Blackstone's Commentaries

on the Laws of England

 
Book the First - Chapter the First:

Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals

 

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COMMENTARIES

ON THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE FIRST.

OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

THE objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and extensive, that, in order to consider them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will be necessary to distribute them methodically, under proper and distinct heads ; avoiding as much as possible divisions too large and comprehemive on the one hand, and too trifling and minute on the other ; both of which are equally productive of confusion.

NOW.

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NOW, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong ; or, as Cicero d, and after him our Bracton b, has expressed it, sanctio justa, jubens honesta et prohibens contraria ; it follows, that the primary and principal objects of the law are RIGHTS, and WRONGS. In the prosecution therefore of these commentaries, I shall follow this very simple and obvious division ; and shall in the first place consider the rights that are commanded, and secondly the wrongs that are forbidden by the laws of England.

RIGHTS are however liable to another subdivision ; being either, first, those which concern, and are annexed to the persons of men, and are then called jura personarum or the rights of persons ; or they are, secondly, such as a man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are stiled jura rerum or the rights of things. Wrongs also are divisible into, first, prvate wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of particular rights, concern individuals only, and are called civil injuries ; and secondly, public wrongs, which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole community, and are called crimes and misdemeanors.

THE objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold division, the present commentaries will therefore consist of the four following parts : 1. The rights of persons ; with the means whereby such rights may be either acquired or lost. 2. The rights of things ; with the means also of acquiring and losing them. 3. Private wrongs, or civil injuries ; with the means of redressing them by law. 4. Public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors ; with the means of prevention and punishment.

WE are now, first, to consider the rights of persons ; with the means of acquiring and losing them.

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11 Philipp. 12.

b l. 1. c. 3.

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NOW

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the rights of persons that are commanded to be observed by the municipal law are of two sorts ; first, such as are due from every citizen, which are usually called civil duties ; and, secondly, such as belong to him, which is the more popular acceptation of rights or jura. Both may indeed be comprized in this latter division ; for, as all social duties are of a relative nature, at the same time that they are due from one man, or set of men, they must also be due to another. But I apprehend it will be more clear and easy, to consider many of them as duties required from, rather than as rights belonging to, particular persons. Thus, for instance, allegiance is usually, and therefore as the duty of the magistrate ; and yet they are, reciprocally, the rights as well as duties of each other. Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the people.

PERSONS also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us : artificial are such as created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government; which are called corporations or bodies politic.

THE rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are also of two sorts, absolute, and relative. Absolute, which are such as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals or single persons : relative, which are incident to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to each other. The first, that is, absolute rights, will be the subject of the present chapter.

BY the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is intitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it. But with regard to the absolute duties, which man is bound to perform con-

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sidered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any human municipal laws should at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, as they are members of society, and stand in various relations to each other, they have consequently no business or concern with any but social or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend againft the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as drunkenness, or the like) they then become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious effects to society ; and therefore it is then the business of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of publication is what alters the nature of the café. Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws : private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by any civil fanction. But, with respect to rights, the café is different. Human laws define and enforce as well those rights which belong to a man confidered as an individual, as those which belong to him confidered as related to others.

FOR the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature ; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to formation of states and societies : so that to maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent consideration. And therefore the principal view of human laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as are

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absolute, which in themselves are few and simple ; and, then, such rights as are relative, which arising from a variety of connexions, will be far more numerous and more complicated. These will take up a greater space in any code of laws, and hence may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.

THE absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to known good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually fumed up on one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature : being a right inherent in a us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of freewill. But every man, when he enters into society, gives, up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase ; and, in confideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himfelf to conform to those laws, which the community has tough proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable, than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power ; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. Political therefore, or civil, liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the publick c. Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a

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c Facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nifi quid jure prohibetur. Inft. 1. 3. 1.

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Q

man

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man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end in view, are laws destructive of liberty : whereas if any public advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the control of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preserve our general freedom in others of more importance ; by supporting that state, of society, which alone can secure our independence. Thus the statute of king Edward IV d, which forbad the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree of a lord) to wear pikes upon their shoes or boots of more than two inches in length, was a law that favoured of oppression ; because, however ridiculous the fashion then in use might appear, the restraining it by pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose of common utility. But the statute of king Charles II e, which prescribes a thing seemingly as indifferent ; viz. a dress for the dead, who are all ordered to be buried in woollen; is a law consistent with public liberty, for it encourages the staple trade, on which in great meafure depends the univerfal good of the nation. So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty ; for (as Mr Locke has well observed f) where there is no law, there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or frame of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint.

THE idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flourish in their highest vigour in these kingdoms, where it falls little

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d 3 Edw. IV. c. 5.

e 30 Car. II. ft. 1. c. 3.

f on Gov. p. 2. § 57.

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short

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short of perfection, and can only be lost or destroyed by the folly or demerits of it's owner : the legislature, and of course the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable bluffing even in the meanest subject. Very different from the modern constitutions of other states, on the continent of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law ; which in general are calculated to vest an arbitrary and despotic power of controlling the actions of the subject in the prince, or in a few grandees. And this spirit of liberty is fo deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very foil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo instanti a freeman g.

THE absolute rights of every Englishman (which, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties) as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government ; though subject at times to fluctuate and change : their establifhment (excellent as it is) being still human. At some times we have seen them depressed by overbearing and tyrannical princes; at others so luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse state than tyranny itself, as any government is better than none at all. But the vigour of our free constitution has always delivered the nation from thefe embarassments, and, as soon as the convulsions consequent on the struggle have been over, the balance of our rights and liberties has settled to it's proper level; and their fundamental articles have been from time to time asserted in parliament, as often as they were thought to be in danger.

FIRST, by the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, sword in hand, from king John ; and afterwards, with some alterations, confirmed in parliament by king Henry the third, his son. Which charter contained very few new grants ; but, as sir Edward Coke h observes, was for the most part declaratory of the

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s Salk. 666.

h 2 Inft. proem.

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Q 2

principal

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principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards by the statute called confirmatio cartarum I, whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law ; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be sent to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to the people ; and sentence of excommunication is directed to be as constantly denounced againft all those that by word, deed, or counsel act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it. Next by a multitude of subsequent corroborating statutes, (sir Edward Coke, I think, reckons thirty two k,) from the first Edward to Henry the fourth. Then, after a long interval, by the petition of right ; which was a parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people , assented to by king Charles the first in the beginning of his reign. Which was closely followed by the still more ample conceffions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament, before the fatal rupture between them ; and by the many salutary laws, particularly the habeas corpus act, passed under Charles the second. To these succeeded the bill of rights, or declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and princess of Orange 13 February 1688; and afterwards enacted in parliament, when they became king and queen : which declaration concludes in these remarkable words ; “and they do claim, “demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises, as their “undoubted rights and liberties.” And the act of parliament itself l recognizes “all and singular the rights and liberties afferted “and claimed in the said declaration to be the true, antient, and “indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom.” Lartly, these liberties wee again asserted at the commencement of the present century, in the act of settlement m, whereby the crown is limited to his present majest's illustrious house, and some new provisions were added at the same fortunate aera for better securing our religion, laws, and liberties; which the statute declares to be “the birthright of the people of England,” according to the antient doctrine of the common law n.

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i 25 Edw. I.

k 2 Inft. proem.

l 1 W. and M. ft. 2. c. 2.

m 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2.

n Plowd. 55.

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THUS

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THUS much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights themselves thus defined by these several statutes , consist in a number of private immunities ; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind ; but, in most other countries of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles ; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty ; and the right of private property : because as there is no other known method of compulsion, or of abridging man's natural free will, but by an infringment or diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense.

I. THE right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

1. LIFE is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual ; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child ; this, though not murder, was by the antient law homicide or manslaughter o. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so

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o Si aliquis mulierem praegnantem percusserit, vel ei venenum dederit, per quod secerit abortivam ; si puerperium jam formatum fuerit, et maxime si fuerit animatum, facit bomicidium. Bracton. l. 3. c. 21.

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atrocious

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atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanor p.

AN infant in ventre statute mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it q ; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to it's use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born r. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours s.

2. A MAN'S limbs, (by which for the present we only understand those members which may be useful to him in fight, and the loss of which only amounts to mayhem by the common law) are also the gift of the wise creator; to enable man to protect himself from external injuries in a state of nature. To these therefore he has a natural inherent right ; and they cannot be wantonly destroyed or disabled without a manifest breach of civil liberty.

BOTH the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estimation of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed .{FE} defendendo, or in order to preserve them. For whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. Therefore if a man through fear of death or mayhem is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act ; these, though accompanied with all other the requisite solemnities, are totally void in law, if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehension of losing his life, or even his limbs, in café of his non-compliance t. And the same is also a sufficient excuse for the commission of many misdemeanors, as will appear in the fourth book.

