RELIGION.

Chap. XV

Of the Kingdome of God, by Nature.

I. Wee have already in the foregoing Chapters, proved both by
reason, and testimonies of holy Writ, that the estate of nature,
that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, who
neither govern, nor are governed, is an Anarchy, or hostile
state; that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state, are the
Lawes of nature; that there can be no civill government without a
Soveraigne; and that they who have gotten this Soveraigne command
must be obey'd simply, that is to say, in all things which
repugne not the Commandments of God: There is this one thing only
wanting to the complete understanding of all civill duty, & that
is, to know which are the Laws and Commandments of God. For else
we cannot tell whether that which the civill power commands us,
be against the Lawes of God, or not; whence it must necessarily
happen, that either by too much obedience to the civill
authority, we become stubborne against the divine Majesty; or for
feare of sinning against God, we runne into disobedience against
the civill power: To avoid both these rocks, its necessary to
know the Divine Lawes. now because the knowledge of the Lawes,
depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome, we must in what
followes, speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God.

    II. The Lord is King, the earth may be glad there of saith
the Psalmist, Psal: 97 v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist, Psal.
99. v. 1. The Lord is King, be the People never so unpatient; he
sitteth betweene the Cherubins, be the Earth never so unquiet; to
wit, whether men will, or not, God is THE King over all the
Earth, nor is he mov'd from his Throne, if there be any who deny
either his existence, or his providence. Now although God governe
all men so by his power, that none can doe any thing which he
would not have done, yet this, to speake properly, and
accurately, is not to reigne; for he is sayed to reigne, who
rules not by acting, but speaking, that is to say, by precepts
and threatnings. And therefore we account not inanimate, nor
irrationall bodies, for Subjects in the Kingdome of God, although
they be subordinate to the Divine power; because they understand
not the commands, and threats of God; nor yet the Atheists,
because they beleeve not that there is a God; nor yet those who
beleeving there is a God, doe not yet beleeve that he rules these
Inferiour things; for even these, although they be govern'd by
the power of God, yet doe they not acknowledge any of his
Commands, nor stand in awe of his threats. Those onely therefore
are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome, who acknowledge him to
be the Governour of all things, and that he hath given his
Commands to men, and appointed punishments for the
transgressours; The rest, we must not call Subjects, but Enemies
of God.

    III. But none are said to governe by commands, but they who
openly declare them to those who are govern'd by them; for the
Commands of the Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd. But lawes they
are not, if not perspicuously publisht, in so much as all excuse
of Ignorance may be taken away. Men indeed publish their Lawes by
word or voice, neither can they make their will universally
knowne any other way; But Gods lawes are declar'd after a
threefold manner: first, by the tacit dictates of Right reason:
next, by immediate revelation, which is suppos'd to be done
either by a supernaturall voice, or by a vision or dreame, or
divine inspiration: Thirdly, by the voice of one man whom God
recommends to the rest, as worthy of beliefe, by the working of
true miracles. Now he whose voice God thus makes use of to
signifie his will unto others, is called a PROPHET. These three
manners may be term'd the threefold word of God, to wit the
Rationall word, the sensible word, and the word of Prophecy: To
which answer, the three manners whereby we are said to heare God,
Right reasoning, sense, and faith. Gods sensible word hath come
but to few; neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except
particularly to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have any
Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any
people.

    IV. And according to the difference which is between the
Rationall word and the word of Prophecy, we attribute a twofold
Kingdome unto God: Naturall, in which he reignes by the dictates
of right reason, and which is universall over all who acknowledge
the Divine power, by reason of that rationall nature which is
common to all; and Propheticall, in which he rules also by the
word of Prophecy, which is peculiar, because he hath not given
positive Lawes to all men, but to his peculiar people, and some
certaine men elected by him.

