Chap. X.

A comparison between 3. kinds of government, according to their
severall inconveniences.

    I. What Democraty, Aristocraty, and monarchy are, hath
already been spoken, but which of them tends most to the
preservation of the subjects Peace, and procuring their
advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let
us set forth the advantages, and disadvantages of a City in
generall, lest some perhaps should think it better, that every
man be left to live at his own will, then to constitute any
civill society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of
civill government hath a most entire, but unfruitfull liberty;
because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his
own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others,
suffer al at anothers wil; but in a constituted City, every
subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as suffices him to
live well, and quietly, & there is so much taken away from
others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state,
every man hath such a Right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing;
in it, each one securely enjoyes his limited Right; Out of it,
any man may rightly spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but
one. Out of it we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the
power of all. Out of it no man is sure of the fruit of his
labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a
Dominion of Passions, war, fear, poverty, slovinlinesse,
solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty. In it, the Dominion of
reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy,
sciences, and benevolence.

    II. Aristotle in his seventh book, and fourteenth Chapter of
his Politiques saith, that there are two sorts of governments,
whereof the one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to
that of the Subjects; as if where Subjects are severely dealt
with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another
form of government; which opinion may by no means be subscribed
to, for all the profits and disprofits arising from government
are the same, and common both to the Ruler, and the Subject; The
Dammages which befall some particular subjects through
misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very
well be severed from those which concern the Ruler, but those
relate not to the government it selfe, being such as may happen
in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from
the first institution of the City, they will then be truly called
the inconveniencies of government, but they will be common to the
Ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common; but the
first and greatest benefit, Peace, and defence, is common to
both, for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the
end that he may defend his life, makes use at once of all the
forces of his fellow-subjects; and in the greatest inconvenience
that can befall a City, namely the slaughter of subjects, arising
from Anarchy, both the Commander, and the Parties commanded, are
equally concerned. Next, if the Ruler levie such a summe of vast
monies from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain
themselves, and their families, nor conserve their bodily
strength, and vigour, the disadvantage is as much his, as theirs,
who with never so great a stock, or measure of riches, is not
able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of
his subjects; but if he raise no more then is sufficient for the
due administration of his power, that is a benefit equall to
himselfe and his subjects, tending to a common Peace, and
defence. Nor is it imaginable which way publick treasures can be
a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted, as
to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by
their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their
bodies, and mindes; for even thus the grievance would concern the
Ruler; nor would it arise from the ill institution, or ordination
of the government, (because in all manner of governments subjects
may be opprest) but from the ill administration of a well
established government.

    III. Now that Monarchy of the foresaid forms, of Democraty,
Aristocraty, and Monarchy, hath the preheminence, will best
appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising
in each one of them. Those arguments therefore that the whole
universe is governed by one God; that the Ancients preferr'd the
Monarchicall state before all others, ascribing the Rule of the
Gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs, and of
Nations, the decrees of Princes were held for Laws; that
paternall government instituted by God himselfe in the Creation,
was Monarchicall. that other governments were compacted by the
artifice of men out of the ashes of Monarchy, after it had been
ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the
jurisdiction of Kings, although I say these doe hold forth
Monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they doe it by
examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will passe
them over.

    Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the Ancients
who made that same fable of Prometheus pointed at this. They say,
that Prometheus having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a man
out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter
with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver. which is, that by humane
invention (which is signified by Prometheus) Laws and Justice
were by imitation taken from Monarchy, by vertue whereof (as by
fire removed from its naturall orbe) the multitude (as the durt
and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a
civill Person, which is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the
Awthours and Abettors being found, who might securely and quietly
have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus
smart for it, that being exposed still to alteration, they are
tormented with perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.