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p 3. Inft. 90.

q Stat. 12 Car II c. 24.

r Stat. 10 & 11 W. III. c. 16.

s 2id in imtelliguntur in rervum natura effe, cum de eorum commode agatur. Ff. 1. 5. 26.

t 2 Inft. 483.

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The

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The constraint a man is under in these circumstances is called in law duress, from the Latin durities, of which there are two forts ; duress of imprisonment, where a man actually loses his liberty, so which we shall presently speak ; and duress per minas, where the hardship is only threatened and impending, which is that we are now discoursing of. Duress per minas is either for fear of loss of life, or else for fear of mayhem, or loss of limb. And this fear must be upon sufficient reason ; “non,” as Bracton expresses it, 'suspicio cujuslibet vani et meticulofi bominis, sed talis qui poffit “cadere in cirum constantem ; talis enim debet effe metus, qui in .se “contineat vitae periculum, aut corporis cruciatum u.” A fear of battery, or being beaten, though never so well grounded, is no duress ; neither is the fear of having one's house burnt, or one's goods taken away and destroyed ; because in these cases, should the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering equivalent damages w: but no suitable atonement can be made for the loss of life, or limb. And the indulgence shewn to a man under this, the principal, for of duress, he fear of losing his life or limbs, agrees also with that maxim of the civil law ; ignofcitur ei qui sanguinem fuum qualiter redemptum voluit x.

THE law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with every thing necessary for their support. For there is no man fo indigent or wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life, from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor, of which in their proper places. A humane provision ; yet, though dictated by the principles of society, discountenanced by the Roman laws. For the edicts of the emperor Constantine, commanding the public to maintain the children of those who were unable to provide for them, in order to prevent the murder and exposure of infants, an institution founded on the same principle as our

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u l. 2. c. 5.

w 2 inft. 483.

z Ff. 48. 21. 1.

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founding

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founding hospitals, though comprized in the Theodosian code y, were rejected in Justinian's collection.

THESE rights, of life and member, can only be determined by the death of the person ; which is either a civil or natural death. The civil death commences if any man be banished the realm z by the process of the common law, or enters into religion ; that is, goes into a monastery, and becomes there a monk professed : in which cases he is absolutely dead in law, and his next heir shall have his estate. For, such banished man is entirely cut off from society; and such a monk, upon his profession, renounces solemnly all secular concerns : and besides, as the popish clergy claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life, and the commands of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English law would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society, who secluded themfelves from it, and refused to submit to it's regulations a. A monk is therefore accounted civiliter mortuus, and when he enters into religion may, like other dying men, make his testament and executors ; or, if he makes none, the ordinary may grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were actually dead intestate. And such executors and administrators shall have the same power, and may bring the fame actions for debts due to the religious, and are liable to the same actions for those due from him, as if he were naturally deceased b. Nay, do far has this principle been carried, that when one was bound in a bond to an abbot and his successors, and afterwards made his executors and professed himfelf a monk of the same abbey, and in process of time was himself made abbot thereof ; here the law gave him, in the capacity of abbot, an action of debt against his own executors to recover the money due c. In short, a monk or religious is so effectually dead in law, that a lease made even to a third perfon, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards becomes a monk, determines by such his entry into religion : for

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y l. 11. t. 27.

z Co. Litt. 133.

a This was alfo a rv'e in the feudal law, l. 2. t. 21. defat effe miles seculi, qui factus eft miles Christi ; nec beneficium pertinet ad cum qui non debet gerere officium.

b Litt. §. 200.

c Co. Litt. 133 b.

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which

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which reafon leases, and other conveyances, for life, are usually made to have and to hold for the term of one's natural life d.

THIS natural life being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the great creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority. Yet nevertheless it may, by the divine permission, be frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital punishments ; of the nature, restrictions, expedience, and legality of which, we may hereafter more conveniently enquire in the concluding book of these commentaries. At present, I shall only observe, that whenever the constitution of a state vests in any man, or body of men, a power of destroying at pleasure, without the direction of laws, the lives or members of the subject, such constitution is in the highest degree tyrannical : and that whenever any laws direct such destruction for light and trivial causes, such laws are likewise tyrannical, though in an inferior degree ; because here the subject is aware of the danger he is exposed to, and may by prudent caution provide against it. The statute law of England does therefore very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest necessity : and the constitution is an utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express warrant of law. “Nullus liber homo, says the great charter e, ali- “ quo modo deftruatur, nifi per legale judicium parium fuorum aut “per legem terrae.” Which words, “aliquo modo destruatur,” according to sir Edward Coke f, include a prohibition not only of killing, and maiming, but also of torturing (to which our laws are strangers) and of every oppression by colour of an illegal authority. And it is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb, contrary to the great charter and the law of the land : and again, by statute 28 Ed. III.

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d 2 Rep. 48. Co. Litt. 132.

e c. 29.

f 2 Inft. 48.

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R

c. 3.

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c. 3. that no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law.

3. BESIDES those limbs and members that may be necessary to man, in order to defend himself or annoy his enemy, the rest of his person or body is also entitled by the same natural right to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding ; though such insults amount not to destruction of life or member.

4.THE preservation of a man's health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy it, and

5. THE security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is intitled, by reason and natural justice ; since without these it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right. But these three last articles (being of much less importance than those which have gone before, and those which are yet to come) it will suffice to have barely mentioned among the rights of persons ; referring the more minute discussion of their several branches, to those parts of our commentaries which treat of the infringement of these rights, under the head of personal wrongs.

II. NEXT to personal fecurity, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct ; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same observations as upon the preceding article ; that it is a right strictly natural ; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and , that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of the great charter g is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned

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g c. 29.

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but

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but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many subsequent old statutes h expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned or detained without cause shewn, to which he may make answer according to law. By 16 Car. I. c. 10. if any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any illegal court, or by command of the king's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board, or of any of the privy council ; he shall, upon demand of his counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of king's bench or common pleas ; who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by 31 Car. II. c. 2. commonly called the babcas corpus act, the methods of obtaining this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of England can be long detained in prison, except in those cafes in which the law requires and justifies such detainer. And, left this act should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or sureties for the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. that excesive bail ought not to be required.

OF great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty : for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown ) there would foon be an end of all other rights and immunities. Some have thought, that unjust attacks, even upon life, or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less dangerous to the commonwealth, than such as are made upon the personal liberty of the subject. To bereave a man of life, of by violence to consiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once

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h 5 Edw. III. c. 9. 25. Edw. III. Ft. 5. c. 4. and 28 Edw. III. 4. 3.

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R 2

convey

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convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten ; is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render this measure expedient. For the parliament only, or legislative power, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing. As the senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a magistrate of absolute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger. The decree of the senate, which usually preceded the nomination of this magistrate, “dent operam consu- “les, nequid refpublica detrimenti capiat,” was called the fenatus confultum ultimate necessitatis. In like manner this experiment ought only to be tried in case of extreme emergency ; and in these the nation parts with it's liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for ever.

THE confinement of the person, in any wife, is an imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment i. And the law so much discourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under duress of imprisonment, which we before explained to mean a compulsion by an illegal restraint of liberty, until he feals a bond or the like ; he may alledge this duress, and avoid the extorted bond. But if a man be lawfully imprisoned, and either to procure his discharge, or on any other fair account, feals a bond or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid itk. To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by process from the courts of judicature, or by warrant from some

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i 2. Inft. 5 9.

k 2 Inft. 482.

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legal

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legal officer, having authority to commit to prison ; which warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal of the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus. If there be no cause expressed, the goaler is not bound to detain the prisoner l. For the law judges in this respect, faith sir Edward Coke, like Festus the Roman governor ; that it is unreasonable to fend a prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged againft him.

A NATURAL and regular consequence of this personal liberty, is that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases ; and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. The king indeed, by his royal prerogative, may issue out his writ ne exeat regnum, and prohibit any of his subjects from going into foreign parts without licence m. This may be necessary for the public service, and safeguard of the commonwealth. But no power on earth, except the authority of parliament, can fend any subject of England out of the land againft his will ; no not even a criminal. For exile, or transportation, is a punishment unknown to the common law ; and, wherever it is now insticted, it is either by the choice of the criminal himself, to escape a capital punishment, or else by the express direction of some modern act of parliament. To this purpose the great charter n declares that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. c. 2. (that secund magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties) it is enacted, that no subject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of England, Wales, or Berwick , shall be fent prisoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jerfey, Guernsey, or places beyond the seas ; (where they cannot have the benefit and protection of the common law ) but that all such imprisonments shall be illegal ; that the person, who shall dare to commit another contrary to this law, shall be disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a praemunire, and be incapable of receiving the king's pardon :

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l 2 Inft. 52. 53.

m F. N. B. 85.

n cap. 29.

