Chap. VI.

Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath
the supreme power in the City.

    I. We must consider first of all what a multitude of men
(gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society) is,
namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each
one hath his owne will, and his peculiar judgment concerning all
things that may be propos'd. And though by particular Contracts
each single man may have his own Right, and Propriety, so as one
may say This is mine, the other, That is his; yet will there not
be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a Person distinct
from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more then
anothers. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as
it's one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be
an Action, but as many actions, as Men. For although in some
great Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City
have taken up Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in
Armes, or who consent to them. For the City, which is one Person,
cannot take up Armes against it selfe. Whatsoever therefore is
done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one
of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the
Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the
things that were done by it, must be judg'd to have done nothing.
Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that
manner as hath been said, there remaines that same state of
nature in which all things belong to all men and there is no
place for Meum & Tuum, which is call'd Dominion, and Propriety,
by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have
declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of
the Naturall Laws.

    Multitude, &c.] The Doctrine of the Power of a City over it's
Citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the
difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a
multitude ruled: For such is the nature of a City, That a
multitude, or company of Citizens, not onely may have command,
but may also be subject to command, but in diverse senses; which
difference I did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this
first Article,, but by the objections of many against those
things which follow, I discern otherwise; wherefore it seemed
good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to adde
these few things. By Multitude, because it is a collective word,
we understand more then one, so as a multitude of men is the same
with many men; The same word, because it is of the singular
number, signifies one thing, namely, one multitude; but in
neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will
given to it by nature, but to either a severall; and therefore
neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it:
therefore a Multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire Right,
conveigh Right, act, have, Possesse, and the like, unlesse it be
every one apart, and Man by Man; so as there must be as many
promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as Men. therefore a
Multitude is no naturall Person; but if the same Multitude doe
Contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the
agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for
the will of all, then it becomes one Person; for it is endu'd
with a will, and therefore can doe voluntary actions, such as are
Commanding, making Lawes, acquiring and transferring of Right,
and so forth; and it is oftner call'd the People, then the
Multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. then we say the
People, or Multitude, wills, commands, or doth any thing, it is
understood that the City which Commands, tills and Acts by the
will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which cannot be
done, but in an Assembly; But as oft as any thing is said to be
done by a Multitude of Men, whether great, or small, without the
will of that man, or assembly of men, that's understood to be
done by a subjected People, that is, by many single Citizens
together, and not proceeding from one till, but from diverse
wills of diverse men, who are Citizens, and Subjects, but not a
City.

    II. Next, we must consider that every one of the Multitude
(by whose meanes there may be a beginning to make up the City)
must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be
propounded by any one in the Assembly, that be received for the
will of all which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise
there will be no will at all of a Multitude of Men, whose Wills
and Votes differ so variously. Now if any one will not consent,
the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves constitute the
City without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the City
retaines its primitive Right against the Dissentour, that is, the
Right of tar, as against an Enemy.

    III. But because we said in the foregoing Chapter, the sixth
Article, That there was requir'd to the security of men, not
onely their Consent, but also the Subjection of their wills in
such things as were necessary to Peace and Defence; and that in
that Union, and Subjection, the nature of a City consisted; We
must discerne now in this place, out of those things which may be
propounded, discuss'd, and stated in an Assembly of men, (all
whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part) what
things are necessary to Peace, and common defence: But first of
all, it is necessary to Peace, that a man be so farre forth
protected against the violence of others, that he may live
securely, that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others,
so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether
safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or
injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore comes not within
deliberation. But care may be had there be no just cause of fear;
for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to
others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have
submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all
things, before that there was a care had of his security.

    IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one
of those who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with
the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill,
and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane
disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known
how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their
duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore
provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments;
and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so
great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it
prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it:
for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them
appears to be the lesse evill.

    V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given
to any one, when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to
be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice.
But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most
part, till either themselves, or their near friends are to
suffer.

    VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men,
and, by consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that
the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to
some Man or Counsell, that Man or Counsell is necessarily
understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City. For he
that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells
all men to all things which he himselfe wills; then which a
greater command cannot be imagined.

    VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot
defend themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for
them to protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are
not united; and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of
particulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one man, who
hath the Right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many
Citizens in all dangers, and on all occasions, as shall be
needfull for common defence against the certain number, and
strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it
expedient) to make peace with them. We must understand therefore,
that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of
Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this
right (which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to the same
Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no
Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the
expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth
not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War, as that of
Justice, even by the constitution it selfe of a City, and
essentially, doe belong to the chiefe command.

    VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but
to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it
followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the
same party: for if the Power of judging were in one, and the
power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain
would he give judgement, who could not execute his commands; or
if he executed them by the power of another, he himselfe is not
said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he
is onely an Officer. All judgement therefore in a City belongs to
him who hath the swords, (i.e.) to him, who hath the supreme
authority.

    IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more
conduceth to Peace to prevent brawles from arising, then to
appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred
from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum &
Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and
evill, honest and dishonest, and the like, which every man
esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same
chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to
declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be
called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest,
what dishonest, what good, what evill, that is summarily, what is
to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But
those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or
the Lawes of the City, as being the Commands of him who hath the
supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may
define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath
the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future
actions of his Citizens.

    X. Furthermore, since the affaires of the City, both those of
Warre, and Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man,
or one Counsell, without Officers and subordinate Magistrates,
and that it appertains to Peace, and common defence, that they to
whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into
neighbouring counsels, prudently to wage war, and on all hands
warily to attend the benefit of the City, should also rightly
exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason, that they
depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both
in War, and in Peace.

    XI. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have
their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will, and
that the will of doing, or omitting ought, depends on the opinion
of the good and evill of the reward, or punishment, which a man
conceives he shall receive by the act, or omission; so as the
actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each; wherefore
by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it
very much concerns the interest of Peace, that no opinions or
doctrines be delivered to Citizens, by which they may imagine,
that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City,
that is, the commands of that man, or Counsell, to whom the
supreme power is committed, or that it is lawfull for to resist
him, or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies,
then him that yeelds obedience. For if one command somewhat to be
done under penalty of naturall death, another forbids it under
pain of eternall death, and both by their own Right, it will
follow that the Citizens, although innocent, are not onely by
Right punishable, but that the City it selfe is altogether
dissolved; for no man can serve two Masters: nor is he lesse, but
rather more, a Master, whom we believe we are to obey for feare
of damnation, then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death.
It followes therefore, that this one, whether Man, or Court, to
whom the City hath committed the supreme Power, have also this
Right, That he both judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies
unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught
.
    Judge what opinions, & c.] There is scarce any Principle,
neither in the worship of God, nor humane sciences, from whence
there may not spring dissentions, discords, reproaches, and by
degrees war it selfe; neither doth this happen by reason of the
falshood of the Principle, but of the disposition of men, who
seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others:
But though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising, yet
may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme Power, that
they Prove no hinderance to the publique peace. of these kind of
opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place. There are
certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted, they verily
believe that obedience may be refused to the City, and that by
Right they may, nay ought, to oppose, and fight against chiefe
Princes, and dignities. Such are those, which whether directly,
and openly, or more obscurely, and by consequence require
obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme
authority is committed. I deny not, but this reflects on that
Power which many living under other government, ascribe to the
chiefe head of the Church of Rome, and also on that, which
elsewhere out of that Church, Bishops require in theirs, to be
given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower
sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to
themselves; for what civill war was there ever in the Christian
world, which did not either grow from, or was nourisht by this
Root? The judgement therefore of doctrines, whether they be
repugnant to civill obedience or not, and if they be repugnant,
the Power of prohibiting them to be taught, I doe here attribute
to the civill authority; for since there is no man who grants not
to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its
Peace, and defence, and it is manifest, that the opinions which I
have already recited do relate to its Peace, it followes
necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they
be such, or not, must be referred to the City, that is, to him
who hath the supreme authority.

    XII. Last of all, from this consideration, that each Citizen
hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in
the City, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it
followes manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who
commands, must not be punisht; for as he who hath not power
enough, cannot punish him naturally; so neither can he punish him
by Right, who by Right hath not sufficient power.