    IV. Some there are who are discontented with the government
under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as
if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many,
should so farre excell in power, as to be able at his own
pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they
could, would withdraw themselves from under the Dominion of one
God. But this exception against one is suggested by envie, while
they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the same
cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few
commanded, unlesse they themselves either were, or hoped to be of
the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have
not an equall Right, surely an Aristocraty must be unreasonable
also. But because we have shewed that the state of equality is
the state of warre, and that therefore inequality was introduc'd
by a generall consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have
voluntarily given more to,enjoyes more, is no longer to be
accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore
which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his
Unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater
grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.
    V. But first, we must remove their opinion who deny that to
be any City at all, which is compacted of never so great a number
of servants under a common Lord. In the 9. Artic. of the 5.
Chapter, a City is defined to be one Person made out of many men,
whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills
of them all, insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of
each single Person for the publick Peace and safety; and by the
same article of the same Chapter, One Person is that, when the
wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of
each servant is contained in the will of his Lord, as hath been
declared in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter, so as he may employ
all their forces and faculties according to his own will, and
pleasure; it followes therefore that that must needs be a city,
which is constituted by a Lord, and many servants; neither can
any reason be brought to contradict this which doth not equally
combat against a City constituted by a Father, and his Sonnes;
for to a Lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of
sonnes; for they are both his honour, and safeguard; neither are
servants more subject to their Lords, then children to their
Parents, as hath been manifested above in the 5. Article of the
8. Chapter.

    VI. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that
the Ruler, beside those monies necessary for publick charges, as
the maintaining of publick Ministers, building, and defending of
Castles, waging warres, honourable sustaining his own houshold,
may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to
enrich his sonnes, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I
confesse this is a grievance, but of the number of those which
accompany all kindes of government, but are more tolerable in a
Monarchy then in a Democraty; for though the Monarch would enrich
them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a
Democraty, look how many Demagoges, (that is) how many powerfull
Oratours there are with the people (which ever are many, and
daily new ones growing) so many Children, Kinsmen, friends, &
Flatterers, are to be rewarded; for every of them desire not
onely to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth,
as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits for the
better strengthning of themselves. A Monarch may in great part
satisfie his Officers and Friends, because they are not many,
without any cost to his Subjects, I mean, without robbing them of
any of those Treasures given in for the maintenance of War, and
Peace; In a Democraty, where many are to be satisfied, and
alwayes new ones, this cannot be done without the Subjects
oppression. Though a Monarch may promote unworthy Persons, yet
oft times he will not doe it; but in a Democraty all the popular
men are therefore suppos'd to doe it, because it is necessary;
for else, the power of them who did it would so encrease, as it
would not onely become dreadfull to those others, but even to the
whole City also.

    VII. Another grievance is, that same perpetuall fear of death
which every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with
himself that the Ruler hath power. not onely to appoint what
punishments he lists on any Transgressions, but that he may also
in his wrath, and sensuality, slaughter his innocent Subjects,
and those who never offended against the Lawes. And truly this is
a very great grievance in any forme of Government wheresoever it
happens: (for it is therefore a grievance because it is; not,
because it may be done) but it is the fault of the Ruler, not of
the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not essentiall to
Monarchie; yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd
under one Ruler, then under the People: For Kings are onely
severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent
Counsells, or oppose them with reproachfull words, or controule
their Wills; but they are the cause that that excesse of power
which one Subject might have above another becomes harmlesse.
Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly
suffer, but such as are known to him, namely Courtiers, and such
as are remarkable for some eminent Charge; and not all neither,
but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy; for
they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly
punisht. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired
life, let him be what he will that Reignes, he is out of danger:
for the ambitious onely suffer, the rest are protected from the
injuries of the more potent. But in a popular Dominion there may
be as many Nero's, as there are Oratours who sooth the People;
for each one of them can doe as much as the People, and they
mutually give way to each others appetite (as it were by this
secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow) while
they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfie their lust,
and private hatred, have undeservedly slain their
fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private
power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realme,
and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to
have a care that the common-weale do thence receive no prejudice.
When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of Riches,
they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in
popular applause, the powerfull party without any other crime
laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was
usually practised in Democraties; for the Athenians inflicted a
punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull,
meerly because of their powers, without the guilt of any other
crime; and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the
common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a
Kingdome. In this Democraty and Monarchy were eaven; yet differ'd
they much in fame, because fame derives from the People, and what
is done by many, is commended by many: and therefore what the
Monarch does, is said to be done out of envie to their vertues,
which if it were done by the People, would be accounted Politie.