    V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule, and to
punish those who break his Lawes, from his sole irresistable
power. For all Right over others is either from nature, or from
Contract. How the Right of governing springs from Contract, we
have already shewed in the 6. Chapter. And the same Right is
derived from nature, in this very thing, that it is not by nature
taken away. For when by nature all men had a Right over all
things, every man had a Right of ruling over all as ancient as
nature it selfe; but the reason why this was abolisht among men,
was no other but mutuall fear; as hath been declared above in the
second Chapter, the 3. art; reason namely dictating that they
must foregoe that Right for the preservation of mankinde, because
the equality of men among themselves according to their strength
and naturall powers was necessarily accompanied with warre, and
with warre joynes the destruction of mankinde. Now if any man had
so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joyned
forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why
he should part with that Right which nature had given him; The
Right therefore of Dominion over all the rest, would have
remained with him, by reason of that excesse of power whereby he
could have preserved both himselfe and them. They therefore whose
power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty,
derives his Right of Soveraignty from the Power it selfe. And as
oft as God punisheth, or slayes a sinner, although he therefore
punish him because he sinned, yet may we not say that he could
not justly have punisht or killed him although he had not sinned.
Neither, if the will of God in punishing, may perhaps have regard
to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the Right
of afflicting, and killing, depends not on divine Power, but on
mens sins.

    VI. That question made famous by the disputations of the
Antients, why evill things befell the good, and good things the
evill, is the same with this of ours, by what Right God
dispenseth good and evill things unto men. And with its
difficulty, it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar
concerning the divine providence, but also of Philosophers, and
which is more, even of holy men. Psal. 73. v. 1, 2, 3. Truly God
is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart. but as
for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well nigh slipt.
And why? I was grieved at the wicked, I doe also see the ungodly
in such prosperity. And how bitterly did Job expostulate with
God, that being just, he should yet be afflicted with so many
calamities? God himselfe with open voyce resolved this difficulty
in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his Right by arguments
drawn not from Jobs sinne, but from his own power. For Job and
his friends had argued so among themselves, that they would needs
make him guilty, because he was punisht; and he would reprove
their accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence: But
God when he had heard both him and them, refutes his
expostulation, not by condemning him of injustice, or any sin,
but by declaring his own power, Job. 38. v. 4. Where wast thou
(sayes he) when I laid the foundation of the earth, &c. And for
his friends, God pronounces himself angry against them, Job. 42.
v. 7. Because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right,
like his servant Job. Agreeable to this is that speech of our
Saviours in the mans case who was born blind, when, his Disciples
asking him whether he or his Parents had sinned, that he was born
blind, he answered, John 9. v. 3. neither hath this man sinned,
nor his Parents, but that the works of God should be manifest in
him. For though it be said, Rom. 5. 12. That death entred into
the world by sinne, it followes not, but that God by his Right
might have made men subject to diseases, and death, although they
had never sinned, even as he hath made the other animalls
mortall, and sickly, although they cannot sinne.

    VII. Now if God have the Right of Soveraignty from his power,
it is manifest, that the obligation of yeelding him obedience
lyes on men by reason of their weaknesse; for that obligation
which rises from Contract, of which we have spoken in the second
Chapter, can have no place here, where the Right of Ruling (no
Covenant passing between) rises only from nature. But there are
two Species of naturall obligation, one when liberty is taken
away by corporall impediments, according to which we say that
heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe obey the common Lawes of
their Creation: The other when it is taken away by hope, or fear,
according to which the weaker despairing of his own power to
resist, cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinde of
obligation, that is to say from fear, or conscience of our own
weaknesse (in respect of the divine power) it comes to passe,
that we are obliged to obey God in his naturall Kingdome; reason
dictating to all, acknowledging the divine power and providence,
that there is no kicking against the pricks.

    (By reason of their weaknesse) If this shall seem hard to any
man, I desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there
were two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey; I beleeve he
will confesse that neither is bound: if this be true, then it is
also true what I have set down, that men are subject unto God
because they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour
admonishing Paul (who at that time was an enemy to the Church)
that he should not kick against the pricks, seems to require
obedience from him for this cause, because he had not Power
enough to resist.