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and the party suffering shall also have his private action against the person committing, and all his aiders, advisers and abettors, and shall recover treble costs ; besides his damages, which no jury shall affefs at less than five hundred pounds.

THE law in is this respect so benignly and liberally construed for the benefit of the subject, that, though within the realm the king may command the attendance and service, of all his liegemen, yet he cannot fend any man out of the realm, even upon the public service : he cannot even constitute a man lord deputy or lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him a foreign embassador o. For this might in reality be no more than an honorable exile.

III. THE third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property : which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. The original of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully explained in the secund book of the ensuing commentaries : but certainly the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society ; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of England are therefore, in point of honor and juftice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter p has declared that no freeman shall be diffeised, or divested, of his freehold, or of his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by a variety of antient statutes q it is enacted, that no man's lands or goods fhall be seised into the king's hands, against the great charter, and the law of the land ; and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold,

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o 2 Inft. 47.

p c. 29.

q 5 Edw. III. c. 9. 25 Edw. III. ft. 5. c. 4. 28 Edw. III. c. 3.

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unless he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law ; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed, and holden for none.

SO great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it ; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extenfively beneficial to the public ; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community ; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this, and similar cafes the legislature alone, can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel ? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner ; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now confidered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price ; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.

NOR is this the only instance in which the law of the land has postponed even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property. For no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his represenatives in parliament. By the statute 25 Edw. I. c. 5 and 6, it is provided, that the king

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shall not take any aids or tasks, but by the common assent of the realm. And what that common assent is, is more fully explained by 34 Edw. I. ft. 4. cap. 1. which enacts, that no talliage or aid shall be taken without assent of the arch-bishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land r : and again by 14 Edw. III. ft. 2. c. 1. the prelates, earls, barons, and commons, citizens, burgesses, and merchants shall not be charged to make any aid, if it be not by the common assent of the great men and commons in parliament. And as this fundamental law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding princes, by compulsive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and voluntary consent, it was made an article in the petition of right 3 Car. I, that no man shall be compelled to yield any gift, loan, or benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by act of parliament. And, lastly, by the statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that levying money for or to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament ; or for longer time, or in other manner, than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.

IN the three preceding articles we have taken a short view of the principal absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman. But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. These are,

1. THE constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament, of which I shall treat at large in the ensuing chapter.

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r See the historical introduction to the great charter, & c. sub anno 1297 ; wherein it is shewn that this statute de talliagio non concedendo, suppo ed to have been made in 34 Edw. I, is in reality nothing more than a sort of translation into Latin of the confirmatio cartarum, 25 Edw. I, which was originally published in the Norman language.

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2. THE limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should exceed them without the consent of the people. Of this also I shall treat in it's proper place. The former of these keeps the lcgislative power in due health and vigour, so as to make it improbable that laws should be enacted destructive of general liberty : the latter is a guard upon the executive power, by restraining it from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed and established by the other.

3. A THIRD subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administred therein. The emphatical words of magna carta s, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment of law (says sir Edward Coke t) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are these ; “nulli “vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam : “and therefore every subject,” continues the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terries, vel persona, by “any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any “exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and “have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely with- “out fale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.” It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of parliament wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law of the land : and what that law is, every subject knows ; or may know if he pleases : for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge ; but is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament. I shall however juft mention a few negative statutes , whereby abuses, perversions, or delays of justice, especially by the prerogative, are restrained. It is ordained by

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magna carta u, that no freeman shall be outlawed, that is, put out of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the land. By 2 Edw. III. c. 8. and 11 Ric. II. c. 10. it is enacted, that no commands or letters shall be sent under the great seal, or the little seal, the signet, or privy seal, in disturbance of the law ; or to disturb or delay common right : and, though such commandments should come, the judges shall not cease to do right. And by 1 W. & M. ft. 2 : c. 2. it is declared, that the pretended power of suspending, or dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority without confent of parliament, is illegal.

NOT only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be altered but by parliament ; for if once those outworks were demolished, there would be no inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itfelf. The king, it is true, may erect new courts of justice ; but then they must proceed according to the old established forms of the common law. For which reason it is declared in the statute 16 Car. I. c. 10. upon the dissolution of the court of starchamber, that neither his majesty, nor his privy council, have any jurisdiction, power, or authority by English bill, petition, articles, libel (which were the course of proceeding in the starchamber, borrowed from the civil law) or by any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine, or draw into question, determine or dispose of the lands or goods of any subjects of this kingdom ; but that the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by course of law.

4. IF there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights beforementioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, for the

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redress of grievances. In Russia we are told w that the czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition the throne, till he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In café he obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince ; but upon pain of death, if found to be in the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one dared to offer such third petition ; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different ; and while they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only muft be taken, left, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult ; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640 : and, to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II. ft. 1. c. 5. that no petition to the king, or either house of parliament, for any alterations in church or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace or the major part of the grand jury, in the country ; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council ; nor shall any petition be presented by more than two persons at a time. But under these regulations , it is declared by the statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. that the subject hath a right to petition ; and that all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

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IN

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IN these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of Englishmen : liberties more generally talked of, than thoroughly understood; and yet highly necessary to be perfectly known and considered by every man of rank or property, left his ignorance of the points whereon it is founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the one hand, or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on the other. And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. So long as these remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free ; for every species of compulsive tyranny and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliaments be supported in it's full vigor ; and limits certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And, lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in the courts of law ; next to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redress of grievances ; and lastly to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence. And all these rights and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints. Restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, 23 will appear upon farther enquiry, that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice to do every thing that a good man would desire to do ; and are restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow citizens. So that this review of our situation may fully justify the observation of a learned French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom x; and who hath not scrupled to profess, even

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in the very bosom of his native country, that the English is the only nation in the world, where political or civil liberty is the direct end of it's constitution. Recommending therefore to the student in our laws a farther and more accurate reach into this extensive and important title, I shall close my remarks upon it with the expiring wish of the famous father Paul to his country,

“ESTO PERPETUA !”

 

Book the First - Chapter the Third:

 

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CHAPTER THE THIRD.

OF THE KING, AND HIS TITLE.

THE supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, the king or queen : for it matters not to which sex the crown defends ; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power ; as is declared by statute 1 Mar. st. 3. c. 1.

IN discoursing of the royal rights and authority, I shall consider the king under six distinct views : 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His duties, 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And, first, with regard to his title.

THE executive power of the English nation being vested in a single person, by the general consent of the people, the evidence of which general consent is long and immemorial usage, it became necessary to the freedom and peace of the state, that a rule should be laid down, uniform, universal, and permanent ; in order to mark out with precision, who is that single person, to whom are committed (in subservience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the community ; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual are due. It is of the highest importance to the public tranquillity, and to the con-

sciences

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sciences of private men, that this rule should be clear and indisputable : and our constitution has not left us in the dark upon this material occasion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out the constitutional doctrine of the royal succession, with that freedom and regard to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and respect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the subject require.

THE grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus coronae, or right of succession to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take to be this : “that the crown is, by common law and “constitutional custom, hereditary ; and this in a manner peculiar to itself : but that the right of inheritance may from time “to time be changed or limited by act of parliament ; under “which limitations the crown still continues hereditary.” And this proposition it will be the business of this chapter to prove, in all it's branches : first, that the crown is hereditary ; secondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itself ; thirdly, that this inheritance is subject to limitation by parliament ; lastly, that when it is so limited, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

1. FIRST, it is in general hereditary, or descendible to the next heir, on the death or demise of the last proprietor. All regal governments must be either hereditary or elective : and, as I believe there is no instance wherein the crown of England has ever been asserted to be elective, except by the regicides at the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I, it must of consequence be hereditary. Yet while I assert an hereditary, It by on means intend a sure divino, title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have subsisted under the theocratic establishments of the children of Israel in Paleftine : but is never yet subsisted in any other country ; save only so far as kingdoms, like other human fabrics, are subject to the general and ordinary dispensations of providence. Nor indeed have a jure divino and an hereditary right any necessary connexion with each other ; as some have every weakly imagined. The titles of David and Jehu were equally

jure

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jure divino, as those of either Solomon or Ahab; and yet David flew the sons of his predecessor, and Jehu his predecesor himself. And when our kings have the same warrant as the had, whether it be to fit upon the throne of their fathers, or to destroy the house of the preceding sovereign, they will then, and not before, possess the crown of England by a right like theirs, immediately derived from heaven. The hereditary right, which the laws of England acknowlege, owes it's origin to the founders of our constitution, and to them only. It has no relation to, nor depends upon, the civil laws of the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, or any other nation upon earth : the municipal laws of one society having no connexion with, or influence upon, the fundamental polity of another. The founders of our English monarchy might perhaps, if they had though proper, have made it an elective monarchy but they rather chose, and upon good reason, to establish originally a succession by inheritance. This. has been acquiesced in by general consent ; and ripened by degrees into common law : the very same title that every private man has to his own estate. Lands are not naturally descendible any more than thrones : but the law has thought proper, for the benefit and peace of the public, to establish hereditary succession in one as well as the other.