    VIII. There are some who therefore imagine Monarchy to bee
more grievous then Democraty, because there is lesse liberty in
that, then in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from
that subjection which is due to the Lawes (i.e.) the commands of
the People, neither in Democraty, nor in any other state of
government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they
suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few lawes, few
prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were
forbidden, there could be no Peace; then I deny that there is
more liberty in Democraty then Monarchy; for the one as truly
consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the
word liberty, may in large, and ample letters be written over the
gates of any City whatsoever, yet is it not meant the Subjects,
but the Cities liberty, neither can that word with better Right
be inscribed on a City which is governed. by the people, then
that which is ruled by a Monarch. But when private men or
subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not
for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding,
they little consider; for if every man would grant the same
liberty to another, which he desires for himselfe, as is
commanded by the law of nature, that same naturall state would
return again, in which all men may by Right doe all things, which
if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse then all kind of
civill subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his
single freedome, the rest being bound, what does he else demand
but to have the Dominion? for who so is freed from all bonds, is
Lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore
have no greater liberty in a Popular, then in a Monarchicall
State. That which deceives them, is the equall participation of
command, and publique places; for where the authority is in the
People, single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are
parts of the People ruling; and they equally partake in publique
Offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing
Magistrates, and publique Ministers. And this is that which
Aristotle aim'd at, himself also, through the custome of that
time, mis-calling Dominion liberty, in his sixth Book, and second
Chapter of Politiques. In a popular State there is liberty by
supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were
free out of this State. From whence, by the way, we may collect,
That those Subjects, who in a Monarchy deplore their lost
liberty, doe onely stomack this, that they are not receiv'd to
the steerage of the Common-weal.

    IX. But perhaps for this very reason some will say, That a
Popular State is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall.
because that, where all men have a hand in publique businesses,
'there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome, knowledge,
and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty
and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is
bred in humane nature, is to them who excell in such like
faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most
delightfull of all things. But in a Monarchy, this same way to
obtain praise, and honour, is shut up to the greatest part of
Subjects; and what is a grievance, if this be none? Ile tell you:
To see his opinion whom we scorne, preferr'd before ours; to have
our wisedome undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain
tryall of a little vaine glory, to undergoe most certaine
enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better,
or the worse); to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the
disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Counsells, and
advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit; to
neglect the affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are
grievances. But to be absent from a triall of wits, although
those trialls are pleasant to the Eloquent, is not therefore a
grievance to them, unlesse we will say, that it is a grievance to
valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight
in it.

    X. Besides, there are many reasons why deliberations are
lesse successefull in great Assemblies, then in lesser Councells;
whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to
the preservation of a Common-weal, we must not onely understand
matters at home, but Forraign Affaires too: at Home, by what
goods the Country is nourished, and defended, and whence they are
fetched; what places are fit to make Garrisons of; by what means
Souldiers are best to be raised, and maintained; what manner of
affections the Subjects bear toward their Prince, or Governours
of their Country, and many the like: Abroad, what the power of
each neighbouring Country is, and wherein it consists; what
advantage, or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their
dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other
among themselves, and what Counsell daily passeth among them.
Now, because very few in a great Assembly of men understand these
things, being for the most part unskilfull (that I say not
incapable) of them, what can that same number of advisers with
their impertinent Opinions contribute to good Counsells, other
then meer letts and impediments?

    XI. Another reason why a great Assembly is not so fit for
consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds
it necessary to make a long continued Speech, and to gain the
more esteem from his Auditours, he polishes, and adornes it with
the best, and smoothest language. Now the nature of Eloquence is
to make Good and Evill, Profitable and Unprofitable, Honest and
Dishonest, appear to be more or lesse then indeed they are, and
to make that seem just, which is unjust, according as it shall
best suit with his end that speaketh. For this is to perswade;
and though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true
Principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which, for the
most part, are erroneous; neither endeavour they so much to fit
their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the
Passions of their mindes to whom they speak; whence it happens
that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain
violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the Man, but in the nature
it selfe of Eloquence, whose end (as all the Masters of Rhetorick
teach us) is not truth (except by chance) but victory, and whose
property is not to inform, but to allure.