    XIII. It is most manifest by what hath been said, That in
every perfect City (that is, where no Citizen hath Right to use
his faculties, at his owne discretion, for the preservation of
himselfe, or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded)
there is a Supreme Power in some one, greater then which cannot
by Right be conferr'd by men, or greater then which no mortall
man can have over himself. But that power, greater then which
cannot by men, be conveigh'd on a man, we call ABSOLUTE: for
whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City,
That he can, unpunisht, doe any thing, make Lawes, judge
Controversies, set Penalties, make use, at his own pleasure, of
the strength, and wealth of men, and all this by Right, truly he
hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This
same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Cities which are,
or ever have beene; for though it be sometimes in doubt, what
Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet ever there is such
a Command, and alwayes exercis'd, except in the time of Sedition,
and Civill War, and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out
of one: Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute
Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to conveigh it
on others; for removing this power, they together take away
Civill Society, and a confusion of all things returnes. There is
so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief
Ruler, as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City,
that is to say, so much as that Right of his may not be granted
in vaine. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons
it may sometimes, by Right, be deny'd, yet because a greater
cannot be perform'd, we will call it SIMPLE. But the obligation
to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by
which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City, but mediately
from hence, That, without obedience, the Cities Right would be
frustrate, and by consequence there would be no City constituted.
For it is one thing if I say, I give you Right to Command what
you will; another, if I say, I will doe whatsoever you Command;
and the Command may be such, as I would rather die then doe it;
forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd,
much lesse is he tyed to that, which to him is worse then death:
if therefore I be commanded to kill my self, I am not bound to
doe it; for though I deny to doe it, yet the Right of dominion is
not frustrated, since others may be found, who being commanded,
will not refuse to doe it; neither doe I refuse to doe that which
I have contracted to doe. In like manner, if the Chief Ruler
command any man to kill him, he is not tyed to doe it, because it
cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant; nor if he
command to execute a Parent, whether he be innocent, or guilty,
and condemned by the Law, since there are others, who, being
commanded, will doe that, and a Son will rather die, then live
infamous, and hated of all the world. There are many other cases,
in which, since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some,
and not by others, Obedience may, by Right, be perform'd by
these, and refus'd by those; and this, without breach of that
absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler. For in no case
is the Right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall
refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by Right
given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that Right
otherwise then right Reason requires, they sin against the Lawes
of Nature, (that is) against God.

    Absolute] A popular state openly challengeth absolute
dominion, and the Citizens oppose it not, for in the gathering
together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a City; and
even the unskilfull understand, that matters there are rul'd by
Counsell. Yet monarchy is no lesse a City, then Democraty, and
absolute Kings have their Counsellours, from whom they will take
advice, and suffer their Power, in matters of greater
consequence, to be guided, but not recall'd. But it appears not
to most men how a City is contain'd in the person of a King; and
therefore they object against Absolute Command: First, that if
any man had such a Right, the condition of the Citizens would be
miserable: For thus they think, he will take all, spoil all, kill
all; and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not
already spoil'd and kill'd. But why should he doe thus? not
because he can; for unlesse he have a mind to it, he will not doe
it. till he, to please one, or some few, spoil all the rest?
First, though by Right, that is, without injury to them, he may
doe it, yet can he not doe it justly, that is, without breach of
the Naturall Lawes, and injury against God. And therefore there
is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which princes take.
Next, if he could justly doe it, or that he made no account of
his Oath, yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it,
since he findes no good in it. But it cannot be deny'd but a
prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly; but
grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not
absolute, but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the
injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for
thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? for he
that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency
to oppresse all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that
humane affaires cannot be without some inconvenience. And this
inconvenience it self is in the Citizens, not in the Government;
for if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command,
that's to say, could they live according to the Lawes of Nature,
there would be no need at all of a City, nor of a common coercive
power. Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the
Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not true, for all
Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although they, who
have the chief Command, doe not all those things they would, and
what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not
the defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their
Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and carelesse
of what tends to the publique, cannot sometimes be drawn to
performe their duties without the hazard of the City. therefore
princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and
prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.

    XIV. Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe; for he is
already suppos'd to have what he can give himself; nor can he be
oblig'd to himselfe, for the same party being both the obliged,
and the Obliger, and the Obliger having power to release the
obliged, it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to
himselfe, because he can release himself at his own pleasure; and
he that can doe this, is already actually free. Whence its
plaine, that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes; for the
Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City, by which, if she were
engag'd, she should be engag'd to her selfe. Neither can the City
be oblig'd to her Citizen, because, if he will, he can free her
from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills, (for the
will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will
of the City); the City therefore is free when she pleaseth, that
is, she is now actually free; but the will of a Councell, or one
who hath the Supreme Authority given him, is the will of the
City; he therefore containes the wills of all particular
Citizens: Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes (for
this is to be bound to himself) nor to any of his Citizens.