    VIII. Because the word of God ruling by nature onely, is
supposed to be nothing else but right reason, and the Laws of
Kings can be known by their word only, its manifest that the Laws
of God ruling by nature alone, are onely the naturall Lawes;
namely those which we have set down in the second and third
Chapters, and deduced from the dictates of reason, Humility,
Equity, Justice, Mercy, and other Morall vertues befriending
Peace, which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men one
toward the other, and those which right reason shall dictate
besides, concerning the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty.
We need not repeat what those Naturall Laws, or Morall vertues
are; but we must see what honours, and what divine worship, that
is to say, what sacred Lawes, the same naturall reason doth
dictate.

    IX. Honour, to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion
of anothers Power joyned with goodnesse; and to honour a man, is
the same with highly esteeming him, and so honour is not in the
Party honoured, but in the honourer. Now three Passions do
necessarily follow honour thus placed in opinion; Love, which
referres to goodnesse; hope, and feare, which regard Power. And
from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerfull are
appeased, and become Propitious, and which are the effects, and
therefore also the naturall signes of honour it selfe. But the
word honour is transferred also to those outward effects of
honour, in which sense, we are said to honour him, of whose power
we testifie our selves, either in word, or deed, to have a very
great respect; insomuch as honour is the same with worship. Now
WORSHIP is an outward act, the sign of inward honour. and whom we
endeavour by our homage to appease, if they be, angry or
howsoever to make them favourable to us, we are said to worship.

    X. All signes of the mind are either words or deeds, and
therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds. Now both
the one and the other are referred to three kindes; whereof the
first is Praise, or publique declaration of goodnesse; The
second, a publique declaration of Present Power, which is to
magnify megalunois; The third, is a publique declaration of
happinesse, or of Power, secure also for the future, which is
called, makariomos. I say, that all kindes of honour may be
discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then
praise, and celebrate in words, when we doe it by way of
Proposition, or Dogmatically, that is to say by Attributes, or
Titles, which may be termed praysing, and celebrating,
categorically, and plainly, as when we declare him whom we honour
to be liberall, strong, wise; And then, in deeds, when it is done
by consequence, or by hypothesis, or supposition, as by
Thanksgiving, which supposeth goodnesse; or by Obedience, which
supposeth Power. or by Congratulation, which supposeth
happinesse;

    XI. Now whether we desire to praise a man in words, or deeds,
we shall find some things which signify honour with all men, such
as among attributes, are the generall words of vertues and
powers, which cannot be taken in ill sense, As Good, Faire,
Strong, Just, and the like; and among actions, Obedience,
Thanksgiving, Prayers, and others of that kinde, by which an
acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever understood: Others,
which signify honour, but with some, and scorne with others, or
else neither; such as in Attributes, are those words which
according to the diversity of opinions, are diversly referred to
vertues or vices, to honest or dishonest things; As that a man
slew his enemy, that he fled, that he is a Philosopher, or an
Orator, and the like, which with some are had in honour, with
others in contempt. In deeds, such as depend on the custome of
the place, or prescriptions of civill Lawes, as in saluting to be
bareheaded, to put off the shoes, to bend the body. to petition
for any thing, and the like. Now standing, prostrate, kneeling,
forms of ceremony, that worship which is alwayes, and by all men
accounted honourable, may be called Naturall; the other, which
followes places, and customes, Arbitrary.

    XII. Furthermore, worship may be enjoyned, to wit by the
command of him that is worshiped, and it may bee voluntary,
namely such as seems good to the worshipper: If it be enjoyned,
the actions expressing it, do not signify honour, as they signify
actions, but as they are enjoyned: for they signify obedience
immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship enjoyned
consists in obedience. Voluntary is honourable onely in the
nature of the actions, which if they doe signify honour to the
beholders, it is worship, if not, it is Reproach. Again worship
may be either publique or private. But publique, respecting each
single worshipper, may not be voluntary; respecting the City it
may. For seeing that which is done voluntarily, depends on the
will of the Doer, there would not one worship be given, but as
many worships as worshippers, except the will of all men were
united by the command, of one. But Private worship may be
voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is done openly is
restrained, either by Lawes, or through modesty, which is
contrary to the nature of a voluntary action.

