The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787

[Farrand's Records, Volume 1] YATES

Monday, June 25th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states.

Mr. C. Pinkney. On the question upon the second branch of the general legislature, as reported by the committee in the fourth resolve, now under consideration, it will be necessary to enquire into the true situation of the people of this country. Without this we can form no adequate idea what kind of government will secure their rights and liberties. There is more equality of rank and fortune in America than in any other country under the sun; and this is likely to continue as long as the unappropriated western lands remain unsettled. They are equal in rights, nor is extreme of poverty to be seen in any part of the union. If we are thus singularly situated, both as to fortune and rights, it evidently follows, that we cannot draw any useful lessons from the examples of any of the European states or kingdoms; much less can Great Britain afford us any striking institution, which can be adapted to our own situation--unless we indeed intend to establish an hereditary executive, or one for life. Great Britain drew its first rude institutions from the forests of Germany, and with it that of its nobility. These having originally in their hands the property of the state, the crown of Great Britian was obliged to yield to the claims of power which those large possessions enabled them to assert. The commons were then too contemptible to form part of the national councils. Many parliaments were held, without their being represented, until in process of time, under the protection of the crown, and forming distinct communities, they obtained some weight in the British government. From such discordant materials brought casually together, those admirable checks and balances, now so much he boast of the British constitution, took their rise.

-- But will we be able to copy from this original? I do not suppose that in the confederation, there are one hundred gentlemen of sufficient fortunes to establish a nobility; and the equality of others as to rank would never admit of the distinctions of nobility. I lay it therefore down as a settled principle, that equality of condition is a leading axiom in our government. It may be said we must necessarily establish checks, lest one rank of people should usurp the rights of another. Commerce can never interfere with the government, nor give a complexion to its councils. Can we copy from Greece or Rome? Have we their nobles or patricians? With them offices were open to few--The different ranks in the community formed opposite interests and produced unceasing struggles and disputes. Can this apply equally to the free yeomanry of America? We surely differ from the whole. Our situation is unexampled, and it is in our power, on different grounds, to secure civil and religious liberty; and when we secure these we secure every thing that is necessary to establish happiness. We cannot pretend to rival the European nations in their grandeur or power; nor is the situation of any two nations so exactly alike as that the one can adopt the regulations or government of the other. If we have any distinctions they may be divided into three classes.

The latter is the governing power of America, and the other two must ever be dependent on them--Will a national government suit them? No. The three orders have necessarily a mixed interest, and in that view, I repeat it again, the United States of America compose in fact but one order. The clergy and nobility of Great Britain can never be adopted by us. Our government must be made suitable to the people, and we are perhaps the only people in the world who ever had sense enough to appoint delegates to establish a general government. I believe that the propositions from Virginia, with some amendments, will satisfy the people. But a general government must not be made dependent on the state governments.

The United States include a territory of about 1500 miles in length, and in breadth about 400; the whole of which is divided into states and districts. While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it was in contemplation to have formed the whole into one--but it was found impracticable. No legislature could make good laws for the whole, nor can it now be done. It would necessarily place the power in the hands of the few, nearest the seat of government. State governments must therefore remain, if you mean to prevent confusion. The general negative powers will support the general government. Upon these considerations I am led to form the second branch differently from the report. Their powers are important and the number not too large, upon the principle of proportion. I have considered the subject with great attention; and I propose this plan (reads it) and if no better plan is proposed, I will then move its adoption.

Mr. Randolph moved that the 4th resolve be divided, in the same manner as the 3d resolve.

Mr. Gorham moved the question on the first resolve. Sixteen members from one state will certainly have greater weight, than the same number of members from different states. We must therefore depart from this rule of apportionment in some shape or other--perhaps on the plan Mr. Pinkney has suggested.