    XV. Now because (as hath been shewn above) before the
constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men, nor is
there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may
not, by the same Right, claime as his own, (for where all things
are common, there can be nothing proper to any man) it followes,
that propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd
theirs, and that that onely is proper to each man which he can
keep by the Lawes, and the power of the whole City, (that is) of
him on whom its chief command is conferr'd. Whence we understand,
that each particular Citizen hath a propriety, to which none of
his fellow-Citizens hath Right, because they are tyed to the same
Lawes; but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler (whose
Commands are the Lawes, whose will contains the will of each man,
and who, by every single person, is constituted the Supreme
Judge) hath not a Right. But although there be many things which
the City permits to its Citizens, and therefore they may
sometimes goe to Law against their Chief; yet is not that action
belonging to Civill Right, but to Naturall Equity; neither is it
concerning what by Right he may doe who hath the Supreme power,
but what he hath been willing shouLd be done, and therefore he
shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being
well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.

    Propriety receiv'd its beginning, &c.] What's objected by
some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution
of Cities, was found in Fathers of Families, that objection is
vaine, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little
City. For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods
granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest
of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the
Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are
subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common
Right in all things.

    What by Right he may doe, &c.] As often as a Citizen is
granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme, i.e.
against the City, the question is not in that action, whether the
City may, by Right, keep possession of the thing in controversie,
but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it; for the
Law is the declared will of the Supreme: since then the City may
raise money from the Citizens under two Titles, either as
Tribute, or as Debt, in the former case there is no action of Law
allowed; for there can be no question whether the City have Right
to require Tribute: in the latter it is allowed, because the City
will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud, or cunning, and yet
if need require, all they have, openly; and therefore he that
condemnes this place, saying, That by this doctrine it is easie
for princes to free themselves from their Debts, he does it
impertinently.

    XVI. Theft, further, AduLtery, and all injuries are forbid by
the Lawes of nature; but what is to be called Theft, what
further, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not to
be determined by the naturall, but by the civill Law: for not
every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but
onely another mans goods is theft; but what is ours, and what
anothers, is a question belonging to the civill Law. In like
manner, not every killing of a man is further, but onely that
which the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women
Adultery, but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. Lastly,
all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise it selfe is
lawfull, but where there is no Right to make any compact, there
can be no conveighance of it, and therefore there can no injury
follow, as hath been said in the second Chapter, Artic. 17. Now
what we may contract for, and what not, depends wholly upon the
civill Lawes. The City of Lacedoemon therefore rightly ordered
that those young men who could so take away certain goods from
others as not to be caught, should goe unpunisht; for it was
nothing else, but to make a Law that what was so acquired should
be their own, and not anothers. Rightly also is that man every
where slain, whom we kill in warre, or by the necessity of
selfe-defence. So also that copulation which in one City is
Matrimony, in another will be judged Adultery. Also those
contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen, doe not so in
another, although of the same City. because that he who is
forbidden by the City (that is by that one man, or Councell,
whose the supreme power is) to contract ought, hath no Right to
make any contract, and therefore having made any, it is not
valid, and by consequence, no Marriage. But his contract which
received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was
Matrimony: neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts,
that they were made by an Oath, or Sacrament, for those adde
nothing to the strengthning of the contract, as hath been said
above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft, what Murther,
what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must be known by
the civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the
supreme authority.

    That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament, &c.] Whether
Matrimony bee a Sacrament (in which sense that word is used by
some Divines) or not, it is not my purpose to dispute: Onely I
say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live
together, i.e. granted by the civill Law, whether it be a
Sacrament, or not, is surely a legitimate Marriage; but that
copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage, since
it is of t he essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract.
There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the
Jewes, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved.
But with those who permit no such contracts, but by a Law that
they shall never be broke, Wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the
reason is, because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble,
not because Matrimony is a Sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies
which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple, to blesse,
or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and wife, will
perhaps belong only to the office of Clergy-men; all the rest,
namely who, when, and by what contracts Marriages may be made,
pertains to the Lawes of the City.