    XIII. Now that we may know what the scope and end of
worshipping others is, we must consider the cause why men delight
in worship: And we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere, that
Joy consists in this, that a man contemplate vertue, strength,
science, beauty, friends, or any Power whatsoever, as being, or
as though it were his own; and it is nothing else but a Glory, or
Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured, that is to say,
lov'd and fear'd, that is to say, having the services and
assistances of men in readinesse. Now because men beleeve him to
be powerfull whom they see honoured (that is to say) esteemed
powerfull by others, it falls out that honour is increased by
worship; and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired. His
end therefore who either commands, or suffers himself to be
worshipt, is, that by this means he may acquire as many as he
can, either through love, or fear, to be obedient unto him.

    XIV. But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God
naturall reason doth assigne us, let us begin from his
Attributes: where, first it is manifest, that existence is to be
allowed him; for there can be no will to honour him, who, we
think, hath no being. Next, those Philosophers who said, that God
was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that is to say, a part of it)
spake unworthily of God, for they attribute nothing to him, but
wholly deny his being. For by the word God we understand the
Worlds cause; but in saying that the World is God, they say, that
it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like
manner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but
eternall; because there can be no cause of an eternall thing, In
denying the world to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a
God. They also have a wretched apprehension of God, who imputing
idlenesse to him, doe take from him the Government of the world,
and of mankind. For say they should acknowledge him omnipotent,
yet if he minde not these inferiour things, that same thred-bare
Sentence will take place with them, Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos;
What is above us, doth not concern us. And seeing there is
nothing for which they should either love, or fear him, truly he
will be to them as though he were not at all. Moreover in
Attributes which signifie Greatnesse, or Power, those which
signifie some finite, or limited thing, are not signes at all of
an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily if we ascribe
lesse Power, or greatnesse to him then possibly we can; but every
finite thing is lesse then we can, for most easily we may alwayes
assigne and attribute more to a finite thing; No shape therefore
must be assigned to God, for all shape is finite; nor must he be
said to be conceived, or comprehended by imagination, or any
other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is finite:
And although this word Infinite signifie a conception of the
mind, yet it followes not, that we have any conception of an
infinite thing: For when we say that a thing is infinite, we
signifie nothing really, but the impotency in our owne mind, as
if we should say we know not whether, or where it is limited:
Neither speak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an
Idea of him in our mind; for an Idea is our conception, but
conception we have none, except of a finite thing: Nor they, who
say that he hath Parts, or that he is some certaine intire thing;
which are also attributes of finite things: Nor that he is in any
place; for nothing can be said to be in a place, but what hath
bounds and limits of its greatnesse on all sides: Nor that he is
moved, or is at rest; for either of them suppose a being in some
place: Nor that there are more Gods; because not more infinites.
Farthermore concerning attributes of happinesse, those are
unworthy of God which signify sorrow (unlesse they be taken not
for any Passion, but by a Metonomy for the effect) such as
Repentance, anger, Pity: Or Want, as Appetite, Hope,
Concupiscence, and that love which is also called lust, for they
are signes of Poverty, since it cannot be understood, that a man
should desire, hope, and wish for ought, but what he wants and
stands in need. of. Or any Passive faculty; for suffering belongs
to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we
therefore attribute a will to God, it is not to be conceived like
unto ours, which is called a rationall desire; for if God
desires, he wants, which for any man to say, is a contumelie; but
we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive. In
like manner when wee attribute sight and other acts of the senses
to him, or knowledge, or understanding, which in us are nothing
else but a tumult of the minde raised from outward objects
pressing the Organes, wee must not think that any such thing
befalls the Deity; for it is a signe of power depending upon some
other, which is not the most blessed thing. He therefore who
would not ascribe any other titles to God, then what reason
commands, must use such as are either Negative, as infinite,
eternall, incomprehensible, &c. or superlative, as most good,
most great, most powerfull, &c. or Indefinite, as good, just,
strong, Creatour, King, and the like; in such sense, as not
desiring to declare what he is (which were to circumscribe him
within the narrow limits of our phantasie), but to confesse our
own admiration, and obedience, which is the property of humility,
and of a minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe. For
Reason dictates one name alone, which doth signify the nature of
God (i.e.) Existent, or simply, that he is; and one in order to,
and in relation to us, namely God, under which is contained both
King, and Lord, and Father.