IT must be owned, an elective monarchy seems to be the most obvious, and best suited of any to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of human nature : and accordingly we find from history that, in the infancy and first rudiments of almost every state, the leader, chief magistrate, or prince, hath usually been elective. And, if the individuals who compose that state could always continue true to first principles, uninfluenced by passion or prejudice, unassailed by corruption, and unawed by violence, elective succession were as much to be desired in a kingdom, as in other inferior communities. The best, the wisest, and the bravest man would then be sure of receiving that crown, which his endowments have merited ; and the sense of an unbiassed majority would be dutifully acquiesced in by the few who where

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of different opinions. But history and observation will inform us, that elections of every kind (in the present state of human nature) are too frequently brought about by influence, partiality, and artifice : and, even where the café is otherwife, these practices will be often suspected, and as constantly charged upon the successful, by a splenetic disappointed minority. This is an evil, to which all societies are liable ; as well those of a private and domestic kind, as the great community of the public, which regulates and includes the rest. But in the former there is this advantage ; that such suspicions, if false, proceed no farther than jealousies and murmurs, which time will effectually suppress ; and, if true, the injustice may be remedied by legal means, by an appeal to those tribunals to which every member of society has (by becoming fuch) virtually engaged to submit. Whereas, in the great and independent society, which every nation composes, there is no superior to resort to but the law of nature ; no method to redress the infringements of that law, but the actual exertion of private force. As therefore between two nations, complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel can only be decided by the law of arms; so in one and the same nation, when the fundamental principles of their common union are supposed to be invaded, and more especially when the appointment of their chief magistrate is alleged to be unduly made, the only tribunal to which the complainants can appeal is that of the God of battles, the only process by which the appeal can be carried on is that of a civil and intestine war. An hereditary succession to the crown is therefore now established, in this and most other countries, in order to prevent that periodical bloodshed and misery, which the history of antient imperial Rome, and the more modern experience of Poland and Germany, may shew us are the consequences of elective kingdoms.

2. BUT, secondly, as to the particular mode of inheritance, it in general corresponds with the feodal path of descents, chalked out by the common law in the succession to landed estates ; yet with one or two material exceptions. Like them, the crown will

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descend lineally to the issue of the reigning monarch ; as it did from king John to Richard II, through a regular pedigree of fix lineal descents. As in them, the preference of males to females, and the right of primogeniture among the males, are strictly adhered to. Thus Edward V succeeded to the crown, in preference to Richard his younger brother and Elizabeth his elder sister. Like them, on failure of the male line, it descends to the iffue female ;' according to the antient British custom remarked by Tacitus a, “solent soeminarum ductu bellare, et fexum in imperiis non discer- “nere.” Thus Mary I succeeded to Edward VI; and the line of Margaret queen of Scots, the daughter of Henry VII, succeeded on failure of the line of Henry VIII, his son. But, among the females, the crown descends by right of primogeniture to the eldest daughter only and her issue ; and not, as in common inheritances, to all the daughters at once ; the evident necessity of a sole succession to the throne having occasioned the royal law of descents to depart from the common law in this respect : and therefore queen Mary on the death of her brother succeeded to the crown alone, and not in partnership with her sister Elizabeth. Again : the doctrine of representation prevails in the descent of the crown, as it does in other inheritances ; whereby the lineal descendants of any person deceased stand in the same place as their ancestor, if living, would have done. Thus Richard II. succeeded his grandfather Edward III, in right of his father the black prince ; to the exclusion of all his uncles, his grandfather's younger children. Lastly, on failure of lineal descendants, the crown goes to the next collateral relations of the late king ; provided they are lineally descended from the blood royal, that is, from that royal stock which originally acquired the crown. Thus Henry I succeeded to William II, John to Richard I, and James I to Elizabeth ; being all derived from the conqueror, who was then the only regal ftock. But herein there is no objection (as in the café of common descents) to the succession of a brother, an uncle, or other collateral relation, of the half blood ; that is, where the relationship proceeds not from the same couple of ancestors (which

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constitutes a kinsman of the whole blood) but from a single ancestor only; as when two persons are derived from the same father, and not from the same mother, or vice versa: provided only, that the one ancestor, from whom both are descended, be he from whose veins the blood royal is communicated to each. Thus Mary I inherited to Edward VI, and Elizabeth inherited to Mary; all born of the same father, king Henry VIII, but all by different mother. The reason of which diversity, between royal and common descents, will be better understood hereafter, when we examine the nature of inheritances in general.

3. THE doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an indefeasible right to the throne. No man will, I think, assert this, that has considered our laws, constitution, and history, without prejudice, and with any degree of attention. It is unquestionably in the breast of the supreme legislative authority of this kingdom, the king and both houses of parliament, to defeat his hereditary right; and, by particular entails, limitations, and provisions, to exclude the immediate heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else. This is strictly consonant to our laws and constitution; as may be gathered from the expression so frequently used in our statute book, of “the king's majesty, his heirs, and successors.” In which we may observe, that as the work, “heirs,” necessarily implies an inheritance or hereditary right, generally subsisting in the royal person; so the word, “successors,” distinctly taken, must imply that this inheritance may sometimes be broke through; or, that there may be a successor, without being the heir, of the king. And this is so extremely reasonable, that without such a power, lodged somewhere, our polity would be very defective. For, let us barely suppose so melancholy a cafe, as that the heir apparent should be a lunatic, an ideot, or otherwise incapable of reigning: how miserable would the condition of the nation be, if he were also incapable of being set aside! --- It is therefore necessary that this power should be lodged somewhere: and yet the inheritance, and regal dignity, would be very precarious indeed, if this power were expressly and avow-

edly

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edly lodged in the hands of the subject only, to be exerted whenever prejudice, caprice, or discontent should happen to take the lead. Consequently it can no where be so properly lodged as in the two houses of parliament, by and with the consent of the reigning king; who, it is not to be supposed, will agree to any thing improperly prejudicial to the rights of his own descendants. And therefore in the king, lords, and commons, in parliament assembled, our laws have expressly lodged it.

4. BUT, fourthly; however the crown may be limited or transferred, it still retains it's descendible quality, and becomes hereditary in the wearer of it: and hence in our laws the king is said never to die, in his political capacity; though, in common with other men, he is subject to mortality in his natural: because immediately upon the natural death of Henry, William, or Edward, the king survives in his successor; and the right of the crown vests, eo instanti, upon his heir; either the haeres natus, if the course of descent remains unimpeached, or the haeres facius, if the inheritance be under any particular settlement. So that there can be no interregnum; but as sir Matthew Haleb observes, the right of sovereignty is fully invested in the successor by the very descent of the crown. And therefore, however acquired, it becomes in him absolutely hereditary, unless by the rules of the limitation it is otherwise ordered and determined. In the same manner as landed estates, to continue our former comparison, are by the law hereditary, or descendible to the heirs of the owner; but still there exists a power, by which the property of those lands may be transferred to another person. If this transfer be made simply and absolutely, and lands will be hereditary in the new owner, and descend to his heirs at law: but if the transfer be clogged with any limitations, conditions, or entails, the lands must descend in that chanel, so limited and prescribed, and no other.

IN these four points consists, as I take it, the constitutional notion of hereditary right to the throne: which will be still far-

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ther

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there elucidated, and made clear beyond all dispute, from a short historical view of the successions to the crown of England, the doctrines of our antient lawyers, and the several acts of parliament that have from time to time been made, to create, to declare, to confirm, to limit, or to bar, the hereditary title to the throne. And in the pursuit of this enquiry we shall find, that from the days of Egbert, the first sole monarch of this kingdom, even to the present, the four cardinal maxims above mentioned have ever been held the constitutional canons of succession. It is true, this succession, through fraud, or force, or sometimes through necessity, when in hostile times the crown descended on a minor or the like, has been very frequently suspended; but has always at last returned back into the old hereditary chanel, though sometimes a very considerable period has intervened. And, even in those instances where the succession has been violated, the crown has ever been looked upon as hereditary in the wearer of it. Of which the usurpers themselves were so sensible, that they for the most part endeavoured to vamp up fome feeble shew of a title by descent, in order to amuse the people, while they gained the possession of the kingdom. And, when possession was once gained, they considered it as the purchase or acquisition of a new estate of inheritance, and transmitted or endeavoured to transmit it to their own posterity, by a king of hereditary right of usurpation.