    XII. The third reason why men advise lesse successfully in a
great convent is, because that thence arise Factions in a
commonweal, and out of Factions, Seditions, and Civill War; for
when equall Oratours doe combat with contrary Opinions, and
Speeches, the conquered hates the Conquerour, and all those that
were of his side, as holding his Counsell, and wisedome in
scorne: and studyes all meanes to make the advise of his
adversaries prejudiciall to the State, for thus he hopes to see
the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Farthermore,
where the Votes are not so unequall, but that the conquered have
hopes by the accession of some few of their own opinion at
another sitting to make the stronger Party, the chief heads do
call the rest together; they advise apart how they may abrogate
the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and
earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what
order each man shall speak, that the same businesse may again be
brought to agitation, that so what was confirmed before by the
number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in
some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently
absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they
use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a
faction is inferiour in votes, and superiour, or not much
inferiour in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft, and
language, they attempt by force of armes, and so it comes to a
civill warre. But some will say, these things doe not
necessarily, nor often happen; he may as well say, that the chief
Parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the
greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.

    XIII. It followes hence, that when the legislative power
resides in such convents as these, the Laws must needs be
inconstant, and change, not according to the alteration of the
state of affaires, nor according to the changeablenesse of mens
mindes, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction,
do convene; insomuch as the Laws do flote here, and there, as it
were upon the waters.

    XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies
have this inconvenience, that whereas it is oft of great
consequence, that they should be kept secret, they are for the
most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to
any effect, and their power, and will, is as soon known abroad,
as to the People it selfe commanding at home.

    XV. These inconveniences which are found in the deliberations
of great assemblies do so farre forth evince Monarchy to be
better then Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great
consequence are oftner trusted to be discussed by such like
Committees, then in a Monarchy. Neither can it easily bee done
otherwayes; for there is no reason why every man should not
naturally rather minde his own private, then the publique
businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his
eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenuous,
and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his Parents, to
his wife, and children, rejoyce, and triumph in the applause of
his dexterous behaviour: As of old all the delight Marcus
Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so
well pleasing to his Mother. But if the People in a Democraty
would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of Warre, and
Peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the
nomination of Magistrates, and publique Ministers, that is to
say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be
confest, that in this particular, Democraty and Monarchy would be
equall.

    XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are
found to be more in one kind of government then another, arise
from hence, namely, because the government it self, or the
administration of its affairs, are better committed to one, then
many; or on the other side, to many, then to some few. For
Government, is the power, the administration of it, is the. act.
now the Power in all kind of government is equall; the acts only
differ, that is to say the actions, and motions of a
common-weale, as they flow from the deliberations of many, or
few, of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that
the conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not
on him in whom the authority resides, but on his Officers; and
therefore nothing hinders, but that the common-weale may be well
governed, although the Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant,
provided that they be fit for affaires, who are endued with the
publique Offices, and charges; And that which is said, Woe to the
land whose King is a childe, doth not signifie the condition of a
Monarchy to be inferiour to a Popular state, but contrariwise,
that by accident it is the grievance of a Kingdome, that the King
being a childe, it often happens, that many by ambition, and
power, intruding themselves into publique counsels, the
government comes to be administred in a Democraticall manner, and
that thence arise those infelicities which for the most part
accompany the Dominion of the People.

    XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute
Monarchy is the best state of government, that not onely Kings,
but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to
Nobles, give the whole command of warre to one only, and that so
absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way this must be
noted also, that no King can give a Generall greater authority
over his army, then he himselfe by Right may exercise over all
his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments
in the Camps. But what else, are many Common-wealths, then so
many Camps strengthened with armes, and men against each other,
whose state (because not restrained by any common power,
howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may passe
between them) is to be accounted for the state of nature, which
is the state of War.

    XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of
our selves to be subject to some Man, or Councell, we cannot on
better condition be subject to any, then one whose interest
depends upon our safety, and welfare; and this then comes to
passe when we are the inheritance of the Ruler; for every man of
his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance.
But the Lands, and Monies of the Subjects are not onely the
Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and active minds; which will
be easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the
Dominion of lesser Countries is valued, and how much easier it is
for men to procure mony, then money men; nor doe we readily meet
with any example that shewes us when any subject, without any
default of his own, hath by his Prince been despoiled of his
life, or goods, through the sole licenciousnesse of his
Authority.

    XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Monarchicall, with a Popular
State; we have said nothing of Aristocracy; we may conclude of
this, by what hath been said of those, that, that which is
hereditary, and content with the election of Magistrates; which
transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able;
which simply imitates the government of Monarchs most, and the
People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and more
lasting then the rest.

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