
which gives up its Right unto it; where we must understand that
certain men distinguisht from others, either by eminence of
title, blood, or some other Character, are propounded to the
People, and by plurality of voyces are elected; and being
elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is conveighed on
them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the
same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which
being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one
Person, (its supreme authority being already transferred on
these) is no longer now in being.
IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the
Court of Nobles is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing
subjects not contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts
among themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence
also they were tyed to that act of the People in resigning up its
Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this
Court, although elected by the People, be by it obliged to any
thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved, as was
declared above, and the authority it had as being a Person
utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the
Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.
X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, together with
Democraty; First, that without an appointment of some certain
times, and places, at which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is
no longer a Court, or one Person, but a dissolute multitude
without any supreme power; Secondly, that the times of their
assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls, without
prejudice to the supreme power, unlesse its administration be
transferred to some one man: Now the reasons why this happens,
are the same which we set down in the fifth Article.
XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a monarchy is derived from
the Power of the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its
Authoritie on one man: Here also we must understand, that some
one man, either by name, or some other token, is propounded to be
taken notice of above all the rest, and that by a plurality of
voyces the whole Right of the People is conveighed on him,
insomuch as whatsoever the People could doe before he were
elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being
elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person,
but a rude multitude, as being only one before by vertue of the
supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from
themselves on this one Man.
XII. And therefore neither doth the Monarch oblige himselfe
to any for the command he receives, for he receives it from the
People; but as hath been shewed above, the People, as soon as
that act is done, ceaseth to be a Person; but the Person
vanishing, all obligation to the Person vanisheth. The subjects
therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the Monarch, by those
compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the
observation of all that the People should command them, (that is)
to obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.
XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well from an Aristocraty, as
a Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be
certain set times and places for deliberation, and consultation
of affaires, that is, for the actuall exercise of it in all
times, and places; For the People, or the Nobles not being one
naturall Person must necessarily have their meetings. The Monarch
who is one by nature, is alwayes in a present capacity to execute
his authority.
XIV. Because we have declared above in the 7. 9. and 12.
Articles, that they who have gotten the supreme command are by no
compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily followes, that they
can doe no injury to the subjects; for injury according to the
definition made in the third Article of the third Chapter, is
nothing else but a breach of contract: and therefore where no
contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the People, the
Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the
other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and
other like vices, which come not under this strict, and exact
notion of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the
supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious
as well to his fellow subjects, because each man hath compacted
with the other to obey, as to his chief Ruler, in resuming that
Right, which he hath given him, without his consent. And in a
Democraty, or Aristocraty, if any thing be decreed against any
Law of nature, the City it selfe (i.e.) the civill Person sinnes
not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for
sinne is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not of the
politicall, which is artificiall; for if it were otherwise, they
would be guilty, by whom the decree was absolutely disliked: But
in a Monarchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes
of nature, he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and
the naturall are all one.
XV. The people who are about to make a Monarch, may give him
the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a
certaine season; and time determined; if simply, we must
understand that he who receives it, hath the selfe-same power
which they had, who gave it, on the same grounds: therefore that
the People by Right could make him a Monarch, may he make another
Monarch: insomuch as the Monarch to whom the command is simply
given, receives a Right not of possession onely, but of
succession also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his
successor.
XVI. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must
have regard to somewhat more then the bare gift onely: First,
whether the People conveighing its authority, left it selfe any
Right to meet at certain times, and places, or not. Next, if it
have reserved this power, whether it were done, so as they might
meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the
Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet onely at
the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise. Suppose now
the People had delivered up its Power to some one man for term of
life onely; which being done, let us suppose in the first place,
that every man departed from the Counsell without making any
order at all concerning the place where (after his death) they
should meet again to make a new election. In this case it is
manifest by the fifth Article of this Chapter, that the People
ceaseth to be a Person, and is become a dissolute multitude,
every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a naturall Right to
meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall
best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse the supreme power
to himselfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever
therefore hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the
Law of nature (set down in the Article of the third Chapter of
not returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his
death the City suffer not a dissolution, either by appointing a
certain day, & place, in which those subjects of his who have a
mind to it may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a
successor: whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to
their common benefit. He therefore who on this foresaid manner
hath received his command during life, hath an absolute Power,
and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next
place, if we grant that the people departed not from the election
of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time and
place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead,
the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of
the subjects, but by vertue of the former Right; for all the
supreme command (as Dominion) was in the People, but the use, and
exercise of it was only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that
takes the benefit, but hath not the Right. But if the People
after the election of a temporarie Monarch, depart not from the
Court before they have appointed certain times, and places to
convene, during the time prescribed him (as the Dictators in
ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one is not
to be accounted a Monarch, but the Prime Officer of the People;
and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his
office even before that time, as the People of Rome did, when
they conferred an equall power on Minutius Master of the horse,
with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made Dictator.
The reason whereof is, hat it is not to be imagined, that,
whether Man or Counsell who hath the readiest, and most immediate
power to act, should hold his command on such termes as not to be
able actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a
Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it possible.
Lastly, if the People having declared a temporary Monarch, depart
from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for
them to meet without the command of the Monarch, we must
understand the People to be immediately dissolved, and that his
authority who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is
not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City anew,
unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor
matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his
Subjects on some certain times, since there remains no Person now
in being, but at his discretion, to whom the promise was made.
What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a
Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing
them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the
People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no
Heir but whom it self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between
the times of the subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd to those
times wherein the Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of
commanding ceases, the Power remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve
the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the
People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the
death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir, going to
his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit
the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake,
does by consequence give him the Succession; the People also
electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to
convene, delivers up to him the whole Dominion of the Country:
Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts
the administration of his Kingdome to some other, and waking
takes it again; so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch,
and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and
place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King
who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another,
himself in the mean while waking, can recall this commission
againe when he pleaseth; so the People, who during the time
prescribed to the Temporary Monarch, doth by Right convene, may
if they please, deprive the Monarch of his Authority. Lastly, the
King, who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps,
not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give
consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so the
people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch
in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is
absolutely dissolv'd, and the power remaines with him whom they
have chosen.
XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many
subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his
power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made
by Oath, or without it, is null: for all Compact is a conveyance
of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of
the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will
in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of
retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits
not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath
promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power,
and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens,
That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power
might be retain'd without it. Whensoever therefore it shall
appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without
prejudice to the Power, the promise must be valued as not made,
(i.e.) of no effect.
XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have
oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the SuPreme Power.
We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are
releas'd from these bonds of obedience. And first of all this
happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but
conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is
thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all alike, catch who catch
can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every subject may heed
the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In
the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of the
enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them,
we must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority,
hath now lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full
indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they
have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each
with other, and what, being conquer'd, they promise afterwards,
to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to
performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a Democraty, and
Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all the
subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is
suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it
were impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all
subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that
liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and
salvage, (for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the
Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to
Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Furthermore, each subject may
lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath
the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be
done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to
dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is Banisht: In
both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country,
because he is tyed to observe those of the latter.
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