KING Egbert about the year 800, found himself in possession of the throne of the west Saxons, by a long and undisturbed descent from his ancestors of above three hundred years. How his ancestors acquired their title, whether by force, by fraud, by contract, or by election, it matters not much to enquire; and is indeed a point of such high antiquity, as must render all enquiries at best but plausible guesses. His right must be supposed indisputably good, because we know no better. The other kingdoms of the heptarchy he acquired, some by consent, but most by a voluntary submiffion. And it is an established maxim in civil polity, and the law of nations, that when one country is united

to

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to another in such a manner, as that one keeps it's government and states, and the other loses them; the latter entirely assimilates or is melted down in the former, and must adopt it's laws and customsc. And in pursuance of this maxim there hath ever been, since the union of the heptarchy in king Egbert, a general acquiescence under the hereditary monarchy of the west Saxons, through all the united kingdoms.

FROM Egbert to the death of Edmund Ironside, a period of above two hundred years, the crown descended regularly, through a succession of fifteen princes, without any deviation or interruption; save only that king Edred, the uncle of Edwy, mounted the throne for about nine years, in the right of his nephew a minor, the times being very troublesome and dangerous. But this was with a view to preserve, and not to destroy, and succession; and accordingly Edwy succeeded him.

KING Edmund Ironside was obliged, by the hostile irruption of the Danes, at first to divide his kingdom with Canute, king of Denmark; and Canute, after his death, seised the whole of it, Edmund's sons being driven into foreign countries. Here the succession was suspended by actual force, and a new family introduced upon the throne: in whom however this new acquired throne continued hereditary for three reigns; when, upon the death of Hardiknute, the antient Saxon line was restored in the person of Edward the confessor.

HE was not indeed the true heir to the crown, being the younger brother of king Edmund Ironside, who has a son Edward, sirnamed (from his exile) the outlaw, still living. But this son was then in Hungary; and, the English having just shaken off the Danish yoke, it was necessary that somebody on the spot should mount the throne; and the confessor was the next of the royal line then in England. On his decease without issue, Harold II usurped the throne, and almost at the same instant came on the

.{FS}

c Puff. L. of N. and N. b. 8. c. 12. §. 6.

.{FE}

Norman

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Norman invasion: the right to the crown being all the time in Edgar, sirnamed Atheling, (which signifies in the Saxon language the first of the blood royal) who was the son of Edward the outlaw, and grandfon of Edmund Ironside; or, as Matthew Parisd well expresses the sense of our old constitution, “Edmundus autem latusserreum, rex naturalis de stirpe regum, genuit Edwardum; et Edwardus genuit Edgarum, cui de jure debebatur regnum Anglorum.”

WILLIAM the Norman claimed the crown by virtue of a pretended grant from king Edward the confessor; a grant which, if real, was in itself utterly invalid: because it was made, as Harold well observed in his reply to William's demande, “absque generali senatus et populi conventu et edicto;” which also very plainly implies, that it then was generally understood that the king, with consent of the general council, might dispose of the crown and change the line of succession. William's title however was altogether as good as Harold's, he being a mere private subject, and an utter stranger to the royal blood. Edgar Atheling's undoubted right was overwhelmed by the violence of the times; though frequently asserted by the English nobility after the conquest, till such time as he died without issue: but all their attempts proved unsuccessful, and only served the more firmly to establish the crown in the family which had newly acquired it.

THIS conquest then by William of Normandy was, like that of Canute before, a forcible transfer of the crown of England into a new family: but, the crown being fo transferred, all the inherent properties of the crown were with it transferred also. For, the victory obtained at Hastings not beingf a victory over the nation collectively, but only over the person of Harold, the only right that the conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to possess the crown of England, not to alter the nature of the government. And therefore, as the English laws still re-

.{FS}

d A. D. 1066.

e William of Malmsb. l. 3.

f Hale, Hift. C. L. c. 5. Seld. review of tithes, c. 8.

.{FE}

mained

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mained in force, he must necessarily take the crown subject to those laws, and with all it's inherent properties; the first and principal of which was it's descendibility. Here then we must drop our race of Saxon kings, at least for a while, and derive our descents from William the conqueror as from a new stock, who acquired by right of war (such as it is, yet still the dernier resort of kings) a strong and undisputed title to the inheritable crown of England.

ACCORDINGLY it descended from him to his sons William II and Henry I. Robert, it must be owned, his eldest son, was kept out of possession by the arts and violence of his brethren; who proceeded upon a notion, which prevailed for some time in the law of descents, that when the eldest son was already provided for (as Robert was constituted duke of Normandy by his father's will) in such a cafe the next brother was entitled to enjoy the rest of their father's inheritance. But, as he died without issue, Henry at last had a good title to the throne, whatever he might have at first.

STEPHEN of Blois, who succeeded him, was indeed the grandson of the conqueror, by Adelicia his daughter, and claimed the throne by a feeble kind of hereditary right; not as being the nearest of the male line, but as the nearest male of the blood royal. The real right was in the empress Matilda or Maud, the daughter of Henry I; the rule of succession being (where women are admitted at all) that the daughter of a son shall be preferred to the son of a daughter. So that Stephen was little better than a mere usurper; and the empress Maud did not fail to assert her right by the sword: which dispute was attended with various success, and ended at last in a compromise, that Stephen should keep the crown, but that Henry the son of Maud should succeed him; as he afterwards accordingly did.

HENRY, the second of that name, was the undoubted heir of William the conqueror; but he had also another connexion in

A a

blood,

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blood, which endeared him still farther to English. He was lineally descended from Edmund Ironside, the last of the Saxon race of hereditary kings. For Edward the outlaw, the son of Edmund Ironside, had (besides Edgar Atheling, who died without issue) a daughter Margaret, who was married to Malcolm king of Scotland; and in her the Saxon hereditary right resided. By Malcolm she had several children, and among the rest Matilda the wife of Henry I, who by him had the empress Maud, the mother of Henry II. Upon which account the Saxon line is in our histories frequently said to have been restored in his person: though in reality that right subsisted in the sons of Malcolm by queen Margaret; king Henry's best title being as heir to the conqueror.

FROM Henry II the crown descended to his eldest son Richard I, who dying childless, the right vested in his nephew Arthur, the son of Geoffrey his next brother; but John, the youngest son of king Henry, seised the throne; claiming, as appers from his charters, the crown by hereditary rightg: that is to say, he was next of kin to the deceased king, being his surviving brother; whereas Arthur was removed one degree farther, being his brother's son, though by right of representation he stood in the place of his father Geoffrey. And however flimzey this title, and those of William Rufus and Stephen of Blois, may appear at this distance to us, after the law of descents hath now been settled for so many centuries, they were sufficient to puzzle the understandings of our brave, but unlettered, ancestors. Nor indeed can we wonder at the number of partizans, who espoufed the pretensions of king John in particular; since even in the reign of his father, king Henry II, it was a point undeterminedh, whether, even in common inheritances, the child of an elder brother should succeed to the land in right of representation, or the younger surviving brother in right of proximity of blood. Nor is it to this day decided in the collateral succession to the fiefs of

.{FS}

g “Regni Angliae; quod nobis jure competit baereditarie.” Spelm. Hift. R. Foh. apud Wilkins. 354.

h Glanv. l. 7. c. 3.

.{FE}

the

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the empire, whether the order of the stocks, or the proximity of degree shall take placei. However, on the death of Arthur and his sister Eleanor without issue, a clear and indisputable title vested in Henry III the son of John: and from him to Richard the second, a succession of six generations, the crown descended in the true hereditary line. Under one of which race of princesk, we find it declared in parliament, “that the law of the crown of England is, and always hath been, that the law of the crown of England is, and always hath been, that the children of the king of England, whether born in England, or elsewhere, ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their ancestors. Which law, our sovereign lord the king, the prelates, earls, and barons, and other great men, together with all the commons, in parliament assembled, do approve and affirm for ever.”

