The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [Elliot's Debates, Volume 1]
Wednesday, June 20, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment. Present, eleven states.
Judge ELLSWORTH. I propose, and therefore move, to expunge the word "national," in the 1st resolve, and to place, in the room of it, "government of the United States;" which was agreed to, nem. con.
Mr. LANSING then moved that the 1st resolve be postponed, in order to take into consideration the following: "that the powers of legislation ought to be vested in the United States in Congress."
I am clearly of opinion that I am not authorized to accede to a system which will annihilate the state governments, and the Virginia plan is declarative of such extinction. It has been asserted that the public mind is not known. To some points it may be true; but we may collect from the fate of the requisition of the impost, what it may be on the principles of a national government. When many of the states were so tenacious of their rights on this point, can we expect that thirteen states will surrender their governments up to a national plan? Rhode Island pointedly refused granting it. Certainly she had a federal right to do so; and I hold it as an undoubted truth, as long as state distinctions remain, let the national government be modified as you please, both branches of your legislature will be impressed with local and state attachments. The Virginia plan proposes a negative on the state laws where, in the opinion of the national legislature, they contravene the national government; and no laws can pass unless approved by them. They will have more than a law in a day to revise; and are they competent to judge of the wants and necessities of remote states?
This national government will, from their power, have great influence in the state governments; and the existence of the latter are only saved in appearance. And has it not been asserted that they expect their extinction? If this be the object, let us say so, and extinguish them at once. But remember, if we devise a system of government which will not meet the approbation of our constituents, we are dissolving the Union; but if we act within the limits of our power, it will be approved of; and should it, upon experiment, prove defective, the people will intrust a future convention again to amend it. Fond as many are of a general government, do any of you believe that it can pervade the whole continent so effectually as to secure the peace, harmony, and happiness, of the whole? The excellence of the British model of government has been much insisted on; but we are endeavoring to complicate it with state governments, on principles which will gradually destroy the one or the other. You are sowing the seeds of rivalship, which must at last end in ruin.
Mr. MASON. The material difference between the two plans has already been clearly pointed out. The objection to that of Virginia arises from the want of power to institute it, and the want of practicability to carry it into effect. Will the first objection apply to a power merely recommendatory? In certain seasons of public danger, it is commendable to exceed power. The treaty of peace, under which we now enjoy the blessings of freedom, was made by persons who exceeded their powers. It met the approbation of the public, and thus deserved the praises of those who sent them. The impracticability of the plan is still more groundless. These measures are supported by one who, at his time of life, has little to hope or expect from any government. Let me ask, Will the people intrust their dearest rights and liberties to the determination of one body of men, and those not chosen by them, and who are invested both with the sword and purse? They never will--they never can--to a conclave, transacting their business secret from the eye of the public. Do we not discover by their public journals of the years 1778--9 and 1780, that factions and party spirit had guided many of their acts? The people of America, like all other people, are unsettled in their minds, and their principles fixed to no object, except that a republican government is the best, and that the legislature ought to consist of two branches. The constitutions of the respective states, made and approved of by them, evince this principle. Congress, however, from other causes, received a different organization. What! would you use military force to compel the observance of a social compact? It is destructive to the rights of the people. Do you expect the militia will do it? or do you mean a standing army? The first will never, on such an occasion, exert any power; and the latter may turn its arms against the government which employs them. I never will consent to destroy state government, and will ever be as careful to preserve the one as the other. If we should, in the formation of the latter, have omitted some necessary regulation, I will trust my posterity to amend it. That the one government will be productive of disputes and jealousies against the other, I believe; but it will produce mutual safety. I shall close with observing that, though some have expressed much warmth on this and former occasions, I can excuse it, as the result of sudden passion; and hope that, although we may differ in some particular points, if we mean the good of the whole, that our good sense, upon reflection, will prevent us from spreading our discontent farther.
Mr. MARTIN. I know the government must be supported; and if the one was incompatible with the other, I would support the state government at the expense of the Union; for I consider the present system as a system of slavery. Impressed with this idea, I made use, on a former occasion, of expressions perhaps rather harsh. If gentlemen conceive that the legislative branch is dangerous, divide them into two. They are as much the representatives of the states as the state assemblies are the representatives of the people. Are not the powers which we here exercise given by the legislatures? [After giving a detail of the revolution and of state governments, Mr. M. continued:] I confess, when the Confederation was made, Congress ought to have been invested with more extensive powers; but when the states saw that Congress indirectly aimed at sovereignty, they were jealous, and therefore refused any further concessions. The time is now come that we can constitutionally grant them not only new powers, but to modify their government, so that the state governments are not endangered. But whatever we have now in our power to grant, the grant is a state grant, and therefore it must be so organized that the state governments are interested in supporting the Union. Thus systematized, there can be no danger if a small force is maintained.
Mr. SHERMAN. We have found, during the war, that, though Congress consisted of but one branch, it was that body which carried us through the whole war; and we were crowned with success. We closed the war, performing all the functions of a good government, by making a beneficial peace. But the great difficulty now is, How shall we pay the public debt incurred during that war? The unwillingness of the states to comply with the requisitions of Congress has embarrassed us greatly. But to amend these defects in government, I am not fond of speculation. I would rather proceed on experimental ground. We can so modify the powers of Congress, that we will all be mutual supporters of one another. The disparity of the states can be no difficulty. We know this by experience. Virginia and Massachusetts were the first who unanimously ratified the old Confederation. They then had no claim to more votes in Congress than one. Foreign states have made treaties with us as confederated states, not as a national government. Suppose we put an end to that government under which those treaties were made; will not these treaties be void?
Mr. WILSON. The question before us may admit of the three following considerations: --
Confederations are usually of a short date. The Amphictyonic council was instituted in the infancy of the Grecian republics. As those grew in strength, the council lost its weight and power. The Achæan league met the same fate. Switzerland and Holland are supported in their confederation, not by its intrinsic merit, but the incumbent pressure of surrounding bodies. Germany is kept together by the house of Austria. True, Congress carried us through the war even against its own weakness. That powers were wanting, you, Mr. President, must have felt. To other causes, not to Congress, must the success be ascribed. That the great states acceded to the Confederation, and that they, in the hour of danger, made a sacrifice of their interest to the lesser states, is true. Like the wisdom of Solomon, in adjudging the child to its true mother, from tenderness to it, the greater states well knew that the loss of a limb was fatal to the Confederation: they, too, through tenderness, sacrificed their dearest rights to preserve the whole. But the time is come when justice will be done to their claims. Situations are altered.
Congress have frequently made their appeal to the people. I wish they had always done it: the national government would sooner have been extricated.
Question then put on Mr. Lansing's motion, and lost--6 states against 4, 1 divided. New York in the minority.
Adjourned till to-morrow morning.
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