    XV. Concerning the Outward actions wherewith God is to be
worshipped (as also concerning his Titles) its a most generall
command of Reason, that they be signes of a mind yeelding honour;
under which are contained in the first place, Prayers;

        Qui fingit sacros auro, vel marmore vultus,
        Non facit ille Deos, qui rogat, ille facit.

    For Prayers are the signes of hope, and hope is an
acknowledgement of the divine Power, or goodnesse.

    In the second place, Thanksgiving; which is a signe of the
same affection, but that prayers goe before the benefit, and
thanks follow it.

    In the third, Guifts, that is to say oblations and
sacrifices, for these are thanksgivings.

    In the fourth, not to sweare by any other. For a mans Oath is
an, Imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both
knowes whether he doe, or not, and can punish him if he doe,
though he be never so powerfull; which only belongs to God: for
if there were any man from whom his subjects malice could not lye
hid, and whom no humane power could resist, plighted faith would
suffice without swearing, which, broken, might be punisht by that
Man; and for this very reason there would be no need of an Oath.

    In the fifth place, To speak warily of God; for that is a
sign of fear, and feare is an acknowledgement of Power. It
followes from this precept: That we may not take the name of God
in vain, or use it rashly; for either are inconsiderate. That wee
must not swear where there is no need; for that is in vain; but
need there is none, unlesse it be between Cities to avoyd or take
away contention by force, which necessarily must arise, where
there is no faith kept in promises, or in a City, for the better
certainty of Judicature. Also, That we must not dispute of the
Divine nature: For it is supposed that all things in the naturall
Kingdom of God are enquired into by reason only, that is to say,
out of the Principles of naturall Science; but we are so far off
by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of God, that we
cannot so much as reach to the full understanding of all the
qualities of our own bodies, or of any other Creatures. Wherefore
there comes nothing from these disputes, but a rash imposition of
names to the divine Majesty, according to the small measure of
our conceptions. It followes also (which belongs to the Right of
Gods Kingdome) that their speech is inconsiderate, and rash, who
say, That this, or that, doth not stand with divine justice; for
even men count it an affront that their children should dispute
their Right, or measure their justice otherwise then by the rule
of their Commands.

    In the sixth. Whatsoever is offered up in Prayers,
thanksgivings, and sacrifices, must in its kind be the best, and
most betokening honour; namely, Prayers must not be rash, or
light, or vulgar, but beautifull, and well composed.

    For though it were absurd in the Heathen to worship God in an
image, yet was it not against reason to use Poetry, and Musick,
in their Churches.

    Also Oblations must be clean, and Presents sumptuous, and
such as are significative either of submission, or gratitude, or
commemorative of benefits received; for all these proceed from a
desire of honouring.

    In the seventh. That God must be worshipt not privately
onely, but openly, and publiquely in the sight of all men;
because that worship is so much more acceptable, by how much it
begets honour, and esteem in others (as hath been declared before
in the 13. art.). Unlesse others therefore see it, that which is
most pleasing in our worship, vanisheth.

    In the last place. That we use our best endeavour to keep the
Lawes of Nature. For the undervaluing of our Masters command,
exceeds all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side,
Obedience is more acceptable then all other sacrifices. And these
are principally the naturall Lawes concerning the worship of God,
those I mean which Reason dictates to every Man; but to whole
Cities, every one whereof is one Person, the same naturall Reason
farther commands an uniformity of publique worship. For the
actions done by particular Persons, according to their private
Reasons, are not the Cities actions, and therefore not the Cities
worship; but what is done by the City, is understood to be done
by the command of him, or them who have the Soveraignty,
wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects,
that is to say, Uniformly.