UPON Richard the second's resignation of the crown, he having no children, the right resulted to the issue of his grandfather Edward III. That king had many children, besides his eldest, Edward the black prince of Wales, the father or Richard II: but to avoid confusion I shall only mention three; William his second son, who died without issue; Lionel duke of Clarence, his third son; and John of Gant duke of Lancaster, his fourth. By the rules of succession therefore the posterity of Lionel duke of Clarence were entitled to the throne, upon the resignation of king Richard; and had accordingly been declared by the king, many years before, the presumptive heirs of the crown; which declaration was also confirmed in parliamentl. But Henry duke of Lancaster, the son of John of Gant, having then a large army in the kingdom, the pretence of raising which was to recover his patrimony from the king, and to redress the grievances of the subject, it was impossible for any other title to be asserted with any safety; and he became king under the title of Henry IV. But, as sir Matthew Hale remarksm, though the people unjuftly assisted Henry IV in his usurpation of the crown, yet he was not admitted thereto, until he had declared that he

.{FS}

I Mod. Un. Hift. xxx. 512.

k Stat. 25. Edw. III. ft. 2.

l Sandford's geneal. hift. 246.

m Hift. C. L. c. 5.

.{FE}

A a

2claimed,

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claimed, not as a conqueror, (which he very much inclined to don) but as a successor, descended by right line of the blood royal; as appears from the rolls of parliament in those times. And in order to this he set up a shew of two titled: the one upon the pretence of being the first of the blood royal in the intire male line, whereas the duke of Clarence left only one daughter Philippa; from which female branch, by a marriage with Edmond Mortimer earl of March, the house of York descended: the other, by reviving an exploded rumour, first propagated by John of Gant, that Edmond earl of Lancaster (to whom Henry's mother was heiress) was in reality the elder brother of king Edward I; though his parents, on account of his personal deformity, had imposed him on the world for the younger: and therefore Henry would be intitled to the crown, either as successor to Richard II, in cafe the intire male line was allowed a preference to the female; or, even prior to that unfortunate prince, if the crown could descend through a female, while an intire male line was existing.

HOWEVER, as in Edward the third's time we find the parliament approving and affirming the right of the crown, as before stated, so in the reign of Henry IV they actually exerted their right of new-settling the succession to the crown. And this was done by the statute 7 Hen. IV. c. 2. whereby it is enacted, that the inheritance of the crown and realms of England and France, and all other the king's dominions, shall be set and remaino in the person of our sovereign lord the king, and in the heirs of his body issuing;” and prince Henry is declared heir apparent to the crown, to hold to him and the heirs of his body issuing, with remainder to lord Thomas, lord John, and lord Humphry, the king's sons, and the heirs of their bodies respectively. Which is indeed nothing more than the law would have done before, provided Henry the fourth had been a rightful king. It however serves to shew that it was then generally understood, that the king and parliament had a right to new-model and re-

.{FS}

n Seld. tit. hon. 1. 3.

o foit mys demoerge.

.{FE}

gulate

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gulate the succession to the crown. And we may observe, with what caution and delicacy the parliament then avoided declaring any sentiment of Henry's original title. However sir Edward Coke more than once expressly declaresp, that at the time of passing this act the right of the crown was in the descent from Philippa, daughter and heir of Lionel duke of Clarence.

NEVERTHELESS the crown descended regularly from Henry IV to his son and grandson Henry V and VI; in the latter of whose reigns the house of York asserted their dormant title; and, after imbruing the kingdom in blood and confusion for seven years together, at last established it in the person of Edward IV. At his accession to the throne, after a breach of the succession that continued for three descents, and above threescore years, the distinction of a king de jure, and a king de facto began to be first taken; in order to indemnify such as had submitted to the late establishment, and to provide for the peace of the kingdom by confirming all honors conferred, and all acts done, by those who were now called the usurpers, not tending to the disherison of the rightful heir. In statute 1 Edw. IV. c. 1. the three Henrys are stiled, “late kings of England succeffively in dede, and not of ryght.” And, in all the charters which I have met with of king Edward, wherever he has occasion to speak of any of the line of Lancaster, he calls them “nuper de facto, et non de jure, reges Angliae.”

EDWARD IV left two sons and a daughter; the eldest of which sons, king Edward V, enjoyed the regal dignity for a very short time, and was then deposed by Richard his unnatural uncle; who immediately usurped the royal dignity, having previoufly insinuated to the populace a suspicion of bastardy in the children of Edward IV, to make a shew of some hereditary title: after which he is generally believed to have murdered his two nephews; upon whose death the right of the crown devolved to their sister Elizabeth.

.{FS}

p 4 Inft. 37, 205.

.{FE}

THE

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THE tyrannical reign of king Richard III gave occasion to Henry earl of Richmond to assert his title to the crown. A title the most remote and unaccountable that was ever set up, and which nothing could have given success to, but the universal detestation of the then usurper Richard. For, besides that he claimed under a descent from John of Gant, whose title was now exploded, the claim (such at it was) was through John earl of Somerset, a bastard son, begotten by John of Gant upon Catherine Swinford. It is true, that, by an act of parliament 20 Ric. II, this son was, with others, legitimated and made inheritable to all lands, offices, and dignities, as if he had been born in wedlock: but still, with an express reservation so the crown, “excepta dignitate regaliq.”

NOTHWITHSTANDING all this, immediately after the battle of Bosworth field, he assumed the regal dignity; the right of the crown then being, as sir Edward Coke expressly declaresr, in Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Edward IV: and his possession was established by parliament, held the first year of his reign. In the act for which purpose, the parliament seems to have copied the caution of their predecessors in the reign of Henry IV; and therefore (as lord Bacon the historian of this reign observes) carefully avoided any recognition of Henry VII's right, which indeed was none at all; and the king would not have it by way of new law or ordinance, whereby a right might seem to be created and conferred upon him; and therefore a middle way was rather chosen, by way (as the noble historian expresses it) of establishment, and that under covert and indifferent words, “that the inheritance of the crown should rest, remain, and abide in king Henry VII and the heirs of his body:” thereby providing for the future, and at the same time acknowleging his present possession; but not determining either way, whether that possession was de jure or de facto merely. However he soon after married Elizabeth of York, the undoubted heiress of the conqueror, and thereby gained (as sir Edward Cokes declares) by much his best title to the crown.

.{FS}

q 4 Inft. 36.

r 4 Inft. 37.

s Ibid.

.{FE}

Where-

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Whereupon the act made in his favour was so much disregarded, that it never was printed in our statute books.

HENRY the eighth, the issue of this marriage, succeeded to the crown by clear indisputable hereditary right, and transmitted it to his three children in successive order. But in his reign we at several times find the parliament busy in regulating the succession to the kingdom. And, first, by statute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 12. which recites the mischiefs, which have and may ensue by disputed titles, because no perfect and substantial provision hath been made by law concerning the succession; and then enacts, that the crown shall be entailed to his majesty, and the sons or heirs males of his body; and in default of such sons to the lady Elizabeth (who is declared to be the king's eldeft issue female, in exclusion of the lady Mary, on account of her supposed illegitimacy by the divorce of her mother queen Catherine) and to the lady Elizabeth's heirs of her body; and so on from issue female to issue female, and the heirs of their bodies, by course of inheritance according to their ages, as the crown of England hath been accustomed and ought to go, in cafe where there be heirs female of the same: and in default of issue female, then to the king's right heirs for ever. This single statute is an ample proof of all the four positions we at first set out with.

BUT, upon the king's divorce from Ann Boleyn, this statute was, with regard to the settlement of the crown, repealed by statute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 7. wherein the lady Elizabeth is also, as well as the lady Mary, bastardized, and the crown settled on the king's children by queen Jane Seymour, and his future wives; and, in defect of such children, then with this remarkable remainder, to such perfons as the king by letters patent, or last will and testament, should limit and appoint the same. A vast power; but, notwithstanding, as it was regularly vested in him by the supreme legislative authority, it was therefore indisputably valid. But this power was never carried into execution; for by statute 35 Hen. VIII. c. 1. the king's two daughters are legitimated again, and the

crown

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crown is limited to prince Edward by name after that to the lady Mary, and then to the lady Elizabeth, and the heirs of their respective bodies; which succession took effect accordingly, being indeed no other than the usual course of the law, with regard to the descent of the crown.

BUT lest there should remain any doubt in the minds of the people, through this jumble of acts for limiting the succession, by statute 1 Mar. p. 2. c. 1. queen Mary's hereditary right to the throne is acknowleged and recognized in these words: “the crown of these realms is most lawfully, justly, and rightly descended and come to the queen's highness that now is, being the very, true, and undoubted heir and inheritrix thereof.” And again, upon the queen's marriage with Philip of Spain, in the statute which settles the preliminaries of that matcht, the hereditary right to the crown is thus asserted and declared: “as touching the right of the queen's inheritance in the realm and dominions of England, the children, whether male or female, shall succeed in them, according to the known laws, statutes, and customs of the fame.” Which determination of the parliament, that the succession shall continue in the usual course, seems tacitly to imply a power of new-modelling and altering it, in cafe the legislature had thought proper.