    XVII. This same supreme command, and absolute power, seems so
harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming
of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what
humane nature, and the civill Lawes are, and partly also through
their default, who when they are invested with so great
authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may
therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority, some of them will
have a City well enough constituted, if they who shall be the
Citizens convening, doe agree concerning certaine Articles
propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved; and doe
command them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be
inflicted on them who shall break them: to which purpose, and
also to the repelling of a forraign enemy, they appoint a certain
and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice
not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a
City thus constituted, that the Assembly who prescribed those
things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue,
or from time to time have a certain day, and place of meeting,
that power will be perpetuall. But if they wholly dissolve,
either the City dissolves with them, and so all is returned to
the state of War, or else there is somewhere a power left to
punish those who shall transgresse the Lawes, whosoever, or how
many soever they be that have it, which cannot possibly be
without an absolute power: for he that by right hath this might
given, by punishments to restrain what Citizens he pleaseth, hath
such a power, as a greater cannot possibly be given by any
Citizens.

    XVIII. It is therefore manifest, that in every City there is
some one man, or Councell, or Court, who by Right hath as great a
power over each single Citizen, as each man hath over himselfe
considered out of that civill state, that is, supreme and
absolute, to be limited onely by the strength and forces of the
City it selfe, and by nothing else in the world: for if his power
were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some
greater power; For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater
power then he who is confin'd by them; now that confining power
is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other
greater then it selfe, and so we shall at length arrive to a
power which hath no other limit, but that which is the terminus
ultimus of the forces of all the Citizens together. That same is
called the supreme command, and if it bee committed to a
councell, a supreme councell, but if to one man, the supreme Lord
of the City. Now the notes of supreme command are these, To make
and abrogate Lawes. To determine War and peace, to know, and
judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or by Judges
appointed by him; to elect all Magistrates; Ministers, and
Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe
some one action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens
to doe beside himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power:
For those things which by Right may not be done by any one or
many Citizens, the City it selfe can onely doe: He therefore that
doth those things useth the Cities Right, which is the supreme
power.

    XIX. They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and
his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power
in the City, is in relation to the whole City, such as the head
is to the whole man; But it appeares by what hath been already
said, that he who is endued with such a power, (whether it be a
man, or a Court) hath a relation to the City, not as that of the
head, but of the soule to the body. For it is the soule by which
a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or nill; so by him
who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the City hath a
will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is
rather to be compared with the head, or one Counsellor, whose
only Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of
in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to
counsell, as the soules is to command.

    XX. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by vertue
of the compacts which each single Citizen, or subject, mutually
makes with the other. but all contracts, as they receive their
force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it
again, and are broken; perhaps some may inferre hence, that by
the consent of all the subjects together, the supreme authority
may be wholly taken away. Which inference if it were true, I
cannot discerne what danger would thence by Right arise to the
supreme Commanders. For since it is supposed, that each one hath
obliged himselfe to each other, if any one of them shall refuse,
whatsoever the rest shall agree to doe, he is bound
notwithstanding; neither can any man without injury to me, doe
that which by contract made with me, he hath obliged himselfe not
to doe. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen,
that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will
combine against the supreme power; wherefore there is no feare
for Rulers in chiefe, that by any Right they can be despoyled of
their authority. If notwithstanding it were granted, that their
Right depended onely on that contract which each man makes with
his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen, that they might
be robbed of that Dominion under pretence of Right; for subjects
being called either by the command of the City, or seditiously
flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are
contained in the votes of the greater part. Which in truth is
false; for it is not from nature that the consent of the major
part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it
true in tumults, but it proceeds from civill institution, and is
then onely true, when that Man or Court which hath the supreme
power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatnesse of
their number, allowes those that are elected a power of speaking
for those who elected them, and will have the major part of
voyces, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust,
to be as effectuall as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he
who is chiefe, ever convened his subjects with intention that
they should dispute his Right, unlesse, weary of the burthen of
his charge, he declared in plain termes, that he renounces and
abandons his government. Now because most men through ignorance
esteem not the consent of the major part of Citizens only, but
even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the
consent of the whole City, it may very well seem to them, that
the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in
some great Assembly of Citizens by the votes of the greater
number; But though a government be constituted by the contracts
of particular men with particulars, yet its Right depends not on
that obligation onely; there is another tye also toward him who
commands; for each Citizen compacting with his fellow, sayes
thus, I conveigh my Right on this party, upon condition, that you
passe yours to the same; by which means, that Right which every
man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now
wholly translated on some certain man, or Councell, for the
common benefit; wherefore what by the mutuall contracts each one
hath made with the other, what by the donation of Right which
every man is bound to ratifie to him that commands, the
government is upheld by a double obligation from the Citizens,
first that which is due to their fellow citizens, next that which
they owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects how many soever
they be, can with any Right despoyle him who bears the chiefe
Rule, of his authority, even without his own consent.

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