    XVI. The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article
concerning the divine worship, only command the giving of
naturall signes of honour; but we must consider that there are
two kindes of signes, the one naturall, the other done upon
agreement, or by expresse, or tacite composition. Now because in
every language, the use of words, and names, come by appointment,
it may also by appointment be altered; for that which depends on,
and derives its force from the will of men, can by the will of
the same men agreeing be changed again, or abolisht. Such names
therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men, can
by the same appointment be taken away; now what can be done by
the appointment of men, that the City may doe; The City therefore
by Right (that is to say, they who have the power of the whole
City) shall judge what names or appellations are more, what lesse
honourable for God, that is to say, what doctrines are to be held
and profest concerning the nature of God, and his operations. Now
actions doe signify not by mens appointment, but naturally, even
as the effects are signes of their causes; whereof some are
alwayes signes of Scorn to them before whom they are committed,
as those, whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered, and
whatsoever men are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect;
Others are alwayes signes of honour, as to draw near, and
discourse decently and humbly, to give way, or to yeeld in any
matter of private benefit: In these actions the City can alter
nothing. But there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs
to honour, or reproach, are indifferent; now these, by the
institution of the City, may both be made signes of honour, and
being made so, doe in very deed become so. From whence we may
understand, that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall
command to be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to say,
for Worship; provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour,
because that is a sign of honour, which by the Cities command is
us'd for such.

    XVII. We have already declared which were the Laws of God, as
wel sacred as secular, in his government by the way of Nature
onely. Now because there is no man but may be deceived in
reasoning, and that it so falls out, that men are of different
opinions concerning the most actions, it may be demanded farther,
whom God would have to be the Interpreter of right Reason, that
is to say, of his Lawes. And as for the Secular Lawes, I mean
those which concern justice, and the carriage of men towards men;
by what hath been said before of the constitution of a City, we
have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason, that all
Judicature belongs to the City, and that Judicature is nothing
else but an Interpretation of the Laws, and by consequence, that
everywhere Cities, that is to say, those who have the Soveraign
power, are the Interpreters of the Lawes. As for the Sacred
Lawes, we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the
fifth Chap. the 13. art. that every Subject hath transferr'd as
much right as he could on him, or them, who had the supreme
authority, but he could have transferred his right of judging the
manner how God is to be honoured, and therefore also he hath done
it; That he could, it appeares hence, that the manner of
honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht
from every mans private Reason; but every man can subject his
private Reason to the Reason of the whole. City Moreover, if each
Man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so
great a diversity of worshippers, one would be apt to judge
anothers worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem
to the other to honour God: Even that therefore which were most
consonant to reason, would not be a worship, because that the
nature of worship consists in this, that it be the sign of inward
honour; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known
to others, and therefore is there no sign of honour but what
seems so to others. Again, that's a true sign which by the
consent of men becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable,
which by the consent of men, that is to say, by the command of
the City, becomes a sign of honour. It is not therefore against
the will of God, declared by the way of reason onely, to give him
such signs of honour as the City shall command. Wherefore
Subjects can transferre their Right of judging the manner of Gods
worship on him or them who have the Soveraign power. Nay, they
must doe it, for else all manner of absurd opinions, concerning
the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been
used by any Nations, will bee seen at once in the same, City.
whence it will fall out, that every man will beleeve that all the
rest doe offer God an affront; so that it cannot be truly said of
any that he worships God; for no man worships God, that is to
say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby
hee appeares to others for to honour him. It may therefore bee
concluded, that the Interpretation of all Lawes, as well Sacred,
as Secular, (God ruling by the way of nature only) depends on the
authority of the City, that is to say, that man, or councell, to
whom the Soveraign power is committed; and that whatsoever God
commands, he commands by his voyce. And on the other side, that
whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of
honouring God, and concerning secular affaires, is commanded by
God himselfe.