ON queen Elizabeth's accession, her right is recognized in still stronger terms than her sister's; the parliament acknowlegingu, that the queen's highness is, and in very deed and of most mere right ought to be, by the laws of God, and the laws and statutes of this realm, our most lawful and rightful sovereign liege lady and queen; and that her highness is rightly, lineally, and lawfully descended and come of the blood royal of this realm of England; in and to whose princely person, and to the heirs of the body lawfully to be begotten, after her, the imperial crown and dignity of this realm doth belong.” And in the same reign, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 1. we fine the right of parlia-

.{FS}

t 1 Mar. p. 2. c. 2.

u Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 3.

.{FE}

ment

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ment to direct the succession of the crown asserted in the most explicit words. “If any person shall hold, affirm, or maintain that the common laws of this realm, not altered by parliament, ought not to direct the right of the crown of England; or that the queen's majesty, with and by the authority of parliament, is not able to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity, to limit and bind the crown of this realm, and the descent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof; --- such perfon, so holding, affirming, or maintaining, shall during the life of the queen be guilty of high treason; and after her decease shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and forfeit his goods and chattels.”

ON the death of queen Elizabeth, without issue, the line of Henry VIII became extinct. It therefore became necessary to recur to the other issue of Henry VII, by Elizabeth of York his queen: whose eldest daughter Margaret having married James IV king of Scotland, king James the sixth of Scotland, and of England the first, was the lineal descendant from that alliance. So that is his person, as clearly as in Henry VIII, centered all the claims of different competitors from the conquest downwards, he being indisputably the lineal heir of the conqueror. And, what is still more remarkable, in his person also centered the right of the Saxon monarchs, which had been suspended from the conquest till his accession. For, as was formerly observed, Margaret the sister of Edgar Atheling, the daughter of Edward the outlaw, and granddaughter of king Edmund Ironside, was the person in whom the hereditary right of the Saxon kings, supposing it not abolished by the conquest, resided. She married Malcolm king of Scotland; and Henry II, by a descent from Matilda their daughter, is generally called the restorer of the Saxon line. But it must be remembered, that Malcolm by his Saxon queen had sons as well as daughters; and that the royal family of Scotland from that time downwards were the offspring of Malcolm and Margaret. Of this royal family king James the first was the direct lineal heir, and therefore united in his person every possible

B b

claim

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claim by hereditary right to the English, as well as Scottish throne, being the heir both of Egbert and William the conqueror.

AND it is no wonder that a prince of more learning that wisdom, who could deduce an hereditary title for more than eight hundred years, should eafily be taught by the statterers of the times to believe there was something divine in this right, and that the finger of providence was visible in it's preservation. Whereas, though a wife institution, it was clearly a human institution; and the right inherent in him no natural, but a positive right. And in this and no other light was it taken by the English parliament; who by statute 1 Jac. I. c. 1. did “recognize and acknowlege, that immediately upon the dissolution and decease of Elizabeth late queen of England, the imperial crown thereof did by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted succession, descend and come to his most excellent majesty, as being lineally, justly, and lawfully, next and sole heir of the blood royal of this realm.” Not a word here of any right immediately derived from heaven: which, if it existed any where, must be sought for among the aborigines of the island, the antient Britons; among whose princes indeed some have gone to search it for himw.

BUT, wild and absurd as the doctrine of divine right most undoubtedly is, it is still more astonishing, that when so many human hereditary rights had centered in this king, his son and heir king Charles the first should be told by those infamous judges, who pronounced his unparalleled sentence, that he was an elective prince; elected by his people, and therefore accountable to them, in his own proper person, for his conduct. The confusion, instability, and madness, which followed the fatal catastrophe of that pious and unfortunate prince, will be a standing argument in

.{FS}

w Elizabeth of York, the mother of queen Margaret of Scotland, was heiress of the house of Mortimer. And Mr Carte observes, that the house of Mortimer, in virtue of it's descent from Gladys only sister of Lewellin ap Jorweth the great, had the true right to the principality of Wales, iii, 705.

.{FE}

favour

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favour of hereditary monarchy to all future ages; as they proved at last to the then deluded people: who, in order to recover that peace and happiness which for twenty years together they had lost, in a solemn parliamentary convention of the states restored the right heir of the crown. And in the proclamation for that purpose, which was drawn up and attended by both housesx, they declared, “that, according to their duty and allegiance, they did heartily, joyfully, and unanimously acknowlege and proclaim, that immediately upon the decease of our late sovereign lord king Charles, the imperial crown of these realms did by inherent birthright and lawful and undoubted succession descend and come to his most excellent majesty Charles the second, as being lineally, justly, and lawfully, next heir of the blood royal of this realm: and thereunto they most humbly and faithfully did submit and oblige themselves, their heirs and posterity for ever.”

THUS I think it clearly appears, from the highest authority this nation is acquainted with, that the crown of England hath been ever an hereditary crown; though subject to limitations by parliament. The remainder of this chapter will consist principally of those instances, wherein the parliament has asserted or exercised this right of altering and limiting the succession; a right which, we have seen, was before exercised and asserted in the reigns of Henry IV, Henry VII, Henry VIII, queen Mary, and queen Elizabeth.

THE first instance, in point of time, is the famous bill of exclusion, which raised such a ferment in the latter end of the reign of king Charles the second. It is well know, that the purport of this bill was to have set aside the king's brother and presumptive heir, the duke of York, from the succession, on the score of his being a papist; that it passed the house of commons, but was rejected by the lords; the king having also declared beforehand, that he never would be brought to consent to it. And from this transaction we may collect two things: 1. That the crown was

.{FS}

x Com. Journ. 8 May, 1660.

.{FE}

B b

2univer-

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universally acknowleged to be hereditary; and the inheritance indefeasible unless by parliament: else it has been needless to prefer such a bill. 2. That the parliament had a power to have defeated the inheritance: else such a bill had been ineffectual. The common acknowleged the hereditary right then subsisting; and the lords did not dispute the power, but merely the propriety, of an exclusion. However, as the bill took no effect, king James the second succeeded to the throne of his ancestors; and might have enjoyed it during the remainder of his life, but for his own infatuated conduct, which (with other concurring circumftances) brought on the revolution in 1688.

THE true ground and principle, upon which that memorable event proceeded, was an entirely new cafe in politics, which had never before happened in our history; the abdication of the reigning monarch, and the vacancy of the throne thereupon. It was not a defeazance of the right of succession, and a new limitation of the crown, by the king and both houses of parliament: it was the act of the nation alone, upon an apprehenfion that there was no king in being. For in a full assembly of the lords and commons, met in convention upon this apprehended vacancy, both housesy came to this resolution; “that king James the second, having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king and people; and, by the advice of jesuits and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental laws; and having withdrawn himself out of this kingdom; has abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby vacant.” Thus ended at once, by this sudden and unexpected vacancy of the throne, the old line of succession; which from the conquest had lasted above six hundred years, and from the union of the heptarchy in king Egbert almost nine hundred. The facts themselves thus appealed to, the king's endeavours to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract, his violation of the fundamental laws, and his withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, were evident and notorious: and the

.{FS}

y Com. Journ. 7 Feb. 1688.

.{FE}

con-

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consequences drawn from these facts (namely, that they amounted to an abdication of the government; which abdication did not affect only the person of the king himfelf, but also all his heirs, and rendered the throne absolutely and completely vacant) it belonged to our ancestors to determine. For, whenever a question arises between the society at large and any magistrate vested with powers originally delegated by that society, it must be decided by the voice of the society itself: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to resort to. And that these consequences were fairly deduced from these facts, our ancestors have solemnly determined, in a full parliamentary convention representing the whole society. The reasons upon which they decided may be found at large in the parliamentary proceedings of the times; and may be matter of instructive amusement for us to contemplate, as a speculative point of history. But care must be taken not to carry this enquiry farther, than merely for for instruction or amusement. The idea, that the consciences of posterity were concerned in the rectitude of their ancestors' decisions, gave birth to those dangerous political heresies, which so long distracted the state, but at length are all happily extinguished. I therefore rather cause to consider this great political measure, upon the solid footing of authority, than to reason in it's favour from it's justice, moderation, and expedience: because that might imply a right of dissenting or revolting from it, in case we should think it unjust, oppressive, or inexpedient. Whereas, our ancestors having most indisputably a competent jurisdiction to decide this great and important question, and having in fact decided it, it is now become our duty at this distance of time to acquiesce in their determination; being born under that establishment which was built upon this foundation, and obliged by every tie, religious as well as civil, to maintain it.