Mr. Read. Some gentlemen argue, that the representation must be determined according to the weight of each state--That we have heretofore been partners in trade, in which we all put in our respective proportions of stock--That the articles of our co-partnership were drawn in forming the confederation--And that before we make a new co-partnership, we must first settle the old business. But to drop the allusion--we find that the great states have appropriated to themselves the common lands in their respective states--These lands having been forfeited as heretofore belonging to the king, ought to be applied to the discharge of our public debts. Let this still be done, and then if you please, proportion the representation, and we shall not be jealous of one another--A jealousy, in a great measure, owing to the public property appropriated by individual states--and which, as it has been gained by the united power of the confederation, ought to be appropriated to the discharge of the public debts.

Mr. Gorham. This motion has been agitated often in congress; and it was owing to the want of power, rather than inclination, that it was not justly settled. Great surrenders have been made by the great states, for the benefit of the confederation.

Mr. Wilson. The question now before us is, whether the second branch of the general legislature shall or shall not be appointed by the state legislatures. In every point of view it is an important question. The magnitude of the object is indeed embarrassing. The great system of Henry the IVth of France, aided by the greatest statesmen, is small when compared to the fabric we are now about to erect--In laying the stone amiss we may injure the superstructure; and what will be the consequence, if the corner-stone should be loosely placed? It is improper that the state legislatures should have the power contemplated to be given them. A citizen of America may be considered in two points of view--as a citizen of the general government, and as a citizen of the particular state, in which he may reside. We ought to consider in what character he acts in forming a general government. I am both a citizen of Pennsylvania and of the United States. I must therefore lay aside my state connections and act for the general good of the whole. We must forget our local habits and attachments. The general government should not depend on the state governments. This ought to be a leading distinction between the one and the other; nor ought the general government to be composed of an assemblage of different state governments--We have unanimously agreed to establish a general government--That the powers of peace, war, treaties, coinage and regulating of commerce, ought to reside in that government. And if we reason in this manner, we shall soon see the impropriety of admitting the interference of state governments into the general government. Equality of representation can not be established, if the second branch is elected by the state legislatures. When we are laying the foundation of a building, which is to last for ages, and in which millions are interested, it ought to be well laid. If the national government does not act upon state prejudices, state distinctions will be lost. I therefore move, that the second branch of the legislature of the national government be elected by electors chosen by the people of the United States.

Judge Elsworth. I think the second branch of the general legislature ought to be elected agreeable to the report. The other way, it is said, will be more the choice of the people--The one mode is as much so as the other. No doubt every citizen of every state is interested in the state governments; and elect him in whatever manner you please, whenever he takes a seat in the general government, it will prevail in some shape or other. The state legislatures are more competent to make a judicious choice, than the people at large. Instability pervades their choice. In the second branch of the general government we want wisdom and firmness. As to balances, where nothing can be balanced, it is a perfect utopian scheme. But still great advantages will result in having a second branch endowed with the qualifications I have mentioned. Their weight and wisdom may check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of the first branch.

I cannot see the force of the reasoning in attempting to detach the state governments from the general government. In that case, without a standing army, you cannot support the general government, but on the pillars of the state governments. Are the larger states now more energetic than the smaller? Massachusetts cannot support a government at the distance of one hundred miles from her capital, without an army; and how long Virginia and Pennsylvania will support their governments it is difficult to say. Shall we proceed like unskilful workmen, and make use of timber, which is too weak to build a first rate ship? We know that the people of the states are strongly attached to their own constitutions. If you hold up a system of general government, destructive of their constitutional rights, they will oppose it. Some are of opinion that if we cannot form a general government so as to destroy state governments, we ought at least to balance the one against the other. On the contrary, the only chance we have to support a general government is to graft it on the state governments. I want to proceed on this ground, as the safest, and I believe no other plan is practicable. In this way, and in this way only, can we rely on the confidence and support of the people.

Dr. Johnson. The state governments must be preserved: but this motion leaves them at the will and pleasure of the general government.

Mr. Madison. I find great differences of opinion in this convention on the clause now under consideration. Let us postpone it in order to take up the 8th resolve, that we may previously determine the mode of representation.

Mr. Mason. All agree that a more efficient government is necessary. It is equally necessary to preserve the state governments, as they ought to have the means of self-defence. On the motion of Mr. Wilson, the only means they ought to have would be destroyed.