    XVIII. Against this, some Man may demand, first, Whether it
doth not follow, that the City must be obeyed if it command us
directly to affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it
does not follow, neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to
worship at all, cannot by any Man be understood for a manner of
worshipping; neither also had any one, before the constitution of
a City, of those who acknowledge God to rule, a Right to deny him
the honour which was then due unto him; nor could he therefore
transfer a Right on the City of commanding any such things. Next,
if it be demanded whether the City must be obeyed if it command
somewhat to be said, or done, which is not a disgrace to God
directly, but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences
may be derived: as for example, if it were commanded to worship
God in an image, before those who account that honourable? Truly
it is to be done. For Worship is instituted in signe of Honour;
but to Worship him thus, is a signe of honour, and increaseth
Gods Honour among those who do so account of it. Or if it be
commanded to call God by a name which we know not what it
signifies, or how it can agree with this word, God? That also
must be done; for what we do for Honours sake, (and we know no
better), if it be taken for a signe of Honour, it is a signe of
Honour; and therefore if we refuse to doe it, we refuse the
enlarging of Gods Honour. The same judgement must be had of all
the Attributes and Actions about the meerly rationall Worship of
God which may be controverted, and disputed; for though these
kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and
therefore sins in them who command them, yet are they not against
right reason, nor sins in Subjects, whose right reason in points
of Controversie is that, which submits its selfe to the reason of
the City. Lastly, if that Man, or Councell, who hath the Supreme
Power, command himselfe to be Worshipt with the same Attributes,
and Actions, wherewith God is to be Worshipt, the question is,
whether we must obey? There are many things which may be commonly
attributed both to God, and Men; for even Men may be Praised, and
Magnified; and there are many actions whereby God, and Men, may
be Worshipt. But the significations of the Attributes, and
Actions, are onely to be regarded: Those Attributes therefore,
whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion, that there is
any man endued with a Soveraignty independent from God, or that
he is immortall, or of infinite power, and the like, though
commanded by Princes, yet must they be abstained from. As also
from those Actions signifying the same, as Prayer to the absent;
to aske those things which God alone can give, as Rain, and Fair
weather; to offer him what God can onely accept, as Oblations,
Holocausts; or to give a Worship, then which a greater cannot be
given, as Sacrifice. For these things seeme to tend to this end,
that God may not be thought to rule, contrary to what was
supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or
any other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even
in civill Worship. for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the
civill power onely. For Divine Worship is distinguisht from
civill, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the
Body, but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we doe
Worship; as if we cast down our selves before any man, with
intention of declaring by that Signe that we esteeme him as God,
it is Divine Worship; if we doe the same thing as a Signe of our
acknowledgment of the civill Power, it is civill Worship. Neither
is the Divine Worship distinguished from Civill by any action
usually understood by the words latreia and douleia, whereof the
former marking out the Duty of Servants, the latter their
Destiny, they are words of the same action in degree.

    Truly it is to be done We said in the 14. Article of this
Chapter, That they who attributed limits to God, transgrest the
naturall Law concerning Gods Worship. Now they who worship him in
an Image, assigne him limits; wherefore they doe that which they
ought not to doe, and this place seemes to contradict the former.
We must therefore know first, that they who are constrained by
Authority, doe not set God any bounds, but they who command them;
for they who worship unwillingly, doe worship in very deed, but
they either stand or fall there, where they are commanded to
stand or fall by a lawfull Soveraign. Secondly, I say it must be
done, not at all times, and every where, but on supposition that
there is no other rule of worshipping God beside the dictates of
humane reason; for then the will of the City stands for Reason.
But in the Kingdome of God by way of Covenant, whether old, or
new, where idolatry is expressely forbid, though the City
commands us to worship thus, yet must we not do it. Which, if he
shall consider, who conceived some repugnancy between this, and
the 14. Article, will surely cease to think so any longer.

    XIX. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God
reigning by the way of naturall reason onely, Subjects doe sinne,
First, if they break the morall Laws, which are unfolded in the
second and third Chapters. Secondly, if they break the Lawes, or
commands of the City in those things which pertain to Justice.
Thirdly, if they worship not God, kata ta nomika. Fourthly, if
they confesse not before men, both in words, and deeds, that
there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme
King of the World, and of all worldly Kings; that is to say, if
they doe not worship God. This fourth sinne in the naturall
Kingdome of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter,
in the second Article, is the sinne of Treason against the Divine
Majesty; for it is a denying of the Divine Power, or Atheisme.
For sinnes proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to
be the Soveraign King, who being himselfe absent, should rule by
his Vice-Roy; against whom sure they would transgresse who should
not obey his Vice-Roy in all things, except he usurpt the
Kingdome to himself, or would give it to some other; but they who
should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception,
might be said to be guilty of Treason.

HOME

2006 GunShowOnTheNet.com