BUT, while we rest this fundamental transaction, in point of authority, upon grounds the least liable to cavil, we are bound both in justice and gratitude to add, that it was conducted with a temper and moderation which naturally arose from it's equity;

that,

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that, however it might in some respects go beyond the letter of our antient laws, (the reason of which will more fully appear hereafterz) it was agreeable to the spirit of our constitution, and the rights of human nature; and that though in other points (owing to the peculiar circumftances of things and persons) it was not altogether so perfect as might have been withed, yet from thence a new aera commenced, in which the bounds of prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government more thoroughly examined and understood, and the rights of the subject more explicity guarded by legal provisions, than in any other period of the English history. In particular, it is worthy observation that the convention, in this their judgment, avoided with great wisdom the wild extremes into which the visionary theories of some zealous republicans would have led them. They held that this misconduct of king James amounted to an endeavour to fubvert the constitution, and not to an actual subversion, or total dissolution of the government, according to the principles of Mr Lockea: which would have reduced the society almost to a state of nature; would have leveled all distinctions of honour, rank, offices, and property; would have annihilated the sovereign power, and in consequence have repealed all positive laws; and would have left the people at liberty to have erected a new system of state upon a new foundation of polity. They therefore very prudently voted it to amount to no more than an abdication of the government, and a consequent vacancy of the throne; whereby the government was allowed to subsist, though the executive magistrate was gone, and the kingly office to remain, though king James was no longer kung. And thus the constitution was kept intire; which upon every found principle of government muft otherwise have fallen to pieces, had so principal and constituent a part as the royal authority been abolished, or even suspended.

THIS single postulatum, the vacancy of the throne, being once established, the rest that was then done followed almost of

.{FS}

z See chapter 7.

a on Gov. p. 2. c. 19.

.{FE}

courfe.

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course. For, if the throne be at any time vacant (which may happen by other means besides that of abdication; as if all the bloodroyal should said, without any successor appointed by parliament;) if, I say, a vacancy by any means whatsoever should happen, the right of disposing of this vacancy seems naturally to result to the lords and commons, the trustees and representatives of the nation. For there are no other hands in which it can so properly be intrusted; and there is a necessity of it's being intrusted somewhere, else the whole frame of government muft be dissolved and perish. The lords and commons having therefore determined this main fundamental article, that there was a vacancy of the throne, they proceeded to fill up that vacancy in such manner as they judged the most proper. And this was done by their declaration of 12 February 1688b, in the following manner: “that William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, be, and be declared king and queen, to hold the crown and royal dignity during their lives, and the life of the survivor of them; and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only in, and executed by, the said prince of Orange, in the names of the said prince and princess, during their joint lives; and after their deceases the said crown and royal dignity to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess; and for default of such issue to the princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange.”

PERHAPS, upon the principles before established, the convention might (if they pleased) have vested the regal dignity in a family intirely new, and strangers to the royal blood: but they were too well acquainted with the benefits of hereditary succession, and the influence which it has by custom over the minds of the people, to depart any farther from the antient line than temporary necessity and self-preservation required. They therefore settled the crown, first on king William and queen Mary, king James's eldest daughter, for their joint lives; then on the survivor of them; and then

.{FS}

b Com. Journ. 12 Feb. 1688.

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on

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on the issue of queen Mary: upon failure of such issue, it was limited to princess

Anne, king James's second daughter, and her issue; and lastly, on failure of that, to the issue of king William, who was the grandson of Charles the first, and nephew as well as son in law of king James the second, being the son of Mary his only sister. This settlement included all the protestant posterity of king Charles I, except such other issue as king James might at any time have, which was totally omitted through fear of a popish succession. And this order of succession took effect accordingly.

THESE three princes therefore, king William, queen Mary, and queen Anne, did not take the crown by the crown by hereditary right or descent, but by way of donation or purchase, as the lawyers call it; by which they mean any method of acquiring an eftate otherwise than by descent. The new settlement did not merely consist in excluding king James, and the person pretended to be prince of Wales, and then suffering the crown to descend in the old hereditary chanel: for the usual course of descent was in some instances broken through; and yet the convention still kept it in their eye, and paid a great, though not total, regard to it. Let us see how the succession would have stood, if no abdication had happened, and king James had left no other issue than his two daughters queen Mary and queen Anne. It would have stood thus: queen Mary and her issue; queen Anne and her issue; king William and his issue. But we may remember, that queen Mary was only nominally queen, jointly with her husband king William, who alone had the regal power; and king William was absolutely preferred to queen Anne, though his issue was postponed to hers. Clearly therefore these princes were successively in possession of the crown by a title different from the usual course of descent.

IT was towards the end of king William's reign, when all hopes of any surviving issue from any of these princes died with the duke of Glocester, that the king and parliament thought it necessary again to exert their power of limiting and appointing

the

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the succession, in order to prevent another vacancy of the throne; which mut have ensued upon their deaths, as no farther provision was made at the revolution, than for the issue of king William, queen Mary, and queen Anne. The parliament had previously by the statute of 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2. enacted, that every person who should be reconciled to, or hold communion with, the fee of Rome, should prosess the popish religion, or should marry a papist, should be excluded and for ever incapable to inherit, possess, or enjoy, the crown; and that in such case the people should be absolved from their allegiance, and the crown should descend to such persons, being protestants, as would have inherited the same, in case the person so reconciled, holding communion, prosessing, or marrying, were naturally dead. To act therefore consistently with themselves, and at the same time pay as much regard to the old hereditary line as their former resolutions would admit, they turned their eyes on the princess Sophia, electress and duchess dowager of Hanover, the most accomplished princes of her agec. For, upon the impending extinction of the protestant posterity of Charles the first, the old law of regal descent directed them to recur to the descendants of James the first; and the princess Sophia, being the daughter of Elizabeth queen of Bohemia, who was the youngest daughter of James the first, was the nearest of the antient blood royal, who was not incapacitated by prosessing the popish religion. On her therefore, and the heirs of her body, being protestants, the remainder of the crown, expectant on the death of king William and queen Anne withoug issue, and settled by statute 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2. And at the same time it was enacted, that whosoever should hereafter come to the possession of the crown, should join in the communion of the church of England as by law established.

.{FS}

c Sandford, in his genealogical hiftory, published A. D. 1677, speaking (page 535) of the princesses Elizabeth, Louisa, and Sophia, daughters of the queen of Bohemia, says, the first was reputed the most learned, the second the greatest arrist, and the last one of the most accomplished ladies in Europe.

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C c

THIS

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THIS is the last limitation of the crown that has been made by parliament: and these several actual limitations, from the time of Henry IV to the present, do clearly prove the power of the king and parliament to new-model or alter the succession. And indeed it is now again made highly penal to dispute it: for by the statute 6 Ann. c. 7. it is enacted, that if any person maliciously, advisedly, and directly, shall maintain by writing or printing, that the kings of this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to make laws to bind the crown and the descent thereof, he shall be guilty of high treason; or if he maintains the same by only preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, he shall incur the penalties of a praemunire.

THE princess Sophia dying before queen Anne, the inheritance thus limited descended on her son and heir king George the first; and, having on the death of the queen taken effect in his person, from him it descended to his late majesty king George the second; and from him to his grandson and heir, our present gracious sovereign, king George the third.

HENCE it is easy to collect, that the title to the crown is at present hereditary, though not quite so absolutely hereditary as formerly; and the common stock or ancestor, from whom the descent must be derived, is also different. Formerly the common stock was king Egbert; then William the conqueror; afterwards in James the first's time the two common stocks united, and so continued till the vacancy of the throne in 1688: now it is the princess Sophia, in whom the inheritance was vested by the new king and parliament. Formerly the descent was absolute, and the crown went to the next heir without any restriction: but now upon the new settlement, the inheritance is conditional, being limited to such heirs only, of the body of the princess Sophia, a are protestant members of the church of England, and are married to none but protestants.

AND

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AND in this due medium consists, I apprehend, the true constitutional notion of the right of succession to the imperial crown of these kingdoms. The extremes, between which it steers, are each of them equally destructive of those ends for which societies were formed and are kept on foot. Where the magistrate, upon every succession, is elected by the people, and may by the express provision of the laws be deposed (if not punished) by his subjects, this may sound like the perfection of liberty, and look well enough when delineated on paper; but in practice will be ever productive of tumult, contention, and anarchy. And, on the other hand, divine indefeasible hereditary right, when coupled with the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience, is surely of all constitutions the most thoroughly slavish and dreadful. But when such an hereditary right, as our laws have created and vested in the royal stock, is closely interwoven with those liberties, which, we have seen in a former chapter, are equally the inheritance of the subject; this union will form a constitution, in theory the most beautiful of any, in practice the most approved, and, I trust, in duration the most permanent. It was the duty of an expounder of our laws to lay this constitution before the student in it's true and genuine light: it is the duty of every good Englishman to understand, to revere, to defend it.

   C c 2

Courtesy:

The Avalon Project at Yale Law School

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