The question was put for postponing, in order to take into consideration the 8th resolve, and lost--7 noes--4 ayes.

Question on the 1st clause in the 4th resolve--9 states for--2 against it.

The age of the senators (30 years) agreed to.

Mr. Gorham proposed that the senators be classed, and to remain 4 years in office; otherwise great inconveniences may arise if a dissolution should take place at once.

Gov. Randolph. This body must act with firmness. They may possibly always sit--perhaps to aid the executive. The state governments will always attempt to counteract the general government. They ought to go out in classes: therefore I move, that they go out of ofice in fixed proportions of time, instead of the words, seven years.

Mr. Read moved (though not seconded) that they ought to continue in office during good behaviour.

Mr. Williamson moved that they remain in office for six years.

Mr. Pinkney. I am for four years. Longer time would give them too great attachment to the states, where the general government may reside. They may be induced, from the proposed length of time, to sell their estates, and become inhabitants near the seat of government.

Mr. Madison. We are proceeding in the same manner that was done when the confederation was first formed--Its original draft was excellent, but in its progress and completion it became so insufficient as to give rise to the present convention. By the vote already taken, will not the temper of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the senate? Do we create a free government?

Question on Gov. Randolph's motion26--7 ayes--3 noes--one divided.

[Note 26: 26 The question was not on Randolph's motion, see Journal and Madison.]

Motion to fix the term of service at six years--5 ayes--5 noes--one divided.

Do. for 5 years--5 ayes--5 noes--one divided.

The question for 4 years was not put; and the convention adjourned till to-morrow morning.

KING

25 June--Shall the Senate be elected by the State Legislatures?

Wilson--Every man will possess a double Character, that of a Citizen of the US. & yt. of a Citizen of an individl. State--The national Legis. will apply to ye. former Charactr--it ought then to be elected or appointed by the Citizens of the US, and not by the Legislatures of the indivdl States; Because they are characters peculiarly of a state feature & partaking of the State Citizenship rather yn. of that of the US--The State Legislrs. have no interest in the Genl. Govt. but the Citizens of every State have an important interest--this Distinction points out the Difference which shd. govern us in the appointment of the Natl. Govt. The natil. Govt. is one & yt. of the states another--Commerce, War, Peace, Treaties, &c are peculiar to the former--certain inferior and local Qualities are the province of the Latter--there is a line of separation; where ever the prerogatives lies on the side of the Genl. Govt. we are citizens of the nation or of the US--(although I think we shd. use a term in the singular Number), and so on the other side--We must not then refer ourselves to the States or yr. Legislatures, but must proceed on the basis of the people; the Senate shd. be elected by Electors appointed by the people.

Elsworth--We must build our Genl. Govt. upon the vigour & strength of the State Govts--the Genl. Govt. could not proceed without them, or a large standing Army; Mass. cannot maintain her Republican Govt. without an Army--Pennsylvania will soon want it--Virginia can not & does not govern Kentucke--each of these States is too large for a Republican System--I am therefore for proceeding on the continuation of the States--let the 2d Br. or the Senate be elected by the State Legislatures--

Johnson--When the Question of State Security or State Individuality was presented--it was sd. by Mr. Wilson & Mr. Madison that the States were secured by the right of yr. Legislatures to appt. the members of the Senate or 2d. Br. of the Genl. Legislature. If Mr. Wilson's present plan of appointing the Senate obtains, the State individuality is insecure --

Mason--The Executive negatives both Brs of the Legislatr and each Br. has a negative on the other--and the Genl. Gov. have a neg. on the State Legislature--these regulations are necessary on the principles of self Defence--it is an instinctive principle in nature, and in a proper degree every being professes this power. If the State Legislatures are deprived of the Election of the 2d. or 1st Br. of the natil. Legislature the States are destitute of this principle of self protection--I wish them to continue & I shall not agree to deprive them of the power of a constitutional self Protection--27

[Note 27: 27 [Endorsed:] 25 June | Shall the Senators be elected | by the State Legislatures | Wilson no | Ellsworth aye | Mason aye]

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